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Abstract 
MANAGING CHANGE IN SERVICES OUTSOURCING: The influence of power and 
governance on implementation success 
This research evaluates the change observed during the implementation of an 
outsourced application development within a large defence organisation in Europe. 
Whereas most extant research focuses on the firm level or dyadic relations this 
research aims to uncover how different outcomes can be explained by attending to the 
micro-processes and specific mechanisms of work between purposive actors as they 
create the new service.  
The research was a longitudinal, six-year in-depth participant observation 
focused on the implementation of an HRM application carried out by six case 
organisations within a consortium formed to implement the service. The results of the 
field study are based on a grounded analysis from semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, documents, and over 5,000 email communications involving a total of 62 
stakeholders. A conceptual framework of neo-institutional theory, practice and power 
was used to analyse the process of change as the consortium worked together to 
deliver the outsourcing.  
The findings showed that political goals and behaviour influenced and shaped 
the outsourcing implementation and exposed the systemic nature of conflict within a 
constrained project context. The high conflict observed was shown to negatively 
influence success and supports the notion that strong contracting is only effective in 
stable contexts. It was also shown that tight control can negatively impact 
collaboration, by reducing adaptability, forcing vendors to take an inflexible posture. 
This type of behaviour was observed to increase power and conflict within the project 
and buyers reacted by increasing control and applying sanctions. This resulting in 
increased conflict and was a form of feedback loop. The findings also showed control 
in general is ineffective and can be overwhelmed in situations where there is high 
demand uncertainty. These observations add to the outsourcing and power/political 
literature by showing the central role of power and conflict and suggests the final 
configuration of an outsourcing is a negotiated order that may be at variance to the 
original objectives.  
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Implications for practice 
From a practical perspective, managers should think carefully before rushing into tight 
preventative contracts and consider the complexity of the demanded service and 
degree of completeness in their requirements. High uncertainty can lead to 
outsourcing failure, conflict within the implementation, and unmet expectations, 
unless specific mechanisms are in place to mitigate this. Furthermore, embedding new 
work processes and procedures to manage the service within the buying organisation 
is fundamental to how outsourcing actually works. Buyers and suppliers must pay 
attention to the design and implementation of processes and routines to manage 
effective delivery of the outsourced service. 
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Glossary 
Organisation Short Name Description 
Agency AG The contracting and procurement organisation of DefOrg 
Agency IS AGIS Agency's second role as IS service provider to DefOrg 
DefOrg DefOrg A defence organisation operating in Europe and North America 
HRMDept HRM The HRM department Allied Command Operations DefOrg 
IT&V IT&V Independent Test and Validation organisation 
PersonSoft PS A specialist Defence software provider based in UK 
System Integrator SI A large Pan-European system integrator and software provider 
TestCo TC An offshore test and training organisation based in Romania 
   
Terms Short Name Description 
Agile Development Agile Iterative incremental deliveries of completed functions delivered in sprints 
Back sourcing Back source Returning an outsourced service back under internal control 
Bespoke Bespoke A tailor made software solution built to the specific needs of the buyer 
Configuration Config Creating software elements that change the system behaviour 
COTS COTS Commercial off the shelf - a generic software package tailored to requirements 
Critical Design Review CDR A project milestone where the design is validated and agreed 
Deficiency Bug A failure of a functional, documentation or system element of the delivery 
FAT FAT Factory acceptance test - a software test executed at the supplier location 
FOC FOC The Final Operating Capability of the outsourced service. 
HRMSys HRMSys The software and service solution delivered by the project 
Incumbent MAPS The existing software solution at HRMDept 
Insourcing Insource Sourcing from external provider but managing the service internally 
IOC IOC The Initial Operating Capability phase of the outsourced service 
Offshoring Offshore Outsourcing to an organisation outside the country boundary 
Outsourcing Outsource Contracting an external organisation to provide service for an agreed fee 
Preliminary Design Review PDR A project milestone where the initial concepts for the design are agreed 
Requirement Requirement A atomic simple textual statement of functional or system need 
SAT SAT System acceptance test - an integrated test of the entire IT system 
Shared Service Shared Centralising a service and providing this to other parts of the same organisation 
Statement of Work SOW A statement defining the project specific activities, deliverables and timelines 
UAT UAT User acceptance test - the acceptance of the functional delivery 
Use Cases UC A charting technique used for design based on universal modelling language V2 
Water Fall Water fall An implementation approach that emphasises staged sequential process 
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Chapter 1 – Outsourcing:  a strategic change     
1.1 Introduction 
Outsourcing is a co-operative inter-firm activity undertaken to improve inter-firm 
transactions and is ‘a decision taken by an organisation to contract-out or sell the 
organisation’s IT assets, people and/or activities’ Willcocks and Kern (1998: 29) to 
external vendors, who then manage the services for an agreed fee (Barthelemy, 2003, 
Dibbern et al., 2004, Lacity and Willcocks, 1998). It has been argued that the broad aim 
for organisations outsourcing internal functions is to achieve benefits in cost, flexibility 
and access to resources. However, actual outcomes have been mixed with some 
outsourcing contracts achieving poor outcomes with a gap between expectations and 
actual service performance emerging (Deloittes, 2008). This research is motivated by 
this problem and paucity of research in-situ and poses a relatively simple question: 
‘why does outsourcing work in some contexts and yet in other seemingly identical 
situations fail?’ To approach this question the actual practices of work during an 
outsourcing case will be studied in depth. The findings suggest, that the actual 
outcome of an outsourcing is emergent and shaped by local adaptations and 
negotiations, driven by real contingencies, occurring during the implementation 
(March, 1981).  
1.2 Research background 
Strategic Outsourcing is the subcontracting of part or all of an organisation’s internal 
systems to an external vendor that goes beyond just a simple service contract and 
takes the form of partnership or alliance (Altinkemer et al., 1994). Outsourcing is a 
prevalent practice and over 80% of organisations will outsource at least one service 
(Corbett, 2004). However, despite this widespread adoption there are evident 
performance issues, increasing dissatisfaction, and an apparent dichotomy as to why 
outsourcing is so common but lacks empirical justification (Alexander and Young, 
1996). In this regard, outsourcing as a business process shares similar sub-optimal 
outcomes with other large scale changes, inter alia: Business Process Engineering 
(Holland and Kumar, 1995), Merger and Acquisitions (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993), 
the chronic problems of ERP implementation (Scarbrough et al., 2008) and even major 
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failings in large scale projects (Bronte-Stewart, 2009). These failings do not appear to 
derive from poor decision making per se but from internal factors such as: poor 
professionalism and communications (Deloittes, 2008), poor understanding of the 
business or possibly an attachment to implementation practices that ‘lack any 
scientific justification’ (Dietz, 2011). 
Arguably the IT outsourcing phenomena in the UK and US gained traction in the 
late 80s and early 90s with a total IT outsource to IBM by Eastman Kodak in 1989 – 
although there were many similar deals being concluded at that time (Altinkemer et 
al., 1994). Outsourcing is, therefore, not a new phenomenon: for a long time 
organisations have sourced functions from the market, for example, in the 60s and 70s 
bureau based services1were common (Cronk et al, 2000). What differs, since the 
commencement of the outsourcing revolution, is that the term outsourcing is 
increasingly used as a generic term to describe IT sourcing. Corporations were exalted 
to do more with less and to release shareholder value as part of concerted effort to 
address the perceived productivity gaps between Western Industry and the Asian 
experience. However the diagnosis for the competitive gap stripped away the cultural 
and social context from the Japanese experience and was mistranslated in a uniquely 
Western way to focus on; downsizing, outsourcing and business process re-
engineering as recipes by which the competitive gap could be closed (Harvey et al., 
2001). The call to focus on core competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), Value 
Chains (Porter, 1985) and especially Peters and Waterman (1982) in 'In search of 
excellence' lent intellectual justification to outsourcing. 
 Outsourcing has been the subject of intense research and well over twenty 
reference theories have been applied, mainly at an organisational level of analysis, in 
framing the phenomena. Over 90% of all empirical based research on outsourcing have 
drawn on Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory, Resource Based View, Resource 
Dependency Theory and Social Exchange Theory (Alsudairi and Dwivedi, 2010, Dibbern 
et al., 2004, Lacity et al., 2010).  
Alliances, joint ventures and outsourcing all share in common the perceptions 
                                                     
1
 Bureau services (sometimes referred to as utility computing) offer centralised processing and storage 
for a fee. This concept is extended by suppliers offering standard third party applications on their 
hosting platform referred to as Application Service Provision (ASP) or even Software as a Service (SaaS) 
where a supplier offers its hosted software as a service. 
 
Chapter 1–  Outsourcing:   a strategic  change  Page| 3 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
of low satisfaction, relatively high failure rates, poor returns, critical loss of knowledge 
and IPR, as well as premature closure (Madhok, 1995). What unites these diverse areas 
is the common thread of organisations working together in a social context and 
collaborating for a common purpose yet apparently failing to achieve organisational 
benefits. Little has changed since Mintzberg et al. (1996) asserted that formal 
approaches have had minimal success in addressing the problem of collaboration as 
this is embedded in the specific context, and closer attention needs to be paid to the 
social aspects of collaboration. The ongoing high number of failures, dissatisfaction 
and a continuing high level of outsourcing activity either means managers are taking 
decisions in ignorance of the potential risks or there is a ‘IT outsourcing paradox’ that 
despite the large scale adoption ‘the theoretical benefits have largely not been 
confirmed’ and general evidence for outsourcing’s benefits is ‘relatively scarce’ (Rouse, 
2007: 129). 
1.2.1 IT outsourcing as an embedded process 
Information technology is embedded in the work processes of organisations and much 
of what is regarded as technology edge is tightly bound to the people, organisational 
routines, knowledge structures and processes within organisations. This integration 
with core processes, specific context, and the close relationship with the people 
delivering the service, mean that IT outsourcing is particularly problematic, and 
processes, people and technology are tightly bound and functionally inseparable 
(Orlikowski and Lacono, 2001).  
IT is often regarded as a tool or a black-box, conceived as stable and capable of 
being used by anyone in an unproblematic way (Latour, 1987). User involvement is 
optional, resistance unproblematic and implementation underpinned by a 
technologically determinist perspective. And there is ignorance of the way  
‘technologies play active roles in social systems embodying rules and guiding action’ 
(Boudreau and Robey, 2005: 4). Exchanges between actors during implementation of 
outsourcing are structured within the social space and must be understood within the 
‘various social and institutional contexts’ within which it is embedded (Orlikowski and 
Lacono, 2001: 131). From this perspective workplace implementations of technology 
can be regarded as  ‘thoroughly social processes’ (Berg, 2006). 
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It has been argued that Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) is too 
complex to be fully explained by any single reference theory. This is the situation that 
has led some researchers to claim a new approach in academic research is needed, 
moving away from a too heavy reliance on reference discipline theories, towards the 
development of an endogenous theory of outsourcing based on specific empirically 
grounded research accounting for the social aspects of change (Lacity et al., 2011a). 
Research into the practices of implementation going beyond unsupported plausible 
prescriptions and exhortations is rare (see for example: Cullen et al., 2006). There are 
very few real longitudinal in depth process studies; technology is treated as 
homogeneous (as are stakeholders), an overriding unitary perspective prevails, with 
consistently high level approaches applied that avoid the real practices of work (Van de 
Ven, 2007). 
This thesis aims to examine the knowledge gap in outsourcing and based on the 
findings proposes that the observed outcomes are a result of a loose coupling between 
a rational logic of implementation, built on strong contracts and formal project control, 
and the actual practices of work carried out by developers, project managers and 
users. Furthermore, no outsourcing implementation is ‘de novo’ and is always 
influenced by prior history and operates within a context of competing interest groups. 
And as a result is essentially a conflictual environment. Everyday problems, failings and 
inconsistencies within this context cause deviations from plans resulting in differences 
between initial expectations and eventual outcomes. It is this that can result in a 
perceived failure in the implementation. This research focuses in detail on the 
activities and processes during the implementation and adds to the theory of 
outsourcing by showing how the change actually unfolds and shows that the 
outsourcing outcome is a constrained and emergent process. 
1.3 Research focus and objectives  
Outsourcing is an important and widespread form of organising sourcing. The 
outsourcing market is large, for example, the UK market alone in 2011 had a turnover 
of £207 billion, or 8% of the economies output, and this was still growing at £20 billion 
annually in 2015 (Oxford Economics, 2011, Whitelane Research, 2015). However, there 
are apparent performance issues and a dichotomy as to why ‘it’ is so common a 
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practice but can sometimes have poor outcomes despite the use of robust 
implementation techniques. If only a part of this shortfall in outcomes could be 
addressed the gains would be immense.  
Much of outsourcing research has been based on interviews with senior 
management or decision makers about the definition and formation of outsourcing, 
with limited attention to the transition and execution phases, due to the real 
difficulties of observing an outsourcing in-situ. 
Figure 1-1 - Lifecycle model outsourcing 
Definition
Define the Requirement
Define Service Contract
Define Service Model
Benchmark Services
Define Vendor Profile
Define Project 
Organisation
Agree Business Case
Survey Market
Formation
Selection Vendor/Partner
Conduct Due Diligence
Define Governance 
Structure
Define Retained/
Outsourced Organisation
Agree Transition Plan
Agree Contract
Agree SLA’s
Transition
Create Retained Structure
Create Transition Team
Change Management
Set up operations
Transition personnel
Start-up Service
Set up Governance and 
Reporting
Execution
Creating Service
Service Reporting
Change management
Contract Management
SLA Management
Embedding Service
Knowledge Transfer
Continuous Improvement
Evaluation
Service Evaluation
Lessons Learnt
Evaluate Business Case
Assess Strategic Fit
Evaluate Options
EndStart
Re-contracting and rescoping
Case Research Focus
Formation Implementation Consolidation
Kick 
off
Sign 
off
  
 
Source Author: based on Morgan (2009) 
 
The purpose of this research is to explore this neglected part of the problem, the 
implementation phase of the outsourcing lifecycle (Figure 1-1 derived in the literature 
section 2.3), where the actual service product is created and embedded into the 
outsourcing organisation. It is assumed that it is in the actual processes of work the 
problems emerge. This is approached in this research by identifying those factors in 
the history, context, and actual development that influenced progress, and from this 
understand how the change developed over time. 
1.3.1 Theoretical lens 
To enable understanding a neo-institutional, social practice and power perspective will 
be used to consider how organisational routines and mechanisms constrained and 
shaped the outsourcing implementation (Zucker, 1987). An institutional lens considers  
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how organisational routines and mechanisms can constrain implementation processes 
within an inter-firm context to maintain stability and control (Zucker, 1987). Early 
Institutional Theory focused on the deeper and more resilient aspects of social 
structure and is based on the idea that organisations consist of regular patterns and 
routines across social contexts and have organising principles or logics that operate 
within organisational fields that act to mediate actor action (Scott, 2004a). Institutions 
are ‘material practices or symbolic constructions’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 248). 
The underlying assumption underpinning institutional theory is that organisations are 
deeply embedded in social and cultural practice and organisational structure and 
practices are ‘strongly influenced by institutional demands’ (Weiss et al., 2013: 3). 
Barley and Tolbert (1997) earlier argued that institutional theory and structuration are 
inextricably linked and from their perspective, ‘institutions are to social action as 
grammars are to speech (ibid: 96).’ From their standpoint institutions represent the 
material routines and legitimised norms adapted by the process of structuration 
occurring in the observed practices and processes. 
There is a sizeable body of research within the field of institutional theory2 
which considers institutional effects but far fewer adopt a process oriented approach 
that includes a wider conceptualisation of power (Currie, 2009a). This thesis responds 
to the call for more process-oriented organisation research that expands the agenda, 
to not only consider stability and inertia, but explicitly study the process of change 
emerging from the micro-practices of work (Currie and Swanson, 2009).  
The focus of this study is on the implementation phase of a large scale IT 
implementation, firstly, as there has been so little attention given to the micro-
practices of change in the literature, and secondly, it is proposed that it is in the actual 
processes of work, as purposive actors solve problems, that explanations can be found 
for different outsourcing outcomes. The research is informed by an adaption from the 
literature of the processes of institutionalisation proposed by Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996); habitualization, responding to the need for new structural forms; 
objectification, increasing adoption and implementation; and sedimentation, where 
changes are consolidated and new norms established. This is illustrated in the process 
                                                     
2
 Following Barley and Tolbert (1997) suggestion institutionalisation and structuration will be used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
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model in Figure 1-2 where the three step model is shown as formation, 
implementation and consolidation derived from the literature and more in line with 
the case vocabulary of a project oriented outsourcing implementation. 
Figure 1-2 – Model of institutionalisation of change 
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1.3.2 Research questions 
The overall aim of this research, using the lenses of outsourcing and organisational 
theory, is to contribute to the understanding of IT outsourcing by examining the 
practices of work that take place during an outsourcing implementation as actors solve 
problems and deliver the service. To do this the research adopts a longitudinal process 
analysis of an application development outsourcing case. The proposition within this 
thesis is: Outsourcing as a management innovation can be understood as a process of 
change, and the practices of implementation, power dynamics and the interactions 
between actors, help explain different outcomes. The derivation of the case questions 
and conceptual framework is covered in Chapter 2. 
The research questions in this case study are: 
1. In what ways do antecedents and a prior history impact and constrain the 
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implementation processes of outsourcing? 
2. In what ways does strong control and governance impact the development 
practices and how they evolve during the implementation? 
3. How do power and conflict arise during the implementation of outsourcing? 
And how does power and conflict impact work practices? 
4. In what ways is the nature of situated change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project? 
The outcome of the case analysis is: 
 What can the findings tell us about the challenges of outsourcing practice? 
 How might these findings be used to improve the practice of outsourcing and 
deliver better outcomes? 
From this standpoint two main contributions to theory are sought: firstly, to determine 
how people regulate their work in outsourcing to achieve the outcome and, secondly, 
to extend the theoretical understanding of this business process by adopting an 
explicit practice-based social and power dimension.  
1.3.3 Research framework 
The research reported in this thesis is a longitudinal supply chain case study 
(Gummerson, 1991, Yin, 1994) using participant observation (Waddington, 2004), 
interviews and documentary analysis of contracts and substantial volumes of on-going 
e-mail traffic (May, 2005, Rowlinson, 2004) focusing on the negotiation, initialization, 
implementation and service activities between six collaborative case organisations in 
the Defence Industry as they implemented a large-scale human resource application 
(HRMSys) for a multi-national defence organisation of 17,500 personnel operating 
across 28 countries in Europe and the United States (DefOrg).  
1.4 Scope limitations 
The research context involves six main case organisations split over suppliers and the 
client organisation. The contract and governance were driven from the client side and 
suppliers, although supporting contractual decisions and project management were 
subservient to client demands. This meant that suppliers were reactive to scope and 
context changes and were broadly subordinate in power terms throughout. The 
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general context, in terms of power, was asymmetric and responses by actors were 
framed and must be understood by this fact.  
The second limitation is in the object of study: the outsourcing of an application 
development. This type of sourcing differs from outsourcing an existing operation in 
that the processes and practices observed focus on the delivery and implementation of 
a software artefact in a project context rather than focusing on the day-to-day 
operational processes. The implementation also covers the merging of the new system 
control routines and processes within an existing infrastructure. This added complexity 
makes the process of implementation time-bound, concretely targeted towards a 
project end-date and therefore accentuating the observed power dynamics. 
The third limitation concerns the question of what is meant by outsourcing 
success and how this relates to the internal dynamics under study. Within this chosen 
approach, while it is possible to attribute delays to factors such as poor capabilities in 
requirement planning, suggesting a link to overall success is difficult. Indeed within the 
project under study, despite time and cost overruns, from a client perspective success 
was claimed. As a consequence although better conceptualisations of success and 
failure are proposed during the discussion this thesis cannot make any claims for 
predicting overall success of an outsourcing contract and can only suggest factors 
leading to process variability.  
1.5 Contribution 
Methodological 
 Integrating of documentary evidence and participant interviews along with 
actual email and forum traffic to construct an entire narrative timeline. 
 A longitudinal participative process that examined the actual processes of work 
in medias res. There are very few actual process longitudinal studies that trace 
the action as it happened.  
Theoretical/conceptual 
 Showing how the timescales and contractual demands of outsourcing force an 
instrumental focus during implementation, and accordingly can preclude 
innovation and limit organisational change.  
 Demonstrating that conflict and the use of power is endemic in a contracted 
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work situation and arises naturally amongst competing coalitions as they 
perform in real work situation.  
 Adding to the concept of change within the constrained context of outsourcing. 
This is a process of change delimited by a contractual fixed term, and positions 
outsourcing, as a management practice, as a forced change within a fixed time 
scale.  
 Adding to the outsourcing literature by showing the outsourcing outcome is 
constrained by the implementation context and is emergent. 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
This introductory chapter has: 
 Introduced the problem of occasional poor outcomes in the outsourcing field 
that have been observed in the literature that is the core of this thesis. 
 Provided a background to outsourcing practice and positioned the problem of 
outsourcing as a neglect of the complex social processes that occur during 
implementation. 
 Outlined the theoretical lens and approach adopted within this thesis and 
stated the research questions to be explored. 
The remaining chapters are structured as shown in Figure 1-3. 
 Chapter 2 provides a relevant context from the literature, firstly, by briefly 
focusing on the extant outsourcing literature before exploring in the second 
half relevant themes of power and practice.  
 Chapter 3 describes the research design and approach with an emphasis on the 
deep longitudinal nature of this qualitative study.  
 Chapters 4 to 6 cover the main detailed findings from the field observations 
and align with the four main research questions shown above.  
 Chapter 7 integrates the findings and discusses the nature of complex change 
demonstrated by the case results.  
 Finally chapter 8 discusses the research questions and links this to the 
theoretical perspectives introduced during the literature review and the thesis 
concludes in chapter 9 with the overall research outcome, limitations and 
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future research directions. 
 
 
Figure 1-3 - Overall structure of thesis  
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Chapter 2 – Literature review 
2.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter will position the case study within the broad stream of the outsourcing 
literature and will introduce the theoretical framework of institutional change within 
which to place the observed case phenomena. 
This chapter: 
 Contextualises the research within the outsourcing literature with a rationale 
for the focus on the implementation phase within the outsourcing lifecycle.  
 Introduces the theoretical perspective of institutionalisation, structuration as 
the process model, and practices as the object of study within an outsourcing 
implementation. 
 Proposes power and conflict as major influences on the progress of outsourcing 
drawing attention to the impact of power. 
 Sets down the research questions within a theoretical framework. 
It will be argued that the high-level macro perspective adopted by a large part of the 
literature ignores the micro-processual nature of outsourcing implementation and the 
intricacies of the actual engagement between the parties (Dibbern et al., 2004). The 
research proposition is that an outsourcing implementation can be a constrained and 
negotiated process that results from the parties having different expectations and 
objectives that are reflected in the way they work together in delivering the service. 
2.1.1 Outsourcing as an inter-firm alliance  
Alliances can be defined as ‘relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative arrangements, 
involving flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from 
autonomous organisations’ (Parkhe, 1993: 794) and involve the exchange, sharing, or 
co-development of products, technologies, and services (Gulati, 1998). They are ‘long-
term’, ‘trust based’ relations (Jones and George, 1998) where the parties commit 
resources to a relationship for a common benefit (Fontenot and Hyman, 2004). 
Alliances are hybrid in form, intermediate between market and hierarchy, and are a 
form of vertical or horizontal integration where the management of the relation 
 
Chapter 2–  L iterature review Page| 13 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
borrows from the partner’s governance structures (Spekle, 2001, Williamson, 1985a). 
Alliances from this perspective can be seen as part of a broad spectrum of 
relationships (Figure 2-1) that cover: joint ventures (a form of equity based alliance), 
joint research and development, marketing cooperation, long term supply 
arrangements and outsourcing (Kale and Singh, 2009, Langfield-Smith and Smith, 
2003).  
Figure 2-1 - Outsourcing positioned as an alliance 
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Outsourcing can be conceptualised to include many of the aspects of strategic alliances 
(for example Nooteboom et al., 1997, van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). 
However, adopting this perspective tends to ignore some basic characteristics of 
outsourcing; that the service is being delivered by a vendor under a contract, that is 
time bound, and  the flow of resources is one way from vendor to the outsourcer 
(Belcourt, 2006, Mayer and Teece, 2008). Whereas, alliances tend, in principle,  to be a 
form of ‘inter-firm link’ of long duration, combined governance, and involve contracts 
with a wider scope involving dispute resolution knowledge transfer and joint decision 
making (Mayer and Teece, 2008).  Furthermore, alliances rely to a much greater extent 
(than outsourcing) on complementarity of resources and organisational compatibility 
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as often the end goal (of the alliance) is often difficult to specify in advance - which is 
not the case in outsourcing where the outcomes are often specified in detail and 
contracted (Kale and Singh, 2009).  The fixed contract duration in outsourcing, where 
business partners are attentive to the time-bound delivery, focuses the collaboration 
on instrumental goals and may restrict the development of diffuse social exchanges, 
trust and relationship building, needed  in alliances,  where end goals are more 
uncertain, requirements are unclear and/or developmental in nature (Kale and Singh, 
2009, Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
From this perspective, outsourcing is an institutional change involving the 
embedding of new routines and processes and management of activities within the 
context of a stable existing operation but is time bound, in the sense a contract has a 
defined time limit, within which the implementation takes place. The common thread 
linking alliances, joint ventures and outsourcing, is that these are forms of work where 
organisations work together for a common goal and employees have to cooperate 
with people outside their own organisational boundary to deliver the service.  
Alliances, outsourcing and joint ventures share common issues of difficult 
management control structures and tend to have high incidents of problems and low 
success rates (Kale and Singh, 2009, Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). With reports of 
objectives not reached, clients giving up and back-sourcing, partner opportunism and 
premature closure (Oshri and Kotlarsky, 2013). As part of the spectrum of inter-firm 
relations outsourcing is a controversial area, with reported outsourcer dissatisfaction, 
poor financial outcomes, hidden costs, HR issues and assertions that outsourcing 
delivers unclear business benefits and is no more than a passing management fad 
(Alexander and Young, 1996, Deloittes, 2005, Hendry, 1995). In a similar way Madok 
(1995) and Alexander and Young (1996) pointed out there are increasing numbers of 
joint ventures, alliances and outsourcing contracts but managers express high levels of 
dissatisfaction, difficult relations and poor outcomes. Furthermore, organisations that 
actually switched their outsourcing suppliers reported relationship and quality issues 
high on the list as the rationale for change. In a recent survey of outsourcing buyers 
65% renegotiated their contract, 30% cancelled and switched suppliers and 5% back-
sourced the service in-house (Cullen et al., 2014: 51). It has been suggested that part of 
the explanation for these apparent problems is an overemphasis on instrumental 
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outcomes, a lack of understanding of the pitfalls of outsourcing , and a continuing 
neglect of social and contingent implementation issues (Gulati, 1998). An outline of the 
major pitfalls/issues with outsourcing is shown as below 
Table 2-1 - The pitfalls of outsourcing 
Pitfalls and problems with outsourcing Selected Authors 
Information security vulnerability Ketler and Willems (1999), Kurdia et al. (2011), 
Pai and Basu (2007) 
Dependency on supplier  Narasimhan et al. (2009), Parmigiani and 
Mitchell (2010), Pirannejad et al. (2010) 
Controlling outsourced processes Aris et al. (2008), Bertolini et al. (2004), Liou 
and Chuang (2010) 
Difficulty to return to pre‑outsourcing status Bertolini et al. (2004), Whitten and Leidner 
(2006), Whitten and Wakefield (2006) 
Reduced job security staff Adeleye et al. (2004), Morgan (2009b), 
Pulignano (2005) 
High initial costs  Hirschheim and Lacity (2000), Adeleye et al. 
(2004) 
Hidden costs  Hendry (1995), Larsen et al. (2013) 
Increased risk Bahli and Rivard (2003), Chou and Chou 
(2009), Pirannejad et al. (2010) 
 
2.2 The outsourcing lifecycle 
The outsourcing lifecycle is underpinned by the assumption of linearity, rationality, and 
a notion that implementation proceeds organically through a sequence of stages that 
are cumulative and predictable (De Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). These models consist 
typically of  distinct phases around the definition, preparation, implementation and 
rescoping of the delivered service (Chou and Chou, 2009, Cullen et al., 2006, George, 
2005, ISO 37500, 2014, Morgan, 2009a). Figure 2-2 shows a consolidated view of the 
lifecycle model split over the main stages of: definition, formation, transition, 
execution and evaluation that will be used to frame the outsourcing discussion.  
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Figure 2-2 - Consolidated life-cycle model 
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Shown in Figure 2-2 is also the split of the lifecycle model over the reference theory 
stages shown later in Figure 2-3. The focus of the detailed case analysis is on the 
transition and execution phases where limited attention on the micro-processual 
factors leading up to successful implementation was evident from the literature. This 
focal research area was  delimited during the analysis by two observed project 
milestones, firstly, the ‘kick off’ meeting where the project was formally started during 
February 2011, and the ‘signoff’ into service of the first phase of the initial operating 
capability (IOC) that occurred in June 2013. In the following sections a selective 
overview of the literature will be mapped to the phases outlined above. 
2.2.1 Defining the service requirement  
The outsourcing literature has tended to operate at a high level with a  focus on: 
strategic implications (Cullen et al., 2005a, Lacity et al., 1997), the selection of services 
to outsource (Lorence and Spink, 2004), partner selection, knowledge transfer (Singh, 
2006) , the management of risk in outsourcing (Bahlia and Rivard, 2004) with only very 
occasional forays into the people aspects of outsourcing  or internal behavioural 
mechanisms, such as commitment (Coyle-Shapiro and Morrow, 2006, Morgan, 2009a).  
The outsourcing life cycle begins with a decision to adopt and ends with the 
closure of the contract when the service transition is complete (Hirschheim et al., 
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2002). The first phase, defining the process, concerns the need and the rationale for 
why and what to outsource (Chou and Chou, 2009). It is a decision that is made under 
risk, is often irreversible, and exhibits hysteresis3 (Rouse, 2007, Tiwana and Bush, 
2007). It is where options for change and partners are chosen under some uncertainty, 
and once underway is very difficult to stop, and is a decision that has high inertia.  
The question of why outsourcing is an improvement option has been often bound to 
cost benefits and focused on the make or buy decision, defining the choice of 
functions, where transaction costs are minimised (Dibbern et al., 2004, Williamson, 
1985a, b).  
The core rationale is that effective governance structures reduce cost and the 
decision is one of defining the scope of the sourcing decision (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). 
However, this viewpoint has been criticised as insufficient and overly simplistic and 
static, not accounting for risk, critical assets and resources, or the social environment 
(Mol and Kotabe, 2011). Furthermore, a transaction cost approach take little account 
of the internal capabilities of the organisation, is sometimes regarded as a static 
perspective, and is often needs to be combined with other reference theories to 
explain the complexities (Dibbern et al., 2004). It has been suggested that synergies 
can arise from strategic and operational factors by sharing resources, routines and 
knowledge, across boundaries and thereby yielding extra benefits (Prahalad and Bettis 
1986). But other research has shown contradictory results, especially in specific 
contexts, where different practices and cultures prevail (Barthelemy and Geyer, 2001, 
Lee et al., 2010). Furthermore, empirical research into core concepts such as asset 
specificity within transaction cost theory, or aspects of the resource based view, when 
used in explaining outsourcing has cast doubt on the explanatory power of these 
borrowed theories in specific contexts (Lacity et al., 2011a). It has also been argued 
that a transaction cost perspective largely ignores the mechanisms of collaboration 
and  active social processes occurring within inter-firm relations, suggesting that these 
social processes require no explication (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). An extended 
overview of a selection of core reference theories used in outsourcing is shown later as 
section 2.2.6. 
                                                     
3
 The change in state lags behind the changes in the environment and cannot revert completely back to 
the original state – in this example to the situation before the outsourcing was done. 
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2.2.2 Formation and selection 
Implementation focuses on the delivery of the service once the decision has been 
made and sets the functional and technical quality expectations for the engagement 
(Grönroos, 1998, Rouse, 2007)4. It is a formative part of the process and at this stage 
the initial conditions are set for how the relationship will work throughout the 
contract. It involves, inter alia, selection of the vendor, defining the service and setting 
down contract terms. Selecting the correct vendor is critical to the overall success of 
outsourcing and involves two main aspects a) The general fit and ability to deliver the 
service, and b) how the supplier manages the relationship. Greer et al. (1999) set down 
these typical guidelines for vendor selection and emphasised the importance of 
conducting a thorough due diligence during acquisition to assess whether they are 
actually present in a prospective supplier. In addition Levina and Ross (2003), in a 
vendor study of the outsourcing relation, argued that vendor advantages come from 
their ability to develop ‘a complementary set of core competences’ developed from 
experiential learning acquired during the process of delivery. 
Access to resources is a key driver in strategic outsourcing, but to exploit this 
effectively managers need to understand internal resources, processes and 
stakeholders in order to make an informed choice (Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther, 2005, 
Verwaal et al., 2009). Balancing risks at the start of an outsource relationship is critical 
and Willcocks and Feeny (1995) proposed a sourcing framework based on the degree 
of process criticality, uncertainty and comparative vendor/buyer capability. In a similar 
way McIvor (2008), integrating RBV and TCE, developed a sourcing framework for the 
selection of processes to be outsourced and outlined a sourcing strategy accounting 
for process criticality and ability to perform (Figure 2-3). 
                                                     
4
 The concept of functional quality (the process of service delivery) and technical quality (what the 
process delivers) expectations is derived from Service Management. For a complete discussion see 
Grönroos, C. 1998. Marketing Services: The Case of a Missing Product. Journal of Business and Industrial 
Marketing, 13, 322-338, Grönroos, C. 2011. Value Co-Creation in Service Logic: A Critical Analysis. 
Marketing Theory, 11, 279-301, Grönroos, C. 2012. Conceptualising Value Co-Creation: A Journey to the 
1970s and Back to the Future. Journal of Marketing Management, 28, 1520-1534. 
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Figure 2-3 - Sourcing Selection Framework (McIvor 2008) 
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Dobrzykowski et al. (2010) extended this criticality/capability matrix paradigm along 
the supply chain and beyond a single firm boundary, by adding the idea of value co-
creation, and showed how the resource-based view can be applied to jointly held and 
developed critical resources. Holcomb and Hitt (2007) showed, within a transaction 
cost perspective, how linking together specific value chain activities can increase 
overall value in excess of the extra cost in setting up and coordinating such activities. 
Bhagat et al. (2010) also showed a comprehensive framework for linking value across 
the relationship that included client, vendor and relationship value contributions - 
demonstrating the utility of moving beyond a firm’s boundary within collaborative 
relationships. This latter multi-perspective view has received some support in empirical 
work that does show managers holistically evaluate across multiple factors such as 
cost, risks and the criticality of the process (Tiwana and Bush, 2007). However,  most 
empirical research still consists of plausible prescriptions and conceptual frameworks, 
based on limited case material or derived from management self-reports and, as a 
consequence, suffer from a lack of empirical support that these rules are actually 
represented in practice (Rouse, 2007).  
2.2.3 Transition and execution 
The types of services that are outsourced tend to have different characteristics that 
demand specific approaches in terms of contract management, relationships and 
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governance (Cullen et al., 2005b). Whilst generic or simple repetitive services, 
generally require standard market contracting, highly specific embedded services 
demand integrated governance and relational contracting (Williamson, 1985a). 
Furthermore, as Cox (2004) argued, buyers who fail to account for contextual 
conditions create contracts and governance structures that are inappropriate for the 
specific contract. Hansen and Rasmussen (2013) extended this argument to include 
supplier expectation to the contextual argument, showing that certainty in continuity, 
cost recovery and on-going new business supported cooperation while uncertainty 
promoted conflict.  
The outsourcing of application development require partners to collaborate in 
a similar way to short-term alliances formed for a pre-determined time to deliver a 
specific goal (Bignoux, 2006).  Furthermore, especially in the public sector, they must 
engage in this activity within the context of strict contracting and set timescales. In 
such circumstances we propose that trust and collaborative working practices, which 
are essential to clarify sometimes vague business requirements, can be inhibited by 
strict formality and contracting especially during the implementation phase (Qi and 
Chau, 2012).  
At the start of the implementation phase, the vendor selection, an effective 
contract, clear delivery scope, and a well-managed start-up are critical initial 
conditions that if managed poorly will risk starting the relationship off in an adversarial 
direction (Willcocks et al., 2004, Willcocks and Lacity, 1999). The importance of this 
initial conditioning was further emphasised by Kliem (2004) who showed that the 
benefits of outsourcing could not be achieved unless risk management, relationship 
management and appropriate governance were in place. Similarly,  Chou and Chou 
(2009) pointed out that good quality management, risk processes and effective project 
management were essential for delivering a successful outcome in outsourcing. 
Despite these exhortations, Beaumont (2006) pointed out the dearth of 
research into service level agreement (SLAS), requirements planning, governance and 
change processes particularly in terms of changing services during operation. Little has 
changed since Saunders et al. (1997) criticised the over euphoric perception of 
outsourcing and the key role of the contract and governance in the initial stages of the 
process. Stating that managers were expert when constructing contract clauses but 
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lacked deep experience in specifying and controlling the service they needed, 
relationship management, and how to actually manage service fluctuations. Saunders 
et al. (1997) also went on to show that many managers were less excited with their 
contracts after living with them for a while and were frustrated by their inability to 
measure benefits and manage outcomes. The authors concluded that whilst the 
perceptions of success or failure were mixed, in their respondent’s mind one thing was 
clear; that having an effective contract was correlated with overall success and was 
‘important in both supplier and partnership arrangements’ (ibid: 75).  
2.2.4 Evaluating outcomes 
Literature on the achievement of outsourcing is often derived from expectations, 
opinions, extrapolations or hopes gathered very early in the outsource engagement 
(Rouse, 2007) and very little focus on any structured empirical analysis (Dibbern et al., 
2004). Where savings relating to outsourcing contracts are claimed results have been 
mixed, with most reports suggesting around 25-50% of all outsourcing contracts fail to 
meet the original objectives (Willcocks and Lacity, 1999). And even these savings that 
are claimed derive from short-term financial changes or budgetary adjustments (Lacity 
and Hirschheim, 1993). Furthermore, many of the research papers citing benefits from 
outsourcing, particularly cost savings, are mainly based on case studies that are 
repeated, and/or unaltered across a series of papers (Rouse, 2007), with no discernible 
new research to validate the original contentions (for example Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998, Lacity et al., 1996).  
There have been attempts in validating general benefits, for example,  Elmuti et 
al. (2011) carried out a comparative analysis of factories within the same organisation; 
Plant A that had outsourced a substantial part of the workforce and Plant B which had 
not. Although interesting most of the improvements observed were difficult to link to 
the process of outsourcing itself and perhaps even supported that most improvement 
in outsourcing could be achieved by routine management practice (see for example 
Hirschheim and Lacity, 2000). Conklin (2005) in observing the prevalence of 
transaction-based HR outsourcing pointed out the complexities, especially the 
emergence of HR as strategically important, and the way the function is linked to key 
processes such as resource planning. This added complexity has meant decisions in 
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outsourcing HR have become more problematic and it is just too simplistic to consider 
the core/non-core dichotomy and suppliers have to be able to offer transactional as 
well as what can be considered strategic services (Klass, 2003).  
Willcocks et al. (2011: 714) argued that ‘extracting value from outsourcing 
engagements is a key objective for client firms and vendors’. However, research into 
actual outcomes has often meant using initial management expectations without any 
significant re-evaluation or in-depth justification of the benefits (Deloittes, 2008, 
Herath and Kishore, 2009, Oshri and Kotlarsky, 2010). This has meant that little 
empirical research has actually been conducted and what has been done shows poor 
construction of the cost variables (Rouse, 2007), poor use of theoretical constructs, 
(Molloy et al., 2011) or revealed that many organisations have no method to measure 
savings at all (Oshri and Kotlarsky, 2010). What this implies is that much of the 
research into outcomes achieved is poorly underpinned with effective empirical 
evidence and consequently of little use in assessing whether or not outsourcing 
actually delivers anything at all. 
Running counter to the idea that outsourcing can reduce costs, Belcourt (2006) 
asserted that HR outsourcing compared unfavourably with other approaches to cost 
reduction. For example, whereas business process re-engineering can yield up to 50% 
savings, outsource savings were stated as around 10% to 15% with 40% respondents 
reporting higher costs. Furthermore, although some reasonable levels of satisfaction 
have been reported they are caveated by higher than expected costs, unrealized 
benefits, poor quality, poor communications, and insufficient time spent on vendor 
selection and service levels resulting in service problems (Deloittes, 2008). Finally, 
Rouse (2007) pointed out the virtual absence of an effective business case 
underpinning many contracts, with over-optimistic expectations, poor planning and 
vendor management, resulting in dashed hopes, hidden costs and unfulfilled promises 
from outsourcing practices.  
2.2.5 Focus is on the physical implementation processes 
Cullen et al. (2005a) suggested that anecdotal stories of failure may be a consequence 
of too high a level of analysis, and failure to consider the configuration of the 
outsourcing which drives the outcome. However, even when proposing the 
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configuration of the retained organisation as a key factor (see Willcocks et al., 2006) 
researchers and practitioners often remain firmly focused on instrumental and 
technical matters, and display limited attention to the softer relational aspects seen as 
essential prerequisites for a successful collaboration. In addition, although this focus 
on configuration (for example Whitley and Willcocks, 2011) is a useful recipe, 
particularly from a practitioner perspective, close collaborative relationships are much 
more important preconditions for success, and communication, effective management 
processes, trust and coordination all underpin successful outcomes (Vanpoucke and 
Veereke, 2010).  
2.2.6 Selective overview of main reference theories applied to outsourcing 
Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and the Resource Based View are argued 
to inform the choice of market placement based on resource and cost considerations. 
This notion has been criticised for taking a static view of organisations, ignoring the 
processual nature of exchanges and relations and assuming a false continuity over 
time of resources and contexts, with some constructs regarded as vague, tautological 
and oversimplistic (Porter, 1994, Williamson, 1999). For example, when considering 
trust in outsourcing relationships, TCE is biased towards opportunism rather than 
collaboration (Uzzi, 1997), is embedded in the transactions (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 
2003) as a mechanism for controlling opportunism by such coercive strategies as 
'hostage-taking' (Barney and Hansen, 1994). In a similar way Agency Theory context 
strips and oversimplifies relations, and ignores structural features which imply the 
theory retains little utility in explaining real world outsourcing phenomena (Shapiro, 
2005, Uzzi, 1997). Researchers have attempted to address some of these issues by 
combining one or more reference theories to increase the depth of explanatory power, 
however even when this is done the research remains firmly wedded to a high level 
view with limited discussion of underlying contingent practice and social factors (Dyer, 
1997, Dyer and Singh, 1998). Resource Dependency Theory for example takes resource 
exchange beyond the firm boundary but focuses on exchanges in general and do not 
demonstrate the nature of the exchange itself (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). As a 
consequence it can be argued that many reference theories operate at a high level, 
context strip, or have imprecise applications of theoretical constructs (Molloy et al., 
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2011).  
Shown in Table 2-2 is a selective summary of 12 of the main reference theories 
and perspectives used in explaining the phenomena of outsourcing along with a 
representative sample of core authors derived from the literature (Alsudairi and 
Dwivedi, 2010, Dibbern et al., 2004, Lacity et al., 2010). They form two broad groups, 
firstly, those underpinned by a rational normative economic perspective, and secondly, 
those theories eschewing a wholly normative standpoint and introducing more social 
and structural elements to the analysis. What is common to these theories is the 
shortage of detailed empirical research into the processual aspects of implementation 
especially into the real-world complex exchanges that are characteristic of inter-firm 
contractually bound implementations. 
2.2.7 Summary 
Research into outsourcing has shown mixed results with some researchers arguing that 
balance sheets of the advantages and disadvantages of outsourcing, or the 
development of prescriptions, do not allow any kind of conclusion to be drawn in a 
specific situation (Clark et al., 1995). Where outsource outcomes are reported most 
consist of predictions or are desires to reduce cost (Lacity et al., 2010),  are derived 
from expectations, and are not based on any grounded empirical work (Rouse, 2007). 
Alsudairi and Dwivedi (2010) in reviewing the outsourcing literature showed the 
dearth of research into environmental/contextual issues, and as Busi and McIvor 
(2008) pointed out there are key gaps in understanding along with the need for more 
action research, processual and longitudinal studies. Furthermore, the literature is 
dominated by a rational perspective and a number of authors have argued that 
rational theories alone cannot provide an adequate explanation for power and conflict 
within the outsourcing process (Mantel et al., 2006, McIvor, 2009). In addition, the 
importance of organisational politics in the outsourcing process is often ignored in the 
mainstream literature despite outsourcing being ‘regarded as a political act’ impacting 
‘the power structures within the organisational hierarchy’ (Bidwell, 2012, Marshall et 
al., 2015: 548, Peled, 2001).  
Lacity et al. (2010) supported the view that it is time to consider an indigenous 
theory of outsourcing based on how outsourcing is actually implemented and enacted. 
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There is little research on how objectives are achieved, in particular those processes 
and practices which underpin successful outcomes, and a consistently high level 
unitary perspective is pursued that avoids the real practices of work (Van de Ven, 
2007). Finally, despite the vast body of knowledge that has been developed over the 
last 20 to 25 years very limited attention has been spent on social, political or 
contextual factors in outsourcing and how this may impact success  (Bidwell, 2012, 
Lacity et al., 2010, Lacity et al., 2011b, Peled, 2001). 
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M
o
ra
l 
h
a
z
a
rd
 a
n
d
 
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
. 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
s
y
m
m
e
tr
y
. 
In
d
iv
id
u
a
l 
g
ro
u
p
 l
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
. 
N
a
tu
re
 o
f 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 a
n
d
 
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
 r
o
u
ti
n
e
s
 n
o
t 
c
o
n
s
id
e
re
d
. 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
s
tr
ip
p
e
d
, 
s
ta
ti
c
, 
a
h
is
to
ri
c
a
l 
a
n
d
 a
n
 ‘
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
th
e
o
ry
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
 
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
’ 
K
is
e
r 
(1
9
9
9
) 
G
e
n
e
ra
l 
p
ro
b
le
m
 o
f 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
fa
ir
 v
a
lu
e
 
w
it
h
 i
n
c
o
m
p
le
te
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
a
n
d
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 
a
s
y
m
m
e
tr
y
. 
O
ri
e
n
te
d
 
to
w
a
rd
s
 p
re
v
e
n
ta
ti
v
e
 t
ig
h
t 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
 f
o
r 
w
e
ll-
d
e
fi
n
e
d
 
s
e
rv
ic
e
s
. 
J
e
n
s
e
n
 a
n
d
 M
e
c
k
lin
g
 
(1
9
7
6
) 
E
is
e
n
h
a
rd
t 
(1
9
8
9
a
) 
S
h
a
p
ir
o
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
K
is
e
r 
(1
9
9
9
) 
D
y
n
a
m
ic
 C
a
p
a
b
il
it
ie
s
 
H
o
w
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 a
re
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
 
a
n
d
 m
a
n
a
g
e
d
. 
O
n
e
 t
o
 o
n
e
 
c
o
rr
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
c
e
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
d
y
n
a
m
ic
s
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
 
s
u
g
g
e
s
te
d
. 
E
m
p
h
a
s
is
e
s
 h
o
w
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 c
a
n
 c
h
a
n
g
e
, 
re
n
e
w
 a
n
d
 e
v
o
lv
e
 r
a
th
e
r 
th
a
n
 f
o
c
u
s
in
g
 o
n
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
 
c
h
o
ic
e
 a
s
 i
n
 t
h
e
 R
B
V
. 
R
e
s
o
u
rc
e
 a
d
a
p
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t.
 
R
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
, 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
, 
a
b
s
o
rp
ti
v
e
 c
a
p
a
c
it
y
 a
n
d
 
a
g
ili
ty
. 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
o
n
 w
h
a
t 
is
 a
 d
y
n
a
m
ic
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 
w
h
a
t 
a
re
 t
h
e
 ‘
e
ff
e
c
ts
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
s
.’
 D
if
fe
ri
n
g
 
d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
 a
n
d
 u
s
e
s
 d
ri
v
e
n
 
b
y
 s
ta
rt
in
g
 p
e
rs
p
e
c
ti
v
e
. 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
 s
tu
d
ie
s
. 
D
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 t
o
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
 b
o
th
 s
e
le
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
le
v
e
ra
g
in
g
 o
f 
in
te
rn
a
l 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
, 
s
e
le
c
ti
n
g
 a
n
d
 
a
d
a
p
ti
v
e
ly
 m
a
n
a
g
in
g
 t
h
e
 
v
e
n
d
o
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
. 
T
e
e
c
e
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
E
is
e
n
h
a
rd
t 
a
n
d
 M
a
rt
in
 
(2
0
0
0
) 
B
a
rn
e
y
 (
1
9
9
1
) 
Z
h
a
n
g
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
1
3
) 
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Table 2-1 - Overview selected reference theories (continued) 
 Core concept Explanatory 
goal 
Constructs Critiques Use in 
outsourcing 
Selected 
Authors 
R
e
la
ti
o
n
a
l 
V
ie
w
 
Id
io
s
y
n
c
ra
ti
c
 l
in
k
a
g
e
s
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 f
ir
m
 s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
. 
E
x
tr
a
 p
ro
fi
ts
 a
re
 o
b
ta
in
e
d
 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 t
h
a
t 
c
o
u
ld
 n
o
t 
b
e
 o
b
ta
in
e
d
 
s
o
le
ly
. 
A
rg
u
e
s
 t
h
a
t 
th
e
 l
in
k
a
g
e
s
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 
th
e
 s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
. 
N
e
tw
o
rk
s
 a
n
d
 d
y
a
d
s
 u
n
it
s
 
o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
 t
o
 e
x
p
la
in
 
s
u
p
e
ri
o
r 
p
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
c
e
. 
C
o
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
a
n
d
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
a
l 
s
p
e
c
if
ic
 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
. 
S
ta
ti
c
 n
o
t 
a
c
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 f
o
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
le
a
v
in
g
. 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
tr
a
n
s
fe
r 
a
n
d
 p
a
rt
n
e
r 
le
a
rn
in
g
 l
e
a
d
in
g
 t
o
 
p
re
m
a
tu
re
 c
lo
s
u
re
. 
S
p
ill
 
o
v
e
r 
ri
s
k
. 
C
h
o
ic
e
 o
f 
fu
tu
re
 p
a
rt
n
e
rs
, 
tr
a
n
s
it
io
n
 a
n
d
 o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g
 
p
h
a
s
e
 o
f 
o
u
ts
o
u
rc
in
g
. 
C
o
m
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ry
 s
e
rv
ic
e
 
c
re
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t.
 
D
y
e
r 
a
n
d
 S
in
g
h
 (
1
9
9
8
) 
F
in
k
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
M
e
s
q
u
it
a
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
S
o
c
ia
l 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
T
h
e
o
ry
 (
S
E
T
) 
A
c
to
rs
 e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
w
it
h
in
 a
 s
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
. 
In
te
rp
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
 
u
n
d
e
r 
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s
 o
f 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 s
c
a
rc
it
y
. 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 c
re
a
te
 
u
n
s
p
e
c
if
ie
d
 o
b
lig
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
E
x
te
n
d
e
d
 b
y
 R
E
T
. 
E
x
p
la
in
s
 m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 i
n
 i
m
p
e
rf
e
c
t 
m
a
rk
e
ts
 v
ia
 a
 s
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
. 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
 o
n
 r
e
w
a
rd
 c
o
s
t 
b
a
la
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 r
e
c
ip
ro
c
a
ti
o
n
. 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
s
 a
n
d
 
a
c
ti
v
it
ie
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 a
c
to
rs
. 
P
o
w
e
r 
a
ri
s
in
g
 f
ro
m
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
y
. 
L
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
 f
ir
m
, 
g
ro
u
p
 a
n
d
 
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l.
 
D
if
fi
c
u
lt
 t
o
 t
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 
e
v
a
lu
a
te
 n
a
tu
re
 o
f 
c
o
s
ts
 
a
n
d
 r
e
w
a
rd
s
. 
C
ir
c
u
la
r 
d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
s
, 
o
v
e
r 
ra
ti
o
n
a
lis
ti
c
 a
n
d
 
in
s
tr
u
m
e
n
ta
l 
p
e
rs
p
e
c
ti
v
e
 
o
n
 e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
. 
Il
l 
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
d
 c
o
re
 c
o
n
c
e
p
ts
. 
In
te
r-
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 a
n
d
 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
s
 q
u
a
lit
y
, 
a
n
d
 
re
la
ti
o
n
a
l 
in
v
e
s
tm
e
n
ts
. 
A
ft
e
r 
th
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
s
ig
n
in
g
 
c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 s
e
ri
e
s
 o
f 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 m
e
d
ia
te
d
 b
y
 
s
o
c
ia
l 
c
o
n
ta
c
ts
. 
H
o
m
a
n
s
 (
1
9
5
8
) 
B
la
u
 (
1
9
6
4
) 
E
m
e
rs
o
n
 (
1
9
7
6
) 
C
o
o
k
 a
n
d
 W
h
it
m
e
y
e
r 
(1
9
9
2
) 
P
a
rk
e
r 
a
n
d
 R
u
s
s
e
ll 
(2
0
0
4
) 
B
ig
n
o
u
x
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
P
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 P
o
li
ti
c
s
 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
s
 s
it
e
s
 o
f 
p
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
fl
ic
t 
–
 
s
y
s
te
m
ic
 c
o
n
fl
ic
t 
fa
c
t 
o
f 
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
lif
e
. 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
 a
s
 
c
o
m
p
e
ti
n
g
 c
o
a
lit
io
n
s
 o
f 
in
te
re
s
t 
g
ro
u
p
s
. 
E
x
p
la
in
in
g
 o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
s
 
a
s
 l
o
c
a
ti
o
n
s
 o
f 
n
o
n
-r
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
p
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 p
o
lit
ic
a
l 
a
c
ti
o
n
 
th
a
t 
in
fl
u
e
n
c
e
s
 t
h
e
 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
o
f 
a
c
to
rs
. 
P
o
w
e
r 
in
 e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 –
 
p
o
w
e
r 
in
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
, 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
n
d
 m
e
a
n
in
g
s
. 
U
n
it
s
 o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
, 
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l,
 g
ro
u
p
s
, 
o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
. 
S
o
m
e
ti
m
e
s
 c
la
im
e
d
 a
s
 
a
b
e
rr
a
n
t 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r.
 U
n
it
a
ry
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
p
e
rs
p
e
c
ti
v
e
s
 
e
s
c
h
e
w
 p
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 
re
s
is
ta
n
c
e
. 
O
u
ts
o
u
rc
in
g
 c
re
a
te
s
 a
 
re
c
ip
ro
c
a
l 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 t
h
e
 p
a
rt
ie
s
. 
‘I
n
te
rt
w
in
e
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
o
u
ts
o
u
rc
in
g
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
’ 
a
t 
a
ll 
s
ta
g
e
s
 (
A
lle
n
 e
t 
a
l.
, 
2
0
0
2
).
 
Q
u
in
n
 (
1
9
8
0
) 
F
e
rr
is
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
4
) 
M
o
rg
a
n
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
N
a
d
le
r 
(1
9
9
3
) 
H
a
rd
y
 (
1
9
8
4
a
),
 H
a
rd
y
 
(1
9
8
4
b
),
 H
a
rd
y
 (
1
9
9
6
b
) 
In
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 T
h
e
o
ry
 
T
h
e
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 d
if
fu
s
io
n
 
o
f 
te
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
. 
H
o
w
 a
 p
ro
d
u
c
t 
o
r 
s
e
rv
ic
e
 
g
a
in
s
 m
o
m
e
n
tu
m
. 
D
if
fu
s
io
n
 a
n
d
 s
u
b
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
 
c
y
c
le
s
 o
f 
in
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
. 
In
n
o
v
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 c
y
c
le
s
 o
f 
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
. 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
e
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
 
c
e
s
s
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
ro
d
u
c
t 
o
r 
s
e
rv
ic
e
. 
D
if
fu
s
io
n
 a
n
d
 a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
o
u
ts
o
u
rc
in
g
 –
 m
im
e
ti
c
 
fa
c
to
rs
. 
H
u
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
(R
o
g
e
rs
, 
2
0
0
3
) 
K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 B
a
s
e
d
 
V
ie
w
 
S
u
s
ta
in
e
d
 c
o
m
p
e
ti
ti
v
e
 
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
 d
e
ri
v
e
s
 f
ro
m
 
e
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
s
. 
E
m
b
e
d
d
e
d
 n
a
tu
re
 o
f 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
s
 s
tr
a
te
g
ic
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 –
 e
x
te
n
d
s
 R
B
V
 
b
y
 t
re
a
ti
n
g
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
s
 
s
p
e
c
if
ic
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
. 
H
e
te
ro
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
s
 l
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
 
is
 a
t 
th
e
 f
ir
m
/o
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
. 
A
rg
u
e
d
 n
o
t 
a
 t
h
e
o
ry
 o
f 
th
e
 
fi
rm
 a
n
d
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 t
o
 
in
te
g
ra
te
 s
o
c
ia
l 
a
n
d
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
e
rs
p
e
c
ti
v
e
s
 
w
it
h
in
 t
h
e
o
ry
. 
D
o
m
a
in
 l
e
v
e
l 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 c
lie
n
t 
a
n
d
 v
e
n
d
o
r 
e
s
p
e
c
ia
lly
 t
h
e
 
u
n
iq
u
e
 c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
s
ti
c
s
 o
f 
th
e
 c
lie
n
t 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 a
s
 
e
x
p
re
s
s
e
d
 i
n
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
. 
B
a
rn
e
y
 (
1
9
9
1
) 
G
ra
n
t 
(1
9
9
1
) 
T
iw
a
n
a
 a
n
d
 K
e
il 
(2
0
0
7
) 
B
e
c
e
rr
a
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
B
lu
m
e
n
b
e
rg
 e
t 
a
l.
 (
2
0
0
9
) 
In
k
p
e
n
 (
1
9
9
8
) 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
T
h
e
o
ry
 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 s
tr
u
c
tu
re
s
 
th
a
t 
h
a
v
e
 a
c
h
ie
v
e
d
 a
 h
ig
h
 
d
e
g
re
e
 o
f 
s
ta
b
ili
ty
. 
In
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 r
e
-
c
o
n
s
ti
tu
te
d
 b
y
 a
c
to
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
c
o
u
rs
e
 o
f 
e
n
a
c
tm
e
n
t.
 
H
o
w
 i
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
s
 a
re
 
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
d
, 
re
c
re
a
te
d
 a
n
d
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
. 
N
e
o
-i
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
fo
rm
s
 r
e
je
c
t 
ra
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
c
to
r 
m
o
d
e
ls
 i
n
 f
a
v
o
u
r 
o
f 
c
u
lt
u
ra
l,
 p
o
w
e
r 
a
n
d
 s
o
c
ia
l 
e
x
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
s
. 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 t
h
a
t 
e
s
ta
b
lis
h
 
re
c
re
a
te
 n
o
rm
s
 a
n
d
 
ro
u
ti
n
e
s
. 
T
h
re
e
 p
ill
a
rs
 
n
o
rm
a
ti
v
e
, 
c
o
e
rc
iv
e
 a
n
d
 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
. 
L
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
a
n
a
ly
s
is
 g
ro
u
p
, 
fi
rm
 a
n
d
 
in
d
u
s
tr
y
. 
V
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 i
n
 a
 
c
o
m
p
a
ra
ti
v
e
 s
e
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2.3 The processes of outsourcing 
This part of the review will be on the endogenous internal practices and external 
contextual factors that potentially influence outsource success and will lead up to the 
development of a conceptual model to guide the research questions shown later in 
section 2.4.3. 
2.3.1 Theoretical lens Institutional theory 
The original focus of institutional theory was in explaining those factors leading to 
similarities in how organisations structured and displayed similar behaviours and 
forms, and how a ‘limited range of socially approved templates’ emerged that 
exhibited high resilience and inertia (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006: 27). New-
institutionalisation changes the focus of enquiry to consider the fact that, although 
institutions do exhibit resilience and isomorphism, change does in fact occur, and this 
change is not only resulting from rational adaptations to environmental changes and 
drives for efficiency (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). This new orientation adopted the 
perspective that not only is structure influenced by technology and resource 
dependencies, it is shaped by institutional forces, and organisation practices are 
responses to the embeddedness  of organisations within their social and political 
environment (Powell, 2007). 
‘The new institutionalisation of organisational theory and sociology comprises a 
rejection of rational actor models an interest in institutions as independent 
variables [and] a turn towards cognitive and cultural explanation.’ (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991:8) 
This leads to a paradox in Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) terms in how researchers 
can explain stability and longevity while at the same time accounting for the 
adaptability of organisations to changing contexts within a single theory. As it was put 
by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), why despite increasing change do organisations look 
so similar? 
The definition of Institutions can be argued as ‘systems of established and 
embedded social rules that structure social interactions’ (Hodgson, 2006: 18). They are 
structures that exhibit activities that are ‘stable, repetitive and enduring’ (Oliver, 1992: 
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563). However, even in early institutionalisation the inherent duality of institutions 
was recognised in that they arise from and constrain action (Barley and Tolbert, 1997). 
Based on this notion Barley and Tolbert (1997) proposed that institutions represent an 
historical accumulation of rules, processes and scripts that are enacted and structured 
by actions. By this means they proposed to translate Giddens’ (1984) static perspective 
of structuration to a dynamic model then link this to the maintenance and change of 
an institution. From this perspective institutionalisation can be seen as a process of 
structuration grounded on the micro processual level, and is a theory of practical 
action where institutions are reproduced and changed by the ‘everyday actions of 
individuals’ (Powell and Colyvas, 2008: 277).  
Barley and Tolbert (1997) proposed a duality for structuration and 
institutionalisation, and proposed that institutions and actions are inextricably linked. 
They suggested that institutional theory can be thought of as the grammar of change 
and structuration as the process theory describing institutionalisation. It is this 
perspective that is adopted within this research and following Barley and Tolbert 
structuration and institutionalisation will be used interchangeably. Institutionalisation 
takes the argument forward by not only accounting for the technical rationality in 
change, but also accounts for the ‘social, political and normative’ contexts of the 
practices of work (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). The purpose of using institutional 
theory during this research will be that it offers a window on the routines, goals and 
scripts that underpin the actual behaviours that occur during the processes of work, 
and from this explains how the outcome of outsourcing is achieved (Powell and 
Dimaggio, 1991). 
2.3.2 Institutional change 
Institutional change can be conceptualised as occurring at the macro and micro level of 
analysis. Macro change occurs at the field level where external context is considered 
the main driver for change operating via the coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphic mechanisms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Pishdad and Haider, 2013) . 
Those mechanisms that tend at the field level to restrain structure within legitimate 
and accepted bounds and represent a macro level adaptation to context (Weiss et al., 
2013). Coercive pressure, for example, can be exerted by stronger organisations on 
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more dependent ones by forcing them to conform to rules or specific contractual 
requirements. Normative pressure by ensuring prevailing standards of conduct and 
professionalization are applied, and mimetic aspects, by a cultural emphasis on taken 
for granted assumptions, such as the client to buyer hierarchy.  
Organisational institutionalisation, it is argued, has three defining principles; it 
arises from small group and organisational processes can increase agility and 
performance, and the ‘institutional order is negotiated and emergent, never 
systematically controlled’ (Zucker, 1987: 447). Two processes are important during the 
implementation of a major organisational change, firstly, deinstitutionalisation or the 
erosion of existing institutional norms that occurs in parallel with the implementation 
of a change, such as outsourcing ( Pishdad et al., 2012, Seal, 2003), and secondly, 
institutionalisation whereby systems and procedures become the accepted norm and 
are integrated into organisational life (Currie, 2009b). In order for effective change to 
occur old processes and systems must be replaced by the new and the current taken 
for granted ways of working and behaviours broken down and replaced.  
At the micro-level change is effected by institutionalisation and 
deinstitutionalisation where old routines and processes are ‘forgotten or discarded’ 
Zhu et al. (2006) (cited in Pishdad and Haider, 2013). It is during this process of change 
that socially constructed structures becomes stabilised. This process of 
institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation is carried out by organisational members 
who can exercise power to ‘create, transform, maintain and disrupt institutions’ and 
thus can act as agents of change and as responding actors  (Lawrence, 2008: 173, 
Powell and Colyvas, 2008). Deinstitutionalisation can therefore be seen as the 
weakening and disappearance of a set of existing processes and routines, and their 
replacement with others created during the processes of work.  
Institutionalisation of change within an organisational context thus takes place 
in parallel to the process of deinstitutionalisation. From this viewpoint bureaucratic, 
stable organisations can inhibit change during system development (Currie, 2009a), 
creating project inertia from the tension that arises between the acceptance of the 
changes from the new system and a replication logic seeking to maintain the status 
quo (D’Adderio, 2014). Furthermore, actors resist institutional control and agency by 
acts of mobilisation and the exercise of influence that imposes limits on the agency 
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and control of institutions. These resulting acts of resistance range from passive 
acquiescence, compromise, defying or ignoring the change to manipulation and 
subversion that adapts the relationship between the actors and the institution 
(Lawrence, 2008). In addition, innovations, such as IT change, may be adopted or fade 
away, depending on isomorphic conditions such as when strongly established practices 
are very difficult to change, especially when they are owned  by strong institutional 
actors (Currie, 2012). 
Technology processes change during implementation and institutionalisation 
and ‘the role and scope of information systems evolves continuously such that the 
organisations evolve with their evolution’ (Pishdad et al., 2012: 3). Technology from 
this standpoint acts as a glue that binds together groups and processes, and supports 
the creation and reproduction of institutionalised behaviour. Mignerat and Rivard 
(2009) pointed out the generic inter-organisational perspective within the literature 
and the limited attention that was being paid to the intra-organisation subsystems and 
groups, and highlighted out the dearth of research into the micro-level processual 
aspects of institutional change. (Greenwood et al., 2013) extends this argument, 
proposing more studies and micro-level analysis based on actor action within 
institutions are needed.  
2.3.3 Change in IT sourcing 
Outsourcing is a major management change that involves the sourcing of a part of the 
structure of an organisation from the market, and involves two or more organisations 
collaborating and working together to create a service formerly carried out internally 
by the outsourcing organisation. The change does not simply involve signing a 
contract. Organisational routines, governance and social relations must be adapted 
fundamentally during the implementation and as a result outsourcing is a radical 
institutional change with wide organisational impacts on resources, people, 
organisational boundaries and constituents (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  
To frame the case study analysis and the research questions, the process model 
of institutionalization proposed by Tolbert and Zucker (1996: 182) was adapted to suit 
the specific terminology within the consolidated outsourcing lifecycle model and the 
specific case parameters. This is shown as Figure 2-4. Habitualization is a patterned 
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response to a change in the external context, triggered by events that forces a change 
in institutional structure and initiates the process of deinstitutionalisation (Oliver, 
1992). The patterns occurring during formation represent the series of actions and 
decisions taken in response to the change demands triggered, by the strong 
centralisation and formalisation of the IT support processes and systems at DefOrg. 
The outcome of this is the specific response demanded by the environment triggers. 
Objectification is the structural change brought about by the formalisation of the 
implementation, within the contractual and organisational constraints of the 
outsourcing project. Implementation is both the physical processes of implementation, 
creation of software and services, and the structuring of the project and service within 
the infrastructural and organisational umbrella of DefOrg. Consolidation represents 
the sedimentation of the new processes, structure, support and practices and their 
becoming the new norms of practice and the accepted ways of working. 
Outsourcing as a practice is predicated on the notion of standardisation. 
Suppliers are contracted to provide a service and benefits, such as cost reduction, 
derived from the ability to implement standard processes grounded in their core 
competences across a wide client base. For example, IT suppliers pool their expertise 
in development across their client organisations and seek to deliver cost-effective 
solutions exploiting standardised services. This idea is extended when considering 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) or other commercial off the shelf (COTS) software 
packages delivering standardised service across a diverse client base. However, 
implementation often occurs across organisations with different business models and 
within organisations that consist of diverse and often competing coalitions of interest 
groups, who may have varying goals and objectives that do not follow an orderly linear 
path (Lyytinen et al., 2009). What is implied by this is that these diverse groups can 
expropriate and orient major change programmes, such as outsourcing, to support 
their particular group needs leading to sub-optimal implementations and failure to 
meet overarching organisational objectives (Berente and Yoo, 2012).  
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Figure 2-4 - Implementation HRMSys mapped to Tolbert and Zucker (1996) 
Innovation
Habitualization Objectification Sedimentation
Innovation
Formation Implementation Consolidation
Institutionalization process Tolbert and Zucker 1996
Implementation process HRMSys Outsourcing
Technological
change
Legislation Market
forces
Theorizing Inter-organizational
Monitoring
Positive
outcomes
Interest 
group
advocacy Interest 
group
resistance
Restructuring
DefOrg
Centralising
formalizing
IT
Financial contraints
 
Source:  Author based on an idea by Kaiser et al. (2011) 
 
In addition, outsourcing is a business change that is implemented into an existing 
organisation and  ‘most institutions are not created de novo but contain vestiges from 
the past’ William Riker (1998) (cited by Campbell, 2004: 15). Therefore the buying 
organisation has an existing structure, processes and ways of working as does the 
supplier. Accordingly during the implementation these processes, and people working 
within the outsourcing engagement, have to fundamentally adapt to a completely new 
structure and the impact of antecedents and history can be fundamental to 
outsourcing success. 
Finally, within the outsourcing context complex inter-firm institutions can span 
several logics, between the supplier and buyer viewpoint or between functional 
departments within the same organisation. They can as a result have distinct 
organisational logics that although they may respond to each other can nevertheless 
remain largely distinct and pursue their own agendas. This is a situation can engender 
conflict as the outsourcing implementation proceeds (Berente and Yoo, 2012).  
2.3.4 Power and conflict in organisations 
Institutional control regulates the activities within desired principles and goals 
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(Janowitz, 1975) whereas institutional agency is the work of actors to modify and 
change institutional practices (DiMaggio, 1988). Within this context, resistance reduces 
or modifies the impact of both institutional agency and control. These three forms of 
power (control, agency and resistance) in the view of Lawrence (2008) form the basis 
of institutional politics, and impact on all elements of the project during all phases: the 
scope of the delivery, the use of standards, delivery approaches, project control and 
techniques, the design of functional and non-functional requirements and the delivery 
and quality control of service. From this discussion the interplay between these three 
aspects of power (Figure 2-5) within the organisational field can be described as the 
‘institutional politics of a situation’ (Lawrence, 2008).  
The Power, Political, and Population Ecology perspectives underpin the 
systemic conflict model in organisations (Wilson, 1997). Within this perspective 
organisations are seen as coalitions of interest groups competing and conflicting in 
micro-political processes, in ways that may be at odds with the overarching 
organisational logic (Morgan, 1997, Nadler, 1993, Quinn, 1980). From such a 
perspective political action is a ‘fact of organisational life’ (Ferris and Judge, 1991), and 
organisations can be regarded as intrinsically political entities where managers have to 
manage ‘politically diverse and conflicting interests’ (Morgan, 1997: 154). 
Figure 2-5 - Institutional Politics and Power 
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Power occurs in the control of deviancy in organisations (Quinn, 1980), to co-op 
interest groups in order to reduce conflict (Pfeffer, 1993), to manage culture and 
meaning (Hardy, 1996b), as an embedded part of the supplier to buyer relationship 
along the supply chain (Chicksand, 2015, Cox, 2001, Cox, 2004, Touboulic et al., 2014) 
and to modify hidden assumptions and values (Schein, 1992). 
Unitary management perspectives largely ignore the political nature of 
organisations (Allen et al., 2002), eschew political action and pose issues such as 
resistance as aberrant behaviour (Willcocks and Currie, 1997) or even illegitimate 
(Mintzberg, 1983). Cooperation is assumed and political action treated as symbolic of 
breakdown and there is an overall neglect of ‘the social context and micro-political 
factors’ (Hong and Fiona, 2009: 312). The processes of exchange and the bargaining 
that routinely take place over time and reify the status of power at a given moment in 
time receive little attention (Dawson, 1996).  
Power is used to influence behaviour, to 'change the course of events', to 
manage resistance and to 'get people to act differently' (Emerson, 1962, Pfeffer, 1992). 
Politics is the process, actions and the behaviours by which power is practically 
expressed and operationalised (Horton, 2003, Senior and Swailes, 2010). Hardy 
(1996a) defined power along three dimensions: overt decision making power 
engendered from clearly observable conflict, the power of non-decision making and 
the suppression of alternative options, and the dimension of symbolic power. Where 
symbolic power is controlling the use of language and interpretive framework and is 
socially structured. 
Hardy extended these three dimensions with a fourth based on Lukes’ (1974) 
conceptualisation of the power of the system, and by this means emphasized the 
broader nature of power, moving away from a simple high-level unitary concept. Hardy 
argued that power was embedded in social action, in the systems of control, and 
within the cultural context of organisations. Based on the above discussion an 
overview of the power dimensions that will be used later as a sensitising framework 
during the coding in NVivo10 is shown as Figure 2-6. 
In summary ‘Power, politics and culture … are intertwined in the outsourcing 
process’ (Allen et al., 2002: 170), and power occurs during all aspects of outsourcing's 
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planning and execution. From the basic decision to outsource (Lacity and Hirschheim, 
1993, Marshall et al., 2015), managing conflict between executives and IT managers in 
the decision-making process (Chakrabarty and Whitten, 2011), to controlling supply 
compliance (Heiskanen et al., 2008), controlling supplier power (Stenbacka and 
Tombak, 2012), reducing the effects of conflict and resistance (Pfeffer, 1981, Pfeffer, 
1993) and to managing client dependency (Caniëls and Roeleveld, 2009). Political 
behaviours are seen as withholding or distorting information (Pettigrew, 1973), 
Controlling the agenda (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992), timing decisions to circumvent 
opposition and using inducements as a bargaining tool (Hickson et al., 1986, Papadakis 
et al., 1998).  
Figure 2-6 - Analysis framework power 
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2.3.5 Power, conflict and resources 
Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) posits that power within organisations arises 
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through the control and management of activities and scarce critical resources 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). Power is not a matter of possession and ownership but of 
discretionary control over availability (Dawson, 1996). RDT is related to early Social 
Exchange Theory where Organisations are seen as consisting of coalitions of competing 
interests, whose goals may (or may not) coincide with the over-arching organisational 
intent. Where interaction can be seen as a series of 'action and reaction' exchanges as 
control is maintained and re-created (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). RDT emphasises 
organisational dependence on the external environment, and organisations ‘cope with 
uncertainty… by inter-organisational coordination’ (ibid: 156) seeking to minimise their 
dependence whilst acting to increase their control over the resources held by others. 
This interconnectedness, concentration of resources in the environment, and relative 
abundance define resource availability and the power of the organisation to exploit 
them (Dawson, 1996). Inter-firm collaborations, it is argued, act to sustain the flow of 
resources and manage inter-organisational dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Furthermore, by effective management of these resources organisations can maintain 
their distinctive competitive features (Kern and Kreijger, 2001).  
Outsourcing creates a reciprocal dependency between supplier and buyer and 
a power relationship comes into existence between them (Emerson, 1962). 
Furthermore, Kern and Kreijger (2001) showed a high risk of dependency, and the 
development of a strategic vulnerability, from the control of core systems by the 
vendor especially when customisations to the system are allowed. From a structural 
perspective resource dependency engenders a mutual power relation between buyer 
and supplier and along the supply chain (Chicksand, 2015, Cox et al., 2004). This level 
of dependency will be moderated by the complexity of outsourcing, the criticality of 
the resource, availability of alternatives and switching cost (Caniëls and Roeleveld, 
2009, Cheon et al., 1995). Outsourcing is controlled by a commercial contract between 
the parties and the economic exchange at a high level is a contracted service delivery 
(Emerson, 1987). Power is operationalised in this context by the client disciplining the 
vendor to comply with requirements or by the supplier in controlling resources 
(Heiskanen et al., 2008). Clients and vendors have different objectives - vendors need 
to manage profit margin over the long and short term whilst the client is motivated by 
delivery performance and cost. These different perspectives are fundamentally 
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conflictual and the parties use power to achieve their own aims (Heiskanen et al., 
2008).  
Power exists in patterns of exchange as a property of a social relation and 
‘resides implicitly in the others dependency’ (Dawson, 2003, Emerson, 1962: 32) 
Emerson (1962) pp.32. Power is structured in the rules, processes and control 
mechanisms within an outsourcing relation. It acts to frame exchanges and constrain 
action within expected norms and it is this broader conceptualisation that will be used 
in this thesis. Outsourcing from this perspective can be seen as organisations seeking 
to acquire scarce resources outside their organisational boundaries, whilst controlling 
for the dependency created in the action of exchange. Inter-firm structures from this 
perspective are characterised as consisting of a network of ‘power relations based on  
exchanges of resources’ (Ulrich and Barney, 1984 : 472).  
2.3.6 Collaboration in an outsourcing project 
Collaboration, trust and firm specific knowledge are acquired over time and are 
institutionalised by a mechanism of socialisation enabled by social exchange (Klass, 
2003). During this process formal roles such as: the project manager, account manager 
or IT specialist become steadily replaced by personal relationships, formal control by 
psychological contracts, and relationships become socially embedded (Ring and van de 
Ven, 1994). Alliances and collaborations are adaptive environments where trust, 
control and relationships develop over time within a context of formal control (Inkpen 
and Currall, 2004, Klepper, 1995). 
Collaboration begins at the earliest stages of the engagement and is focused on 
defining initial conditions such as the clarification of the task,  governance, meeting 
structure, details of performance expectations, behaviour, and how these are to be 
monitored and controlled (Doz, 1996). It is at this stage that the parallel process of 
formal and informal bargaining begins and sense-making starts (Ring and van de Ven, 
1994). Initial conditions, it is argued, ‘imprint’ the processes and trajectory of the 
collaboration and set the ‘conditions fostering or blocking inter-partner learning’, 
leading to either virtuous circles of interactive learning or inertia  (Doz, 1996: 56). It is 
argued that during these initial stages the focus should be away from contracts, service 
level agreements and overtly formal governance structures and towards setting up the 
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relation correctly to support successful interaction (Lyles, 1988).  
Related to the setting of initial operating conditions is the question of initial 
control choice; whether market based, bureaucratic or trust based (Phua et al., 2011). 
This question addresses the risk orientation adopted by the client and determines the 
mode of control structure, for example bureaucratic, market or hybrid/clan-based 
(Ouchi, 1980). Bureaucratic oriented clients favour specific norms and rules, market 
control being more arm’s length based on cost/price, and trust-based favouring social 
and outcome controls (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). This latter point is supported 
by van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman (2000) who showed collaborations based on 
trust tended to have more social process controls and less detailed contracting. 
Related to this, balancing knowledge sharing and knowledge loss, due to 
leakage and differential partner learning, is also a significant issue in outsourcing 
especially between supplier partners (Li et al., 2012). Mesquita et al. (2008) even 
questioned the training of suppliers and argued that suppliers can potentially deploy 
the knowledge they gain either formally or informally to other clients. Although tacit 
knowledge is more embedded in the relationship, nevertheless this type of process 
could lead to ‘spillover risk’ (Inkpen and Currall, 2004). Partner knowledge being 
acquired, appropriated and lost (Park et al., 2011). 
Madhok (1995), when considering the number of failures and the high level of 
dissatisfaction in inter-firm relations, proposed that there was a neglect of the 
underlying social processes and proposed a trust based logic shifting the focus from 
ownership of resources to relational dynamics. Supporting this view Das and Teng 
(1997) showed that there was a lack of attention to the contingent social factors, such 
as the environment for trust and knowledge transfer, and this lack of attention could 
lead to failure in collaborative ventures. 
2.3.7 Sharing knowledge between partners 
Initial perceptions of trust and how trust continues to evolve is argued to be critical to 
knowledge sharing and benefit realisation (Lee and Choi, 2011). Inter-personal trust is 
more important to building relational success than interfirm relations and is an 
essential component in the facilitation of knowledge sharing (Cong and Chau, 2007). 
The development of trust and commitment can overcome differences in culture and 
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goals whereas weak actor bonds, disputes over contract interpretation, and frequent 
organisational changes ruin trust, threaten success and block partner learning (Johnsen 
et al., 2006).  
High levels of knowledge sharing including explicit knowledge (SLA’s, training 
and standards) are predictors of outsource success (Blumenberg et al., 2009). Lee 
(2001), for example, demonstrated that the degree of attainment of knowledge 
sharing was related to eventual outsource success. Successful knowledge transfer is a 
key process; tacit knowledge transfer is needed as declarative knowledge alone is 
insufficient to manage the service effectively. Ray et al. (2005b) developed this further 
showing that tacit socially complex resources lie at the heart of explaining differential 
performance in organisations, and the effects of IT are best understood at the level of 
the micro-processes and exchanges of knowledge. 
From a vendor perspective, within multiple supplier contracts, partner 
knowledge integration is critical for understanding the service requirements - and 
clarifying partner needs are linked to the success or failure of the partnership (Ahuja et 
al., 2011, Kale and Singh, 2007). In an information technology context, Ray et al. 
(2005a) built on this to assert that IT knowledge structures were tacit, socially complex 
and context specific, and understanding this fact fostered success, whereas a focus on 
the configuration of IT outsourcing alone did not.  
Frequent interaction, intentional actions to increase trust and interpersonal 
contact can be used to manage the difficult and diffuse nature of tacit knowledge 
(Collins and Hitt, 2006). This last point is supported by Al-Salti and Hackney (2011) who 
pointed out, that although manuals and reports are often physically available, for the 
transfer of codified knowledge, tacit processes are too complex and investments in 
face-to-face time are needed. Bustinza et al. (2010) supported the view that the 
tacitness and ambiguity of knowledge can mean that knowledge transfer is difficult 
and benefits are hard to realise in practice. As Eisenhardt and Santos (2002: 160) state: 
‘More focus should go into knowledge integration processes, in which the 
development of meaning and the creation of new knowledge occurs through individual 
interactions and is affected by social contexts’. Furthermore, this knowledge is 
acquired in a trust based context as a result of interactions and exchanges between 
actors performing the normal everyday work. 
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2.3.8 Delivering to expectations  
A key issue in the initial stages of an outsource is the setting of the expectations, since 
the predictability of expectations forms a crucial aspect of the judgement of output 
performance (Luhmann, 2000). From a service management perspective, a ‘decision 
maker compares the experience of the service against expectations’ (Rouse, 2007: 
131). This comparison is against two main quality dimensions, firstly, the technical or 
outcome of the service process, and secondly, the functional or interaction part 
covering the delivery of the service (Grönroos, 2011). To these two dimensions is 
added the relationship quality which is related to the learning of how to collaborate 
and work together (Ring and Ven, 1992).  
 Inkpen and Currall (2004) proposed that inter-firm trust is essential for 
knowledge transfer. Relationships characterised as high trust enable partners to 
refrain from using tight controls – low trust implying a fear of opportunism. Process 
based controls inhibit supplier performance and do not allow the supplier to show 
competence in managing the service delivery (Tiwana and Keil, 2007). Furthermore, 
process controls are not needed when managing highly competent suppliers and may 
actually be counterproductive. This latter view is consistent with research that showed 
bureaucratic hierarchical organisations, with a preventative contracting approach, can 
suppress knowledge sharing and the development of a culture that supports 
innovation (Al-Salti and Hackney, 2011). 
Uzzi (1997) argued that exchange processes that result in outcomes meeting 
client expectations lead to the building of trust. Trust emerges as a result of exchanges 
occurring over time when the obligations of the exchange are successfully met. Trust 
can act as a 'behavioural lubricant' in inter-organisational relationships and permits 
partners to be more tolerant of occasional failures (Madhok, 1995). This allows 
moderate deviations from the expected norms based on the belief that the 
performance will be corrected without the need for formal sanctions. Trust from this 
perspective implies positive expectations and confidence that those expectations will 
be met (Luhmann, 2000). Sako and Helper (1998) defined trust along three 
dimensions: contractual (meet contract obligations), competence (ability to perform) 
and goodwill (collaboration for mutual benefit), that map closely to the service 
management concepts of technical and functional service delivery which underpin the 
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expectations within an outsource contract (Grönroos, 2012). The key point is how trust 
arises and develops over time, its various social components and the way exchanges 
and communication between organisations maintains it (Madhok, 1995, Ring and Ven, 
1992). For example, as trust increases, high levels of communication are not required 
and social control dominates (Ybarra and Turk, 2009).  
2.4 Summary and conceptual framework 
2.4.1 Research gap 
The literature review showed that there is an evident shortfall in process-oriented 
studies in outsourcing and an endogenous approach, moving away from ‘borrowed 
theories’, and focused on the actual mechanisms of change is required (section 2.2.7). 
It was shown in the review that although Institutional Theory is a useful addition as a 
theoretical lens there has been virtually no empirical research into the micro practices 
of work or on how the process of deinstitutionalisation practically impacts resources, 
boundaries and organisations (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). Furthermore, the 
review showed that the influence of history on institutional structure mainly ignored 
the micro-practices of work, takes an organisational level of analysis (Oliver, 1992), 
with a very limited body of knowledge from a process standpoint (Mignerat and 
Rivard, 2009). How innovation is shaped or work practices altered by antecedent 
factors is also under researched. The notion adopted here is that organisations contain 
vestiges of the past and history that can profoundly impact success and constrain the 
future (Campbell, 2004, Kingston and Caballero, 2009). The literature also suggested a 
strong influence for power on outsourcing; in the way formal control is applied, by the 
use of systemic power, and in how conflict can arise in an interfirm context. However, 
where and how conflict arises in the practices of work remains untouched. The 
proposition is that outsourcing represents a network of power and high power 
contexts transform and are transformed by everyday practices and politics (Bourdieu, 
1991) . Finally collaboration and partner learning is suggested as an essential 
ingredient for success that could be blocked by poor practices. Blocked partner 
learning can lead to outsourcing failure and the exchanges that give rise to this can be 
the object of study from a process perspective (Levina, 2005, Ray et al., 2005a).  
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2.4.2 Research contribution 
This research uses an institutional, power and structuration lens to closely examine the 
actual practices of work of purposive actors solving everyday problems as they work 
together to deliver the outsourced solution (March, 1981). Central to the research are 
the collaborative practices of work delivering the outcomes and how this is influenced 
by, history, context and power. The research aims to contribute to the outsourcing 
literature by explaining apparent poor success as partially a consequence of poor 
implementation practices, power and real world constraints on action. 
2.4.3 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework shown in Figure 2-7 displays the interrelations between 
literature concepts discussed in section 2.3. Arrows on this diagram show conjectured 
relations between the derived constructs. The analysis for this framework is shown as 
Appendix F. The diagram shows how the influence of antecedents might influence 
current events, especially how collaboration is built and maintained or how legacy 
work practices are renewed or replaced in the new project and is shown as ‘history 
and antecedents’ in Figure 2-7. The outsourcing project took place within a Defence 
Sector organisation in Europe (DefOrg) that was a highly-centralised bureaucracy. The 
management of the procurement and governance of any project, including this 
outsourcing activity, was formalised and strictly controlled to manage buyer risk. 
Based on the literature, heavily formalised and controlling contracts are assumed to 
have a negative impact on innovation and collaboration and this construct is shown as 
‘institutional context’ in Figure 2-7. Strong governance, enforcing compliance to 
contractual norms, or disciplining suppliers for service failure, demonstrates explicit 
application of power, and increases power and conflict within the outsourcing 
relationship. Furthermore, contingencies; such as delivery failures, arguments over 
scope, or major changes in the project scope, may increase internal conflict as a new 
project balance is negotiated. The construct of power and conjectured influence on 
implementation is shown as ‘power and conflict’ in Figure 2-7. 
The outsourcing organisation for the HRM application and service consisted of 
three main supplier parties and three departments within the buying organisation. 
These organisations worked together collaboratively to create the service. From the 
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literature, high levels of collaboration and knowledge sharing for complex services can 
lead to improved outsource outcomes; conversely, poor collaboration can lead to 
failure. This construct is shown as ‘collaborating and implementing’ in Figure 2-7. The 
process of implementing delivers outcomes related to the contractual goals. The 
failure to deliver goals can result from capability or contingent factors and can be 
constrained by real world factors this construct is represented in Figure 2-7 by 
‘delivering outcomes and expectations’. 
Figure 2-7 - Conceptual framework HRMSys project 
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The conceptual framework suggested four main research questions. Firstly, it is rare 
for an outsourcing to be implemented de novo therefore what could be the influence 
of prior history on how the development initiates and proceeds (RQ1)? Secondly, how 
does strong governance and control influence the progress of the work (RQ2) – this is 
especially apposite in this project as it occurred in a defence context. Thirdly, in what 
ways is outsourcing a political process, why does it occur, and how does this influence 
success (RQ3)? Finally, how do organisations work effectively and do processes change 
as collaboration is deepened? This leads to a consideration of whether the above 
factors together act as inhibiters or accelerators and as a consequence outsourcing as 
a change is always partially limited by time and contextual constraints (RQ4). 
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2.4.4 Research questions and rationale 
In this section the research questions derived from the framework will be mapped the 
interview questions used in the initial stages of the project to gain initial 
understanding, Appendix D, and the final post IOC interview series Appendix E, that 
explored and validated emergent themes. During the activity a formal protocol was 
not used and observations, reports and informal interviews, on specific issues, were 
used as the data acquisition method. The scope of the interview guides is shown on 
Figure 3-5. The interview questions were derived by thematising the research 
questions into meaningful sentences that allowed the respondent to describe the 
events that occurred from their perspective (Kvale, 1996, Kvale, 2007).  
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history impact and constrain the 
implementation processes of outsourcing?  
The first question focuses on the prior conditions and context up until the actual start-
up of HRMSys. It considers the broader impact of context and explores the prior 
history and the initial relationship between the parties, especially PersonSoft and 
HRMDept and how this history influenced the current activity. 
 Can you describe how the outsource vendor (PersonSoft) was selected? 
 How formal or informal were the discussions? 
 The contract and agreement is it too tight or too lax? 
 How would you say the relationship developed between the parties during the 
contracting phase? 
 How were communications between the organisations at that time?  
There were also three group interviews held jointly with senior staff from HRMDept 
and PersonSoft after the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) phase with the topic the 
prior history between the organisations and the selection process for the outsourced 
activity. 
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance impact the development 
practices and how they evolve during the implementation? 
The second question goes more deeply into the practices of work, and how the actors 
within the project went about solving problems and creating the service products. 
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 What actions or behaviours in your view helped progress? 
 What actions or behaviours in your view hindered progress? 
 What do you consider the negative events that possibly led to a poor outcome 
during the implementation of HRMSys? 
RQ3: How do power and conflict arise during the implementation of outsourcing? 
RQ3.1: How do power and conflict impact work practices? 
The conflict and power dimensions were explored by asking the respondents to reflect 
on critical issues and problems that occurred during the implementation.   
 What aspects of working together were effective in delivering outcomes? 
 What aspects of working together were blocking progress? 
 How effective were your partners in delivering the outcomes? 
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project? 
Question four completes the research by reviewing the situated nature of change, 
taking a practice based perspective to understand how the change process unfolded 
during this implementation.  
 Thinking back on the implementation of HRMSys from your perspective: 
 What do you consider the positive or beneficial outcomes/events that occurred 
as a result of the implementation? 
 What do you consider the negative events that possibly led to a poor outcome 
during the implementation of HRMSys?  
 Were there any critical points where things went well or went badly?  
 
Following the interviews the responses were thematically analysed in NVivo10 to 
structure the answers to the research questions. In addition email narratives, reports, 
observations were also analysed against this research framework and this process is 
described in detail in the research design Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 – Research design and context 
The research design is a plan describing how the research is to be organised, data 
collected and analysed, such that the research questions are answered (Easterby-
Smith et al., 1991). The key choices in the design are determined by the philosophical 
position adopted by the researcher which in turn is driven by the nature of the enquiry 
and research questions. To meet the requirements of disciplined enquiry the design is 
organised around four aspects: the paradigm, the strategy of enquiry, the methods of 
data acquisition and the data analysis. All of which must be internally consistent and 
coherent with the overall philosophy adopted (Hiles, 1999). 
3.1 Paradigms 
A paradigm provides a guide for research and is a framework of rules, techniques and 
methods, forming a coherent set of practices (Kuhn, 1962). As Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
pointed out however, paradigms are just a set of basic beliefs in that they must be 
accepted on faith, as there is 'no way to establish their ultimate truth' (ibid: 107). The 
point Guba and Lincoln are making is that what is acceptable scientific knowledge is 
not theory neutral, but a negotiated social construction. Research practice from such a 
standpoint allows incorporation of methods across paradigms dependent on the 
research need. Nevertheless, it is important that the underpinning assumptions of 
incorporated techniques are understood, fully grounded and made visible within the 
research (Shepherd and Challenger, 2013).  
The paradigm from Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) perspective defines the bounds 
of legitimate enquiry and can be determined from consideration of the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological perspective of the enquirer. The ontological 
question considers assumptions about the nature of reality. This focuses on whether 
there is an objective reality 'out there' to be observed or whether reality exists only in 
the mind of the observer. Epistemological questions consider the nature of legitimate 
and warranted scientific knowledge and thus what can be regarded as truth. Finally, 
methodological aspects examine how knowledge should be acquired consistent with 
the ontological and epistemological research standpoint adopted. Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) extended this reasoning by inclusion of the values and assumptions of human 
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nature. That is, whether action is determined by the context or whether there is an 
underlying core of human agency and self-interest. Based on this extended set of 
assumptions (Burrell and Morgan) outlined four major paradigms constructed from the  
subjective/objective and regulatory/radical change dimensions that are shown in 
Figure 3-1 below. 
Figure 3-1 – Research Paradigms 
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Criticising in particular the 'naïve realism' implicit in positivism, Guba and Lincoln 
(1994) set down refinements to the positivist paradigm, post positivism, where an 
imperfect critical realism is accepted, replicated findings indicate probable truth and 
falsification replaces verification as the validation mechanism. This perspective, 
although broadly accepting of experimentation, places an emphasis on replication and 
triangulation as well as an orientation towards organisational enquiry within natural 
settings (see Guba and Lincoln, 1994 table 6.1: 109). This post-positivist paradigm 
exists between the functional and interpretivist spectrum and can be characterised as 
realist/interpretivist, retaining aspects of a functional perspective while including 
emergent social processes and the experiences of social actors into the object of 
enquiry. Five potential paradigms are therefore available, and below is an assessment 
of which of these is most likely to answer the research questions. 
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3.2 Choice of paradigm 
A 'purely' positivist perspective has been criticised for its: over-rational, experimental 
orientation, with an over-reliance on hypothetico/deductive reasoning (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). Furthermore, there is a strong orientation towards quantitative 
approaches as the only valid approach to knowledge creation, a position roundly 
debunked by Cook and Reichardt (1979). Flyvberg (2004) went further, criticising 
attempts to construct theories to explain organisational behaviour, suggesting 
'predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs' 
(Flyvberg, 2004: 423). Finally, context is important as it makes theory more robust, and 
simplifications by de-contextualisation in positivist research in a search for parsimony 
risk misrepresentation (Rousseau and Fried, 2001). Accordingly, based on the need to 
include context, the inability to experimentally manipulate the organisations and a 
need to research historical and contemporary behaviours, a positivist paradigm is not 
suitable for this research. 
Critical perspectives are also realist but start from the standpoint of historical 
realism, where organisations are considered as social creations, within a broader 
historical economic context that engenders asymmetric patterns of power in society 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). A critical research paradigm regards organisations as 
political sites, where conflict over the control of resources between organisational 
actors gives rise to distortions in the distribution of goods, services and income. A 
radical structuralist position is adopted and the objective of critical research is 
emancipatory, with the broad aim the overthrow of current economic structures. This 
research focusses on the exchanges occurring at the site of the outsourcing service, 
and the micro-political processes that arise, and will not consider the overarching 
societal aspects as would a critical perspective. In addition, although critical research 
does address power and conflict, the object is to address social influences and 
emancipation, and is regarded as less practical than more normative approaches. 
Consequently, as the research perspective adopted here is normative, and questions of 
societal injustices will not be addressed, a critical view, although insightful, will not 
form the paradigm underpinning this research. 
Interpretivist viewpoints take a subjective ontology and understand 
organisational phenomena by exploring the subjective meanings of organisational 
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actors within their natural setting (Saunders et al., 2003). Rarely considering power 
and politics, the focus of the research is in identifying emergent social processes, and is 
broadly constructionist and emic in its approach. This research into outsourcing 
follows a broadly etic approach where across-setting comparability is sought. 
Furthermore, the exchanges and decisions that are observed are assumed to be real 
behaviours and not subjective constructions in the minds of the actors. Accordingly, 
the research does not follow a purely Interpretist perspective.  
Finally, a Post-Modern perspective takes a fully relativist position and has a 
subjective ontology and epistemology. In this case there is no acceptance of an 
objective reality to observe and all phenomena are constructions of societal 
influences. The main focus of research is language, and the search for knowledge and 
truth in structures of discourse, and the principal thrust is the overthrow of existing 
societal relations. It is also ideographic, with a focus on individual cases or events, with 
research techniques such as deconstruction the core of the analysis. The usefulness of 
this approach in an organisational setting has been questioned, and its fragmented 
approach, its view that power resides in structures of language, and overall obscure 
writing makes its utility in this research doubtful (see Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). 
This research addresses the outsourcing relations between clients and vendors 
in the natural context of the location where the service is delivered. The object of 
study is the outsourcing case and the interactions that take place, along with the 
relations that develop, between actors performing their everyday roles. The 
perspective of the researcher is that there exists 'evolving relationships to be 
discovered in the social world' (Miles and Huberman, 1984 : 23), and aims to explain 
what is going on in the research subject. Real behaviours and exchanges will be 
examined and triangulated across historical records. A framework will be built up 
explaining the outsource service process, the patterns of power and cooperation, and 
the antecedents to decisions based on a qualitative case analysis. From this 
perspective the research follows a realist/interpretivist paradigm and is post positive in 
the terms of Guba and Lincoln (1994). 
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3.3 Context of research 
Context is the setting within which the behaviour under study occurs, and is the 
'stimuli and phenomena … in the environment external to the individual' (Johns, 2001: 
22). It consists of two main factors: the substantive and the methodological context. 
Substantive context consists of the task attributes, the information processes and 
social norms that constrain action, whilst methodological context defines how the 
research is conducted and key research decisions made (Johns, 2001) 
Serious consideration of context clarifies the predictions of theory and adds 
explanatory value to the study. To add value the details of context must be 
appropriate, as too much contextual information can give a false appearance of 
uniqueness to the case (Johns, 2001). Context begins with a strategic selection of cases 
that frames the domain of study and represents the range of variability within the 
phenomena (Flyvberg, 2004, Johns, 2001, Rousseau and Fried, 2001). However a range 
selection restricts and moderates the phenomena under study and this restriction 
should be accounted for within the research results. For example, where cases are 
chosen from restricted organisational settings, such as the public sector, the specific 
nature of the context at that point in time and how it might frame the results should 
be acknowledged and explained.  
Methodological context is accounted for by making the processes of research 
visible. Clarifying how the research was conducted, and demonstrating consistency in 
the use of levels and units of analysis, enables an aspect of validity and auditing of the 
research process (Johns, 2001). For example, social exchange theory applies to the 
level of the individual (Blau, 1964). The research location for this thesis is where the 
service is performed, and the object of study is the exchange between suppliers and 
customers in an outsourcing relation. From this perspective, the evolution of the 
service is tracked over time and used to explain the outcome by considering the 
impact of critical exchanges. By holding such a focus on a consistent level of analysis 
two logical traps can be avoided: firstly, 'treating organisations as if they have the 
same properties as individuals and, secondly, treating organisational outcomes as 
merely the aggregate product of individual behaviours'  (Swanson (1971) as cited in 
Whetten et al., 2009: 543). 
Substantive context operates at two levels. Firstly, at a level external to the 
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phenomena, where organisational factors, the external environment, job role and time 
are important. Organisations can be seen as social actors in their own right that exhibit 
high levels of control over their individual members and employees and maintain the 
social context (King et al., 2010). Context also has a constraining influence on the 
phenomena under study especially in strong situations, in for example bureaucratic 
organisations such as defence, where the influence of control on behaviour is much 
higher compared to looser organisations (Rousseau and Fried, 2001). This control is felt 
in terms of the management control structures, risk appetite, processes and 
procedures within which individuals carry out their day-to-day work. For example, in a 
situation such as outsourcing in the public sector, this can be seen in contracts, 
procedures, and clauses containing detailed statements of work that are quite 
restrictive in terms of how the service is to be performed. The second aspect of 
substantive context occurs at the level of the phenomena and concerns the events and 
'bundles of practice' (Rousseau and Fried, 2001). In this case the context is felt in the 
accepted norms and rules required for the performance of the service as they are 
framed by the institutional context and the ways in which the service is defined in 
service level agreements, control meetings, and day-to-day formal interaction 
between the actors. 
The focus of this research is on the practice of work and how the institutional 
context influences both initial conditions and evolution of work practice over time, 
with a view to understanding how outsourcing outcomes are judged and decisions 
rationalised. But outsourcing as a practice also operates within a broader societal 
environment. This outsourcing research is occurring in a period when the UK is 
emerging from a period of recession and where public sector outsourcing is being 
driven by a need to reduce cost in a period of austerity. Furthermore, although 
outsourcing is regarded as a maturing management practice, it is nevertheless subject 
to problems of empirical justification, and signs of increasing resistance and 
dissatisfaction are emerging. This broader context is seen as social, technological, 
economic and political influences, including regulatory pressure, to reduce cost by 
outsourcing. Figure 3-2 below summarises the contextual factors framing the work 
practices of an outsourcing service within an organisational context. It shows the main 
contextual streams and the sources of data informing the research and also acts as an 
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organising framework for the data acquisition and analysis. 
Figure 3-2 - Research context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Enquiry strategy 
3.4.1 Case study research 
Much empirical research within organisations is high level, consisting of surveys and 
occasional interviews with (mainly) senior level management, and cannot access the 
true problem. This is because problems are bound to the organisational context and 
this takes time to learn (Gummerson, 2000). Poor and superficial access, in 
Gummerson's view, is characteristic of much management research and risks 
delivering 'advanced statistical analysis of poor empirical data' and to overcome this a 
case study approach is required (Gummerson, 2000: 80). A case study from this 
perspective is an analysis of an organisation within its natural setting and enables a 
'fundamental understanding of the structure of processes and driving forces' within 
organisations (ibid: 89). The understanding of the context in this way enables research 
to move away from simplistic rule-based logic towards effective knowledge acquisition 
and understanding of the phenomena (Flyvberg, 2004). Finally, where control over the 
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environment is impossible or the object of study is ‘not distinguishable from its 
context’ or the boundary unclear then a case study is most appropriate (Yin, 1994, Yin, 
2003: 4). 
Furthermore, within an organisational area such as information technology 
outsourcing, it is appropriate to use a case when the phenomena to be observed is 
dynamic, immature, or when there is no agreed settled theory (Darke et al., 1998).The 
case itself can be seen as a system that exhibits patterns of behaviour that reveal its 
inner workings (Darke et al, 1998). Embedding constructs, such as power, within the 
organisational context, enable theory elaboration and allows differences and 
similarities across units and levels of analysis to emerge, whilst also enabling theory 
development to be enhanced (Vaughan, 2000). 
Research questions drive the choice of case, its location, and the focus of the 
research (Darke et al., 1998, Vaughan, 2000) while the type of questions give clues as 
to the form of study to be followed. 'What' questions denote exploratory studies and 
draw mainly on historical documentary evidence, whereas 'how/why' questions imply 
explanatory research (Yin, 1994). In explanatory research; cases, experiments or 
historical analysis form the core of the approach where access to phenomena by direct 
observation is required. Stake (2008) proposed three broad types of case study 
enquiry: 
 Intrinsic studies where study proceeds as a result of a basic intrinsic interest in 
the phenomena by the researcher,  
 Instrumental studies that aim to expose theory and explain and, 
 Collective case studies, where instrumental approaches are extended across 
multiple cases. 
Explanatory research can be developed on the basis of a single case study with 
additional cases used as a form of replication protocol (Darke et al., 1998). In this 
situation, a strategic selection of cases that represent the research domain is required, 
in order to ensure variability of phenomena across cases and to maximise the actors 
involved. This avoids the risk of a diffuse view of the behaviour being studied that 
could result if a random case selection procedure was followed (Flyvberg, 2004). 
The research reported in this thesis is a supply chain case study with six organisations 
contributing to the outcome (Gummerson, 1991, Yin, 1994) using participant 
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observation (Waddington, 2004), interviews and documentary analysis of contracts 
and substantial volumes of on-going e-mail traffic (May, 2005, Rowlinson, 2004), 
focusing on the negotiation, initialization, implementation and service activities 
between six collaborative partners in the defence industry as they implemented a 
large-scale human resource application (HRMSys) for a defence client (DefOrg).  
 The research questions considered two main aspects within the outsourcing 
service setting. Firstly, how the context and antecedent conditions influenced the 
initial stages of the activity, and secondly how relationships and service practices 
developed over time. On this basis the research adopted a realist perspective in that 
the objects of study were real project events and processes occurring outside of the 
internal lives of the participants (Kvale, 2007). A key aspect of case study approaches is 
the multiple methods of data collection. To support the research two main types of 
data were acquired: firstly, documentary evidence, meeting minutes, consulting 
reports and other project documentation; secondly, qualitative semi-structured 
interviews and email narratives that were made accessible. The participant 
observation aimed to create a contemporaneous account as a framework to situate 
and validate respondent responses that occurred months or years after the event 
(Barley and Tolbert, 1997). Respondent data enabled a historical reconstruction of the 
key events as the implementation narrative unfolded, whilst documentation enabled 
the accounts of the respondents to be situated within their context as well as 
providing triangulation of events (May, 2005).  
3.4.2 Interviews 
The interview approach was semi-structured in the sense that themes to be raised 
during the interview were scripted but the researcher was allowed to follow emergent 
themes that arose during the process (King, 2004a). In a practical sense this meant the 
researcher could step outside of the script to explore new avenues which would not be 
the case in a fully structured interview. Realist interviews tend to be more structured 
than is the case for phenomenological or social constructionist semi-structured 
approaches, the focus of which is the internal lives of participants. More structure in 
the realist interview allows comparisons to be made across respondents and the 
different forms of data which supports triangulation. For example, documentary 
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evidence was used to verify the recall of respondents and to compare and contrast 
themes across the case organisations. 
An interview guide covering the main elements of the interview sessions is 
shown later as Appendix D. It is a list of questions and themes that were addressed 
during the interview session and included probes for further information or 
clarification. Making explicit the topics to be discussed in the guide also allowed for 
validation and confirmation of research quality by, for example, analysing interview 
question coverage, or how effectively questions and probes were being asked (Guest 
et al., 2012). Although the general question structure of the guide was similar across 
the case organisations, different respondents were involved at different times (and 
performed different roles) and required some change in emphasis to the questions. 
Furthermore, following the IOC phase closure a series of interviews were conducted 
focused on critical events and behaviours this interview protocol is shown later in 
Appendix E. Within the outsource buyer these included the senior and junior 
management levels, and on the vendor side, the client account teams, contract and 
project managers.  
It is a research proposition that the evolution of the service and the 
relationships set the direction towards a specific endpoint and thus in part explain the 
outcome. The general data collection strategy was to conduct interviews, within the 
case organisations, when the outsourcing project had reached a defined terminal 
state. In the case of this research the main interviews, including follow-up, were 
conducted post the initial operating capability delivery. In this way the research 
validated historic events that led to a certain decision point in time, for example, 
continuing with the contract, cancelling, continuing but dissatisfied, or even switching 
suppliers (Freytag et al., 2012). This meant that the issue of continuity was broadly 
settled before the final research interviews started. This reduced the risk of the 
researcher being treated as a consultant, being asked for opinions or 
recommendations, and helped the researcher as a result maintain a level of objectivity 
(Doz, 1996, Stake, 1994). 
In planning the primary data collection, the interviews, three basic tasks 
needed to be considered: clarification of the purpose of the study, understanding and 
gaining pre-knowledge, and defining which techniques of interviewing would be 
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needed to acquire the right knowledge (Kvale, 2007). The first of these tasks involved 
thematising the research questions, which meant clarifying the meaning and the 
theme of the study. This enabled focus to be placed on those behaviours that needed 
to be identified (during interviews) to answer the research questions - all other 
matters fell into the background (Kvale, 2007). 
The overall interview structure followed the research questions from the initial 
phases and start-up of the service to the notional endpoint. This is when the 
performance was evaluated and the decision taken whether or not to continue. The 
research purpose was to search out historical events that occurred during an 
outsourcing contract at specific phases of the implementation that materially impacted 
the outsourcing outcome. Responses were then critically examined to assess 
respondents’ self-presentation and underpinning rationale for any decisions taken. By 
this means the respondents’ recall was anchored in time and information elicited in a 
structured order. The types of questions and linguistic structure used fell into matter 
of fact descriptive questions, and questions with a more evaluative and cognitive 
thrust, that fitted in with the general realist perspective of this research (Kvale, 2007). 
Questions that were descriptive asked the respondent to describe a situation for 
example, 'Can you tell me what happened?', or, ‘Can you describe…?' Evaluative 
questions on the other hand probed the respondents’ judgement and took the form, 
'What do you think was happening or going on then?', or, 'How did you judge that…?' 
During the interview process, unless spontaneously arising, respondents were 
probed for specific critical incidents occurring during the phases of the project. A 
critical incident account is always historic, and subject to a risk of loss in detail, but as it 
is critical it is always possible to achieve good recall as the event itself creates a 'hook' 
on which the respondent can attach his or her narrative (Chell, 2004). A critical 
incident, for the research purpose, was a behaviour undertaken during the specific 
phase of an outsourcing project that shaped the outcome and revealed ‘prototypical 
behaviour' (Chell, 2004). Probing for a critical incident was performed by using 
questions structures such as; 'Can you describe the positive and negative events that 
moved the project forward or inhibited progress?', or, 'What happened when…?' In 
this research context respondents were asked to describe an incident and go on to 
describe its outcome. For example, if a key worker was removed (or joined) the 
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outsourcing vendor and moved to another project this could be the critical incident, 
whilst the judgement of outcome was that it had a profound effect on team cohesion. 
By such a critical incident approach, within the broader interview strategy, the wider 
context and setting of the behaviour was understood, and from there the researcher 
was able to assess the managerial and process impact. 
The general principle of data collection was to document the case as the data 
was collected and interview logistics followed the general guidelines as suggested by 
King (2004a). Interview notes were taken during the interview, in addition to 
recording, in order to note specific issues and any contextual influences in the 
interview setting. Where permission was given, all interviews were tape recorded in 
situ or by audio streaming capture for online interviews. All interviews were 
transcribed verbatim into Word 2010 ready for import into NVivo10. Furthermore, 
interview notes taken during the interview, and all meeting reports, were completed 
immediately (or as soon as possible) after the interview was concluded to aid recall. 
Case summaries, interview notes and contextual information were also confirmed with 
the respondent and any issues requiring clarification were followed up, either by a 
short interview, or via email. Transcribed interviews, meeting reports, documentary 
evidence and other source material were prepared and imported into NVivo10 where 
the bulk of the analysis and coding was carried out. To clarify whether research 
objectives were being covered, the interview protocol (Appendix E) was validated by 
conducting three pilot interviews with the Services Director and Two Consultants from 
PersonSoft, enabling the later interviews to be refocused and the interview guide 
adjusted. The coding and the loading to NVivo10 of transcripts started as soon as the 
main research material was available. This also provided further confirmation that data 
needs were being met, and enabled minor adjustments to the interview protocol to 
take place.  
3.5 Documentary evidence 
Documents were used to triangulate respondents’ accounts, for example the dates of 
significant events or contextual influences on the outsourcing relation. Differences in 
recall of particular events in respondent interviews were compared to the 
documentary evidence and yielded themes and issues from disputes that had been lost 
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from awareness. For example, the agreement of a particular action can be forgotten 
over time, or the specific context within which the decision was made can be glossed 
over. In a similar vein, it was important to clarify the intent of the document, what the 
purpose of the author was, and how its meaning was interpreted and enacted by the 
recipients (May, 2001). It was also important to consider what was included, or 
omitted, from the text as inconsistencies in the level of detail across documents and 
accounts can yield insight into causal factors of internal disputes. Documents also 
provided understanding of the structure and organisational context within which the 
outsourcing took place. For example, company memos, procedural guidelines and 
strategy documents acted to define the context of the outsourcing service delivery.  
In addition to standard documentation, emails formed a core set of data 
collected for the research, as full email traffic from a shared email account, capturing 
the entire interaction for the full implementation phase, was made available to the 
researcher when the initial operating capability (IOC) phase was concluded. Following 
data cleansing to remove duplicates this data was constructed into narrative ‘threads’ 
and coded against case nodes. Data cleansing was carried out by extracting the email 
traffic from Outlook, using a small visual basic macro, then importing into Excel 2010 
then executing a utility program to remove duplications and erroneous data (such as 
email signatures). Figure 3-3 shows the categorisation schema used within the 
research for the documentation element of the data and summarises the volumes of 
data collated for this thesis.  
Figure 3-3 - Document categorisation in NVivo10 
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The analysis of documentation proceeded in the same way as a textual analysis of the 
interviews and thematically analysed. The major difference between interviews and 
documents is that documentation will be historic and represent the context of a 
situation at a point in time. Furthermore, documents such as emails, internal memos, 
minutes or reports are not composed with an external audience in mind, or to record 
history, but are created to record organisational decisions resulting from 'the outcome 
of political processes' (Rowlinson, 2004). Further, the analysis of documentary 
evidence is selective, first by the selective availability and actual selection of what 
documents to include, and second by the selectivity of the account within the text 
itself (May, 2005). However, this limitation was minimal in this research as a full three 
years of all documentation, including all applicable standards, was made available to 
the researcher. Never-the-less these aspects and risks when using documentary 
evidence, especially the selection of what documentary evidence to include, are 
acknowledged and explained in the analysis. 
3.6 The analysis approach 
3.6.1 Applied thematic analysis 
The analysis was based on 'thematic analysis (as) a method for identifying, analysing, 
and reporting patterns (or themes) within data' (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 6). Themes 
are understood as patterns of meaning within text that inform and relate to the 
research questions. From a realist perspective, the themes represent real experiences, 
events and actions compared to a more constructionist view where these patterns 
represent socially constructed understandings of the events. Qualitative data, free 
flowing text from semi-structured interviews, are analysed and themes identified 
within the text by finding segments that express an implicit or explicit idea related to a 
research question (Guest et al., 2012). This text is then coded. This code represents a 
theme, an abstracted research concept, and it is the structure of the codes, particularly 
the relationship between them, that is subsequently analysed. 
Themes are identified and text coded: either top-down deductively, where the 
analysis proceeds guided by the researcher’s theoretical interest, or inductively, 
bottom-up, where no pre-existing framework or theory is assumed (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). In this latter case, themes reflect the internal world of the respondent, and may 
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not relate directly to a specific research question and coding proceeds without trying 
to fit in with an existing theoretical context. Grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) has no predetermined coding structure; the structure of the codes are 
inductively derived from the data by a process of constant comparison. Grounded 
Theory is oriented towards the development of theory and does not assume the 
questions or the analysis, are framed a priori by a theoretical position. 
Applied Thematic Analysis, Guest et al. (2012), shares many similarities with 
grounded theory in that a rigorous framework for the analysis is followed, but oriented 
towards explaining, exploring, or validating existing theory, rather than theory 
development. The research orientation adopted is explanatory and realist and themes 
within the text are assumed to point to concrete events. Segments of text, that are 
surrogates for real patterns of exchange or power, are coded and the analysis of these 
themes used to understand and explain outcomes. Compared to a template analysis 
(King, 2004b) there is no prior insight into the structure of the themes. This has to 
come from analysis, but the approach is deductive, and in contrast to grounded theory 
verification and discovery can take place at the same time (Vaughan, 2000). Template 
analysis, for example, classifies data based on themes identified during literature 
analysis and a set of codes is developed a priori (King, 2004b). Although the codes can 
be added to during the analysis, the overall coding structure is predetermined which 
was not the case in this research. 
Analysis involved three major steps: firstly data reduction, the simplification 
and the abstraction of ideas and transforming these into coherent themes; secondly, 
the display of data in tables or figures and, finally, drawing conclusions from the data, 
verification and critically evaluating (Darke et al., 1998). During the analysis phase links 
were also made from the themes/constructs that emerged which can help 'lift theory 
development' to a new level (Eisenhardt, 1989b). 
3.7 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity of qualitative research address the question of 'trustworthiness' 
(Stiles, 1993). Trustworthiness in Stiles’ view has two main aspects, firstly, reliability, 
whether or not the observations represent the phenomena consistently and, secondly, 
validity; how well the interpretation of the data can be trusted. To address these 
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concerns, procedural consistency, and the accuracy of data analysis techniques, has 
been made visible, by showing a clear trace from raw data via constructs to 
dimensions, such that reviewers can have confidence that the research is trustworthy. 
Content validity has been addressed separately for narrative descriptions, 
interpretations, and theme identification as well as theories and judgements (Stake, 
2008). Methodological validity covering: data collection, data display, data reduction 
and the drawing of conclusions was assured by making visible verifiable procedures 
that enable full traceability, and in principle allows for replication by other researchers 
(Miles and Huberman, 1984). Results from qualitative research can only be uncertain, 
unless these processes, procedures, assumptions and operations are made clear and 
visible. Issues with how the data was selected, its reduction and analysis, and coding, 
cannot be evaluated unless an audit trail is in place (ibid.). Accordingly, all main data 
items, notes, records, and documentation were coded and kept together and a full 
track on all research material implemented. 
Repeatability of observations is not possible in case study research and 
triangulation and replications are used, to clarify meaning, and to acknowledge 
different perspectives (Stake, 2008). Triangulation is the overriding type of validity and 
assesses multiple sources of data for coherence and convergence of the findings 
(Stiles, 1993: 608). Triangulation also helped to avoid bias and supported the 
maintenance of a clear evidence trail. Presenting results in lucid and unambiguous 
language was also important in ensuring a link can be seen from the observational data 
to the final analytical statement (Darke et al., 1998). Bias was also reduced by checking 
for representativeness, taking a sceptical position, searching for disconfirmation, or 
assuming the data is flawed and actively looking for other explanations (Stiles, 1993).  
A particular risk to validity during analysis concerns the use of computer aided 
analysis techniques such as NVivo10 as the main tool that was used for the storage and 
analysis of data. The use of computer programs in qualitative analysis has long been a 
concern of researchers (Grbich, 2007). In Grbich’s (2007) view, the procedural aspects 
of preparing and entering data into a computer system are fundamentally reductionist 
and promote procedural rather than interpretive thinking. The use of the coding 
structure, and a hierarchical creation of nodes (in NVivo10), potentially risks 
prematurely framing the data, risks losing context, and oversimplifies meanings within 
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the data. Furthermore, the process of abstraction of segments of text into themes can 
break the narrative thread and chain of reasoning. Finally, the use of a qualitative data-
management system, that can easily handle vast quantities of data, encourages 
collection of large quantities of data in a false search for more accuracy. 
Although these are valid criticisms of using any qualitative data management 
system, the main risk that is alluded to is loss of meaning within the narrative by 
reductionism. A qualitative, phenomenological approach examines the motivations 
and the meanings that respondents attach to real-world events. It is these meanings 
that are interrupted by an overly formal system. This research takes a realist 
perspective, and although not immune from these criticisms, it was interested not in 
the meaning of events but in constructing the significance of the events themselves. 
The risks inherent in the use of systems to analyse the data were minimised by 
triangulation across respondent interviews and documentary evidence. Triangulation 
was used to test the recall of respondents, and understand in what ways critical events 
led to particular outcomes, whilst the risk of interpreting meanings from actual people 
was minimised. However, respondent interviews, particularly when explaining 
decisions and judgements, could be subject to these risks. Accordingly, care was 
exercised to capture during analysis the full context of decisions by including adjacent 
text, particularly in a chain of respondent rationalisation, to ensure de-
contextualisation was avoided. 
3.8 Ensuring valid research 
Validity and reliability was accounted for throughout the research process from: data 
collection, data reduction, data display and during conclusion drawing or verification 
see Figure 3-4 (Miles and Huberman, 1984). Each of these four areas had verifiable 
processes and procedures to ensure full traceability of the research process. These 
processes and procedures are made explicitly visible in the results and analysis section. 
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Figure 3-4 – Components of Data Analysis 
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Source: Miles and Huberman (1984) 
 
The key aspects of the approach to ensure valid research were: 
 Data collection: including the rationale for case selection and the ways data 
were physically collected. For example, the recording and transcribing of 
interviews verbatim and how contextual information was recorded in meeting 
and visit reports, and how this was stored, retrieved and used. 
 Data reduction: this includes the selection of data for analysis, the tools and 
techniques that were employed, and how data reduction took place - it was 
important to maintain a comprehensive codebook such that other researchers 
could clearly see and judge the quality of the encoding to nodes.  
 Display: the display of results is also a form of data reduction and a clear 
traceable link can be seen between respondent data and how it is represented 
in matrices, charts or figures. The data display must also be fair and 
representative of the research findings and any exclusions identified. 
 Conclusion drawing: conclusions that were drawn must be valid and robust, 
and be seen to plausibly come from the evidence presented. 
3.9 Case organisations 
The IT requirements were contracted to a major IT systems house (SI) which 
outsourced complex IT requirements to a relatively small specialist software house in 
the UK (PersonSoft), and the testing and validation of the software to a company 
(TestCo) in Romania (Table 3-1). An overview of the role, project role and 
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organisational affiliation of the main case respondents is shown as Table 3-2. No 
information on highest educational achievement or specific competence was acquired. 
Table 3-1 - Organisations in HRMSys project 
 
The case reported here was monitored for five years from contract bid and award in 
2008 until September 2013 when the initial operating capability (IOC) delivery was 
accepted. Further data was collected for pre-2008 and post-2013 during the Final 
Operating Capability (FOC) negotiation and implementation and the scope of the 
research is shown in  
Figure 3-5.  
Table 3-2 - Profile main case respondents 
Case 
Organisation 
Description HRMSys Project Role 
SI A large system integration house based in Europe of around 
80,000 employees operating in 34 countries world-wide. 
Lead contractor responsible for managing the sub-
contractors, quality, supplier project management 
and system integration. 
PersonSoft A specialist software house providing scheduling and 
advanced HRM software applications within the defence and 
health sectors based in the UK with around 250 employees 
(around 30 specifically on defence). 
PersonSoft provide the software and all aspects of 
the documentation and installation procedures. 
They are the developers of the software. 
TestCo The residual part of a large multinational industrial 
conglomerate based in Europe of around 300,000 employees. 
They operate in Romania and are remains of the old IT 
division that was taken over by SI in mid-2011. 
Testing of the software, training documentation and 
delivery of training. Responsible for system testing 
and physical delivery of tested software. 
DefOrg The strategic organisation managing defence matters within 
Europe. They are responsible in the end for the 
commissioning of IT projects within DefOrg. 
No specific project role – no formal project board 
was evident during contract execution. 
Agency The contracting and procurement organisation of DefOrg 
based in Brussels. 
Prime contracting part of the client - responsible for 
contract execution, project management, the 
acceptance of deliverables and payments. 
HRMDept The end-user department for the software and the 
organisation that manages establishment planning and 
personnel management within the operation. They are the 
main users of the delivered application. 
The department using the software – the source of 
business requirements. Responsible for user 
acceptance testing and deployment into service.  
Agency IS The organisation within DefOrg responsible for ensuring 
integration and security for all delivered applications within 
the organisation. 
Responsible for the acceptance of the software as 
being fit to operate on DefOrg’s infrastructure. They 
cover particularly security and integration. 
Case 
Organisation 
Case Respondent Organisational role HRMSys Project role Age Range 
(years) 
Approx. 
experience 
SI SI1 Service Director 
SI2 Project Manager 
SI3 Project Manager 
SI4 Project Office 
S15 Account Director 
6 Secondary respondents 
Public sector services director 
Senior project manager 
Project office support 
Project office support 
Sales defence sector 
Senior supplier 
Project director suppliers 
Admin and Project mgmt. 
Admin and quality control 
Sales director defence 
 
51-55 
62-63 
45-50 
30-35 
51-60 
 
+15 years 
+25 years 
10 years 
7-8 years 
+20 years 
PersonSoft PS1 Services Director 
PS2 Commercial Manager 
PS3 Project Manager 
PS4 Senior tech consultant 
PS5 Business consultant 
PS6 Tech manager 
24 Secondary and tertiary 
respondents 
Defence/Maritime services 
Defence/Maritime sales 
Engagement manager 
Technical implementation 
Consulting and analysis 
Core product development, 
training and consulting 
Senior supplier (Personsoft) 
Sales and contract mgmt. 
Project leader PS 
Software development lead 
Requirements analysis 
Product manager HRMSys 
64-65 
62-63 
35-40 
35-40 
30-35 
35-40 
+20 years 
+20 years 
12 years 
8 years 
6 years 
+10 years 
TestCo TC1 Test Director Software test director Test manager HRMSys 31-40 +10 years 
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Figure 3-5 - Data collection across the project phases 
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Source: Author 
 
Research data for the implementation phase included: semi-structured interviews, 
emails and structured interviews, documented workshops, research diaries, all 
TC2 Commercial Manager 
TC3 Test Consultant 
TC4 Test Consultant 
TC5 Tech Project Manager 
5 Secondary respondents 
European sales and services 
Test analyst 
Test analyst 
Tech project management 
Trainers 
Sales and contract mgmt. 
Testing software 
Testing software 
Technical lead suppliers 
51-60 
31-40 
31-40 
31-40 
+15 years 
5 years 
5 years 
8-10 years 
DefOrg No respondents in this 
research project 
NA NA NA NA 
Agency AG1 Contract Manager 
AG2 Project Manager 
AG3 IT Senior User 
AG4 Project Manager 
2 Secondary respondents 
Procurement DEFORG 
Senior project manager 
IT department management 
Senior project manager 
IT&V consultants 
Senior buyer/contract mgmt. 
Project director (overall) 
Supplier IT system support 
Deputy project director 
Independent validation 
51-60 
31-40 
31-40 
51-60 
+20 years 
7-8 years 
+12 years 
+10 years 
HRMDept HR1 HRM Director 
HR2 Department Manager 
HR3 System Support MGR 
HR4 System Administrator 
HR5 Project Manager 
3 Secondary respondents 
HRM Director 
Manager HRMDept 
Tech Support Manager 
System administration 
Project management 
Central user support  
Senior user and project owner 
Manager support group 
Manager 1st line support 
System and user admin 
Project leader HRMDept 
System users 
64-65 
65-66 
40-45 
35-40 
51-60 
+20 years 
+20 years 
+10 years 
8 years 
4 years 
Agency IS IS1 IS Support Manager 
3 Secondary respondents 
IT support manager 
Security test consultants 
Senior supplier  
Security and penetration 
testing  
31-40 
 
+10 years 
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contract documentation, design, planning, project management and control 
documents, internal memos and all monitoring reports. The number of personnel in 
the project across the main case organisations was sixty-two with twenty-five core 
participants who were tracked closely. This data was stored electronically in archive 
folders covering the general project control (13 folders, 535 files), design (12 folders, 
675 files), emails (4,921) and memos/reports (1389). All data, including extracted 
emails, was entered to a password protected database, NVivo10. 
These data analysis steps were executed mainly following IOC system 
acceptance during 2014, but realising that recall and interpretation of the respondent 
data were likely to be fallible and influenced by the researchers own theoretical 
interpretation and biases an additional round of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted during 2015 with key project participants to discuss and validate main 
themes and critical points the analysis uncovered. The overall data collection model 
and interview structure for the HRMSys project within the overall longitudinal case is 
shown as Figure 3-6. 
Figure 3-6 - Data collection structure across organisations 
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Source: Author 
3.9.1 Data analysis 
The framework for analysing the qualitative data extracted from the interviews, email 
narratives and documents followed the model described by Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
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for grounded theory, and the data analysis was carried out in four main phases 
following the procedure outlined by Gioia et al. (2013). First, field notes and project 
log, interview transcripts and archived project document data were thoroughly 
reviewed to get a broad understanding of the main project events and their sequence, 
which were then used as a guide for the initial coding. The second stage involved 
coding and classifying documentation, emails and interview transcripts chronologically 
and across organisations. Extracts of the document and respondent classification 
sheets are shown later as Appendix K. Email data was cleansed and coded into 
NVivo10 along with all interviews, project documentation and project log memos 
against case nodes for participants, organisations, and emails whilst project documents 
were further categorised into weekly time buckets. This analysis covered the full 
timeline of the development phase of the IOC project from its initiation in February 
2011 to final system acceptance in December 2013. At this stage of the analysis a 
timeline of the actual narratives in media res between actors was established that 
acted as a reference baseline to triangulate respondents’ recall. During the third step 
from the basic dataset, original terms and concept ideas from the respondents were 
identified and coded ‘in vivo’, a specific coding technique in NVivo10, then grouped 
into first order categories or concepts. As an intermediate step to support the 
identification of the main clusters the technique of hexagon brainstorming was used 
(Hodgson, 1992) – a small extract of this part of the analysis is shown in Appendix F. 
The coding phase was carried out in two separate constant comparison cycles covering 
the delivery service concepts model and power themes based on initial sensitising 
frameworks derived from the literature framework (Figure 2-6). The themes were 
converged on the final models by a process of constant comparison, using framework 
matrices, iterating between the raw data with that already encoded and by this means 
arrived at second-order theoretical constructs shown in the data models. Finally, 
higher level connections and structures within the data were identified and used to 
derive the theoretical dimensions that were used to explore and develop process maps 
and to derive a grounded model. An outline of the collation and analysis approach is 
shown as Figure 3-7. 
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Figure 3-7 - Outline data analysis process HRMSys project 
Source: Author 
 
 
Start data 
acquisition and 
analysis
Interviews carried out 
and transcribed then 
imported into NVIVO
Interviews classified 
into respondent case 
nodes
Email and forum data 
coded across 
respondent nodes
Respondents coded 
across organisations
Open coding across 
main project phases
Hexagon 
brainstorming to 
identify main clusters
Coding across clusters 
axial coding across 
organisations phases
Constant comparison 
and adaption clusters 
and names
Recode for power 
dimensions
Data representation 
into Visio 2010
Email joint project 
mailbox data cleansed 
and imported into 
NVIVO
Case documentation 
acquired and coded 
and imported as 
externals into NVIVO
Coded and classified 
source documents 
scheme
Coded as data source 
across weekly timeline 
nodes and 
respondents
Constant comparison 
and adaption clusters 
and names
Enter orgs 
as nodes
Enter 
phases as 
nodes
Framework matrices 
and models
Framework matrices 
and models
‘These guys were the gatekeepers so I 
couldn’t directly go to DEFORG I am running 
a workshop on this date this is the aim and 
objectives… we couldn’t do that for HRMSys 
because we are not allowed to.’ 
Controlling decisions
Controlling actions and 
decisions
Controlling resources
We need a suitable response to the issue of 
unit testing... we simply do not have the 
resource to test the COTs application and 
provide documentation as requested 
Deflecting blame
Negotiating impact of change
Exploiting relations
‘SI never put the intellectual depth into it to 
understand the product so that they could 
front up some of this or be supportive in 
some of the arguments that we were 
making’
‘They didn’t seem to want to accept any 
change yes there are faults there are always 
faults and mistakes in documents but it felt 
sometimes that they wouldn’t accept any 
change 
‘...And the reason for doing this directly 
with end-users is to avoid having to agree 
the design by a process of documentation 
exchange between SI and Agency.’  
Creating a negotiated order
Symbolic power
Structural power
‘We have had cause to ask for liquidated 
damages in the past for projects that have 
exceeded the contract milestones’ 
‘I think that (Name) was really threatened 
by the agency influence. He recognised 
himself that he was losing personal control. 
Institutional and systemic 
power
Enforcing and policing rules
‘Both deliverables are rejected, the main 
reason, among others, being the deviation 
from the SOW in terms of types of users.’ 
Enforcing compliance to rules
Identified data 
model from nodes
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Centralisation 
HRM processes 
Lack of management information to 
drive policy 
Main driver to get an application was lack 
of basic information to support resource 
planning. 
 
Poorly integrated functional HRM 
support 
Organisational routines were fragmented 
and differed across the headquarter 
organisations. Made comparability and 
coordination difficult. 
‘…he saw this as clear and perfect opportunity to be able to 
answer senior management, senior officer, questions about 
what capability have we got where is it. So I think I think he 
went out looking for some kind of solution that would give him 
a little control of HR data.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
‘The obvious way would be to get to the central organisation 
and to get them to fund it but there is no such central 
organisation, there was no such means of doing so, but he 
managed to get little bits of funding…to make it work.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
DefOrg in all of its different headquarters and operations were 
doing things in a completely uncoordinated way in terms of 
personnel management. It was interesting because the way 
DefOrg was structured and still is that this had been allowed to 
develop the way did and clearly most major organisations, 
companies, would have had a centralised capability from day 
one almost.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Lack of coordinating IT applications 
No centralised systems existed that could 
be used to manage the HRM demands. 
Resulting from many years of 
underinvestment and a history of bottom-
up fragmented developments.  
‘…they kind of nailed their view of what they needed, 
requirements are gonna be, which was going to be a 
combination of what they already had plus (name)’s kind of 
vision.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘…went away and suddenly found there wasn’t a single 
database anywhere in DefOrg that had anything to do with 
people in it. And that’s where the requirement came from – so 
we better bloody well build one.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘The Functional Review of 2004 highlighted the need to 
establish a central store of manpower information, supported 
by a system for the management of organisations and 
personnel.’ [DOC: REQ UR Extract Executive Summary 
15/02/2007] 
Informal funding chains reached limits 
drove formalisation 
Funding in this public sector organisation 
was negotiated across multiple agencies 
and governments. Funding changes 
(increases) were difficult especially 
following the financial crisis in 2008. 
When funding for DefOrg was cut. The 
original assumption that a low bid could 
be supplemented after the contract was 
won with more money was proved false 
‘There was money around then all of a sudden the crash came 
and DefCo funding virtually dried up in fact we got to the point 
where the project had been effectively cancelled.’ [Director 
HRMDept] 
‘Original funding procedures (were) suited (to the) Cold War – 
infrastructure in centre and flanks. The original members were 
comparatively rich … common funding now applied to 
operations and there is a greater burden on common funds. The 
current situation favours ‘rich’ nations but note one nation can 
veto an action.’ [Briefing on DefOrg Command Structures RES: 
INF n.d] 
‘Once it became somebody else’s responsibility to get that 
money and you had no say in the committees and going in front 
of them and everything else that made it almost impossible to 
get more money.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Changes in 
control and 
governance 
Moving from departmental to enterprise 
focus. 
Overtime a relatively large department 
supporting MAPS had developed. The 
need for a formal budget and to extend 
application across whole organisation 
drove the change from a departmental to 
enterprise system. 
‘… the only reason that it was enduring at the time was him. As 
he was running around getting another budget every year but it 
was on a very iterative annual basis. What he wanted was a 10 
year programme and (it to) last for quite a period.’[Sales 
Support PersonSoft] 
‘…And it changed it came to the point where HRMSys even 
(NAME) I think then recognised that he can’t keep doing this it 
had reached a significance that it had to now go open 
tender.’[Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘We were driven out down the procurement path (they) had 
decided for good reason to go for a more structured 
programme to go for funds elsewhere in the organisation by 
doing that you had to have a much more formal path.’[Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
Summary tables 
linking quotations 
to dimensions
Produced
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3.10 Research Ethics 
Research ethics in the social sciences addresses: how independence and integrity of 
the research is assessed, participants recruited, informed consent obtained and 
confidentiality assured (BERA, 2011). To ensure integrity of results, research records 
and notes and the processes of analysis are made visible during the research. 
Intentional biases were minimised by preserving raw data and making visible the 
workings of the research. This was explicitly accounted for in the research method 
outlined earlier but includes memos and daily project logs stored in the project 
database NVivo10. Furthermore, the rationale for selection of which data to represent 
or exclude and the preservation of an audit trail, in principle, enables repeatability of 
the process, increases visibility and honesty and permits peer review (Resnik, 1998). 
Respondents came from participating client and vendor organisations. Consent 
to interview employees of their organisations was sought in writing and an example 
introductory letter and confidentiality agreement is shown later as Appendix A. The 
nature of the research was outlined, covering: how research was to be conducted, the 
management of confidential data, the ethical responsibilities of the researcher and 
how confidentiality and anonymity of respondents was to be assured. The potential 
use of the information, covering academic and practitioner papers, was agreed along 
with any confidentiality and disclosure issues. Required reports on findings for 
organisational use were also specified during the introductory meetings.  
Matters relating to the Data Protection Act (HMSO, 1998) were also explicitly 
laid down in writing and within the oral brief. Organisations and respondents were 
informed, during the oral brief prior to interviews or focus groups, that no personally 
identifiable information would be stored. All notes and data for organisations used 
synonyms or codes and were entered into NVivo10 only using these codes. Access to 
the research data in NVivo10 was only via the author’s password protected desktop PC 
and by the entry of the research database password. Further, confidentiality and 
anonymity of their interview data was assured, and notwithstanding the 'implied 
informed consent' received from their organisation, all respondents were informed 
that they had the right to switch off the tape recorder (where recording was 
permitted), or to withdraw unconditionally from the research at any point. 
Respondents were also told that no repercussions, such as reporting back to their 
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management, would occur should they choose this option. In such cases, the interview 
was terminated, and the results not used in analysis. Furthermore, to assure avoidance 
of harm to respondents, if a line of questioning engendered an emotional response, 
that line of questioning was immediately ceased, and an appropriate note made in the 
meeting report. Following the interviews, the respondents were debriefed, and told, 
inter alia, how the data would be used and asked if they be willing to provide any 
follow-up clarifications. Requirements of the data protection act on the researcher 
were re-emphasised, to further assure them that their confidentiality and anonymity 
would be protected. 
Finally, in the write up and summarising of the cases and data, such as the 
profile of organisations, it is possible that a third party with detailed industry 
knowledge could guess the organisation concerned. However, as the research purpose 
was to identify work practices and to raise these to a theoretical perspective 
identification of specific behaviours to organisations or individuals is believed to be a 
low risk. Nevertheless, during review of final papers, or submitted work derived from 
this research, peer reviewers will be asked specifically to look out for this issue. 
Ethical compliance 
Research carried out at the University of Sussex is subject to an ethical review process 
that checks for compliance to good practice in research. This process is compulsory 
and the author of this thesis submitted an ethical review application and the 
appropriate review certificate is shown later as Appendix C. 
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3.11 Chapter summary  
The chapter has: 
 Addressed the research method adopted to answer the research questions by 
observing and analysing a single supply chain case study with six organisations 
contributing to the outcome following a qualitative analysis methodology.  
 Recognised the contextual influences and how these will be addressed during 
the research. 
 Outlined the qualitative grounded approach that was followed to ensure 
engaged and reliable research was carried out. 
 Detailed the data collection methods and outlined the analysis stages followed 
during the coding of the qualitative data into NVivo10, with attention paid to 
the rigorous approach adopted in assembling the entire narrative timeline of 
the focal stage of implementation. 
 Paid attention to the ethical issues and how these are addressed during the 
complex implementation phase where potential conflict and stresses could 
have occurred. 
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Chapter 4 – The antecedents to change 
4.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 4
The antecedents to 
change
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped 
how the new application was to be created and 
interpreted.
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior 
history impact and constrain the implementation 
processes of outsourcing?
 
This chapter will analyse the impact of antecedents and initial conditions on the 
implementation of HRMSys and demonstrate how the prior history of the participants 
shaped how the business need was constrained and interpreted by the accumulation 
of their past experience of working together (Kimberly  and Bouchikhi, 1995, Wiebe et 
al., 2010) . 
This chapter covers: 
 A brief overview of the history 
of the HRMSys project and 
describes how the working 
relationship developed and 
changed between HRMDept 
and PersonSoft. 
 The entry conditions at the 
start of the HRMSys project 
and the changes in the 
governance and control that 
took place. 
 The evidence for the derived 
dimensions of context linking 
from empirical clusters via 
themes to the high level categories. 
 A summary of findings and a preview of the next chapter. 
This chapter addresses the following research question: 
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history impact and constrain the 
implementation processes of outsourcing? 
 
Abstract and front 
matter
Chapter 1
Outsourcing a 
strategic change
Chapter 2
Literature review
Chapter 3
Research design and 
Context
Chapter 4
The antecedents to 
change
Chapter 5
The practices of 
implementation
Chapter 6
The dynamics of 
institutional politics
Chapter 7
The evolution of 
change
Chapter 8
Discussion complex 
change in outsourcing
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Appendices and 
back matter
Why does outsourcing work in some contexts and yet in 
other seemingly identical situations fail?
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history 
impact and constrain the implementation processes of 
outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance 
impact the development practices and how they evolve 
during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during the 
implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change 
emergent and constrained in an outsourcing project?
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped 
how the new application was to be created and 
interpreted.
Practices are the outcome of a contested field and are 
adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their 
relative salience
The source of power is in the everyday action of actors 
engaged in purposeful work and is an attribute of 
practice based change.
Change is delivered by purposive work by actors it 
resembles a superposition of punctuated and practice 
based change
Theoretical and conceptual aspects linked to RQ’s 
limitations and recommendations
Outsourcing is a complex change, and takes time to 
become a coherent institution and capable of delivering 
the outsourcing goals
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior 
history impact and constrain the implementation 
processes of outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and 
governance impact the development practices 
and how they evolve during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during 
the implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated 
change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project?
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4.2 Overview of the HRMSys project 
HRMSys is a human resource management system deployed across the headquarters 
of a large European defence organisation and provides capability and resource 
management for peace time and crisis establishments. It provides people with the 
required competences to fill posts in establishments. It is an IT system, embedded 
business processes, and a support organisation to manage the application and was 
delivered by a multi-supplier consortium between 2011 and 2015. The software 
supplier for HRMSys was PersonSoft, a small company in the UK who had supplied to 
HRMDept (the user organisation) a software application with essentially the same 
functional scope as the HRMSys software over a period of 15 years. The relationship 
between PersonSoft and HRMDept throughout this time was characterised as 
collaborative with social and outcome controls favoured (Langfield-Smith and Smith, 
2003). They reacted flexibly to HRMDept’s requirements in providing an application 
which supported the core of their functional needs, covering basic personnel 
management and establishment planning at minimal cost. The working relationship 
was built up over fifteen years between PersonSoft and HRMDept and emphasised 
flexibility and a willingness to work collaboratively and as a consequence practices of 
work had evolved and converged over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). There was 
also a tolerance for a lack of formal techniques, testing and documentation, and the 
relatively frequent software errors were accepted. Contracting for services was also 
less formal and PersonSoft were able to bid for software enhancements and extra 
services on a basis of 'time and materials' rather than a fixed price; ‘ we basically 
contracted in days we will do it will take 30 or 50 days 90 days whatever it was.’ This 
sort of behaviour is characteristic of a trusting buyer-supplier relationship (Heiskanen 
et al., 2008). 
It was decided at a strategic level of the Defence Organisation (DefOrg) in 2006 
to purchase a commercial off the shelf (COTS) software application, to support an 
expansion of the scope of the business processes being delivered by HRMDept to cover 
extra services deployed across its entire headquarters. Agency, as the procurement 
and contracting organisation at DefOrg, were instructed to contract for this provision 
and initiated a formal bidding process. As a consequence of their long-standing 
relationship, and to maintain tight control of the selection process, HRMDept 
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encouraged PersonSoft to bid for this wider scale deployment, and in order to qualify 
as a bidder, to seek a supplier partner with good standing with Agency. Accordingly 
PersonSoft were forced to seek a partner (System Integrator, SI) with a broader 
technical capability to integrate the application into the complex IT landscape of 
DefOrg as well to provide the necessary financial guarantees. 
4.3 Entry conditions at the start-up of HRMSys 
The lead supplier System Integrator (SI) and PersonSoft formed a partnership to 
contest the bid, with SI taking the role of prime supplier and contract owner, and 
PersonSoft as sub-contractor delivering the software. The case organisations for the 
delivery of the HRMSys application are shown earlier in (Table 3-1: 65). In responding 
to the bid the consortium offered an extended version of the incumbent client-server 
application (MAPS) that, although technically non-compliant with the specification for 
a full web-based application, offered good functional coverage from the end user 
community perspective. Following a successful competitive bid process SI and 
PersonSoft signed a back-to-back agreement to deliver the project under a formal 
contract with Agency. 
The delivery of the software under the contract meant that the parties, 
PersonSoft and HRMDept, had to adapt their ways of working and operate within the 
formal umbrella of the SI and Agency control procedures. This formal approach 
demanded more rigour, service dependability, good quality and well tested software 
more characteristic of a management control logic (O’Reilly and Reed, 2011, Offenbeek 
et al., 2013). From this perspective, the control processes change from a flexible 
relational approach, to a formally controlled and actively managed contract. Within 
this structure the principal contracting partners were Agency and SI who operated in-
between the old partners HRMDept and PersonSoft respectively. This implied that the 
relationship between PersonSoft and HRMDept became formally arm’s length and 
excluded the more social control mechanisms and adaptable behaviour that formerly 
existed(Weber and Mayer, 2011). The informal approach was replaced with a strict, 
preventative contract framework that acted to minimise risk and control delivery 
precisely (Poppo and Zhou, 2013). The structure of the project broke the direct 
communication chain between PersonSoft and HRMDept and placed both parties 
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within a controlled process of delivery that was channelled via SI and Agency to the 
eventual end user (Figure 4-1). 
Figure 4-1 - System map change in context at HRMDept 
HRMDept
PersonSoft
HRMDept
PersonSoft
System 
Integrator
TestCo
Agency
contract 
management
Agency IS 
services
Project HRMSys start-up
Supplier Consortium
Exchanges
Exchanges
HRMSys within DEFORG 
institutional fieldPressures to formalise and 
centralise functional 
processes and IT
Weakening and 
deinstitutionalisation 
former structures
System map of change in 
context for HRMDept and 
PersonSoft from incumbent 
to HRMSys application 
development
 
Source: Author 
 
Contractually the project was framed by a strict set of requirements and statements of 
work (SOW) covering all aspects of the supply, performance and testing of the 
application. And this was encapsulated in document sets hundreds of pages long. 
Furthermore, project management standards, control processes and how the design, 
testing, documentation and quality standards were to be applied were all mandated. 
Functional and non-functional requirements of the application software, supporting 
design documentation, technical and project meeting dates and physical software 
delivery were controlled by a detailed and complex contract that emphasised risk 
reduction, control and a formal interaction. This contractual posture was typical for a 
public sector bureaucracy (Sanderson, 2009, van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 
2000). This contract bound the suppliers to deliver contract line items (CLINS) for a 
firm fixed price against specific milestone dates and subjected them to contract 
penalties and damages should these be exceeded.  
4.4 Empirical evidence for the contextual dimensions 
The initial sensitising framework for the data analysis for the ‘antecedents to change’ 
data model was drawn from two main sources. Firstly, the theory of de-
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institutionalisation and the antecedent triggers namely: changes in political 
distribution, functional necessity, social consensus, social and environmental pressures 
and changes in constituent relations defined by Oliver (1992: table 2:  579). Secondly, 
an empirical justification of the theory and demonstration of the cumulative 
interaction and potential re-enforcement of the factors by a core role, for example, the 
move to centralisation observed in the HRMSys case (Seal, 2003). Analysis for this 
section was then based on identifying and breaking down the components of the 
contextual influences prior to project start-up eventually arriving at three empirically 
justified themes: Emerging centralisation, changes in relational context and influence 
on practice and requirements. All aspects of antecedent change and de-
institutionalisation that were observed in the HRMSys history (Oliver, 1992).These 
three categories were extracted from the main analysis following the same basic 
procedure as Section 5.2 for the full implementation model. For the first step, the six 
categories of de-institutionalisation were set up as nodes in NVivo10 and used as an 
initial coding target. Interviews, group reports, archival project documentation and 
email narratives were on-coded from the main case nodes into sub-nodes or ‘in vivo’ 
as needed for sub-categories. Convergence on the final model was by a process of 
constant comparison, using framework matrices, recoding and iterating between the 
raw data with that already encoded in the current construct (Bazeley and Jackson, 
2013). Laddering up or down, adapting names and re-comparing and by this means the 
second order constructs emerged. As a final step the second-order themes were 
combined into aggregate categories illustrating the practices observed into the data 
model shown in Figure 4-2.  
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Figure 4-2 – Empirically derived data model for contextual influences  
Favouring the Incumbent application
Using incumbent as a reference system
Using incumbent as a baseline
Retaining existing capabilities
Including user software within scope
Shaping the requirement
Influence on practices and 
requirements
Inheriting legacy problems and bugs
Inheriting ad-hoc informal governance
Nostalgia for the past ways of working
Preserving historic working relations
Shaping work practices
Differing objectives within partner network
Multiple handovers impacting communication
Limited experience with partner learning
Gap between working practices and history
Limited experience with formal approaches
Changes in the supply network
Changes in relational context
Moving from departmental to enterprise focus
Adopting a formal procurement approach
Intermediaries take control and shape relations
Loss of everyday control
A history of bespoke 
development
Lack of management information to drive policy
Poorly integrated functional HRM support
Lack of coordinating IT applications
Informal funding streams reached limits
Limited experience with formal approaches
Move towards COTS standards
Centralisation HRM processes
Emerging centralisation
An Incumbent bespoke application developed
Specific adaptation to processes created inertia
Specific adaptation increased specificity
Small scale bespoke development
Shortage of funding drove lack of rigour
Changes in control and 
governance
Empirical clusters
Themes
(Nodes)
Categories 
(Dimensions)
 
 
For each of the dimensions representative quotations were extracted from the case 
raw material and clustered around the theoretical second order themes. For each 
dimension and sub-construct this analysis is shown below in Table 4-1 to 4-4, enabling 
a trace to be made from empirical evidence to high level category. In the following 
section a brief introduction to the main emergent themes is shown along with a high 
level process model illustrating the interaction of the themes. 
4.5 Dimension - The emerging centralisation 
Two main influences drove the original selection of a bespoke development and the 
subsequent start of the HRMSys project. Firstly, the fragmented and decentralised 
nature of business and IT at DefOrg, and secondly, the formalisation of the delivery of 
business processes as departments and IT support adopted an enterprise focus. The 
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link between the empirical data and these two factors is shown below as Table 4-1 and 
an extract of the data model shown as Figure 4-3 that illustrates the link from the data, 
via empirical themes, to the dimension category centralisation. 
Figure 4-3 - Extract empirical model centralisation 
‘We were driven out down the procurement 
path (they) had decided for good reason to 
go for a more structured programme to go 
for funds elsewhere in the organisation.’
‘DefOrg in all of its different headquarters 
and operations were doing things in a 
completely uncoordinated way in terms of 
personnel management.’
Centralisation HRM 
processes
Emerging centralisation
Changes in control and 
governance
 
The original rationale for integrating human resource management practices across 
the organisation and providing an application that could provide actionable data across 
the DefOrg organisation was the lack of reporting on the status of available resources 
for deployment into operational theatres.  
‘There were times when it got very political because they [politicians and senior 
military staff] were making statements based on what they had and this is 
getting back to ministers and are turning round and saying hello that’s not true 
you can’t say things like that.’ [Director HRMDept] 
When the Director of HRMDept started a search for an application that could support 
processes such as the ‘operational deployable headquarters’, it was found that 
contrary to the expectations that ‘DefOrg would have had a centralised system’, such a 
system did not exist. Rather, information management within the headquarters of 
DefOrg had grown up as ‘little organic bits none of which were doing anything more 
than little spreadsheets’ adding up headcounts [Director HRMDept].  
The resulting application had a long history, reflected the existing operational 
processes, drove the development of HRM practices, and provided a support base for 
HRMDept from which to influence policy direction across DefOrg. At the time of the 
HRMSys actual project start (February 2011) the latest version of the MAPS application 
(incumbent at HRMDept) was version 5.5 and had been in service with several version 
updates for around 11 years and was still being enhanced by the software provider 
PersonSoft. 
Development had been specific and bespoke to HRMDept’s needs and not 
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centrally coordinated by DefOrg. This meant that at the time of the HRMSys project 
start the incumbent (MAPS) encoded the extant departmental business processes, and 
the application behaviour in the way that had been defined over time by HRMDept 
and as a result defined the current state of practice (Lyytinen et al., 2009). Although 
the formalisation of the system meant in principle the procurement process was 
objective as a manager recalled, ‘…the advantage that PersonSoft had coming into it 
was that you had the experience of working with us you knew what we wanted.’ This 
showed that PersonSoft had built up substantial relational advantages and trust prior 
to the start-up (Inkpen and Currall, 1998). This gave the incumbent application and 
software provider an inbuilt advantage, for example, when rival application suppliers 
presented their proposals, the assessors, end-users and HRMDept already had a 
defined mental model based on how the new application should look and perform. 
‘To be honest we will always in favour of basically PersonSoft because we had 
been working, we had been using the system for years, why throw away 
everything, baby out with the bathwater, start again with a completely new 
company who you knew nothing about.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Working with the incumbent application and supplier over many years biased and 
framed the decision-making towards the selection and maintenance of the existing 
arrangements. This carried through to the selection process a mechanism of 
asymmetric information possession between potential competitors that biased the 
whole process in one direction (Zhao et al., 2014).  
Table 4-1 - Emerging centralisation driven by context changes 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Centralisation 
HRM processes 
Lack of management information to 
drive policy 
Main driver to get an application was lack 
of basic information to support resource 
planning. 
 
Poorly integrated functional HRM 
support 
Organisational routines were fragmented 
and differed across the headquarter 
organisations. Made comparability and 
coordination difficult. 
‘…he saw this as clear and perfect opportunity to be able to 
answer senior management, senior officer, questions about 
what capability have we got where is it. So I think I think he 
went out looking for some kind of solution that would give him 
a little control of HR data.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
‘The obvious way would be to get to the central organisation 
and to get them to fund it but there is no such central 
organisation, there was no such means of doing so, but he 
managed to get little bits of funding…to make it work.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
DefOrg in all of its different headquarters and operations were 
doing things in a completely uncoordinated way in terms of 
personnel management. It was interesting because the way 
DefOrg was structured and still is that this had been allowed to 
develop the way did and clearly most major organisations, 
companies, would have had a centralised capability from day 
one almost.’ [Director HRMDept] 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Lack of coordinating IT applications 
No centralised systems existed that could 
be used to manage the HRM demands. 
Resulting from many years of 
underinvestment and a history of bottom-
up fragmented developments.  
‘…they kind of nailed their view of what they needed, 
requirements are gonna be, which was going to be a 
combination of what they already had plus (name)’s kind of 
vision.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘…went away and suddenly found there wasn’t a single 
database anywhere in DefOrg that had anything to do with 
people in it. And that’s where the requirement came from – so 
we better bloody well build one.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘The Functional Review of 2004 highlighted the need to 
establish a central store of manpower information, supported 
by a system for the management of organisations and 
personnel.’ [DOC: REQ UR Extract Executive Summary 
15/02/2007] 
Informal funding chains reached limits 
drove formalisation 
Funding in this public sector organisation 
was negotiated across multiple agencies 
and governments. Funding changes 
(increases) were difficult especially 
following the financial crisis in 2008. 
When funding for DefOrg was cut. The 
original assumption that a low bid could 
be supplemented after the contract was 
won with more money was proved false. 
‘There was money around then all of a sudden the crash came 
and DefCo funding virtually dried up in fact we got to the point 
where the project had been effectively cancelled.’ [Director 
HRMDept] 
‘Original funding procedures (were) suited (to the) Cold War – 
infrastructure in centre and flanks. The original members were 
comparatively rich … common funding now applied to 
operations and there is a greater burden on common funds. The 
current situation favours ‘rich’ nations but note one nation can 
veto an action.’ [Briefing on DefOrg Command Structures RES: 
INF n.d] 
‘Once it became somebody else’s responsibility to get that 
money and you had no say in the committees and going in front 
of them and everything else that made it almost impossible to 
get more money.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Changes in 
control and 
governance 
Moving from departmental to enterprise 
focus. 
Overtime a relatively large department 
supporting MAPS had developed. The 
need for a formal budget and to extend 
application across whole organisation 
drove the change from a departmental to 
enterprise system. 
‘… the only reason that it was enduring at the time was him. As 
he was running around getting another budget every year but it 
was on a very iterative annual basis. What he wanted was a 10 
year programme and (it to) last for quite a period.’ [Sales 
Support PersonSoft] 
‘…And it changed it came to the point where HRMSys even 
(NAME) I think then recognised that he can’t keep doing this it 
had reached a significance that it had to now go open tender.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘We were driven out down the procurement path (they) had 
decided for good reason to go for a more structured 
programme to go for funds elsewhere in the organisation by 
doing that you had to have a much more formal path.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
Adopting a formal procurement 
approach 
A formal contracted project created a 
distance between PersonSoft and 
HRMDept. HRMDept acted as a buyer and 
this was accentuated as key figures were 
replaced by others who did not share a 
common history. 
‘So rather than top-down in selling to the organisation we had 
these individuals within the function who kind of saw the 
opportunity to prove (themselves) using the software.’ [Sales 
Director Defence] 
‘It was always going to be an issue but then you throw in the 
bureaucracy, may be necessary bureaucracy, of a procurement 
organisation. Their remit is to make sure the money doesn’t get 
spent.’ [Director HRMDept]  
‘And I think (name) who was injected in there at some point in 
the process, I can’t remember now when he started, but it was 
fairly early on in the contract phase. But he was a very black-
and-white guy. He saw, he had no allegiance to the past and 
the things that had been done.’ [Engagement Manager Europe 
PersonSoft] 
Intermediaries take control and shape 
relations 
Control of suppliers and procurement of 
services moves from HRMDept to Agency 
who act as contract owners and authority. 
 
Loss of day to day application control 
Management of application moves from 
‘For the future system and its strict versioning, Agency act in 2 
roles in this project; as Host Nation responsible for procuring 
and delivering the project, and also as the Implementation 
Authority (IA) which acts on behalf of the Board to bring new 
systems into service and transfer them to the appropriate 
Service Provision Authority for Operation and Maintenance’ 
[Support Manager HRMDept] 
‘…But I must say at the end of the day there was nothing we 
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department to IT organisation and 
operates within its remit and rules. 
can do they were there to run the project not us. It was not our 
job we felt that they couldn’t perform their job and it was now 
their job but they were just useless.’ [Project Manager 
HRMDept] 
‘...we did absolutely we discussed it not just amongst ourselves 
but with (name) the fundamental issue being the relationship 
we have with them … in future you’re going to be supplied by 
Agency who will then supply to SI … it was obvious to us how 
many times did we have that conversation on the big white 
board in Piccadilly.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
 
4.6 Dimension – Changes in relational context 
The changes in relational context were felt in two main areas; firstly, in how the supply 
network evolved towards a complex supply chain to deliver the formal contract, and 
secondly, how a tension emerged between the older bespoke tailor-made software 
development and the different governance and method implied by the COTS 
approach. The empirical link from the data to these constructs is shown as Table 4-2 
and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 4-4 that illustrates the link from the 
data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category changes in relational context. 
Figure 4-4 - Extract empirical model changes relational context 
‘Multiple handovers in the project (and 
many stakeholders) make for extended and 
(very) complex communication.’ 
Changes in the supply 
network
Changes in relational context
A history of bespoke 
development
‘Have asked for a COTS solution but have 
defined the project governance as a bespoke 
development and will claim any new 
development as their own IPR.’ 
 
To qualify to bid and participate in the HRMSys project PersonSoft had to partner in a 
short term alliance with a major system house (SI), keen to exploit PersonSoft’s access 
to key organisational actors at HRMDept and therefore improve its own access within 
wider organisation DefOrg. The principal objective for SI’s involvement was positioning 
for a much larger logistics programme (100€ million, approximately ten times the 
HRMSys budget). For SI the HRMSys project was quite small whereas for PersonSoft it 
‘was the largest defence project in (their) history’ [CEO PersonSoft public 
announcement]. SI also acquired an offshore Romanian subsidiary (TestCo) to work on 
testing and training development to reduce bid cost. These three organisations formed 
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the core of the supplier consortium with SI as prime contractor controlling PersonSoft 
and TestCo as sub-contractors.  
This structuring of the project exposed three major issues. Firstly, PersonSoft at 
the start of the contract had never worked in a consortium or alliance within the 
defence sector and had very limited experience in the demands for integrated project 
governance as well as the normal rules of partner engagement. Secondly, PersonSoft 
lacked formal techniques (and limited documentation) to support their development, 
and SI seems to have accepted their track record with HRMDept as sufficient proof of 
capability without proper due diligence see as essential for outsourcing success 
(Hopkins and Wood, 2007, Pai and Basu, 2007). This gap between the expectations for 
rigour in COTS development, from the perspective of the larger supplier, led to 
tensions later in the project. Finally, the governance structure of the contract replaced 
the dyad between PersonSoft and HRMDept with an extended supply chain, with 
‘multiple handovers’, and placed the intermediaries, Agency and SI, between users and 
providers of the software. This new situation is illustrated in Figure 4-5 and shows how 
the flow of business requirements and software, directly between HRMDept and 
PersonSoft, became replaced by an indirect chain consisting of formal handovers and 
review between the additional parties introduced by the contract. 
This change in governance structure also impacted HRMDept who had for years 
been solely responsible for the acquisition and management of the software from 
PersonSoft. The first change was in the subordinate role HRMDept had to adopt 
behind Agency who as both a host nation5 and manager of the procurement sat 
between users and suppliers. The formal contact between buyers and suppliers was 
vested in Agency who communicated demands to the suppliers via the system 
integrator (SI). All changes to the application were strictly controlled and managed by 
Agency and in effect HRMDept had no independent funding or control over the 
HRMSys project. The software was formally procured and contracted. Their role was 
one of specifying functional requirements and accepting the application in terms of 
compliance to their business needs during a user acceptance test (UAT). 
                                                     
5
 Agency is the contract manager and also provider of core IT services within DefOrg. In its ‘host nation’ 
role Agency receives the software and runs it on its infrastructure and plays the role of senior user in 
project terms. Agency provides the application as a service to HRMDept. 
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Figure 4-5 - Linkage between PersonSoft and HRMDept from project start 
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Source: Author 
 
The previous ways of working with PersonSoft, the generation of functions based on 
vague ideas and wishes, was replaced by the need to define business processes 
unambiguously. This was a fundamental change in working practices and represents a 
major change in control at HRMDept brought about by the formalisation of HRMSys. 
Furthermore, the change in approach impacted the development process that was 
previously ad-hoc and relatively informal and collaborative (Weber and Mayer, 2011). 
A COTS formal system development demanded rigorous testing and a validated 
delivery, including supporting documentation, training and testing routines. The prime 
contractor SI, and the testing organisation TestCo, had assumed the PersonSoft 
application was COTS ready. However this was not the case and at project start many 
key elements were missing or only partially complete. This was a fundamental flaw 
that caused major problems during the later delivery of the software. 
Table 4-2 - Changes in relational context 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Changes in the 
supply network 
Differing objectives within partner 
network 
The objectives of SI were to gain better 
access to the main DefOrg organisation 
and to block their competitors and drove 
the submission of a compliant bid. They 
also understood the benefits of working 
with an incumbent supplier and the 
‘TestCo is chosen partner as they have substantial and 
successful track record with DefOrg Scale too big for PersonSoft 
as solo bidder Will handle all system integration, training and 
roll out responsibilities partnering with us (over SAP and Oracle) 
as best chance to win contract positioned to win bigger (€54m) 
DefOrg opportunity for logistics.[Sales Internal Presentation 
PersonSoft 2008] 
‘…but more importantly than that was a blocker to anybody 
 
Chapter 4–  The antecedents to change Page| 85 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
pressures on maintenance of the status 
quo. 
else coming in and delivering something else into his patch. And 
that is maybe why we were always going to struggle to deliver 
on time and on budget because we were meeting some 
artificial objectives.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘Yes absolutely and (name) had the nous to understand what 
(name)  wanted and he had an existing supplier who provided 
what he wanted. If we hadn’t had that relationship (name) 
would not have been interested at all. All the dice fell with the 
right number basically.’ [Sales Director Defence] 
Multiple handovers impacting 
communication and effectiveness 
Partner choice at the start and the 
contract structure meant extended supply 
chains, multiple handovers and difficulties 
in integrating and understanding the 
delivery choices.  
 
Limited experience with demands of 
partner learning 
Some assumption that extensive co-
supplier knowledge was unnecessary as 
PersonSoft had been the supplier for 
years. 
‘Multiple handovers in the project (and many stakeholders) 
make for extended and (very) complex communication.’ 
[Internal Workshop PersonSoft 18/09/2009] 
‘I think one of the other problems is when you get this long 
gestation you get rotation with the users as they get new users 
coming in you’ve spoken to one guy and I want to do so and so 
a year later he’s gone and somebody else’s in.’ [Director 
HRMDept] 
‘…from this side of the fence that the people who knew how it 
worked how potentially to do it were surrounded by people who 
didn’t have a clue and it was becoming really very fraught and 
there were letters between companies with dire consequences 
of pulling out of projects et cetera as a result of this tension.’ 
[Project Manager HRMDept] 
Gap between required working practices 
and history. 
PersonSoft were used to collaborative 
tailor made approaches with high 
interaction with end-users as its approach 
to software creation.  
 
Limited experience with formal 
development, project management and 
reporting. 
Formal waterfall development, service 
management and requirements planning 
(as needed by their partners) were at 
variance with current modes of delivery 
and had to be learnt. 
‘Waterfall model is a risk for requirement drift.’ [Internal 
Workshop PersonSoft 18/09/2009] 
‘One of the things that hobbled us in APMS was the product. 
We were creative when we bid for the project about the 
technology and the new web-based form – but we didn’t do 
anything in the two years before the project started.[Services 
Director PersonSoft] 
‘…(it was) much more of a collaborative set of ideas turned into 
some functional capability which people say ah yes that will 
work. And that history didn’t fit at all well with this heavy layer 
of waterfall contractual time driven do it or lose money 
procurement process that DefOrg had.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
  
A history of 
bespoke 
development 
The assumptions in the bid process was 
for a move to COTS standards 
The assumption in the bid process was to 
avoid expensive bespoke development 
and to purchase a COTS product. However 
in the contract processes such as Use 
Cases, testing approaches and design 
rules pointed to specific developments. 
‘Have asked for a COTS solution but have defined the project 
governance as a bespoke development and will claim any new 
development as their own IPR.’ [Sales Internal Presentation 
PersonSoft 2008] 
‘Since we are asking for a COTS product with life cycle support, 
the software design specification should be available (released). 
It is up to the potential Contractor to decide on provided detail 
level in its Bid to support a sound engineering approach.’ [DOC: 
MEM AG Bid Response to Questions 2008] 
 ‘…is an overriding impression that I formed that we were trying 
to sell a COTS product, contracting situation where the history 
and been essentially bespoke development. And that dynamic, 
that dynamic with (name) and (name)’s entourage expected us 
to be able to do whatever, tailor this thing.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
The incumbent bespoke application 
The incumbent application had been 
developed over many years in an iterative 
developmental way and as a result 
changing to a new supplier would 
represent a high switching cost.  
 
Specific adaptation to processes created 
specificity and inertia 
As the HRMDept organisation was trained 
‘The fact that we were incumbent, the fact that (name) was 
there, the fact that he had tailored to some extent the 
requirements to more explicitly follow the capability that they 
had already installed kind of made it not exactly a no-brainer 
but certainly shifted the goalposts towards us I think.’ [Sales 
Support PersonSoft] 
‘But I think that had we gone for one of the other major 
products the biggest problem would be that the DefOrg 
business would have to change to fit the product rather than 
the other way round.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘…he had some influence behind the scenes in terms of 
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and knowledgeable and the application 
specifically was adapted to match their 
work processes this application had high 
asset specificity and was difficult to 
change and implied high switching cost. 
indicating a preference relative to the fact that he had already 
an installed base. So I suspect he had some influence.’ [Services 
Director PersonSoft] 
 
A history of bespoke development 
limited standardisation. 
The history of the development of the 
incumbent application (MAPS) had been 
bespoke. The application specifically 
tailored to the ideas expressed by 
HRMDept. This was driven by informal ad-
hoc arrangements of small ‘pots’ of 
funding raised out-side of the DefOrg 
formal channels.  
 
Shortage of funding and bespoke 
development drove lack of rigour 
This limited funding also caused a focus 
on ‘functions’ being delivered and away 
from documentation and rigorous testing 
and reinforced the informal and 
collaborative relation between PersonSoft 
and HRMDept. 
‘I don’t think he had a view that what we were delivering was a 
COTS product I think that over time it was a kind of bespoke 
capability that we were delivering… yet what they were looking 
for in their contract tender document was a COTS capability.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
 ‘Please be aware in your APMS discussions next week and 
ongoing that we put a number of man day estimates against 
certain SR's labelled 'COTS' on the basis that certain base 
product capabilities would still require specific 
configuration.’[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘Both partners SI and TestCo had no experience at all with the 
delivered application. There was perhaps an assumption that it 
was a COTS product whereas MAPS was basically bespoke 
application development approach.’[Senior Business Analyst 
PersonSoft] 
‘So you ended up not being able to sell a standard product you 
had to have it so I could do lots of tweaks and lots of changes 
and I think that made it harder for you as well. Because 
everywhere you went you were tailoring basic product.’ 
[Director HRM ] 
 
4.7 Dimension – Influence on practices and requirements 
The influence of the incumbent and past developments between HRMDept and 
PersonSoft was mainly felt during the implementation by the role the incumbent 
application (MAPS6.3) played in shaping the requirements, the list of business needs, 
especially influencing the initial design, and shaping work practices; how work was to 
be done mirroring the past ways of working. These two principal constructs and the 
supporting empirical evidence are shown in Table 4-3, a high level process outline as 
Figure 4-7, and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 4-6 that illustrates the 
link from the data, via empirical themes, to the influence on the practices and 
requirements dimension. 
Figure 4-6 - Extract empirical model Influence on practices and requirements 
 ‘We were always against the reference 
model they had in their minds and they 
looked at all of the requirements at that 
time with direct reference to what they had 
now.’ 
Shaping the 
requirement
Influence on practices and 
requirements
‘As well as dealing with our own bugs and 
requirements that we had to implement we are 
also dealing with core issues and then on top of 
it all of the stuff that had been previously built 
for HRMDEPT’ 
Shaping work practices
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The HRMDept ensured that the old application was defined as the ‘baseline’ for an 
upgrade to MAPS6.4, implying an upgrade of the current MAPS installation from ‘V5.5 
to V6.4 (via V6.3), to form the APMS IOC baseline release’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft]. This resulted in an increase in the functional scope of the new application 
beyond the contract and included elements that maintained HRMDept’s autonomy 
and control in relation to Agency who had ‘coveted my workforce and had visions of 
taking over the whole thing’ [Director HRMDept]. Inclusion of the ‘old’ application as a 
fundamental building block for the HRMSys application meant all the pre-existing 
functions, embedded work processes and practices were taken into HRMSys. 
This acted to re-create the previous ways of working at HRMDept in two ways, 
firstly, the business practices encoded in the old system were replicated, and secondly, 
how the application delivered the function was preserved – the application looked and 
felt the same and old practices preserved (Kimberly  and Bouchikhi, 1995). Both these 
aspects moved the preservation of the existing status quo centre stage at the expense 
of the stated objectives for a new COTS application. Furthermore, the preservation of 
the status quo became a contractual commitment included in the contract to the 
extent no loss in old functions were tolerated; ‘there must be no regression of 
functionalities from what (HRMDept) have now’ [Project Manager Agency]. 
Furthermore, once introduced within the formal project scope the old system (MAPS) 
was then used as a design reference point for all new developments, in terms of look 
and feel and performance of the application. The two aspects of preservation 
fundamentally altered the development trajectory and over-scoped the project at a 
stroke. 
The second major influence was in the management of work practices; in the 
influence that the previous ad-hoc bespoke development had on software quality of 
the old application, and in how PersonSoft traditionally would react should problems 
occur. Furthermore, the old incumbent application’s informal development brought 
with it shortfalls in documentation; ‘we didn’t write anything down …it was all on-the-
fly’ whilst software errors that had been tolerated in the past, within a formal 
contracted delivery, quickly became a problem.  
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‘And all of the bugs and faults that [name] had meticulously built into (the MAPS) 
product over the years we had to fix the things – it did hurt a bit to be quite 
honest at the time.’ [Senior Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
In addition there was an expectation from HRMDept that the previous ways of ‘tailor-
making’ the application to suit their needs would continue. These attributes of the 
previous development approach between PersonSoft and HRMDept, which 
emphasised collaboration and agile approaches, clashed with formal software control 
and testing regime, and the arm’s length approach within the new project structure 
where Agency managed the contract. And as the relationship and governance that 
previously existed between PersonSoft and HRMDept was disturbed a latent tension 
and conflict within the project emerged.  
Figure 4-7 - Process outline influence of context on practices 
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Source: Author 
Table 4-3 - Influences on practices and requirements 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Shaping the 
requirement 
Favouring the incumbent application 
Users expressed functional need in terms 
of how the current application delivered 
that process and showed preference in 
the selection of the replacement. 
Using the incumbent as a reference 
system 
Using the MAPS incumbent as a reference 
enabled the functional ways of working 
built up over the years to be replicated. 
‘I think was brought in to do the requirements definition. (To) 
Pull together the serials working for working for (name) and his 
mission, his major mission was to construct requirements for 
the replacement for the maps project.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
 ‘We were always against the reference model they had in their 
minds and they looked at all of the requirements at that time 
with direct reference to what they had now.’ [Services Manager 
PersonSoft] 
Claiming the value embedded in the 
application 
Buyers claimed these functions as already 
delivered (and paid for) and the effort 
offset against any new requirements 
‘Can you provide a bit more information about the SRS covered 
in 6.3? We expected more SRS requirements to be covered in 
6.3, so this excel sheet was probably built as an incremental 
view.’ [Project Manager Agency] 
‘Tomorrow we'll meet at HRMDEPT … AM to participate in a 
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identified. discussion around 6.3 - PM, if 6.3 not closed we keep on 
participation till closed!’ [Project Support SI] 
‘…what must be clarified to E. and myself is what is the frontier 
between ‘what PersonSoft does for HRMDEPT’ and ‘what 
HRMDept does itself’ in MAPS 6.3 or 6.4 (I don't know 
anymore).’ [Project Support SI] 
Retention of existing capabilities 
No loss in current delivered capability was 
tolerated and incumbent functions were 
to be documented and deficiencies fixed 
then moved to the current application.  
 
‘…there is still a long-term goal of making this thing work but 
more importantly they want to keep what they’ve got now 
working and it cannot lose any of the capability they’ve got.’ 
[Director HRMDept] 
‘I best understand now the position of (name)  when ( he is) 
talking about functions already existing in MAPS, but not 
defined in HRMSys requirement, and that he wants to be sure, 
are maintained as available in APMS. I see now that there is 
effectively a high risk.’ [Project Quality SI] 
…’this required stability is far from actuality. There are still 
several critical deficiencies associated with the fielding of MAPS 
v6.3…HRMDept is content for the risk to be raised to HIGH, 
however the resolution lies with PersonSoft; not HRMDept.’ 
[Department Manager HRMDept Meeting Note] 
Including user configured software 
within scope 
HRMDept had the capability over many 
years to code the software themselves in 
what was termed the ‘user config layer’. 
They sought to include this created 
bespoke software within the baseline 
application and have it accepted as part of 
the formal system. This element of the 
application was not within the HRMSys 
scope. 
‘(name) has insisted during the test discussions with TestCo that 
the UC layer needs to be included during UAT testing of the 
final delivery.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘The point is we cannot risk a UAT failure caused by code 
created outside our control. If DefOrg want to do this it is a 
change request.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘(name) will request to Agency next week that the UC layer be 
switched off for FAT and SAT testing by TestCo.’ [Services 
Director PersonSoft] 
‘…next week there's a ‘pre-UAT’ workshop scheduled to test 
HRMSys with the User Configuration switched on…There are 
some 450 objects in this part of the application and we do need 
to have some idea of where the changes may impact HRMSys.’ 
[Senior Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘could you tell us what the status is about the frozen HRMDept 
User Configuration to be included in HRMSys for test and the 
list of open bugs in the current system which DefOrg says must 
be solved in APMS before starting the tests?’ [Project Manager 
SI] 
Impact old work 
practices 
Inheriting legacy problems and bugs 
Including the incumbent MAPS 
application as the baseline – including 
beta released software for training – 
brought with it core product faults and 
bugs that formed the bulk of the testing 
problems that emerged during test. 
 
Bespoke undocumented software also 
incorporated problems built up and 
tolerated over many years. 
‘As well as dealing with our own bugs and requirements that 
we had to implement we are also dealing with core issues and 
then on top of it all of the stuff that had been previously built 
for HRMDEPT.’ [Technical consultant PersonSoft] 
‘…they would not accept it until all these bugs were fixed. And 
that was the real kill. Because we kept saying we don’t need 
them so leave it, it’s irrelevant, no no no it’s got to be fixed.’ 
[Director HRMDept] 
 ‘Yes that meeting we had at … where they put that big long list 
of every support call and whatever before us and at the right 
moment it was brilliantly done.’ [Business Consultant 
PersonSoft] 
 ‘A high percentage of the issues captured are raised against 
CORE product and not the new features.’ [Technical Support 
PersonSoft] 
Inheriting ad-hoc informal governance 
Documentation for the incumbent was 
non-existent resulting from former ad-hoc 
process. Contractually HRMSys (and the 
baselined MAPS incumbent) had to be 
documented to a defined standard. With 
no starting point this added to the project 
scope. 
‘Wasn’t any (formal contracts) we had an idea and we 
discussed it and it happened. And we got the money and then 
procurement followed along.’ [ Sales Director PersonSoft] 
‘There was also the issue when we bought the original versions 
of MAPS there was virtually no documentation with it and the 
company was really suffering from the fact there was no 
adequate documentation for the users, for the administrators.’ 
[Director HRMDept] 
‘I think it was the broken promises that we had made in the 
past if you want me to be honest. Because that it raises ugly 
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head a few times. When I was over there to do all the testing 
little comments in the background you know ‘PersonSoft make 
all these promises and don’t deliver’.’ [Senior Business Analyst 
PersonSoft] 
…’I expect that there is little if any documentation regarding 
this as there was not a requirement for technical 
documentation to be delivered in the last piece of work we 
undertook for HRMDept.’ [European Service Manager 
PersonSoft] 
Preserving historic working relations  
Both HRMDept and PersonSoft reverted 
to former relationships when it suited 
them to move outside of imposed 
governance. Cutting across the formal 
structure acted to accentuate partner 
exclusion. 
Nostalgia for the past ways of working 
Old working practices created an 
expectation of responsiveness to 
demands from HRMDept even within the 
constraints of the formal contract. This 
contradiction between the same actors 
demanding contract compliance and 
responsiveness and ‘tailoring’ created 
stress on occasion between the old 
partners. 
‘Almost every intervention from DefOrg management side reset 
somehow the so fragile connection between TestCo and 
PersonSoft; I mean everyone tried to defend by itself that we 
forgot to react as a team.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘I certainly got these impressions that (names) do not really 
know much about the requirement. I have asked for a Payroll 
contact and he will provide one. [name]  believes that the 
benefit of going with us is that we would already have this 
functionality and hence this provides best benefit for HRMDept 
- clearly this is incorrect as we have no plans to date as far as I 
am aware to add in functionality that covers this.’ [Product 
Manager Defence PersonSoft] 
‘For HRMDEPT, life is easy because they understand the 
systems makeup and are thankfully free of rigorous process, the 
change management that applies.’ [Tech Consultant 3 
PersonSoft]  
 
4.8 The drivers and constraints of the HRMSys project 
The main factors that drove the original move towards selection of PersonSoft as a 
supplier of an application that could manage HRM processes were the need to 
centralise control coupled with the perceived lack of an available application within 
DefOrg. This was the main impetus towards institutional change (Oliver, 1992, Wezel 
and Saka-Helmhout, 2005). The original application developed for HRMDept was 
created from a bespoke tool set and the functions were tailored and modelled to the 
practices and processes then extant within the department. However, the move 
towards centralisation at an organisational level had a logic that made the 
development of a formal enterprise-wide system inevitable.  
Centralisation of the human resources functions, as well as the need to provide 
these functions in enterprise context across Europe, implied a move away from 
departmentally oriented and supported systems. The basic underpinning for the 
adoption of the HRMSys approach was, first, to embed and manage enterprise scale 
systems within the DefOrg application architecture, and secondly, to integrate and 
standardise human resource management (HRM) practices across the organisation. To 
do this within DefOrg meant a formal budget and project had to be raised to deliver 
this requirement. Furthermore, as this was European-wide public sector procurement 
 
Chapter 4–  The antecedents to change  Page| 91 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
there had to be a formal bid and contracting approach within the European Union. 
HRMSys therefore became a formal project funded by DefOrg and controlled by 
Agency - their procurement and contracting organisation. Requirements, work 
processes and functional need for the system needed to be specified in detail and then 
contracted as deliverables within a formal project structure. 
The small scale development of the initial incumbent continued for ten years 
before the HRMSys project start and was limited development and low cost. Limited 
funding and the need to shelter development from the wider DefOrg community led to 
a process that emphasized delivery of useable functions rather than ‘wasting money’ 
on peripheral matters such as documentation. Development was collaborative with 
HRMDept and PersonSoft focused on the delivery of functions – development was by a 
show and tell demonstrative process rather than specified up front in design 
documents. Requirements were based on an idea from HRMDept elaborated by trial 
and error in the application by a bespoke development technique. Furthermore, 
HRMDept were trained in application administration and even programming to 
maintain independence from the formal organisation. To add to this, most of the 
training for new personnel at HRMDept was actually done by the director. As a 
consequence of these processes, deep learning was acquired by HRMDept and many 
of the personnel developed knowledge on the application as deep as the actual 
developers at PersonSoft.  
This previous relationship between PersonSoft and HRMDept set a pattern of 
expectations as to how the relationship would proceed and how the work was to be 
done within the new project. There was an expectation of continuity for the HRMSys 
project at its initialisation. Work formally was intensely collaborative a dyad with 
HRMDept personnel and PersonSoft working closely as an integrated team. The move 
towards HRMSys changed this structure fundamentally to an extended supply chain 
with PersonSoft and HRMDept operating behind SI and Agency respectively with 
‘PersonSoft invisible to DefOrg’ [Sales Director SI]. No longer having a one to one 
dyadic relation but working arms-length within a buyer/supplier context distant from 
its former partner. A summary of these antecedent forces, based on (Oliver, 1992), 
their impact and consequences is shown in Table 4-4. 
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Table 4-4 - Summary of antecedent influences 
Cluster Structural, Practices  and Cultural Impacts Consequences 
Emerging centralisation 
Centralisation 
HRM processes 
Lack of management information to control business processes 
Poorly integrated functional HRM support 
Lack of coordinating IT applications 
The incumbent built as bespoke application 
Specific adaptation to processes created specificity and inertia 
Informal funding chains reached limits drove formalisation 
Original drive to create HRMDept and its supporting 
application was the lack of standardisation in HRM 
processes across DefOrg. Original development was a 
local process. Broader scale centralisation supported 
formalisation and the move away from a 
departmental focus. 
Changes in 
control and 
governance 
Moving from departmental to enterprise focus. 
Adopting a formal procurement approach 
Intermediaries take control and shape relations 
Loss of day to day application control 
  
HRMDept, its business processes and application 
support and provision had to move from an informal 
status to an integral part of DefOrg. A formal 
contractual relation rather than relational processes 
as before. Loss of overall control of project to Agency. 
Changes in relational context 
Changes in the 
supply 
network 
Differing objectives within partner network 
Multiple handovers impacting communication and effectiveness 
Limited experience with demands of partner learning 
Gap between required working practices and history 
Limited experience with formal development, project management and 
reporting 
HRMSys was developed within an extended supply 
chain with multiple handovers in place of simple 
dyadic structure. PersonSoft were forced to move 
away from collaborative tailor made approaches to 
formal structuring of its deliveries. 
A history of 
bespoke 
software 
development  
 
The assumptions in the bid process was for a COTS package 
A history of bespoke development limited standardisation 
Shortage of funding and bespoke development drove lack of rigour in 
development 
History of development was bespoke and application 
was radically tailorable. Informal nature of funding 
and focus on maximising functional delivery tolerated 
a lack of rigour in development cycles. 
Influences of context and history 
Shaping the 
requirement 
 
Favouring the incumbent application 
Using the incumbent as a baseline and reference system 
Claiming the value embedded in the application 
Retention of existing capabilities 
Including user configured software within scope 
The incumbent application built over years encoded 
the work practices extant at HRMDept. Copying 
across the old application as the baseline framed all 
new developments based on the existing business 
processes and application behaviour. 
Shaping work 
practices  
 
Inheriting legacy problems and bugs 
Inheriting ad-hoc informal governance 
Preserving historic working relations  
Nostalgia for the past ways of working 
Earlier development processes and interaction 
favoured a collaborative relation that existed for 
years. HRMDept and PersonSoft drew on this 
resource to circumvent formal controls. The informal 
approach and relaxed quality standards had created 
a bug ridden application. 
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4.9 Chapter summary: strong influence of history 
The main case findings were: 
 The prior history between PersonSoft and HRMDept strongly influenced the 
selection of the consortium and the selection was biased and pre-arranged. 
 Larger scale centralisation within DefOrg was the principal driver for the move 
from departmental to an enterprise focus. 
 Requirements were specified based on the incumbent application and this 
replicated old processes forward into the new technology.  
 The use of the existing application as a baseline framed all the new 
developments based on its embedded mental model. 
 Work practices between PersonSoft and HRMDept in development and 
requirement planning were preserved for the HRMSys project.  
 
What the analysis has shown is that the long history between PersonSoft and 
HRMDept had built up a particular set of work practices and relationships that 
materially influenced the adoption and implementation of HRMSys. Furthermore, as 
the context changed to an extended supply chain, within the broader institution of 
DefOrg, these practices proved resilient and difficult to change, shaping the process of 
adoption to the new structure and how the development and software creation 
proceeded. The findings also hinted that the long standing ties and recurrent relations 
allowed sub-standard performance to continue and decoupled both HRMDept and 
PersonSoft from new innovation and both these factors contributed to overall poor 
exchange performance (Parmigiani and Mitchell, 2010, Poppo et al., 2008b). 
Preview next chapter 
Chapter 5 will focus on the actual implementation phase of HRMSys and how the 
project actors worked together to create the software product and outsource service. 
It will show the iterative and negotiated nature of product creation and how conflict 
emerges as project actors confront real world contingencies and problems.  
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Chapter 5 – Practices of outsourcing implementation 
5.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 5
The practices of 
implementation
Practices are the outcome of a contested field and are 
adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their 
relative salience
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and 
governance impact the development practices 
and how they evolve during implementation?
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the impact that the strong contracting and 
governance had on the implementation of HRMSys and will show that this heavily 
constrained project engendered continuous negotiation and low level conflict. Strong 
controls essentially inhibited buyers and suppliers co-evolving to create the service 
(Inkpen and Currall, 2004) as they aimed to maintain and control contractual demands 
within a preventative contractual framework (Poppo and Zhou, 2013). 
This chapter covers: 
 The evidence for the derived 
dimensions of implementation 
practice showing the link from 
empirical clusters via themes to 
the high-level categories. 
 Discusses each high-level category 
and derives a process model of 
the actual observed practices. 
 Summarises the evolution of the 
dimensions over time and 
consolidates the process analysis 
into a high-level model and 
identifies key critical points during 
the implementation. 
 A summary of findings and a preview of the next chapter. 
This chapter addresses the following research question: 
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance impact the development 
practices and how they evolve during the implementation? 
Abstract and front 
matter
Chapter 1
Outsourcing a 
strategic change
Chapter 2
Literature review
Chapter 3
Research design and 
Context
Chapter 4
The antecedents to 
change
Chapter 5
The practices of 
implementation
Chapter 6
The dynamics of 
institutional politics
Chapter 7
The evolution of 
change
Chapter 8
Discussion complex 
change in outsourcing
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Appendices and 
back matter
Why does outsourcing work in some contexts and yet in 
other seemingly identical situations fail?
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history 
impact and constrain the implementation processes of 
outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance 
impact the development practices and how they evolve 
during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during the 
implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change 
emergent and constrained in an outsourcing project?
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped 
how the new application was to be created and 
interpreted.
Practices are the outcome of a contested field and are 
adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their 
relative salience
The source of power is in the everyday action of actors 
engaged in purposeful work and is an attribute of 
practice based change.
Change is delivered by purposive work by actors it 
resembles a superposition of punctuated and practice 
based change
Theoretical and conceptual aspects linked to RQ’s 
limitations and recommendations
Outsourcing is a complex change, and takes time to 
become a coherent institution and capable of delivering 
the outsourcing goals
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior 
history impact and constrain the implementation 
processes of outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and 
governance impact the development practices 
and how they evolve during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during 
the implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated 
change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project?
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5.2 Empirical evidence for the practice dimensions  
The initial starting point for the ‘practices of outsourcing’ data model was based on the 
conceptual framework Figure 2-7 and the role governance plays in adapting 
collaborative work practices. The theoretical underpinning is organisational 
institutionalisation, where change emerges at the organisation level and small group 
processes (Zucker, 1987). Furthermore, the focus is on the institutional processes of 
institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation, as shown in the actual processes of 
work, where new practices are introduced, and the old routines eroded and discarded 
during the activity of implementation (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996, Pishdad and 
Haider, 2013, Seal, 2003).  The establishment of new norms and practices in IT 
outsourcing involves changes to processes, procedures and structures and how 
changes to these are controlled and structured. This led to initial theoretical nodes: 
control and structure, alignment and defining boundaries, creating the service and 
collaboration/building the organisation. In addition to the theoretically informed initial 
nodes analysis for this section was also based on axially coding for the components of 
the implementation using the lifecycle phases of: requirements validation, design, 
configuration, testing, and acceptance derived from the actual project plan. For the 
first step, these nine categories were set up as initial nodes in NVivo10 and used as an 
initial coding target. Interviews, group reports, logs and email narratives were on-
coded from the case nodes into sub-nodes or ‘in vivo’ as needed for delivery service 
and theoretical concepts (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). Convergence on the final model 
was by a process of constant comparison, using framework matrices, recoding and 
iterating between the raw data with that already encoded in the current construct. 
Laddering up or down, adapting names and then re-comparing, and through these 
means the second-order constructs were derived.  
As a final step the second-order themes were combined into aggregate 
categories or dimensions illustrating the practices observed into the data model shown 
in Figure 5-1 (Gioia et al., 2013). For each of the dimensions representative quotations 
were extracted from the case material and clustered around the theoretical second-
order themes. This enables traceability to be demonstrated from coded raw source 
data, via the first and second-order constructs, to the final extracted dimensions. For 
each dimension and sub-constructs this analysis is shown below in tables 5-1 to 5-5. 
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Figure 5-1 - Data Model for the implementation IOC HRMSys 
Adapting plans and goals
Controlling a change in 
requirements
Reconnaissance and making 
sense of the task
Aligning processes and 
practices
Building working knowledge
Configuration and creation of 
software
Understanding requirements derived from 
incumbent
Redefining the task within new context
Validating requirements
Adapting the plan
Adapting the schedule
Agreeing a new contract
Fitting to capabilities
Controlling expectations
Controlling scope
Controlling requirement change
Gathering and preparing resources
Closing gaps in understanding
Seeking basic facts
Accessing routine knowledge
Managing resource availability
Defining how work is shared
Building the team
Linking and aligning team
Integrating team processes
Policing the rules of engagement
Managing the contract
Controlling access and gatekeeping
Controlling work processes
Providing direction and support
Capturing the business need
Deriving business need
Overcoming poor requirements definition
Clarifying vague business requirements
Remoteness from real users
Poor access to subject matter experts
Lack of an active sponsorship
Lack of focus on business goals
Agreeing goals and plans
Aligning group to the task
Controlling the engagement
Building and repairing software under time pressure
Selective attention to problems
Lacking awareness emerging problems
Emerging gaps in output appeared
Poor build quality exposed
Understanding of the business 
requirement
Configuring and delivering
Testing and accepting
Iterate
Iterate
Iterate
Uncertainty in testing
Lack of internal rigour
System implementation testing failures
User functional testing failures
Outcome achieved fall behind goals
Repairing to get past testing
Adapting scope and task split
Getting knowhow and knowledge
Enabling knowledge transfer
Planning and coordinating 
delivery
Coordination and planning
Agreeing design and analysis rules
Faulty design and encoding process
Design capture process was new
Formalism clashed with prior history
Review and acceptance of design delayed
Re-planning and correcting
Monitoring and controlling 
Controlling the flow of delivery
Directing the actions
Engaging in the process
Control and acceptance of output
Codifying and writing down 
business need
IntegratingSupervising
Iterate
HighPoor
HighLimited
IntegratedLoose
HighLow
Empirical clusters
Themes
(Nodes)
Categories 
(Dimensions)
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5.3 Dimension – Agreeing goals and plans 
There were two main processes observed as the suppliers and buyers sought to 
validate and agree the scope of the project, firstly, the agreement of a new scope by 
adapting plans and goals, and secondly, how suppliers can manage the delivery of the 
requirements more in line with the capabilities of PersonSoft controlling the change in 
requirements. These processes crystallised around the list of requirements, a serial list 
of specifications, that sets down how the system has to functionally perform, the 
management rules that must followed, and the required project and system 
documentation. The link between the empirical data and these two factors is shown in 
Table 5-1 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 5-2 that illustrates the link 
from the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category agreeing goals and 
plans. The output of this process is an impact statement that forms the basis of a 
contract amendment that ends the validation phase. 
Figure 5-2 - Extract empirical model agreeing goals and plans 
Adapting plans and 
goals
Controlling a change in 
requirements
 ‘Plan needs to be realistic and achievable 
within contract, rather than setting a 
completely false expectation’ 
‘We are now confirm that whilst we remain 
able to deliver all required serials within the 
overall budget and timescales, that we are 
now unable to deliver all IOC serials’ 
Agreeing goals and plansIterate
 
In the early stages, following the formal start-up of the activity, the supplier 
consortium’s main task was to reassess and evaluate the scope of the implementation. 
The contract had been awarded to the consortium in 2008 and the start interrupted by 
the financial crash (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). This meant that much of the scope 
became uncertain due to the time lag. A particular problem that emerged early on was 
a conflict between what had been promised during the bid and proposal process and 
what could actually be delivered within the timescales. In order to win the contract a 
non-feasible plan had been presented that matched the buyer’s proposed timescales. 
This meant a commitment to an imposed timescale ahead of due-diligence, a problem 
made worse by the long time-lag between contract award and actual start.  
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 ‘They, System Integrator and Agency, have taken the plan as stated three years 
ago as the baseline – this plan is not sustainable. It is fixed in time scope and 
budget and much has moved on in the interim.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
During the proposal phase the goal of the suppliers was to gain acceptance, and to do 
this compliance was emphasised and all required functionalities would be delivered 
within the given price and timescale even though this implied a non-feasible plan. This 
introduced a major change in scope and rendered the initial assumptions invalid 
(Meredith et al., 2014). This issue was conflated with an assumption, by PersonSoft, 
that this project delivery would follow the same ad-hoc historical pattern and that the 
bureaucratic contractual demands would be ignored and previous ways of working 
maintained. In effect the contracted plan would be ignored in practice. 
‘I don’t think we made any serious allowance for our relationship with TestCo and 
SI (and) delivering to them and to HRMDept I think we envisaged a relationship 
that was much more direct …I don’t think that our contractual estimate made 
any significant allowance for that kind of chain’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
Furthermore, there was an expectation from supplier partners of PersonSoft that the 
COTS HRMSys application was more developed in terms of available documentation 
and software capability. TestCo and SI expected deep tacit knowledge of the client’s 
business processes based on a previous history of work at HRMDept and accordingly 
they would have little difficulty in providing standard documentation, process 
expertise and knowledge transfer. This was not the case in practice and this 
unexpected extra demand from within supplier partners coupled with the basic lack of 
feasibility of the core plan added additional pressure on cost and time (McEvily and 
Marcus, 2005). 
HRMDept regarded delivered functionality and processes encoded in the 
incumbent application (MAPS) as already paid for, and as the incumbent formed the 
baseline for HRMSys, could be taken out of scope in order to make space for changes 
that had arisen during the interregnum from contract award to actual start. Strong 
pressure was exerted by Agency and HRMDept to maintain scope in terms of budget 
and timeline while including the new requirements. This was an issue felt hardest 
within the supplier consortium by PersonSoft, as ‘90%’ of the changes impacted their 
software in terms of delivery. Two acts of resistance were observed, firstly, selective 
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use of the scope change to trade-out resource intensive requirements, and secondly, a 
de-scoping of the IOC phase by moving difficult and problematic functional issues to 
later in the project when more information and resources became available. The major 
activity PersonSoft undertook during these negotiations was to minimise the impact of 
already existing functions in time and cost whilst maximising the effect of changes. The 
above aspects, searching for a match to capabilities, and creating a sensible plan from 
a supplier perspective, were intertwined throughout this phase. This was a process 
that sought to reduce the required delivery efforts and shape the project to one that 
had a greater fit with the financial goals of the suppliers. The buyer’s aim was to 
maintain contractual integrity and obtain as much functionality for minimal cost. 
From the start of the project there was a change of emphasis within the 
HRMSys project away from former ad-hoc informality with low demands for 
documentation, a bespoke development, and informal contracting, towards a context 
that emphasised rigour and formality (Offenbeek et al., 2013). Reduction of the impact 
of this was attempted by negotiation and shifting of requirements to reduce the scope 
of the administrative and project burden to be more in-line with the expectations and 
prior experience of PersonSoft.  
‘At this meeting the Impact statement was reviewed which primarily highlighted 
all the requirements that will be done in IOC (omitted / new) and those moved to 
FOC. It was a very successful meeting which seem to edge us closer to deliverable 
IOC Scope’ [Tech Lead PersonSoft Report] 
Agency was broadly risk averse and a strongly controlling procurement oriented 
DefOrg department typical of a public sector organisation (van der Meer-Kooistra and 
Vosselman, 2000). Their lack of understanding of the application, and the real efforts 
needed from the suppliers to deliver on time, drove continuous cycles of questioning 
and refinement focusing on process, governance and formality rather than content. 
This led to a form of blindness to emerging delivery problems in the project. This 
orientation was also observable in the supplier partners TestCo and SI, who, like 
Agency, lacked understanding in the specifics of the deliverables and favoured more 
rigour and process in administrative matters such as documentation. This lack of 
relevant information about what must be delivered, and how the product worked, 
even at a high level, created a knowledge gap amongst the supplier side and cycles of 
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refinement and questioning that mirrored the buyer/supplier situation.6 
 A simplified process model of the initial phases of the project is shown as 
Figure 5-3. Each of the blocks in this process diagram represents a first order empirical 
cluster shown in Table 5-1, the relationship between them and the grouping around 
dimension categories. It shows how the initial phase of the project was dominated by 
multiple cycles of negotiation as parties, suppliers and buyers, sought to structure the 
project, and its changing context, to match their own objectives and success criterion. 
Figure 5-3 - Process outline agreeing goals and plans 
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Table 5-1 – Agreeing goals and plans 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Adapting plans 
and goals 
Adapting the 
schedule and the 
plan was a 
continuous 
activity 
throughout IOC 
phase. 
Understanding requirements  derived 
from incumbent 
Initial requirements were based on an 
analysis by HRMDept of their existing 
processes based on the incumbent MAPS 
application not on an understanding of 
the supported business processes. 
‘The work breakdown structure has now been edited and 
represents a fair view of the requirements scope.’ [Project 
Support SI] 
 ‘I think looking back is one of these hindsight kind of things we 
were still quoting estimates for the development process based 
on historical pattern of the way we have been delivering stuff to 
(NAME) ‘ [Services Director PersonSoft]. 
‘But they were very woolly and I believe that a lot of the issues 
that we encountered some of the tough negotiations we 
stepped into post the winning of the bid were stemmed from 
those requirements pulled together over this period of time’. 
                                                     
6
 These observed phenomena may represent a coping strategy where partners lacking specific 
knowledge switch to formality and process to control the project trajectory. 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
[Services Director PersonSoft]. 
‘It was almost a serial of capabilities without any degree of 
understanding of what the underlying business processes gonna 
be.’ [Sales Consultant PS] 
‘we can always start off with the system that’s easy option we 
know that. We look at what it does now and say okay this 
reproduce what it does now in new fancy clothes. More or less 
a summary of what the HRMSys requirement looks like.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
Redefining the task within new context 
Requirements were validated in a 
workshop based process that was agreed 
in advance. Document format and 
method was specified in the contract and 
output was validated against business 
requirement and compliance to 
presentation standards. 
‘…find attached a small presentation which I hope will detail 
how the BP workshop will be conducted and the expected 
outcomes etc. Essentially I intend on producing a number of use 
cases and get these validated by the business.’ [Business 
Consultant PS]  
‘There is an action for the next PCR to 'demonstrate' how we 
will use the business workshops planned in a few weeks to 
develop use cases and other related documentation.’ [Project 
Manager PersonSoft] 
‘This document starts the process of considering the start-up 
issues in the development of the APMS system for DefOrg. From 
the team discussion a set of high level issues were derived in a 
workshop setting.’ [DOC:IMR-PS20090918] 
‘…indeed lots of documents but we agreed we would filter 
documents in draft form.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘Given that the HRMDEPT application will very shortly form the 
contractual development base for the APMS IOC release, we are 
fast approaching the point where SI (as prime contractor and 
first level support) and ourselves (as sub-contractor and 
developer) will be contractually bound to offer warranty’. 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
Validating requirements 
Requirements as expressed were 
imprecise and there were gaps. Object 
was to create process descriptors that 
could drive development and close 
imprecision in the task scope.  
‘…a chunk of the requirements ought to somehow should have 
been challenged at the outset before we kind of embarked on 
let’s see how far we could get and then worry at the end.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘I have a dream ... ... my dream is that we could assemble the 
atomic SRS's into use cases, linking them together when 
possible based on the process flows the end-users will describe 
us.’[Project Support SI]  
‘…at the moment I am treating the ‘new requirements as 
proposed.’’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘I believe that part of the departure process for an individual 
leaving the DefOrg organisations deals with a performance 
report with the line manager, I can't find any SRSs that deal this 
with, what should we do?’ [Business Consultant PS] 
Adapting the plan 
The extensive review and revise cycles 
drove multiple changes and adjustments 
to the schedule (sequence of activities) 
and plan. Careful expression and 
presentation of the task had high 
importance rather than an achievable 
plan. 
‘I re-started the exercise to identify how to satisfy each SOW in 
terms of ‘PLANs to be delivered’. Reason for this is that the 
IV&V is awfully strict in his review and spells each ... word ... 
There is thus a need to reduce the number of review cycles by 
sending them documents as complete as possible and 
addressing the dedicated SOW clearly.’ [Project Support SI ] 
 ‘Can You please FIRST tell me at which time you are able to 
send it to me and Daniel for review? I need this because I have 
to deliver a new PMS today EOB and I need to add this date for 
the Schedule.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘(name) asked for a pre-meeting to discuss about the updated 
schedule (sent to him informally, based on the discussion I had 
with you a few weeks ago about all the meetings).’ [Project 
Manager SI] 
 ‘Plan needs to be realistic and achievable within contract, 
rather than setting a completely false expectation’ 
[Development Manager PersonSoft] 
Adapting the schedule 
The schedule went through continuous 
revision throughout IOC phase of project 
‘…herewith attached you'll find the draft of the updated 
schedule (PMS V1.1) as discussed during our last PCR.  1. The 
proposed schedule shows a deviation of 3 weeks from the 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
due to requirement change, failures in 
development and bugs/deficiencies. 
baseline due to:       - extra effort to deliver Rel 4     - the 
additional buffer for bug fixing.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘As PersonSoft needs one more day to fix the issues (there’s still 
significant research needed for the cross-site scripting issue), 
we’ll have to shift the schedule accordingly… New product 
baseline ready by PersonSoft: Friday 30/11/2012.’ [Project 
Manager SI] 
‘…we are negotiating an update to the scheduling due to 
updated requirements.’ [Project Manager PS] 
Agreeing a new contract 
Changes in scope of the project triggered 
a contract amendment and the 
production of an impact statement. The 
impact statement was normally a 
negotiation with buyers preserving cost 
and schedule whilst suppliers attempting 
to extend the budget. By IOC close a total 
of five impact statements were produced, 
one accepted and the rest rejected or 
moved in FOC requirements. 
 
‘no cost reduction is implied by the current approach they have 
bought a COTS.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft EM] 
 ‘It is unclear how much effort was originally planned for IOC 
and how much is still planned for IOC and therefore how much 
effort has been saved.’ [IVV consultant Agency]  
APMS-PM-ImpactAnalysis(ver0.3) [DOC: PCD-IMPACT-
10/06/2011] 
APMS-PM-Impact Analysis-v0.1_DefOrg Review v0.1 [DOC: 
PCD-SHReview-03/05/2011] 
 ‘I still see a few improvements necessary in the latest version of 
the Impact Analysis, and, consequently, in the version of the 
SRS to be attached with the contract amendment. [Project 
Manager Agency EM]’ 
‘…the results of the contract meeting with DefOrg this 
afternoon is a preliminary agreement on the impact analysis 
such that the scope for IOC is accepted…it means that you can 
base your design and development for IOC on that table.’ 
[Project Manager SI EM] 
Controlling a 
change in 
requirements 
The impact of a 
large change in 
requirements at 
the start had to 
be controlled to 
fit with 
capabilities of the 
suppliers within 
the contracted 
timescales. 
Fitting  to capabilities 
To win the contract compliance was 
stated for all business requirements – all 
functional and non-functional 
requirements could be delivered. 
Requirements change at the beginning of 
the project was used to remove 
troublesome promised deliveries or to 
delay ‘them’ to a future project phase. 
‘We agreed that we would get the current telephone directory 
they made working with 6.4 for IOC. I do not have the SRS to 
hand but the web access for IOC is via a terminal services 
session for manager and optimiser functions and web browser 
for EOL’[Project Manager PS] 
 ‘…we need and answer to the point opened by (name)      
‘HRMSys : Web Apps from CURR’ can I make the following 
statement ? PersonSoft confirms that even at CURR, the end-
users of HRMSys use Web browsers, not client applications.’ 
[Quality Support SI] 
‘(we) need to be very careful how we work through clarifying 
this we do not want to appear dishonest.’ [Sales Support 
PersonSoft]  
 ‘We made no reference to the potential 'nuclear' option of 
delivering the new ISAF requirements only as a first IOC stage 
delivery.’ [DOC: IMR-PS] 
Controlling expectations 
PersonSoft needed to control the 
expectations of HRMDept to fall within 
the capabilities of PersonSoft, the project 
timeline available and the application 
they provided. This was accentuated as 
within HRMDept there were new key 
players with no history or understanding 
of what had gone before. 
‘Some signs of understanding amongst DefOrg (although 
embryonic) that project is over scoped and needs re-planning to 
make sustainable – there is an open door to shape the project’ 
[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘I believe we have an opportunity to set the precedence for the 
type of documentation we will produce (i.e. demonstrate the 
sample training doc)...if we set the scene adequately we may 
be-able to control their expectations.’ (Technical Lead PS] 
‘The game plan I guess is to get DefOrg to accept a certain way 
of documenting their processes and bounding their 
expectations - and USE Cases are quite a useful tool to do this 
as long as you do not stray too far in attempting to design an 
application that is.’ [Project Manager PS] 
Controlling scope 
The scope of IOC and any desired changes 
had to be contained within the 
capabilities of the application and 
PersonSoft to deliver them. 
‘…Over 90% of the scope changes impact PersonSoft the impact 
statement has been prepared from that standpoint.’ [Project 
Manager PersonSoft] 
‘…we are now in a position to confirm that whilst we remain 
able to deliver all required serials within the overall IOC and 
FOC budget and timescales, that we are now unable to deliver 
all required IOC serials without adopting one of the following 3 
approaches…’. [Project Manager SI] 
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‘I'd effectively appreciate (name) being there to defend the 
position - scenario 1 of impact analysis.’ [Project Support SI] 
‘The point is we cannot risk a UAT failure caused by code 
created outside our control. If DefOrg want to do this it is a 
change request and we must be able to test their code before 
we can include this HRMDEPT UC layer within APMS.’[Project 
Manager PS] 
Controlling requirement change  
Hidden within the requirements list were 
demanding and non-feasible functions. 
Additional changes introduced severe 
problems in delivery. HRMDept via 
Agency sought to ‘trade-off’ the ‘time 
spent’ on already available functions for 
the new need. Thus preserving overall 
financial scope but expanding delivered 
footprint. 
‘Several of the non-functional, but never-the-less demanding 
SRS serials within the SOW are starting to surface; such as the 
extensive documentation requirement for a COTS project, and 
issues such as CBT and Help that are effectively not scoped with 
any requirement fit criterion’ [PM 2 PersonSoft]. 
‘They will of course try and use these estimates as a basis to 
trade days in and out. We will need to be consistent with these 
estimates, and at the same time also protect our IPR interests.’ 
[Services Director PS] 
‘Based on the number of days additional effort for IOC (due to 
new/changing requirements) is it not possible to keep the 
desired new scope and keep the current timelines. We expect 
that the number of extra man days (50) effort is relatively small 
and should therefore be no problem to implement without 
changing the timelines or moving major parts of IOC to FOC’ 
[DOC: PCD-AG/201103] 
‘We should be implementing minimum features here i.e. 
features which are not heavy on coding thus enabling PQA to 
test earlier.’ [Business Consultant 1 PS]  
 
5.4 Dimension – Aligning group to the task 
In parallel with the agreement of the scope of the task the new organisation created 
by the consortium had to determine and negotiate their respective roles and 
responsibilities, build initial trust, and create an effective working arrangement (Doz, 
1996, Lee and Choi, 2011). The alignment that took place over the project was a 
knowledge exchange from PersonSoft to TestCo and an integration of the delivery 
between the partners that was only partially successful. This alignment covered three 
processes, firstly, reconnaissance and making sense of the task, concerned with 
probing for and acquiring initial codified knowledge, secondly, aligning processes and 
practices, creating end-to-end process and removing overlaps, and thirdly, building 
working knowledge, where in a more evolved collaborative stage deeper knowhow 
was generated and shared (Ring and van de Ven, 1994). These three principal 
constructs and the link between the empirical data and the three factors is shown in 
Table 5-2 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 5-4 that illustrates the link 
from the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category agreeing goals and 
plans. 
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Figure 5-4 - Extract empirical model aligning group to the task 
Reconnaissance and 
making sense of the 
task
Aligning processes and 
practices
Building working 
knowledge
‘Testco has six dedicated testers for this 
project we only have one tester who is a 
recent hire; I believe we are under resourced 
from a testing perspective’ 
‘I believe there is a major bottleneck in the 
flow of information between TestCo and 
Agency and vice a versa. This has resulted in 
misunderstandings in the work to be done.’
Aligning group to the task
‘…what I really need is HOW PersonSoft is 
using the software (specific to HRMSys / 
customisations) not the user manual.’ 
 
The consortium on the supplier side consisted of organisations who had never worked 
together before. Furthermore, PersonSoft, supplier of the incumbent application 
(MAPS), had to adjust to working within the constraints of a formal contract and under 
the direction and control of a larger organisation. In addition, both SI and TestCo had 
no prior experience in the application, or with the client organisation into which 
HRMSys was being delivered. As a consequence they were completely dependent on 
PersonSoft to provide the knowledge of client context and HRMSys’ specific 
technology. PersonSoft had been the incumbent supplier for an earlier version of 
HRMSys for ten years before project start. However the ways of working were informal 
and core elements such as documentation did not exist, as a Director stated, ‘when we 
bought the original versions of (MAPS) there was virtually no documentation with it 
and the company was really suffering from the fact there was no adequate 
documentation for the users, for the administrators and indeed for the company.’7 The 
assumption of Agency, SI and TestCo was for the procurement of a COTS ready-made 
application that would be configured to suit specific functional need whereas 
PersonSoft had created MAPS as a bespoke application. When requests were made 
inter alia, for guides, system descriptions, database schemas, coding standards, or 
training documentation, these did not exist or if they did were out-of-date. It was 
remarked by the director of TestCo Romania: ‘… it seems that these documents are not 
available or if they exist or not, I don't know, essentially we don't have them.’ 
[Commercial manager TestCo] 
                                                     
7
 This was explained to the researcher as resulting from the ad-hoc funding arrangements. Finance came 
from ‘various budget pots’ and was spent on maximising functionality and not on formal 
documentation. 
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Furthermore, PersonSoft, whether from resource shortfall or reluctance, were 
slow to engage with their supplier partners to correct these gaps; ‘…we have no 
generic documentation to give to TestCo’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft]. TestCo, 
who were responsible for executing formal testing processes, lacked almost all 
necessary knowledge and were unable to acquire it from PersonSoft despite repeated 
exchanges. 
‘Is anyone available from PersonSoft who can grant us 30 minutes for our 
technical questions? What about next week? Can we have some WebEx 
sessions?’ [Technical Consultant TestCo] 
Basic knowledge transfer between partners during the early stages of the project was 
ineffective and initial perceptions of trust damaged between the partners (Lee and 
Choi, 2011). This was due to the physical absence of any detailed specification 
accentuated by poor processes, resource shortages, and no felt obligation to do this at 
PersonSoft. Almost every request for documents, information, meetings, and 
conferences failed to yield results and prevented early alignment - a situation that led 
finally to a formal rebuke to PersonSoft from SI. 
‘…we agreed on a series of Webex activities … to this date we were confronted 
with repetitive cancellation.’ [Extract: DOC: LET- SI-09/12/2011] 
The lack of formal documentation was made worse by the ongoing delays in producing 
the design documentation and a lack of access to the ongoing configuration process. 
Releases of software occurred with poor quality release notes that left limited time to 
correct and test the application before it was needed by the schedule. Poor 
communication was endemic and the reluctance of PersonSoft to adapt their 
processes enabled only limited integration; ’our PQA seems to be on the side-lines and 
not engaged.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Communication problems were continuous throughout IOC with a variable 
PersonSoft response to partner questions. Parallel and ongoing communication with 
HRMDept, bypassing TestCo, fragmented the team. Furthermore, there were early 
attempts to conceal poor quality software and TestCo were criticised for going outside 
their (supposed) restricted remit of testing entirely new functions to test the entire 
application.  
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‘During APMS IOC phase we were not a team. Almost every individual person was 
on his own. That’s my general conclusion’ [Test Director TestCo EmInt]. 
Furthermore, PersonSoft at times seemed not to recognising their role as enabling 
partner learning, as was clear from this remark.  
‘I don’t know individually they seem to be quite capable fellows – but they just 
weren’t immersed enough and didn’t have the scope and scale to get close 
enough to meaningfully test this stuff.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
Throughout the IOC stage TestCo and SI were strongly dependent on 
PersonSoft for major aspects of the project, and had no visibility into the development 
processes and were unaware of inherent and emerging problems within the software. 
For example, in getting behind what was driving multiple software releases. Although 
problems in quality had been signalled at an early stage by TestCo this had been 
rejected by PersonSoft who influenced SI to ignore these concerns. The above aspects, 
seeking knowledge and attempts to integrate practices, were intertwined throughout 
IOC within a process that selectively excluded partners and reduced their access to 
essential knowledge to perform their role (Becerra et al., 2008). As a result a lack of 
integrated practices blocked partner learning and materially threatened success (Lee 
et al., 2012).  
Documents and occasional discussions cannot substitute for the face to face 
interaction that is essential for the development of knowhow and tacit knowledge 
(Santhanam et al., 2007). Throughout IOC there was ineffective knowledge transfer 
and no practical alignment of work processes, and ‘clear and evident gaps between 
what must be done between PersonSoft and TestCo’ emerged [Services Manager SI]. 
Unresolved tensions and differences appeared that were not fully addressed by project 
management at SI, resulting from informal processes (being maintained) at PersonSoft 
clashing with expected formality at SI and TestCo.  
 An idealised process model of the initial phases of the project for this 
dimension is shown as Figure 5-5. Each of the blocks in this process diagram represents 
a first order empirical cluster shown in Table 5-2, the relationship between them and 
the grouping around dimension categories. The main aspect observed was the 
continuous cycles of team building and the sharing of knowledge to enable successful 
task performance. These processes were inhibited by poor availability, resource 
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shortfalls and a reluctance to share required knowhow. 
Figure 5-5 - Process outline aligning group to task 
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knowledge
Closing gaps in 
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Table 5-2 - Dimension team building and aligning to the task 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Reconnaissance 
and making 
sense of the task 
A new 
organisational 
group was 
formed by the 
consortium to 
create the 
service. Basic 
knowledge had to 
be exchanged 
about the 
product and the 
ways of working. 
Gathering and preparing resources 
PersonSoft resourced for the project 
based on historical patterns of work with 
HRMDept – that had much less formality. 
At an early stage of IOC resource 
shortfalls became evident especially in 
testing and were endemic throughout 
PersonSoft during this phase. 
‘Testco has six dedicated testers for this project we only have 
one tester who is a recent hire; I believe we are under resourced 
from a testing perspective’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft].  
 ‘Neither myself or (name) was aware of this arrangement to 
work from home in India and that you were not returning to the 
UK until October, I'm not sure how this is going to work for 
HRMSys especially as we have a large backlog of bugs.’ 
[Business Consultant PersonSoft]. 
‘As previously mentioned I believe there is a requirement for 
another full time PQA … I'm convinced that a single resource 
will not be sufficient for IOC.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘we were assigned a tester who is new that was mistake 
number one. We bought someone off the street because they 
were cheap.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft]. 
Closing gaps in understanding 
There was limited and ongoing gaps in 
knowledge transfer throughout the entire 
IOC phase. TestCo in particular were 
stranded by this deficit. 
 
 ‘…no technical knowledge transfer was allowed from 
PersonSoft to TestCo (and by technical I’m not referring to 
application usage, but more in depth knowledge). By having 
such a transfer, we could both understand before-hand and 
avoid future problems with HRMDept.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘…attached the Hardware Guidelines that we discussed during 
our telephone meeting…getting DefOrg to respond to the 
information requested will go a long way in making their 
hardware recommendation specific to HRMSys requirements.’ 
[Senior Technical Lead PersonSoft] 
‘The other thing that was missed was there was knowledge 
transfer in the contract for TestCo to do their testing. There was 
no technical knowledge transfer for HRMDEPT.’ [Service 
Manager Europe PersonSoft] 
Seeking  basic facts  
The suppliers TestCo and SI had no 
practical understanding of the product 
produced by PersonSoft. The first task 
following the project start was to gain 
basic understanding. For this codified 
explicit knowledge in the form of 
‘In HRMSys 5.3( or whatever version is installed in HRMDept) 
how do you handle the measurement of availability? Are there 
installed some tools scripts, etc? I would like to discuss with you 
about Availability Mng and SLA this Thursday after the PDR.’ 
[Technical Lead TestCo] 
‘…we need absolutely to have the exact naming of the CI's you 
will deliver to us. We have to show them now that they have 
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documentation, user guides, test scripts 
etc. were requested. 
requested the access to the CSA portal.’ [Technical Lead TestCo] 
 ‘…regarding the configuration management I have some 
questions.  1) What is you branching strategy? I want to have 
the same strategy as you guys have so that we can map your 
infrastructure. 2) What is your release strategy?’ [Technical 
Consultant TestCo] 
Accessing routine knowledge  
The lack of explicit knowledge of the 
application also affected PersonSoft. It 
was not available, or very dated, within 
the organisation and had to be created 
just for this project. Knowledge of the 
application within PersonSoft was within 
tacit knowledge structures. 
‘I was button holed by TestCo yesterday (again) to be clear on 
what documentation we had or used to test our software …If 
the answer is 'we don't do it that way' so we have nothing 
could you say so and I will inform TestCo  of this today so we 
can deal with the disappointment and tears and prepare 
workarounds.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘The test scripts we have were for the original Defence Suite 
which is 6.0, they have not been updated since then. There are 
a lot of changes between 6.0 and 6.3, although there are no 
reasons why you cannot use the 6.0 test scripts as a basic 
guideline as long as the people using them are familiar (with 
the application) Sorry.’ [Test Manager PersonSoft] 
‘The initial approach was to develop the training materials 
based on standard COTS documentation provided by 
PersonSoft.’ [Director TestCo] 
‘I TestCo has raised issues regarding the use case …I now know 
I'll have to change my approach regarding documentation as 
TestCo  are expecting at least a spec with each release … we 
currently have no generic MAPS documents to provide to 
TestCo.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Aligning 
processes and 
practices 
Alignment of 
processes was 
blocked by poor 
communication 
between actors. 
Managing resource availability 
Resource shortfalls were endemic for all 
processes within PersonSoft. The project 
was unable to recognise this fully and to 
take corrective actions. 
‘I think PersonSoft themselves were under resourced and I still 
think they probably are we estimated the amount of effort else 
we wouldn’t have had problems that we had at IOC. You guys 
know the amount of money you put into it in the end was 
enormous far more than you expected.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘…resources availability and respect of decided actions are still a 
problem.’ [Services Director SI] 
‘Is there any intention to ‘drip-feed’ the updated Use Cases back 
to us or will it be a Big-Bang approach?’ [Dept Manager 
HRMDept] 
‘I think G. may have under resourced this project. I remember 
the discussions with M. beg borrowing and stealing for what 
was the biggest defence project at that time.’ [Senior Business 
Analyst PersonSoft] 
Defining how the work is shared 
The activities of TestCo (testing and 
training) and SI depended on open 
collaboration with PersonSoft and the 
agreement and sharing of common tools. 
This was a problem with PersonSoft who 
insisted (for example) on their own 
service tool being used until overruled by 
SI. Common tools, testing approaches and 
openness in collaboration occurred only 
slowly and only accelerated when serious 
problems with the PersonSoft software 
emerged. 
 
‘Are PersonSoft responsible for teaching TestCo testers how to 
create workflows, alerts etc using Sequence?’ [Senior Business 
Consultant PersonSoft] 
'I’m a little concerned that we're having to use both Mantis and 
Fogbugz to manage issues against the candidate release and 
probably going forward.’ [Senior Business Analyst PS] 
‘We have no knowledge for that …most of them refers to very 
in-depth technical details for the implementation of COTS and 
APMS. There's nobody else except PersonSoft that can 
document those points.’ [Training Consultant TestCo] 
‘We estimate that this would require approx. 200 pages (in 
additional to the 400 pages of the current document) which 
again is unrealistic to do at this stage of the project.’ [Training 
Consultant TestCo] 
‘…best solution for the project schedule is to build UC’s ONLY for 
requirements covered at IOC.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft 
meeting notes] 
‘…would expect the testers to extensively test the new 
enhancements and features implemented … but not to do a full 
regression testing.’ [Technical Lead PersonSoft] 
Building the team 
No serious effort was made to integrate 
the teams and to overcome the barriers 
‘I don’t think we made any serious allowance for our 
relationship with TestCo and delivering to them and to 
HRMDept I think we envisaged a relationship that was much 
more direct one between us and HRMDept.’[Services Director 
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that were erected by PersonSoft. This was 
partially a result of the underestimating of 
the effort needed for this project and 
vulnerability of PersonSoft to scrutiny of 
their processes and products. 
PersonSoft] 
 ‘I did not receive so much support from our partners (SI, 
PersonSoft). I’ve carried on ‘my war’ alone. Only during the late 
autumn, 2011, when other documents were candidates for 
Agency refusal, things were changed and SI management focus 
was set in this direction, too.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘I think once we started to take the lead a little bit more that’s 
when it started to work good or bad it started to work. And 
that’s when the relationship was ad hoc and TestCo started 
working a lot better.’ [Senior Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Linking and aligning team 
There were problems in communication 
between members of the supplier’s 
consortium (and to the buyers) due to 
project governance that emphasized 
control over the parties and their 
interaction. The physical distance 
between the parties also acted to block 
social interaction and informal channels 
of communication. The project team was 
fragmented and occasionally 
uncoordinated – this was not fully 
alleviated by the use of video 
conferencing. 
‘…I believe there is a major bottleneck in the flow of 
information communicated between TestCo and Agency and 
vice a versa. This has resulted in misunderstandings of the work 
to be done and the client’s expectations.’ [Business Analyst 
PersonSoft Report] 
Do you have time next week to meet up in Brussels with C. …I 
discussed with him briefly the possibility of embedding our 
business consultant (you) with the TestCo guys supporting the 
testing of the product …to form a more jointly organised TestCo 
PersonSoft team.’ [Project Manager PS] 
‘PQA cannot have 20 days for unit testing a time box for 
example there is no time for this. There is quite some testing in 
the plan for TestCo for the integration and implementation 
testing of each time box built in as well!’ [Project Manager PS] 
 ‘I would like to arrange a meeting with yourself and PersonSoft 
Software test manager to finalise the approach for testing and 
releasing builds to yourself and your team.’ [Senior Business 
Consultant PersonSoft] 
Integrating  team processes 
TestCo had a view (proved right in the 
end) that the HRMSys application needed 
thorough testing including the core 
product. This was denied by PersonSoft 
and they did attempt to control this by 
direct control over TestCo work 
processes. 
‘The concept of time boxing the deliveries has been discussed 
with TestCo internally and a meeting will be planned over the 
next two weeks to agree and re-state the objectives (to align 
TestCo and PersonSoft thinking).’ [Senior Business Consultant 
PersonSoft Highlight Report]  
‘… the test company TestCo starting off thinking that they must 
test everything including core product. It took quite some time 
to work together effectively and to get TestCo (to) test 
appropriately.’ [Senior Business Analyst PS] 
 ‘Multiple handovers in the project (and many stakeholders) 
make for extended and complex communication.’ [Workshop 
Report PersonSoft DOC:INTERNAL-20090918] 
‘I was very happy to give them full access to FogBugz - that is to 
a common project tool for HRMSys. So we all (as one team) 
could manage errors bugs etc. in one common environment.’ 
[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘We discussed the process of software delivery and testing last 
week… The main purpose was to make the process of delivery 
much slicker and to start working as an integrated team.’ 
[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Building working 
knowledge 
Partner learning 
was effectively 
blocked 
throughout the 
IOC stage and 
compromised 
testing and 
training. 
Adapting scope and task split 
During project execution even up to the 
final testing the task split (who is doing 
what) was still an item of negotiation. 
‘The basis of the waiver was the current COTS cannot provide 
the non-functional in the way described (especially windows 
browser functionality) or is part of the Core COTS that can only 
be changed during a major version upgrade.’ [Sales Support 
PersonSoft] 
‘The story you provided until now is not working since the 
testing of some waived requirements failed.’ [Services Director 
SI Meeting note] 
‘Please accept the following statement, on behalf of PersonSoft 
Software, in support of our formal submission for APMS Test 
Waivers to be applied…’ [Services Director PersonSoft Extract: 
DOC: LET/AL – 24/02/2012] 
Getting  knowhow and knowledge 
As development proceeded knowledge 
requirements moved away from codified 
explicit knowledge to tacit knowhow. 
‘…we encounter lots of issues in Manager trying to check 
different actions described in the Use Cases…they are blocking 
the testing process. I can fully agree to work closely and to solve 
the issues - this will save time on both sides!’ [Test Director 
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TestCo] 
 ‘I cannot use a general description …   As stated below we need 
the following info to incorporate in CMP: features that are to be 
used, what is the workflow in case of an incident, access rights, 
custom fields and reporting capabilities.’ [Test Consultant 2 
TestCo] 
‘…what I really need is HOW PersonSoft is using the software 
(specific to HRMSys / customisations) not the user manual.’ 
[Test Consultant 2 TestCo] 
Enabling knowledge transfer 
Knowledge transfer processes remained 
very poor – including the ability to gain 
understanding to develop training 
programmes. Doubtful value of arm’s 
length communication and knowledge 
sharing processes oriented towards using 
the application. 
‘They are coming over here to see us and get some help as they 
are a little lost. As normal there is very little here and I would 
like to ask whether it is possible for me to have a copy of any 
training materials you guys have created over there for the 
current application. Anything would be start!’ [Consultant PS]. 
 ‘I 've receiving a number of Mantis bug issues now I've looked 
at some of these issues it seems that once again these are 
training issues.’ [Senior Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘I understood that it's very probable that you are not available 
for the whole week for the enabling sessions. Can you confirm 
this? If so, do you know if somebody from PersonSoft that can 
replace you?’ [ Test Director TestCo] 
‘Any news about our planned meeting? Today we are available 
starting from 13:30 (London time) and for the following two 
hours or so.’ [Test Consultant TestCo] 
5.5 Dimension – Understanding the business requirement 
Understanding the business need is essential for the successful development of an 
application. Two main barriers to this were observed, firstly, there was a lack of 
availability and access to key subject matter experts who could articulate the business 
requirement known problems in outsourcing success (TechRepublic, 2007).This 
resulted in a slowly emerging capturing of the business need. Secondly, the capability 
of the consultants at PersonSoft and TestCo to actually codify and write down the 
business need in a structured way and document the process. These two principal 
constructs and the link between the empirical data and the factors is shown in Table 
5-3 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 5-6 that illustrates the link from 
the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category understanding the business 
requirement. 
Figure 5-6 - Extract empirical model understanding the business requirement 
Capturing the business 
need
‘In summary the requirements for the 
project (were) based on very shaky ground 
and came from people remote from the 
actual business processes being supported.’
Understanding of the business 
requirement
Iterate
‘I’ll be honest I think one of the problems 
initially was that’s the first time I’ve been 
involved with use cases…and there was no 
one else on my side who had any knowledge 
or wanted to do anything with it at all.’ 
Codifying and writing 
down business need
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One of the first problems was a lack of availability of appropriate experts to articulate 
the business processes. This was accentuated by project governance that strictly 
controlled access to the user community and a contract that assumed the 
requirements were settled and unproblematic. The access to the business users was 
critical as from an early stage the requirements were perceived as general and lacking 
in precision and ‘insufficient to sustain a development activity’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft]. They had been developed some years earlier by a consultant working for 
HRMDept and based solely on the incumbent application, using the same application 
terminology, and on input from personnel, ‘remote from the actual business.’ A 
situation that was well understood as the project manager at HRMDept noted, ‘I 
wouldn’t take user requirements that have been gathered five years earlier!’ 
PersonSoft and TestCo were restricted and ‘unable to see real users’ and were ‘talking 
to the wrong people’ to define the business processes, a situation that was flagged at 
an early stage. 
‘…very challenging approach in which we expect to understand the drivers of the 
business processes from the end-users. They are the ones who can really define 
the operational sequences … thus allow the Contractor to establish the relation 
between the individual SRS statements and the business flows.’ [DOC:MHR/SI/05-
04-2011] 
This problem of lack of business access was exaggerated by limited understanding 
within HRMDept as to what they wanted to achieve. HRMDept were a relatively small 
central HRM Department within DefOrg, responsible for HRM processes and policy but 
only indirectly involved in many of the business functionalities to be delivered. This 
meant that, to validate the design, they reviewed the documentation then referenced 
this to the incumbent application. This was problematic especially for completely new 
functional needs and in areas where the personnel at HRMDept had no experience of 
the business process being modelled.  
‘I wonder actually asked for the ISAF stuff? I can’t actually recall who in the 
business asked for this? – is probably symptomatic of the connection they had 
with the business. And they’re not connecting with the business they can’t tell us 
what they want.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Poor connection to owners of the business processes, limited understanding within 
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HRMDept, and the loss of active support by key figures acted to create a lack of 
understanding of what had to be achieved. This made the capturing of the 
requirement by PersonSoft and TestCo difficult. 
‘We were dependent on HRMDept to get our foot in the door but the door was 
never opened for us to actually do that.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
The process of defining the business rules took place during workshops between 
HRMDept and PersonSoft. These started just before the final completion of 
requirements validation and continued throughout the project and were only 
completed and ‘signed off’ just before user acceptance testing (UAT). Workshops were 
held with Agency, SI and PersonSoft to derive process maps of key functionalities by 
extracting this information from HRMDept. This was then set down in formal use-case 
and design documentation, and then circulated for review and amendment. HRMDept 
shaped and adapted the design documents from PersonSoft, added new details where 
needed, and a new version of the business requirement was created. This was based 
on the last workshop with corrections and new insights. PersonSoft then took this 
update of the design and adapted it based on their own knowledge of the application 
constraints and created another new version. This process of defining the design took 
several cycles before there was a convergence onto an acceptable compromise 
between the parties. However, this iterative process of design definition meant that 
the actual configuration of the software had started well before the design had been 
finalised and this resulted in major gaps between delivered software and the final 
design specification. And this is what largely contributed to the rejection of the 
software at final acceptance.  
‘ We started configuring before the design had really grounded out in any sort of 
detail and … when it was we did that quite late it had to change again and this 
really basically screwed the development process up.’ [Project Manager 
HRMDept] 
The second major issue that was observed was a resources and capability shortfall in 
the definition of the business processes, particularly in the way these had to be 
documented to a specific standard (UML2) imposed by the contract. It was not just a 
lack of access to subject matter experts but also a capability problem. PersonSoft had 
to adopt an alien and completely new design and development methodology. 
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Furthermore, neither HRMDept nor PersonSoft had any expertise in the development 
of the Use Case Documentation. This was the defined design standard for HRMSys.  
’ (The) Use Cases and a formal documentation that was required within the 
project were completely new to PersonSoft and had never been encountered 
before.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
This posed two learning challenges, firstly, to understand the business processes being 
modelled in the application, and secondly, once captured, to represent these in an 
unfamiliar standard. This implied that, as well as including amendments to the design 
from the business workshops, PersonSoft also had to amend the actual process and 
sequence diagrams that modelled the design. Although there had been some training 
at PersonSoft usage was still embryonic within the HRMSys team. Therefore there 
were two embedded adaption processes occurring during the design phase, firstly, 
PersonSoft and HRMDept creating then converging on a design that matched 
capabilities to business need, and secondly, learning and adapting to a new design 
approach. In summary as a result of these two characteristics of the design process, 
the lack of access to expertise, and the enforcement of unfamiliar processes and 
documentation standards, the design documentation was too late to drive the 
software creation process. They were also strewn with errors and omissions, 
insufficient to drive testing, and unfit for purpose as a baseline reference. As a 
consequence, despite a large amount of effort this activity barely delivered anything 
that was used within the project to drive development. 
A simplified process model of the interaction between the actors for this 
dimension is shown as Figure 5-7. Each of the blocks in this process diagram represents 
a first order empirical cluster shown in Table 5-3, the relationship between them and 
the grouping around dimension categories. The two main related aspects observed 
were the continuing cycles of attempts to discover and document the business 
processes adequate to drive development, and the very limited access to subject 
matter experts who understood the detail of the business processes. These problems 
were accentuated by poor executive sponsorship, as key players took a back seat, and 
a lack of experience within PersonSoft in using the contracted design methodology. 
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Figure 5-7 - Process outline understanding the business requirement 
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Table 5-3 - Dimension understanding of the business requirement 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Capturing 
business need 
Understanding of 
the business 
need limited by 
poor access to 
knowledgeable 
experts in the 
business process 
being modelled.  
Deriving business need 
There was a major shortfall in the ability 
to acquire detailed business process 
knowledge. Software was developed 
based on fundamentally inaccurate 
understanding of what was needed. 
Overcoming poor requirements 
definition 
Requirements were developed as lists of 
needs/wishes and there was a lack of 
insight into the dynamics of the 
underlying business processes. 
Requirements derived from existing 
functions in the incumbent were 
understood new functional areas outside 
of experience were poorly understood. 
 
‘…our requirements were changing and one of the things I 
found frustrating was I was coming up with the new 
requirements for Afghanistan and all I was able to do was to 
talk to people out in Afghanistan over the phone.’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept] 
‘Bear in mind that this use case was agreed to be done at risk 
due to time constraints.’ [Analyst PersonSoft Meeting Note] 
‘…that was annoying because we were coming up with these 
requirements but um they weren’t brilliant. They did change 
(as) they were being developed…And you only found out what 
they really wanted when you went there…and that exposed a 
gap.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
‘…many issues of detail of the process or arrivals and departure 
are missing or in error.’ [IV&V Consultant] 
‘I think it’s one of the key problems with many projects is that 
you have users who know their business you have IT people 
who know how IT works and it’s getting the bit in the middle of 
the hybrid people who can understand the business but also 
know how to apply the IT.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘…had drafted an email before the meeting yesterday to 
indicate that HRMDept had discussed the CE-PE link with 
DefOrg and uncovered DefOrg has not finalised the CE-PE link 
procedures: some key areas are still uncertain and maybe it is 
too early for SI  to spend any further time this function.’ [Project 
Manager Agency] 
Clarifying vague business requirements 
The way the requirements were 
expressed followed poor protocol and 
‘I’d like to pick up on one is the statement of requirements 
because I think the way that it was put together some of the 
serials were at such a high level of interpretation you could 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
approaches, were not ‘atomic’ and mixed 
up application behaviours and business 
requirements.  
argue quite successfully, I think it was argue quite successfully, 
it could be one thing or another.’ [Services Director PS. 
‘In summary the requirements for the project (were) based on 
very shaky ground and came from people remote from the 
actual business processes being supported.’ [Business Analyst 
PS] 
‘These requirement serials were around three years out of date 
and in general poorly formed; being imprecise, not atomic and 
in some cases statements of intent not requirements.’ [Project 
Manager PS] 
 ‘…those people who were defining the requirements did not 
know sufficiently robustly well what the requirement was in 
order to sustain a development activity.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
Remoteness  from real end users 
The owners of the functional 
requirements, HRMDept, did not control 
many of the business processes they were 
responsible for specifying in the HRMSys 
project.  
Unclear boundaries to business 
There was some evidence of using the 
HRMSys to gain control over business 
processes outside of remit of HRMDept. 
Their ideas were not accepted by the 
broader business community. 
‘…there are some gaps that DefOrg need to take action on …We 
may need to arrange access to real users as some of these are 
at quite a level of detail - this also needs to be discussed at the 
meeting.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft Report] 
‘Purchaser side: engagement with the right key users during use 
case modelling phase at the beginning, a lot of development 
was done before the use cases were prepared, work going on at 
risk... CE side ISAF knowledge in HRMDept was not strong 
enough.’ [Development Director PersonSoft] 
‘Clear strong involvement of ISAF teams was missing, now there 
is a clearer strong involvement and ISAF users will be in the 
Lisbon meeting… ISAF element (was) driven by Brunsum, but 
their ideas don't necessarily match the reality of in theatre use.’ 
[Development Director] 
‘very few features from all developed were used by DefOrg. This 
means that having no real feed-back we could not detect users’ 
the real needs.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
Poor access to subject matter experts 
HRMDept were unable (perhaps 
unwilling) to acquire subject matter 
experts to explain and demonstrate their 
business processes. Process modelling 
was based on fragmentary business 
understanding by those remote from the 
actual process. 
‘It must be said that (Name) and his team did not in my opinion 
have full understanding of their business processes they didn’t 
know we were talking to the wrong people.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
‘And the other thing that I wouldn’t do, and I did run that four-
day workshop with user representatives, I wouldn’t take user 
requirements that have been gathered five years earlier. 
Particularly when DefOrg like everywhere else with money 
problems and everything is changing by the minute.’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept]. 
 ‘I know (name) quite well and he doesn’t, or didn’t at that time, 
a quarter of the understanding they had on the actual business 
processes that were supposed to be delivered.’ [Sales Director 
PersonSoft] 
Lack of active sponsorship 
The core sponsor and initiator of HRMSys 
due to illness and imminent retirement 
stepped back from the day-to-day 
involvement in the project. 
‘The reason I question that is I know (name) quite well and he 
doesn’t, or didn’t at that time, have a quarter of the 
understanding (name) had on the actual business processes 
that were supposed to be delivered’ [Sales Director PS] 
‘…everybody knew I was going and there’s always that issue of 
much of the plans you’re doing the deliveries were after you left 
and making then decisions and driving things for things you 
could not then effect and couldn’t take responsibility for was 
one of the issues.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘I think your active engagement [HRMDept Director] in forcing 
through a view that version 6 IOC form was not perfect, would 
have been adequate, it was an interim solution and my problem 
with it internally with PersonSoft is that it took so much to get 
through that closing stages of IOC.’  [Services Director PS] 
‘Can be honest I never knew which side (Name) was going to be 
on. One minute he was shouting they must have done that… 
But the next minute he turnaround saying they’ve got time just 
leave it.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
Lack of focus on the business goals ‘Let’s say was management’s fault that we will focus probably 
 
Chapter 5–  Practices of outsourc ing implementation  Page| 116 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Overall project was driven to meet the 
financial and time goals and little 
attention on the outcomes needed.  
too much on time and hitting deadlines and worrying about 
damages rather than what we had to deliver.’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept. 
‘A number two was what are you actually trying to achieve? Do 
you need an upgrade? Do you need to deploy this to 
Afghanistan? Do you need CE-PE posts? I think at the very 
beginning that’s what they should have done instead of going 
out and collecting all these requirements dumping into a 
contract and saying supplier crack on.’[Senior Business Analyst 
PersonSoft] 
‘What we really lacked was somebody on the other side, your 
side, who knew what you wanted to achieve. Not so much how 
it was going to work this is what we want to do. And somebody 
on your side who knew about the business.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
Codifying 
business need 
There was a lack 
in capability and 
the skills needed 
to document 
business 
processes in the 
manner 
demanded by the 
contract. 
Agreeing design and analysis rules 
Mismatch to how the project was 
contracted and the optimal design 
approach for uncertainty in business 
requirements. 
 
‘I have an intellectual problem with a fixed price project, a fixed 
price contract working in an agile way. Because agile takes a 
degree of flexibility on both sides. A fixed price project 
undermines all that. You must deliver to these specifications 
and that’s it. And that’s what we were trying basically to do.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘We attempted a waterfall approach with – agile is good for 
when the requirements are not quite clear.’ [Project Manager 
HRMDept] 
‘Many of the remarks … are fine but we do seem to have 
strayed away from the original intention … which was to handle 
this as reference data - most of the remarks seem to me to be 
related to new requirements.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘Read what he says and get back to me look like a redesign on 
the fly is going on.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘Review process around documentation and analysis needs to 
be direct between HRMDEPT and Allocate while still ensuring 
formal review and signoff occurs at the project management 
level with SI and AGENCY .’ [Development Manager PersonSoft] 
Faulty design and  encoding process 
The approach to using Use Cases was 
questioned due to a perceived mismatch 
between the desire for a COTS package 
and an imposed design technique that 
implied a new application. 
‘…the Use Cases were too broad and not very consistent. But, 
hey! this is somehow natural – during the development / 
testing activities such artefacts should be improved. No big 
improvement was done on them.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
 ‘And we got side-tracked as well with these damn use cases 
they were never used you know. And at the time F. insisted on 
them as a deliverable and Angela was involved in all of that and 
it was just a waste of resources.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘I’ll be honest I think one of the problems initially was that’s the 
first time I’ve been involved with use cases…So I had a learning 
lesson and there was no one else on my side who had any 
knowledge or wanted to do anything with it at all.’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept] 
Design capture process was new 
Inexperience with using the specific 
techniques required in the contract (from 
both PersonSoft and HRMDept) led to 
multiple cycles of correction just on the 
actual layout and format of the required 
design approach. 
Formalism clashed with prior history 
Lack of experience with the technique per 
se led to major elements of the business 
process rules and exceptions being 
missed. Limited experience and lack of 
availability existing documentation caused 
major resource problems. 
‘This meant that requirements took a long time to write down 
and this was exaggerated by the need for PersonSoft to use 
particular documentation approaches and especially use case.’ 
[Director HRMDept] 
‘My involvement was in some of the use cases in trying to turn 
some other use cases around because there were issues with 
quality of documentation. With views stuff like that there have 
been lots of pushback on the use cases.’ [European Service 
Manager PS]  
 ‘As mentioned before: the big problem is CE-PE links is 
something new and to a degree we are having to make up the 
rules, procedures etc. All we can do is make a few assumptions 
and work on that.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
‘And one thing that crucified us was all documentation and 
formalism I don’t have a problem personally but it was such a 
difference from the way PersonSoft work within before then 
couldn’t find any documentation of anything.’[Senior Business 
Analyst PersonSoft] 
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 ‘And even when it became around to do the install for the 
factory acceptance test is seen to be much more formal and a 
surprise even to U. All seemed very formal and also very very 
new.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Review and acceptance of the design 
delayed  
The time allowed for design capture was 
exceeded and increased the pressure to 
start configuration before the design was 
finalised. Poor and incomplete design, in 
content and presentation, led to an 
emergent design and in configuration and 
technical documentation much rework 
and retesting. 
‘I think if I’m being honest that is the main issue writing the use 
cases doing the code work before the design has been agreed 
fine we can handle that we should have been adaptable to a 
certain extent.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
‘Due to the time constraints, I think we can start work on some 
of the functionality  even before getting the use cases...we can 
then utilise the use cases to refine our final delivery and 
output.’ [Senior Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘HRMDept is not convinced that the Use Cases are at a 
sufficiently mature nature to be formally reviewed.’ [Manager 
HRMDept] 
‘Unfortunately from (name)’s perspective he had to start early 
and I admitted I put pressure on him and the others because of 
the deadline deadlines we had to get something to start.’ 
[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
 
5.6 Dimension – Configuring and implementing 
The core of the delivery of the project was the preparation and configuration and 
creation of software, creating supporting documentation and the testing and 
acceptance of the software technically by Agency and functionally by HRMDept. These 
two principal constructs and the link between the empirical data and the factors is 
shown in Table 5-4 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 5-8 that 
illustrates the link from the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category 
configuring and implementing.  
Figure 5-8 - Extract empirical model configuring and implementing 
Configuration and 
creation of software
‘Some results of UAT highlighted that key 
business rules were not captured at all.  
Need to carefully look at what the required 
level of detail in the documentation.’ 
Configuring and delivering
Testing and accepting
Iterate
‘Where it really got hammered was 
HRMDept decided to regress-test the entire 
application and that’s where it failed. It 
turned up hundreds of bugs’
 
Software configuration, the adaption of the COTS baseline product to suit actual 
project requirements, started within three months of the project initiation. This was 
based on assumptions and a broad understanding of the requirements covered in the 
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MAPS baseline model but well before the design Use Cases had been finalised8. The 
development of the design was subject to delays (see section 5.5 ) and the final 
acceptance of the Use Cases was after system testing and just prior to the user 
acceptance testing (UAT). This meant configuration had started approximately eight 
months before the final design was ‘signed off’. This situation was exacerbated by 
problems in the review and acceptance process and design documents that went 
through ‘so many amendments and modifications it was ridiculous’ [Business 
Consultant PersonSoft]. All project documentation supporting: testing, design, 
configuration and even project reporting were subject to continuous review and 
amendment and as a result delay. This situation may have been acceptable in the old 
ways of working when there were only two parties involved but the failure to agree a 
final design cascaded throughout the project and created problems in software quality, 
exposed major gaps in testing procedures, and resulted in failings in expectations and 
rejection of the delivered software. Both PersonSoft and HRMDept had a working 
assumption that PersonSoft would react as they always had in the past and fix any 
gaps that occurred ‘on the fly’, but this was not possible within the new formal 
structure of HRMSys. 
‘I think if I’m being honest the main issue writing the use cases (was) doing the 
code work before the design has been agreed fine we can handle that we should 
have been adaptable to a certain extent.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Configuring the software had begun early, triggered by an approaching 
contracted deadline for the delivery of a first release that fell six months after start. 
There were multiple continuous releases of the software. From the first release (IOC) 
until the final accepted release (version 8-IOC) - there were twelve major patches to 
the software and six emergency or minor releases. This was symptomatic of a 
problematic development approach. Each new version of the software required an 
adapted document set, a baselined formal release, updated installation manuals and 
scripts, and also had to be fully regression tested9 on the reference system. Following 
testing a list of bugs and deficiencies triggered fixing of the problems, more regression 
                                                     
8
 Use Cases are a process modelling technique that defines how the application interacts with users 
when delivering the required functions specified in the contract. 
9
 Regression testing confirms that the software still performs as expected and nothing has changed due 
to the software update. 
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testing, and then a re-release. It was observed that software fixing during testing and 
acceptance was iterative, using just the list of deficiencies as a guide, and then trying 
again to get it past the testing process.  
Gaps between the design documentation and already configured software 
meant continuous re-work. This was exaggerated as the business requirements and 
design definitions were emerging piecemeal over time rather than as coherent work 
packages and ‘…when new ideas were elaborated this meant things had to be changed 
or even completely deleted.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] In the interaction between 
the design and configuration processes a cycle was observed where design 
documentation, representing the model of the system, emerged and guided 
development that in turn constrained and shaped the design process but only in a 
partial way.  
There was a fundamental mismatch between documentation, design and the 
configuration and major problems in the core software that had not been trapped 
earlier. This meant the testing of HRMSys threw up many old issues that were well 
known to PersonSoft but had been ignored. There were many warnings, from TestCo, 
pointing out these shortfalls and problems within the core product that were 
becoming apparent, but these warnings were derided as unimportant or attributed to 
lack of understanding of the product. 
‘Yet another ‘the world is ending’ ... He is painting the wrong picture in this 
email...essentially the system test is not blocked etc. bugs are bugs and are to 
some degree expected but there was no critical issues raised so far.’ [Business 
Analyst 2 PersonSoft]10 
 HRMDept and PersonSoft were used to a situation where the final adjustment 
to the application, including embedded rules and processes, could be done when the 
completed software was ready. However the defined process emphasised a staged 
‘water-fall’ development where each step had to be completed before moving onto 
the next. Furthermore, standards, plans and testing routines were specified and 
documented in the contract and were subject to test and confirmation that they had 
been followed. In the case of HRMSys each software release had to be validated, 
                                                     
10
 In fact this actual delivery was rejected by Agency due to deficiencies. 
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installed and tested on the reference system, tested for security and finally accepted 
for functionality by HRMDept. This meant a substantial extra load ‘on an under 
resourced project’, especially for PersonSoft, HRMDept and TestCo. This added 
additional delays to the delivery as any fault discovered had to be repaired, and again 
put through the validation process. This was a particularly difficult problem when 
critical faults and gaps emerged very late in the IOC stage resulting from software 
rejection by the end users.  
The configuration and delivery of the software, and related artefacts, was a 
confrontation between the traditional ways of delivery practised at PersonSoft, across 
all of its major markets, and was characteristic of a small entrepreneurial company 
working closely with its clients adapting a bespoke software application. The 
development of HRMSys was strictly formal, and guided by written standards, rules 
and procedures, and within an institutional context of a public sector bureaucratic 
organisation that assumed a COTS packaged development. Delivery was iterative in the 
sense that configuration was driven by rules and schemas and converged on the final 
goal by a process of responding to the gaps exposed by testing. Configuration 
continued until the testing was passed or the testing obstacle removed by, for 
example, eliminating by agreement a problematic function from the project. 
A process model of the interaction between the actors for this dimension is 
shown as Figure 5-9. Each of the blocks in this process diagram represents a first order 
empirical cluster shown in Table 5-4, the relationship between them and the grouping 
around dimension categories. The two main related aspects observed were the 
continuing cycles of repairs and retesting caused by poor configuration processes 
enabled by the limited availability of design documentation in the early stages of 
development. Configuration and creation of the system was started before the design 
was finalised – this was a fundamental mistake.  
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Figure 5-9 - Process outline configuring and implementing 
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Table 5-4 – Dimension configuring and implementing 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Configuration of 
software 
Poor quality 
development 
approaches and 
time pressure 
acted to create a 
delivery with 
many errors. 
Building and repairing software under 
time pressure 
Problems with the software build 
emerged early on especially on the 
number of fixes that were needed within 
the time allowed. The project milestone 
approach, emphasised by SI, concentrated 
on time line conformance and dates 
promised to Agency contributed to poor 
output quality. 
‘We have to deliver a release to TestCo on 1st August and I'm 
getting a little concerned that we only have three weeks to do 
this and I've not seem/reviewed any of the ISAF work yet, which 
of course means this hasn't been through a round of testing and 
fixes.’ [Senior Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
‘A lot of effort has gone into the patch 2 release; in this patch 
we have addressed a total of 58 issues from Fogbugz. I have 
also worked closely with the TestCo team to try to prioritise 
where possible any issues that they deem as “Blocking”.’ 
[Technical Lead PersonSoft] 
 ‘Once again, we are reiterating that due to all the problems 
mentioned above, current release (the so called Release 
Candidate) is NOT acceptable for System Test and Training 
Materials preparation.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘This documentation is proving a pain - pass permits is complex 
although 100 comments is a lot and I thought it had already 
been reviewed by Agency.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Lacking of awareness emerging problems 
There were long delays in the design 
being finalised, continuous rework of the 
application from bugs and deficiencies, 
testing was a problem and the 
documentation was delayed. However 
until quite late during testing reporting on 
progress was positive to senior 
management - there was a filter on this 
strong evidence that the project was 
going astray. 
Selective attention to problems 
When action was taken it was on non-
compliance to the schedule and limited 
attention to the root causes of failure in 
the design and development process and 
‘My assessment is that progress looks v. encouraging in the 
config area, and that we now need to focus on completion of 
the integration piece and killing all the bugs.’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
‘…have now very successfully driven verification stage of this 
Project to a point where we can be much more confident of 
meeting both the current DefOrg end user expectations.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft Note to CEO PersonSoft] 
 ‘…he is confident he can meet the delivery schedule.’ [Project 
Manager PersonSoft] 
 ‘We received a second notice of delay about the 
incompleteness of deliverables … inconsistencies and faults in 
documentation for FAT… as a result the FAT was stopped.’ 
[Letter from SI to PersonSoft DOC:LET-SI09122011] 
‘…hardly any of the documents were signed off early on. 
Minutes of meetings we never signed off. There were so many 
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in poor collaboration. amendments and modifications to everything it was ridiculous.’ 
{Project Manager HRMDept] 
Emerging gaps in output appeared 
Many major problems with software bugs, 
documentation errors, and installation 
routines emerged late or during the 
testing of the product.  
‘Some results of UAT highlighted that key business rules were 
not captured at all. Need to carefully look at what is the 
required level of detail in the documentation.’ [Development 
Director PS] 
 ‘Taking a look only in Manage ISAF, I want to say that there are 
225 comments from IVV Some of them are awaiting 
clarifications or modifications to be done by A.’ [Test Consultant 
1 TestCo] 
 ‘Following a progress  review today we will need to undertake 
some concentrated bug fixing on the HRMSys release to ensure 
we can release a high quality product on schedule.’ [Services 
Director] 
Poor quality exposed 
Poor quality of all aspects of the 
application development, testing and 
documentation drove repeated correction 
cycles. 
 
 ‘Yeah indeed it was really noticeable I’ve looked back over it 
and three or four or even more attempts to get things right and 
then in the end not doing it right if the truth be known.’ [Project 
Manager HRMDept] 
 ‘…have spent the entire morning reviewing only the diagrams. 
There were quite a few comments on them. I actually also 
created an example of a correct use case for them. It might be 
good to send my comments so they don’t keep making the 
same mistakes.’ [IVV consultant Agency] 
‘If this feedback is correct, and the few controls that I made 
seem to confirm it, the quality of the Use Case specification is 
still not at the right level: 100 comments, 50% at severity levels 
1 & 2.’ [Services Director SI] 
Testing and 
accepting  
The application 
and supporting 
documentation 
were poorly 
prepared for final 
buyer testing and 
multiple errors 
were exposed. 
Uncertainty in testing 
The final design was very late and 
restricted access to the configured 
software coupled with multiple releases 
exposed a gap between testing 
procedures and the delivered software.  
Restricted time to test due to time 
pressure 
Time pressure and imposed deadlines 
restricted the time allowed for thorough 
testing to take place. TestCo were always 
under pressure to release early. 
 
‘I had no control and I was relying only on that papers that 
were supposed to attest that particular requirements are 
satisfied by application in similar conditions. I’ve never heard of 
such papers, nor seen them.’ [Test Consultant TestCo]. 
 ‘Remember Unit Testing? No activity was done by PersonSoft in 
this direction. I should not be accepting any software release as 
long as a given code coverage percent was not satisfied.’ [Test 
Director TestCo] 
‘Regarding the Beta Release, from the functionality point of 
view… At a glance, there is a bunch of features that impact the 
Testing activities if they are going to be delivered in the Release 
Candidate.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘This is not to say that the functionality does not exist; to the 
contrary, but how you prove it based on the present regime of 
test procedures makes it unlikely at present.’ [Department 
Manager HRMDept] 
Lack of internal rigour 
Delivered software and documentation 
was demonstrating substantial errors. 
Some were trapped by internal testing – 
despite this testing very large errors were 
getting through. Rigour in all testing 
processes within the consortium was 
limited. 
‘It seems that some very silly bugs have got through this 
process - the QA person we were given seems very 
inexperienced in both QA processes as well as MAPS specifically 
and did not follow the agreed process.’ [Project Manager 
PersonSoft] 
‘More bugs and blocking points were discovered by the 
development team and solved “on the fly”.’ [Development 
Consultant1  PersonSoft] 
‘…currently I have severe doubts as to the chances of successful 
completion of FAT and SAT that contractually prove that the 
functionality to be delivered at IOC is present and working 
correctly.’ [Department Manager HRMDept Letter to SI] 
System implementation testing  
Factory acceptance test (FAT), system 
acceptance testing (SAT) and security 
testing went through multiple cycles of 
repair and retest.  
System testing focused on complete 
accuracy  
Testing the system checks the application 
technically for operational and security 
‘Basically the installation was finished 80% on Brasov test 
environment.  Manager / Optimiser are working - but still some 
errors are visible in the application, while different tests are 
done, due to incompleteness of the installation.’ [Test Director 
TestCo Project Note] 
‘I clearly remember that I was arguing with PersonSoft that we 
are not prepared for FAT. Lots of places where manual 
interaction was required during the HRMSys software 
installation process. Still, we went there in Belgium, and based 
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compliance. Documentation, including the 
installation steps (scripts), was tested for 
complete compliance to contract and 
accuracy. Security tests for resilience 
against cyber-attack or hacking were also 
carried out.  
on the old installation procedures we ‘managed to fail’’. [Test 
Director TestCo] 
‘The feedback on the testing on the ‘patch 6’ release is not such 
that we can go ahead with the implementation plan and start 
installation activities next week. ITV tests were not successful 
and there are several issues remaining after the testing 
activities on the Reference System and on the Training System 
and a number of system requirements are not met.’ [Project 
Manager Agency] 
Security test failure report NCSA SMD/CQM Independent Test 
Report [DOC: PCD-AG/30042012] 
User functional testing failures 
The HRMDept during its test of the 
application decided to regression test 
right across the application including the 
already delivered ‘incumbent’ baseline. 
This included functions that had been in 
service (used) for many years, and outside 
the requirements for the project, but 
contained previously tolerated bugs and 
deficiencies.  
A gap between the design and the 
delivered application arose 
A gap between final design and delivered 
software was exposed during testing and 
resulted in multiple deficiencies being 
reported. 
‘Where it really got hammered was HRMDept for whatever 
reason decided to regress-test the entire application 6.3 to 6.4 
and that’s where it failed. It turned up hundreds of bugs … we 
baselined based on 6.3 and R. looked across the table and said  
don’t worry about that it’s in service let’s do it.’ [Project 
Manager PersonSoft] 
‘Yesterday during the PCR that started with the review of the 
deficiencies DefOrg showed us the results of their UAT 
regression … The result was disappointing: there are 75 
deficiencies left … global result nevertheless is negative and 
installation on the production environment is absolutely out of 
question.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘Will call tomorrow re the UC layer as this is important - we 
cannot allow the UAT to stand or fall on whether the UC works’. 
[Project Manager PS] 
 Outcomes achieved fell behind goals 
The project did not achieve its IOC goals in 
terms of functional deliveries or 
integration. The substantive part of the 
new requirements that caused the 
majority of design delays was not 
deployed. 
‘… only 1/3 of the total requirements included in IOC scope 
were satisfied in IOC. All other were waived. My task here? I 
had no control and I was relying only on that papers that were 
supposed to attest that particular requirements are satisfied by 
application in similar conditions. I’ve never heard of such 
papers, nor seen them.’ [Test Director TestCo]  
‘IOC given it's a fairly small upgrade to an existing system has 
taken 18 months so highlights that we may not be doing things 
right.’ [Development Director PersonSoft] 
‘…everybody forgets all of the interfacing the integration parts 
which the system integrators brought to the party none of that 
was delivered at all in terms of the project.’ [Project Manager 
PersonSoft] 
5.7 Dimension – Coordination and planning 
Coordination and support of the HRMSys project delivery was a project management 
function provided by System Integrator (SI). This consisted of two related tasks, firstly, 
controlling the engagement, managing the relationships and policing the rules in line 
with the strict governance of HRMSys, secondly, planning and coordinating delivery by 
integrating the actions of the supplier organisations delivery processes. These two 
principal constructs and the link between the empirical data and the factors is shown 
in Table 5-5 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 5-10 that illustrates the 
link from the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category configuring and 
implementing. 
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Figure 5-10 - Extract empirical model coordinating and planning 
‘Too much focus on documentation to tick 
boxes rather than focusing on functionality 
and outcomes. Too focused on 
documentation rather than deliverables.’ 
Controlling the 
engagement
Planning and 
coordinating delivery
Coordination and planning
‘…nothing was being signed off and we were 
proceeding, we thought we have to do 
something, and in the end we were 
proceeding at a lot of risk and it did come 
back to bite us very hard’ 
 
SI had no substantive output deliverable but set goals for sub-contractors, produced 
project control documentation in line with the contracted standards, managed project 
meetings and reports, and was responsible for day-to-day interaction with the buyers. 
All deliverables produced by PersonSoft and TestCo were subject to formal review by 
SI before release to Agency. Agency would then review outputs for quality and 
technical compliance passing on these for functional review by HRMDept.  
‘The official software release to DefOrg will come only from SI and not from 
PersonSoft.’ [Services Director SI] 
Even when on-site direct contact between PersonSoft and HRMDept was allowed it 
was normally with SI and Agency in attendance. The rules of engagement, written into 
the contract, specified that the primary interaction was between Agency and SI. In 
project control meetings questions and clarifications, and formal contractual matters, 
passed strictly from Agency to the ‘Contractor’ SI. Sub-contractors were initially 
envisaged ‘to be invisible to DefOrg’ [Sales Director SI], and even when attending 
control meetings all questions went via the contractor even for technical matters 
outside of SI’s competence. The inclusion of a formal channel of communication that 
interjected Agency and SI between PersonSoft and HRMDept extended the reporting 
lines and added to delays and confusion. 
Coordinating the delivery process was the principal task of SI and a plan and 
schedule was created that simply replicated the contracted delivery dates. This plan 
set time-bounds within which the sub-contractors had to deliver their components. 
This plan was not effort driven or substantially changed after the change in scope. The 
imposition of a top-down directed schedule meant that an emphasis was placed on 
meeting the milestones above quality. This particularly placed stress on PersonSoft 
who were broadly under-resourced and continuously fell behind on deliveries. 
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However, Agency would not permit adapting the schedule and held a strictly compliant 
approach despite growing evidence of deviation from planning. 
Overall project management and support was perceived by PersonSoft, 
HRMDept and TestCo as poor, with very little effective control exercised over Agency 
or the sub-contractors, and there was no real linkage made between required efforts 
to the scheduled time-line. Setting targets consisted of giving the date and the 
required output to be achieved. Overall delays and quality issues in design, 
development and software configuration proved almost intractable and contributed to 
a continuous adaptation of the schedule that SI had to justify to Agency. 
A process model of the interaction between the actors for this dimension is 
shown as Figure 5-11. Each of the blocks in this process diagram represents a first 
order empirical cluster shown in Table 5-5, the relationship between them, and the 
grouping around dimension categories. The two main related tasks were observed; the 
control of the interaction between suppliers and buyers, and planning and 
coordinating deliveries. Overall the SI role was perceived as passive and the lack of 
clear oversight of the process of the delivery meant problems were only sensed at the 
time the deliverables were due on the schedule. This meant, from the SI perspective, 
problem solving was always reactive to events and solutions/corrections often had the 
feel of fire-fighting. 
Figure 5-11 - Process outline coordination and planning 
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Controlling flow 
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Controlling 
access and 
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Table 5-5 – Dimension coordination and planning 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Controlling the 
engagement 
The consortium 
ways of working 
and interaction 
was controlled by 
the prime 
contractor SI. 
Managing the contract 
SI managed the contract based on 
compliance to delivery deadlines and 
delegated day-to-day control of the 
delivery to PersonSoft and TestCo - who 
were not an integrated team. Limited 
attention to was spent on outcomes 
particularly on problem solving to manage 
project feasibility. 
 
‘…there didn’t seem to be that level of communication between 
yourselves and SI one got the impression from SI that they 
weren’t particularly concerned. And if you spoke to them about 
any of the problems which we knew we had and discussions on 
use cases or anything like that they didn’t seem bothered.’ 
[Project Manager HRMDept] 
‘Contracting, risk that someone in Agency will say no to 
something that HRMDept and Contractor agree is the correct 
outcome.’ [Development Manager PersonSoft Meeting note 
lessons learnt]  
‘Too much focus on documentation to tick boxes rather than 
focusing on functionality and outcomes. Too focused on 
documentation rather than deliverables.’ [Development 
Manager PersonSoft] 
Policing rules of engagement 
SI policed their control by managing the 
flow of the output to the buyer via 
themselves as intermediary. 
‘As the results of these system tests were unacceptable I won't 
submit this report yet as such to DefOrg, because it would 
endanger our discussion of tomorrow with them.’ [Project 
Manager SI] 
‘All the documents we prepare together must be confidential till 
SI decides to publish them.’ [Project Support SI] 
‘We’ve gone through this presentation we won’t present this 
tomorrow during the PCR while all the consequences are not 
clear to us.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘…we'd like to see in advance what you will demonstrate during 
PCR. This first review is really mandatory before we proceed to 
face to customer.’ [Project Support SI] 
Controlling access and gatekeeping 
Project communication lines were 
extended and Agency and SI imposed as 
intermediaries. Direct communication 
between PersonSoft and HRMDept in 
initial stages was curtailed. 
‘And I think all the way through the project if I’m perfectly 
honest I think that the big problem we had was the two 
organisations between ourselves. In between HRMDept and 
PersonSoft.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
 ‘Reporting lines need to ensure there is direct communication 
between PersonSoft and HRMDept but also protect project 
management and contractual needs… (review) before 
escalation for signoff of final doc at project management level.’ 
[Development Manager PersonSoft] 
‘…where you definitely got caught out is that that you became 
almost fourth remote, third remote, from the user there was us 
who had to feed everything through the agency who fed it 
through SI who fed it to you.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Controlling Work Processes 
The integration of work processes 
between the consortium members to 
ensure effective delivery was limited. 
‘I'm still expecting the weekly test report. Concerning the 
negative feedback from HRMDept about test procedures, 
please come back with a recovery plan.’ [Services Director SI] 
‘Hello Guys, this is very alarming! Please prove that the 
contrary is true and that all new IOC- functionality is properly 
tested and demonstrable.’ [Project Manager SI] 
 ‘…poor support  from SI and PersonSoft related to project 
processes (meant) I could not build a relationship between me 
(Test Director) and other partners related to testing activities 
and what, how, when shall be delivered, etc.’ [Test Director 
TestCo] 
Providing direction and support 
The support to consortium members was 
limited to monitoring against the plan and 
competence in the wider DefOrg 
organisation demonstrated by SI was 
poorly experienced. 
 ‘But it meant concretely at the time at IOC we didn’t have a 
navigator to steer us through the mire of the DefOrg  form and 
approach because SI  didn’t seem to have anybody experienced 
of delivering anything into DefOrg in a formal sense.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
‘If we could get a clear direction and agree on how we move 
forward then I'm sure many of the issues raised over the last 
few weeks could have been avoided.’ [Senior Business Analyst 
PersonSoft] 
‘Only during the late autumn, 2011, when other documents 
were candidates for DefOrg refusal, things were changed and SI 
management focus was set in this direction.’ [Test Director 
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TestCo] 
Planning and 
coordinating 
delivery 
Deliveries were 
coordinated and 
channelled via a 
strictly controlled 
process. 
Re-planning and correcting 
Resource shortages and poor 
performance by PersonSoft (and TestCo) 
forced correction by SI in terms of 
warnings and threats of liquidated 
damages. Control over sub-contractors 
was indirect via a contract not direct by 
day-to-day management. 
 ‘.. (name) this demonstrates that the resources issue at 
PersonSoft is not solved please take the necessary actions.’ 
[Services Director SI] 
‘Agency Project Management couldn’t accept the cure plan as 
such from a contractual point of view, because it implies a 
number of SRS’s that won’t be available for IOC and thus needs 
an update of the contract.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘Please provide the cure plan urgently so we have a basis for 
discussion on Friday. In particular we have not received any 
update on several use cases.’ [Project Manager Agency] 
Monitoring and controlling 
Project manager at SI was continually 
amending schedules and plans to cope 
with performance deficits. Planning from 
Agency had to emphasise timeline 
compliance the critical path to delivery 
was difficult to show. 
Ineffective control over client 
Agency delayed ‘sign offs’ of all important 
documents – this added to delays 
especially in design. Project manager at 
Agency was difficult to control by 
HRMDept and SI adding to ineffective 
overall control. 
‘…nothing was being signed off as you say four months. And we 
were proceeding, we thought we have to do something, and in 
the end we were proceeding at a lot of risk and it did come back 
to bite us very hard.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
‘Can You please FIRST tell me at which time you are able to 
send it to me and Daniel for Review? I need this because I have 
to deliver a new PMS today EOB and I need to add this date for 
the Schedule.’ [Project Support SI] 
‘I have been attempting to identify the critical path for the 
project … There does not seem to be any critical task after the 
‘FAT Trial’ …This is obviously incorrect and I require that the 
contractor be requested to provide a complete, integrated 
schedule showing the actual state, dependencies and criticality 
of the schedule for discussion.’ [Manager HRMDept] 
Controlling the flow of delivery 
The flow of the deliveries through the 
project was from PersonSoft via TestCo/SI 
to Agency who accepted deliveries before 
making services available to HRMDept. 
This flow was strictly maintained 
throughout the IOC phase. 
‘The plan has already moved to the right (for good and 
accepted reasons), but … the critical path is ill defined and that 
it may slip further - they are not able to see or feel the 'real' 
critical path tasks which are being progressed directly by 
PersonSoft  behind the scenes (and at risk).’ [Services Director 
PersonSoft] 
‘…you and I should front up a key session with SI next week to 
review why we keep getting cornered by our supposed partner 
into these documentation delivery panics, and how we avoid 
them in the future.’ [Services Director PersonSoft ] 
Directing the actions 
SI and Agency (via SI) were responsible for 
directing the actions and issuing ‘orders’ 
to the subcontractors TestCo and 
PersonSoft. All output from SI was 
reviewed and formally accepted by 
Agency in a quality review process. 
‘Here’s the latest version of the UAT- installation report 
attached. It’s that one that was rejected… so this one must be 
updated and completed, not only with the results of the recent 
installation last week but also with the problems from previous 
time.’ [Project Manager SI] 
‘Please provide a UAT Installation report that captures the 
issues faced during the installation. In particular, there is no 
mention in the report of the significant problems encountered 
with the installation.’ [Project Manager Agency] 
Active/passive  engagement 
Active engagement in the project output 
outside of timeline conformance seemed 
limited from both SI and Agency. SI was 
remote from the delivery and software 
creation process. 
‘And if you spoke to them about any of the problems which we 
knew we had and discussions on use cases or anything like that 
they didn’t seem bothered.’ [ Project Manager HRMDept] 
 ‘There was a number of meetings particularly after say the first 
six and nine months when (name) ’s boss, big boss, was called 
the HRMDept in front of our commander the head of J1 to 
explain why it was taking so long to do anything. But I must say 
at the end of the day there was nothing we can do they were 
there to run the project not us.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
Control and acceptance of output 
SI was responsible for the acceptance of 
tested software and for the formal 
delivery to Agency. Completeness and 
compliance to contract were key. 
‘For the moment, only 50% of the requirements are covered 
while 100% are necessary to meet the milestone Critical Design 
Review and stop the Liquidated Damages! Please complete it 
ASAP and use this file for future updates.’ [Services Director SI] 
‘…after the numerous and direct exchanges you had with 
HRMDept we believe Agency would like the SI project manager 
to take again the control of the publication.’ [Project Manager 
SI] 
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5.8 The evolution of practices over time 
This section summarises the main observations from the analysis of the practices of 
implementation. To approach the process models (5-5, 5-7, 5-9 and 5-11) were 
combined into an overview process model for the whole implementation phase and 
critical incidents (see Chell, 2004) from the discussion indicated (Figure 5-12). Next the 
constructs from the analysis were coded across the project phases in NVivo10 and 
then analysed using framework matrices to identify any change in emphasis and 
common themes over time, with the outcome of this analysis shown in Appendix I. 
The HRMSys project was predicated on having a fixed price and scope. The 
principal task of the project team during start-up was to account for any changes that 
had occurred in the gap from contracting to start-up. The strict governance prevalent 
at DefOrg acted against this. Agency, responsible for project delivery at DefOrg, 
operated the contract with a strictly preventative focus. Timeline and budget 
compliance was of prime importance; however, there was in fact a loose coupling 
between actual effort needed to complete deliverables and the project plan. 
Furthermore, the organisation appeared unable to change the planning to account for 
this. This meant that changes in scope, that may have demanded an integrative and 
collaborative approach, were blocked by the governance structure.  
At the beginning of the project there were two main areas of change, firstly, a 
set of new requirements were added, and secondly, the incumbent application was 
included with its embedded history of additions and faults (critical incident11  in 
Figure 5-12). This created uncertainty within the fixed contract and added to the 
complexity of the requirements validation. Changes to the project occurred through a 
contract amendment (critical incident  in Figure 5-12) and cycles of changes 
occurred between suppliers and buyers as they sought to minimise or maximise the 
impact. This process was a series of negotiations that began by defining the 
requirements list but over time changed emphasis towards shaping the design to 
match actor objectives. Overall sustainability of the project was not addressed and 
increases in scope, and validation and design effort, were only partially reflected in 
project structure and alignment. 
                                                     
11
 The process of identifying critical incidents in this outsourcing is covered on page 55 in the method 
section. 
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The consortium partners had no prior experience of working together. The 
project started quickly and there was no allowance on the supplier side for integrating 
the team. High levels of shared knowledge were essential but did not occur and this 
resulted in large knowledge deficits (critical incident  in Figure 5-12). Overall there 
was limited explicit knowledge transfer throughout the early stages of the project and 
an absence of application documentation. In the early stages there were repeated 
requests for knowledge transfer and in later stages more tacit knowhow requiring 
face-to-face meetings were required. The overall poor knowledge sharing practice was 
a common theme throughout the project and acted to restrict partner learning.  
Two main aspects of the design process were observed, firstly, the inability to 
access coherent business understanding, and secondly, capability shortfalls in applying 
the formal standards of DefOrg (critical incident  in Figure 5-12). The lack of access 
to subject matter expertise was accentuated by the new requirements introduced at 
project start-up that needed extensive clarification. This poor access to business 
knowledge resulted in a design that was fragmented and incomplete. Two faults 
emerged: a gap between the business processes and what was being articulated in 
design meetings, and basic faults in the technical execution of the standards. As a 
result of these factors the design was unstable. 
Characteristic of the physical software delivery was the repeated cycles of 
rework and test. Poor quality software realisation and latency in design caused rework 
of the application (critical incident  in Figure 5-12). During configuration where 
changes to the application take place there were repeated failures. Each failure 
triggered a cycle of testing and a new formal baseline. This exacting process control of 
the delivery resulted in a ‘fix to the list’ strategy (critical incident  in Figure 5-12). 
Where software corrections closely followed the list of deficiencies and limited 
regression testing was done to check for errors caused by the fix process itself. Large 
gaps between the requirement and the delivered components of the service emerged 
due to three main deficits, firstly, inadequate testing practices, secondly, late 
emergence of the final design, and finally, poor quality basic software (critical incident 
 in Figure 5-12). Final testing was iterative and exploratory. Faults or gaps in design 
resulted in rework or adaptation of the design and corrections were focused just on 
the list of deficiencies and bugs explicitly exposed during a test cycle. 
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Figure 5-12 - Process overview practices of implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 
Chapter 5–  Practices of outsourc ing  implementation  Page| 131 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
5.9 Chapter summary: strong control blocked adaptation 
The main case findings were: 
 A large change in scope had taken place in the three-year gap until project 
start. The new requirements needed substantial elaboration and modelling and 
this was not accounted for within the project. 
 The project context was constrained by an assumption of a fixed price, 
timescale and scope. Strong maintenance of this contractually by Agency, and 
resistance by SI and Agency to change, prevented adaptation. 
 Vendor selection had proceeded on the basis of prior experience with a specific 
software package that required bespoke adaptation and this conflicted with the 
control and development process required contractually. 
 The software vendor did not have the capability, capacity or inclination to work 
within a formally structured consortium. 
 The change in scope and basic lack of feasibility of the project started 
negotiation cycles to move the project objectives in a party’s favour or to resist 
the other parties’ intentions.  
 There was poor understanding of the business need on both the buyer and 
supplier side especially for new functions outside of existing incumbent. The 
design process was flawed, ineffective and delivered very late. 
PersonSoft were selected as the provider of the incumbent application in a politically 
biased process and had difficulty adapting to the formal structure and approach of the 
new centralised way of working. They worked poorly with supplier partners and their 
capability and resource shortfalls lies at the heart of implementation failure.  
Preview next chapter 
Chapter 6 will focus on the emergence of power and conflict within the HRMSys 
project implementation phase. Re-coding for power, resistance and conflict, it will 
demonstrate the dynamic nature of power and how conflict arises from the natural 
evolution of the work as purposive actors solve problems and overcome project 
contingencies.  
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Chapter 6 – The dynamics of power and conflict 
6.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 6
The dynamics of 
power and politics
The source of power is in the everyday action of actors 
engaged in purposeful work and is an attribute of 
practice based change.
RQ3: How does power arise during the 
implementation of outsourcing?
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how power and conflict arises in an outsourced 
project and how the inter-relationship between rational and political actions develops 
over time. It does this by re-analysing the implementation data and recoding it to 
identify power themes based on a framework derived from the literature. 
This chapter covers: 
 The evidence for the derived 
dimensions of power from 
the empirical clusters via 
themes to the high-level 
categories. 
 Discusses each high-level 
category of power and 
identifies the location and 
effect of conflict within the 
actual observed practices. 
 Summarises the evolution of 
the power dimensions over 
time and derives a process 
model demonstrating the 
dynamic nature of power as it emerges from real world problem solving. 
 A summary of findings and a preview of the next chapter. 
This chapter addresses the following research questions: 
RQ3: How do power and conflict arise during the implementation of outsourcing? 
RQ3.1: How does power and conflict impact work practices? 
 
Abstract and front 
matter
Chapter 1
Outsourcing a 
strategic change
Chapter 2
Literature review
Chapter 3
Research design and 
Context
Chapter 4
The antecedents to 
change
Chapter 5
The practices of 
implementation
Chapter 6
The dynamics of 
institutional politics
Chapter 7
The evolution of 
change
Chapter 8
Discussion complex 
change in outsourcing
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Appendices and 
back matter
Why does outsourcing work in some contexts and yet in 
other seemingly identical situations fail?
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history 
impact and constrain the implementation processes of 
outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance 
impact the development practices and how they evolve 
during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during the 
implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change 
emergent and constrained in an outsourcing project?
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped 
how the new application was to be created and 
interpreted.
Practices are the outcome of a contested field and are 
adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their 
relative salience
The source of power is in the everyday action of actors 
engaged in purposeful work and is an attribute of 
practice based change.
Change is delivered by purposive work by actors it 
resembles a superposition of punctuated and practice 
based change
Theoretical and conceptual aspects linked to RQ’s 
limitations and recommendations
Outsourcing is a complex change, and takes time to 
become a coherent institution and capable of delivering 
the outsourcing goals
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior 
history impact and constrain the implementation 
processes of outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and 
governance impact the development practices 
and how they evolve during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during 
the implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated 
change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project?
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6.2 Empirical evidence for the power dimensions  
The first step of the analysis followed a similar trajectory to Chapter 5 and was based 
on identifying the themes of control, agency and resistance observed at identified 
critical moments during project implementation using the theoretical lens of power in 
institutions as a sensitising framework (Lawrence, 2008). The interview, group 
meetings, logs and email narratives were reanalysed and then on-coded from the 
original case nodes into a new set of initial categories based on the power dimension 
framework shown in Figure 2-5. The final model was then converged upon by a 
process of constant comparison, using framework matrices, iterating between the raw 
data with that already encoded in the current construct, and by this means arrived at 
the second-order theoretical constructs as shown in Figure 6-1. As before the 
identified first-order constructs were combined into second-order themes then to the 
aggregate categories or dimensions as suggested explanations for the power themes 
observed. 
To explain the dynamics of conflict and power four aggregate dimensions or 
categories were derived: controlling actions and decisions, creating a negotiated order, 
institutional and systemic power and enforcing compliance to rules. In this section 
these four dimensions will be reviewed and the link demonstrated from the concept 
clusters, second-order themes and the supporting empirical data to these aggregate 
categories shown in the data Table 6-1 to Table 6-4. 
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Figure 6-1- Data model for the observed power dimensions 
Enforcing and policing rules
Compliance to contractual demands
Rejection of service deliveries
Forcing obedience by withholding consent
Enforcing will on design process
Rejecting by recourse to plans and rules
Controlling outcomes to match own objectives
Controlling access between parties
Controlling agenda
Controlling information
Controlling working practices
Controlling decisions
Controlling actions and 
decisions
Enforcing compliance to rules
Controlling resources
Deflecting blame
Negotiating impact of change
Exploiting relations
Symbolic power
Structural power
Managing resource constraints
Disputes over resource shortfalls
Conflict in processes of work
Restricting access to knowledge
Hiding non-compliance
Attributing blame to others
Identifying capability shortfalls
Iterative negotiating scope
Minimising or maximising change
Negotiating timelines
Disputing working relations
Refusing to help partners
Influencing by exploiting relations
Using informal contacts to bypass obstacles
Fragmenting relations
Frustration with changing context
Etiquette and managing the client
The privileged role of the client
Liquidated damages
Using the COTS dialogue
The influence of the past
Changing norms of practice
Standards and design rules
Contracts and statements of work
Influence of other defence organisations
Formalism of HRMSys processes
Internal conflict over control
Creating a negotiated order
Institutional and systemic 
power
Empirical clusters
Themes
(nodes)
Categories 
(Dimensions)
 
 
 
Chapter 6–  The dynamics of power and confl ict  Page| 135 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
6.3 Dimension – controlling actions and decisions 
Rules, regulations, contracts and the recording of minutes are examples of 
mechanisms that control how work should be done and monitored. Controlling 
decision-making by managing access between parties, and determining who is 
included or excluded in discussions, controlling information flows, and defined modes 
of work are characteristic of the power of processes (Hardy, 1996b). The link between 
the empirical data and the two factors of controlling decisions and controlling actions 
is shown in Table 6-1 and an extract of the data model shown as Figure 6-2 that 
illustrates the link from the data, via empirical themes, to the dimension category 
controlling actions and decisions.  
Figure 6-2 - Extract empirical model controlling actions and decisions 
‘These guys were the gatekeepers so I 
couldn’t directly go to DEFORG I am running 
a workshop on this date this is the aim and 
objectives… we couldn’t do that for HRMSys 
because we are not allowed to.’ 
Controlling decisions
Controlling actions and 
decisions
Controlling resources
‘We need a suitable response to the issue of 
unit testing... we simply do not have the 
resource to test the COTs application and 
provide documentation as requested.’ 
 
The contractual framework of HRMSys specified, in detail, the governance, legitimate 
communication channels, delivery flows from suppliers to customers, and the ways in 
which the design must be achieved and documented. No aspect of the development 
process was left open or unspecified. Furthermore, selective control, access and 
release of information as well as a non-integrated team facilitated poor information 
sharing that was characteristic of day-to-day work practices. 
‘We were dependent on HRMDept to get our foot in the door but the door was 
never opened for us to actually do that.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Extensive process control inhibits supplier performance since it does not allow the 
supplier to show competence in managing service delivery (Tiwana and Bush, 2007). 
Tight and inflexible control quickly became an obstacle to progress, especially around 
the definition of the design. A fixed price project demands a known scope, whereas it 
was observed here the business requirements were far from fixed and required a 
much more development, analysis and elucidation. This type of process was not 
allowed at the start of the project and initial design meetings were attended by twenty 
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or even thirty participants and delivered nothing of value. Also a fragmented supplier 
team was evident that exhibited poor knowledge sharing processes. 
‘…no technical knowledge transfer was allowed from PersonSoft to TestCo (and 
by technical I’m not referring to application usage, but more in depth 
knowledge).’ [Test Director TestCo] 
Hong and Fiona (2009) showed social inclusion is a prerequisite for joint development, 
and partners that remain largely distinct and distant cannot create a common identity 
and community of practice that is essential for a successful outcome. Accentuating this 
problem, declarative knowledge in documents or memos is often insufficient to ensure 
success and a high level of shared knowledge, especially deep tacit knowledge is 
essential and can only be acquired by face-to-face interactions that was largely 
prevented and blocked. A social process is essential and a separated non-integrated 
team as was observed impedes this (Collins and Hitt, 2006). 
Table 6-1 – Dimension controlling actions and decisions 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Controlling 
decisions 
The move to a 
formal project 
and the use of a 
consortium 
altered the 
dynamic between 
the parties to be 
much more 
formal. 
Controlling access 
Informal access between PersonSoft and 
HRMDept outside of formal project 
governance was strictly controlled and 
monitored especially at start up. Agency 
and SI were the formal intermediaries 
through which all information and 
deliverables flowed and project decisions 
made. 
‘These guys were the gatekeepers so I couldn’t directly go to 
DefOrg I am running a workshop on this date this is the aim and 
objectives this is the agenda this is location… we couldn’t do 
that for HRMSys because we are not allowed to.’  
[Project Manager SI] 
‘I just called Eric who is in meeting and he agrees that we 
should stop exchanging e-mails with customer for the reason 
that it looks like we increase the dissatisfaction and risk for 
both your project at HRMDEPT and our common project APMS.’ 
[Project Support SI] 
‘We were dependent on HRMDept to get our foot in the door 
but the door was never opened for us to actually do that.’ 
[Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
Controlling the agenda 
Control was exercised by excluding actors 
from meetings where there was a risk of 
exposing countervailing views or when an 
exclusive platform for own views was 
required. 
‘Back to the summer of 2011, I proposed to organize some 
meetings to get the users feedback and their current issues. 
PersonSoft (and I believe also SI) was against this.’ [Test 
Director TestCo] 
‘Since it was decided that I shall not participate to this use cases 
round table meeting, please find inline some questions that I 
hoped to have them clarified by the end of the meeting.’ [Test 
Director TestCo] 
‘…proposes working at HRMDEPT for extended time to wrap 
this up. I want every one out of the room except you and 
(name)’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Controlling information 
Agency had a combative and conflictual 
approach to review and acceptance. 
Documents and reports by the consortium 
were ‘sanitised’ and tightly focused on 
specific issues to avoid generating 
additional questions and conflict. 
‘Please note this is just an email between PersonSoft and 
HRMDept - I have deliberately not included System House or 
Agency as we are desperate to ensure we do not cause any 
further delays.’ [Project Manager HRMDept] 
‘So from that I was wondering do people actually know what 
we doing here. And all of a sudden they started to send  comms   
you know communications to people that was all very new it is 
like putting a postcard in a newsagent who’s gonna actually 
read that.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Controlling  working  practices 
Own processes and procedures were 
proposed as working approaches to 
control how methods were applied and 
used.  
‘We also suggested that there may be some onerous project 
tasks currently scheduled (including extensive documentation 
requirements) which could also reviewed to free up more 
productive 'development' days.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘At this meeting the Impact statement was review which 
primarily highlighted all the requirements that will be done in 
IOC (omitted / new) and those moved to FOC. It was a very 
successful meeting which seem to edge us closer to deliverable 
IOC Scope.’ [Technical lead PersonSoft]  
As we discussed many times together during the Bid, the 
current plan is impossible to meet and we therefore need to 
force through better and more efficient ways of working, or we 
will all fail… need direct access to the end users [Services 
Director PersonSoft] 
Controlling 
resources 
Control over 
information 
resources and its 
poor distribution 
stunted partner 
learning and 
added to 
consortium 
fragmentation. 
Managing resource constraints 
Resources were limited throughout the 
project and gaps in capability within 
PersonSoft drove the implementation of 
new internal processes and the removal 
of some key personnel. 
‘We need a suitable response to the issue of unit testing 
unfortunately we simply do not have the resource to test the 
COTs application and provide documentation as 
requested …there is no way we can provide this to TestCo.’ [Test 
Manager PersonSoft]  
‘But we all know that no real Test Director was in place from 
HRMDept.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
‘I think PersonSoft themselves were under resourced and I still 
think they probably are we estimated the amount of effort else 
we wouldn’t have had problems that we had at IOC’.[HRMDept 
Director] 
‘…expressed his concern about human resources allocation on 
PersonSoft side due to the delay in delivering the Use 
Cases.’[Project Minutes HRMSys July 2011] 
Disputes over resource shortfalls 
SI issued several letters of sanction to 
PersonSoft for continuous delivery failure 
against timelines. This generated an 
exchange of letters between the parties 
with claim and counterclaim for the 
responsibility of failure. 
‘It looks to me, from here, as though we will need to prepare a 
full ‘chapter and verse’ in response to this formal Agency letter 
(of delay).’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘I would like to formally acknowledge receipt of the undated 
letter (on resource shortage) from (name) of SI to PersonSoft.’ 
[MD PersonSoft] 
‘We agreed on a series of WebEx online meetings between 
PersonSoft's business consultant and TestCo testers and 
trainers. To this date we were confronted with repetitive 
cancellation and only a limited number of sessions were held.’ 
[Letter to PersonSoft [09/10/2011] 
Conflict in work processes 
Lack of integration between consortium 
parties led to regular occurrences and 
conflict over what TestCo could/should 
test and lack of information exchange 
blocking progress. Poor and delayed 
acceptance or provision of information 
led to cycles of blame and counter claim.  
 
Restricting access to knowledge 
PersonSoft restricted availability to 
required knowledge of the application 
and development processes to TestCo 
that effectively blocked TestCo progress. 
 ‘TestCo are only to test those issues marked in the original 
spreadsheet sent … So please concentrate your efforts on these 
as the remaining issue are not part of APMS IOC.’ [Technical 
Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘I'm with DefOrg all week so they will have to wait for my 
responses. I've already told them this for the 100th 
time....grrrr!!!’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft]  
 ‘The other thing that was missed was there was knowledge 
transfer in the contract for TestCo to do their testing. There was 
no technical knowledge transfer for HRMSys.’ [Technical 
Services PersonSoft] 
‘…no enabling was done; we are blocked by various 
interpretations that shall be performed.’ [Test Consultant 
TestCo] 
 
6.4 Dimension – creating a negotiated order 
The exchange and bargaining for resources is a political process that creates a pattern 
of exchange that varies over time - the outcome representing the status of the power 
relations at a particular moment in time (Dawson, 1994). The link between the 
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empirical data and the three factors of deflecting blame, negotiating impact of change 
and exploiting relations is shown in Table 6 1 and an extract of the data model shown 
as Figure 6-3 that illustrates the link from the data, via empirical themes, to the 
dimension category creating a negotiated order. 
Figure 6-3 - Extract empirical model creating a negotiated order 
Deflecting blame
Negotiating impact of change
Exploiting relations
‘SI never put the intellectual depth into it to 
understand the product so that they could 
front up some of this or be supportive in 
some of the arguments that we were 
making.’
‘They didn’t seem to want to accept any 
change yes there are faults there are always 
faults and mistakes in documents but it felt 
sometimes that they wouldn’t accept any 
change.’ 
‘...And the reason for doing this directly 
with end-users is to avoid having to agree 
the design by a process of documentation 
exchange between SI and Agency.’  
Creating a negotiated order
 
There was latent conflict at the heart of the project which was manifest in a mismatch 
between a niche supplier of bespoke software and a requirement for a formal COTS 
software solution. From the beginning, how new requirements could be offset against 
existing functionality in the incumbent triggered negotiation. Buyers insisting that new 
requirements could be included within the existing scope with suppliers countering 
that those new requirements were ‘not included in the bid submission’ and must be 
paid for. The process involved buyers repeatedly posing that the ‘substantive 
functionality was already present’ in the incumbent application or could be ‘reasonably 
assumed’ to be delivered from the existing contract. This meant from their perspective 
that the development time saved could be offset against the new requirements at no 
extra cost.  
 The overall process during the requirements phase and later stages revolved 
around this type of formal and informal negotiation, brokering and blaming (including 
the bypassing of the formal project meetings), to reduce or contain scope. Resistance 
was observed and conflict emerged as cycles of negotiation over failures in 
deliverables, blaming failures on partners, the settling of old scores, and conflict over 
the requesting and denial of help, were characteristic throughout the project. These 
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aspects and representative quotations are shown in Table 6-2.  
Table 6-2 – Dimension creating a negotiated order  
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Deflecting blame 
Gaps in resource 
and application 
capabilities were 
shielded by 
PersonSoft and 
actors shaped the 
direction to fit 
capabilities.  
Hiding non-compliance 
HRMSys was based on the old technology 
MAPS that was not compliant to the bid 
documents. In areas where this was most 
acute this was obscured from SI and 
Agency by a creative approach to the bid 
for the contract. 
 
 ‘One of the things that hobbled us in APMS was the product? 
We were creative when we bid for the project about the 
technology and the new web-based that form - we didn’t do 
anything in the two years before the project started. ’ [Services 
Director PersonSoft] 
‘I guess we need to be very careful in how we work through 
clarifying this. I believe we were very clear in our bid, but we 
don't want them to think we have been dishonest in this area.’ 
[Sales Support PersonSoft] 
 ‘The test waiver issue is the major remaining risk for IOC and 
the attached document is not the expected answer. The story 
you provided until now is not working since the testing of some 
waived requirements failed.’ [Services Director SI] 
Attributing blame to others 
Failures in the project were attributed by 
PersonSoft to lack of understanding of 
others, poor processes or vague 
requirements. By TestCo to poor 
knowledge transfer or by SI as lack of 
timeline disciple and shortage of 
resources at PersonSoft.  
‘In conclusion we have it is clear that TestCo / SI are unprepared 
and geared up for the next phase of this project and that we 
may need to apply some to pressure to ensure that they are 
meeting their obligations.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘SI never put the intellectual depth into it to understand the 
product themselves so that they could front up some of this, or 
be supportive in some of the arguments that we were 
making’.[Project Manager PersonSoft] 
‘From my point of view this shouldn't be happening in the 
Release Candidate, or we should not call this release as a 
Candidate.    Expectations:  Another release is required in order 
to have a good starting point for the testing and training 
materials preparation.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
Identifying capability shortfalls 
Individuals openly attributed failures in 
delivery to themselves caveated by a lack 
of experience in the demanded methods 
and processes. 
‘Lack of experience in development of the documentation and 
poor input of the business need meant requirements took a 
long time to develop and was subject to continuous change as 
more ideas came forward.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘I’ll be honest I think one of the problems initially was that’s the 
first time I’ve been involved with use cases. In that way. So I 
had a learning lesson and there was no one else on my side who 
had any knowledge or wanted to do anything with it at all.’ 
[Project Manager HRMDept] 
Negotiating 
impact of change 
The methods, 
requirements, 
and introduced 
changes were 
shaped to fit 
capabilities by a 
process of 
negotiation. 
 
Iteratively negotiating scope 
Scope negotiations during requirements 
and design sought to match requirements 
to delivery capabilities. Removing items or 
reducing their scale was negotiated 
between HRMDept and PersonSoft. 
 
Minimising/maximising change 
Large scale changes were introduced at 
the project start. Buyers sought to 
minimise the impact whilst suppliers 
sought to maximise impact or to use the 
changes to de-scope the remainder of the 
project to fit capabilities. Buyers resisted 
change. 
‘It was proposed at the Use Case Workshops that the 
requirements which focus on replacing the ERT functionality 
can be moved to FOC.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘They have agreed we can only do 5 CBT's at IOC and they want 
to know how much time we will take at IOC to do this. Then 
they can take this time from the time we said at IOC to see if 
any capacity has been freed up’.[Technical Consultant TestCo]  
‘According to our interpretation, these changes should be cost 
neutral so no authorization for extra funding will be necessary, 
and thus (also) precluding a significant impact (on the project 
schedule).’ [Contract Manager Agency] 
‘I don’t think we ever achieve one single impact statement for 
example or one real change it was basically fixed from the start 
to finish with just a bit of shuffling around here and there - but 
more or less that it’.[Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘They didn’t seem to want to accept any change yes there are 
faults there are always faults and mistakes in documents but it 
felt sometimes that they wouldn’t accept anything there was no 
appetite at all to accept any change and corrections of that 
activity.’ [Analyst PersonSoft] 
Negotiating timelines 
The timeline was in constant dispute and 
constantly varying as delays in design, 
configuration and testing occurred. Focus 
‘When we were discussing this with Frank so there are some 
interesting dynamics in terms of roles of partners. He said that 
you win DefOrg bids even if you believe that the timescales and 
unachievable is to get the bid won and then work within the 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
was on the timeline being met above all 
other concerns. 
contract.’ .[Sales Director PersonSoft] 
‘I'm afraid it is too late to change the schedule now.  We must 
stick to the agreed planning because all DefOrg guys already 
replied ‘present’ and a project is not only technical but also 
political.’ [Project Support SI] 
 ‘As we discussed many times together during the Bid, the 
current plan is impossible to meet and we therefore need to 
force through better and more efficient ways of working, or we 
will all fail.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
Disputing working arrangements 
Common approaches and tools were 
negotiated and partially applied across 
the project but there were continuous 
gaps. 
 
Refusing to help partners 
There were continuous requests from 
TestCo to PersonSoft for enabling and 
knowledge transfer – without this their 
work was blocked as testing and training 
was highly dependent on PersonSoft’s 
input.  
 
‘Remember the agreed Unit Testing? No activity was done by 
PersonSoft in this direction. I should not be accepting any 
software release as long as a given code coverage percent was 
not satisfied.’ [Test Consultant TestCo]  
‘We could had a more rigorous and better process if dedicating 
a fixed time period when testers and PersonSoft to meet each 
other and exchange their values.’ [Test Analyst TestCo]  
‘Unfortunately I won't be able to do an enabling session on 
Thursday, so I will conduct one on … as agreed. However, I've 
managed to answer some questions via email.’ [Consultant 
PersonSoft] 
‘That issue that (name) raised as a show stopper is expected 
behaviour of the product. As usual they have no experience and 
training on the product and they are testing with their own 
misconceptions.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘Neither you or I have the time to handhold them; They need to 
go through Angella I am afraid. That means they will need to 
wait. We need one message going to them and Ange is best 
suited for this.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
Exploiting 
relations 
The former 
dyadic relation 
between 
PersonSoft and 
HRMDept was 
exploited by both 
parties to 
circumvent 
control but was 
eroding. 
Influencing by exploiting relations 
The use of demonstrations or pilots and 
pre-releases was used as a process of 
achieving buy-in and acceptance directly 
by PersonSoft to HRMDept and 
attempted to exploit past relationships to 
achieve current leniency. 
‘It is going to be difficult to get this under the radar before we 
get through IOC but what I can promise is that we will  commit 
to deliver this to you very quickly after IOC go-live. It should be 
very easy to slip this one in…with a little help from your side.’ 
[Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘The walkthroughs, conference pilots etc. are defined in our 
approach and was agreed as a way of us 'demonstrating' 
compliance to the requirements directly to HRMDept.’ [Services 
Director PersonSoft]  
‘...And the reason for doing this directly with end-users is to 
avoid having to agree the design by a process of documentation 
exchange between SI and Agency. This way we can gain 
support from the user community to curb the worst excesses of 
Agency.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
Using informal contacts to bypass 
obstacles 
At an early stage PersonSoft arranged by 
informal means, sometimes offsite, and 
meetings to influence progress and force 
a change in the design process more in 
line with previous practice. 
‘I mentioned this to (name) a couple of weeks ago and he was 
OK with the principle of most effective use of Team time. I also 
mentioned it to (name) over lunch at the kick off. We should be 
able to make this work.’ [Sales Manager PersonSoft] 
‘Informal communication on the development of the UCs is 
beneficial to the process and, hopefully, will reduce the 
continuing slippage of the activity dates in the schedule. 
However, such informal communication does not obviate the 
need for an internal “sanity check”.’ [HRMDept Manager] 
Fragmenting of relations 
PersonSoft and HRMDept maintained 
direct relations outside of HRMSys project 
that drew heavily on past experience and 
history but this was ending. 
 
Frustration with changing context 
Changes in key players at HRMDept 
during the project, who had no prior 
history, changed the dynamic between 
HRMDept and PersonSoft to be 
sometimes conflictual. 
‘Re our phone call this morning, please accept my sincere 
apologies for any resulting undermining of relationships. I do 
apologise for not making it clear that raising the subject of our 
discussions directly at the PCR would cause problems. It will not 
happen again.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘What must be clarified to Eric and myself is what is the frontier 
between ‘what PersonSoft does for HRMDept’ and ‘what 
HRMDept does itself’ in MAPS 6.3 or 6.4 (I don't know 
anymore).’ [Project Support SI] 
‘PersonSoft feel ‘hung out to dry’ on occasions… (There is) no 
partnership with HRMDept anymore almost seems hostile 
sometimes and the history with HRMDEPT is a mixed blessing.’ 
[Development Manager PersonSoft] 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
‘(Name) should (have) grabbed those two by the throat and 
said I’m going to be gone in a year or year and a half and I want 
this. (And said what he wanted as his legacy) but he didn’t he 
stepped back and let Agency, SI and ourselves fight it out.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
6.5 Dimension – institutional and systemic power  
Institutional constraints via rules, legitimate rules of engagement, established cultural 
norms of practice regulated the work of the actors in the HRMSys outsourcing. It was 
observed that both suppliers and buyers were trying to modify and shape the contract 
and what must be done within this organisational field to suit their own interests. 
Systemic power is an embedded factor within a project and represented by 
organisational scripts and patterns, and particular ways of talking and behaving 
between project actors, and becomes visible when constituted in actions of 
compliance. The link between the empirical data and the two factors of symbolic 
power and structural power is shown in Table 6-3 and an extract of the data model 
shown as Figure 6-4 illustrates the link from the data, via empirical themes, to the 
dimension category institutional and systemic power. 
Figure 6-4 - Extract empirical model institutional and systemic power 
Symbolic power
Structural power
‘We have had cause to ask for liquidated 
damages in the past for projects that have 
exceeded the contract milestones’ 
‘I think that (Name) was really threatened 
by the agency influence. He recognised 
himself that he was losing personal control.’ 
Institutional and systemic 
power
 
Symbolic tools, such as the discourse liquidated damages, was used for failings in 
contracted deliverables to control group behaviour and force compliance. It was used 
by all organisations at various times, on their own members, as a veiled threat to force 
behavioural change. There was an acceptance of authority hierarchies such as the 
contractor/subcontractor, client/supplier and defence/civilian dyads that legitimised 
authority relations, subordinate roles and particular organisational scripts. For 
example, as is seen here in the role given to the client/buyer as beyond control by the 
supplier. 
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‘There are still a large number of outstanding actions against DefOrg many of 
these actions was raised following the workshops in April  2011 we seem 
reluctant to enforce deadlines against DefOrg in the past but essentially without 
resolutions to some of these issues it will hold work up.’ [Business Consultant 
PersonSoft] 
Time and planning had a legitimate and unquestioned symbolic role within the system 
development. Meeting the schedule was of prime importance and what was delivered 
was secondary to when it was delivered. There were several occasions, for example in 
delivering architectural designs, where the content was made up of internet searches 
slightly modified, or basically invented. No one on the buyer side was able to assess for 
validity so deliverables were accepted on the basis of being on time. This exposed an 
information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers and was an example of shirking 
by suppliers. 
There were changes in the institutional context on a wider organisational scale 
at DefOrg, from a distributed to a centralised form of process control reflected in the 
form of controls and standards being imposed on the organisation. Structural 
influences of wider economic and political forces, such as the financial crisis in 2008, 
drove a tighter focus on cost aspects within this project that put at risk the original 
assumptions made at bid time. Resistance to systemic power was seen by the 
questioning of legitimacy and challenging of the worth of rules and regulations, 
coupled with nostalgia for the old ways of working, and a seeking to re-establish old 
bonds. Symbolic and Institutional power is embedded, almost out of awareness, and 
acts to influence and constrain how organisations and actors perform their roles. 
Resistance as an action is mainly an attempt to reduce these constraints or to co-opt 
those elements in-line with one’s own objectives. The observations for how symbolic 
and systemic power appeared in the case are shown in Table 6-3. 
Table 6-3 - Dimension institutional and systemic power 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Symbolic Power 
The use of 
symbols or 
cultural norms 
that are 
unquestioned 
and frame 
Etiquette and managing the client 
How client should be approached and 
treated was strictly controlled and 
specified in the contract. Contact was 
always by SI and Agency no other 
channels were allowed.  
‘We must avoid multi-communication channels to the 
Purchaser. Here with HRMSys, it is totally different; you saw the 
extreme formalism of those guys. It is an Agency - SI contract 
where HRMDept is behind Agency and PersonSoft behind 
SI’.[Project Support SI] 
‘…such information - especially when it concern APMS - may not 
be sent to the customer. Before doing so we must first discuss 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
relations and 
action. 
The privileged role of the client 
Reluctance to enforce discipline on the 
client for meeting deadlines. Buyer side 
cut across communication lines when it 
suited their interests. 
this internally and come to an agreement, and only then the 
customer can be informed by us.’ [Project Manager SI]  
‘Almost every intervention from DefOrg management side reset 
somehow the so fragile connection between TestCo and 
PersonSoft; I mean everyone tried to defend by itself that we 
forgot to react as a team.’ [Test Director TestCo]  
Liquidated damages 
Threats of liquated damages became an 
accepted tool of behavioural control 
across all actors in the project. 
‘…we have had cause to ask for liquidated damages in the past 
for projects that have exceeded the contract milestones.’ 
[Contract Manager Agency]. 
‘…at the moment, only 50% of the requirements are covered 
while 100% are necessary to meet the milestone Critical Design 
Review and stop the Liquidated Damages!’ [Services Director 
System House]. 
‘…This is a joint action with them in the lead and us supporting 
it is not optional - besides we may need them on side to cover 
us on testing etc. and any liquidated damages comes from us 
all!’ [Project Manager PersonSoft]. 
‘We'll have to submit the updated PMS), such that Agency can 
update the SSS (schedule of supplies and services) based on this 
in order to avoid ‘liquidated damages’.’ [Project Manager 
System House]. 
Using the COTS dialogue 
The bid required a COTS solution and 
SI/PersonSoft claimed the incumbent 
application as COTS. A COTS solution 
implied functions being substantially 
complete and ready - only requiring minor 
modification. 
‘…we were trying to sell a COTS product in a situation where the 
history had been essentially bespoke development.’ [Service 
Director PersonSoft]  
‘We sold a cots package in the bid and all the discussion about 
current or cots basically saying it was all there and there was 
nothing to do and we spent the first six months of the project 
backpedalling saying we had to do everything from scratch.’ 
[Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
‘I believe even (names) and some of the AGENCY guys have not 
lost sight of the fact that the procedures and COTS  package 
were being made to fit to a set of relatively bespoke functional 
requirements.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
The influence of the past 
In the background was a reference to 
older ways of working where there was 
much less formality. 
‘For HRMDept, life is easy because they understand the systems 
makeup and are thankfully free of rigorous process and the 
change management that applies:  Deliveries, CDs, are put 
through the T&V process and on passing this process they are 
locked down.’ [Senior Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘…it was the old relationship you used to come to us and we 
used to sort it out. Exactly, and if we needed money we got it. 
Once it became somebody else’s responsibility it (was) almost 
impossible to get more money.’ [Director HRMDept] 
‘The incumbent was accepted as a baseline so no functionality 
would be lost in APMS and as a result comes on the critical 
path.’ [ Project Manager HRMDept] 
Structural Power 
The institutional 
rules within 
which the project 
must operate. 
Changing norms of practice 
The less formal and loose working had to 
change to a formal stepped approach and 
caused problems as this new way of 
working had to be learnt. 
 
‘I think that’s where the inexperience of us came through 
because we were used to working in that way. And it did take 
two, three, four months before we found our feet and oh (shit) 
this is completely different from what I’m doing now. So it’s a 
little bit of that we were so used to working on-the-fly working 
very quickly at a very rapid pace but when it came to doing 
design phases and testing phases and FAT, SAT we were like 
lost.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
Standards and design rules 
The rules surrounding the project covered 
all aspects of management, design, 
processes of development and ran to 
several thousand pages.  
Contracts and statements of work 
The contract specified a fixed price, scope 
and timeline for the project three years in 
advance of the project. Contractual 
framework was strongly preventative and 
contained disciplinary elements. 
DefOrg (2007), DefOrg Architecture Framework Version 3 
CHAPTER 4 Architecture Views and sub view, DefOrg 
Documents C-M(2002)49 and AC/322-D/1[DOC:REF:STAN] 
DefOrg (2012) GUIDELINES for the STRUCTURE and CONTENT of 
SECURITY OPERATING PROCEDURES (SecOPs) for 
COMMUNICATION and INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS) 
[Doc:REF:STAN]  
Document describing and listing management and standards 
compliance :CO-12318-HRMSys_PartIII-SOW_v1.31 
IFB CO-12318-HRMSys Book II Prospective Contract v1.7 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
[DOC:REF:CONT] 
List of Plans to be maintained_v1 [DOC:CON] 
Influence of other defence organisations 
PersonSoft were developing defence 
systems for other clients outside DefOrg 
that drew resource and focus away from 
HRMSys that was seen as a threat to 
HRMDept hegemony over the design 
direction and other players in defence. 
Lisbon User Group - Defence Suite Project Plan Review [Doc: 
REF:POL] 
‘As we move towards FOC there is a much broader user 
community the system will be exposed to, so must engage with 
the broader user community - Lisbon is to drive user 
engagement as well as perform analysis.’ [Development 
Manager PersonSoft]  
‘I had a very strained telephone conversation with (Name). He 
is clearly incandescent with the current status and proposed 
roadmap of our new Defence Suite development as it relates to 
his DefOrg FOC requirements. I believe we face a real danger of 
losing DefOrg as an account.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
‘I think he was trying to sell it internally to a series of senior 
guys from DefOrg and he was also trying to influence the 
Norfolk Virginia DefOrg group. He saw a bigger view than just 
DefOrg Europe.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
Formalisation of HRMSys processes 
The formalism of HRMSys meant new 
processes at variance with past practice 
that also limited freedom and reduced 
innovation.  
Internal conflict over control 
Control for HRMDept and PersonSoft was 
being transferred from them to others 
within the project hierarchy. 
‘I do have a concern that in the new and strictly version 
controlled HRMSys world, with the HRMDept application 
ownership in particular being transferred to and managed by 
Agency, that the previously enjoyed freedom to amend and add 
functionality to the MAPS application will be severely and 
abruptly curtailed.’ [Services Manager HRMDept] 
‘I think the whole contracting, procurement, waterfall, define 
everything upfront and define the timescales from them to 
work within then contract it and then nail your suppliers to the 
wall was not the way we had been working with HRMDept.’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft]  
‘The fact is that we had with the relationship we had over 15 
years with (Name) and almost direct, you know one to one 
relationship. Instead we were dealing and eventually that loop 
all the way around from Agency and SI and back to the end 
users I think contributed significantly (to the 
problems).’[Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘I think that (Name) was really threatened by the agency 
influence. He recognised himself that he was losing personal 
control. He might be senior user but nevertheless the whole 
contractual obligations were resting with agency.’ [Sales 
Director PersonSoft] 
6.6 Dimension – enforcing compliance to rules 
Literature on power characterises compliance primarily as a direct application of the 
power of possession or control of resources, and is seen by the allowing or denying of 
access and is a practical operationalisation of power. It is seen episodically as actors 
enforce systemic and symbolic power (Lawrence, 2008). The link between the 
empirical data and the factor of enforcing and policing rules is shown in Table 6-4 and 
an extract of the data model shown as Figure 6-5 illustrates the link from the data, via 
empirical themes, to the dimension category enforcing compliance to rules.  
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Figure 6-5 - Extract empirical model enforcing compliance to rules 
Enforcing and policing rules
‘Both deliverables are rejected, the main 
reason, among others, being the deviation 
from the SOW in terms of types of users.’ 
Enforcing compliance to rules
 
Agency and the HRMDept used their ability to reject, accept and veto deliverables as a 
mechanism for ensuring close compliance to the contractual imperatives. It was 
observed how obedience and compliance were ensured, by strictly controlling 
conformance to design rules or documentation standards, or by using sanctions and 
rewards. This was an overt direct use of power to control and influence the behaviour 
of the suppliers to be in line with that of the objectives of the dominant actor. Within 
this project, rejection of deliverables (software or documentation) meant delays, extra 
work to repair deficiencies and ultimately delays in payment for services which had a 
high internal impact within the suppliers. The negative aspects of this focus on 
compliance, and not outcomes, resulted in a lack of sensitivity to emerging problems in 
service delivery that only became apparent late in the project. The observations 
showed that resistance to the application of this type of power came mainly through 
negotiation to reduce the scale and scope of deliverables, questioning the utility of key 
aspects of the project, criticising requirements, claims of vagueness in business need, 
or reducing the impact of compliance by claiming inappropriateness. 
Table 6-4 - Dimension enforcing compliance 
Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Enforcing and 
policing  rules 
Compliance to 
the contract was 
enforced by 
withholding of 
acceptance and 
ultimately 
payment. 
Compliance to contractual demands 
All aspects of the delivery, processes, 
documentation and management 
standards were contracted. The contract 
specified standards, roles of participants, 
design rules and architectural schemes 
compliant with DefOrg standards that 
were applied strictly. 
‘It is expected that for the next APMS release … will include the 
fix for workflows and a fortiori the hotfix for deficiencies as well 
as other critical issue fixes, SI must finally adhere to the 
prescribed processes and provide comprehensive 
documentation.’ [Project Manager Agency] 
‘Some modifications were made to the Use Cases 
documentation apparently outside of the changes agreed with 
ACO. Please make the necessary changes to the UC 
documentation.’ [Project Manager Agency] 
‘I cannot remember any change ever being accepted.’ [Project 
Manager PersonSoft] 
Rejection of service deliveries 
Enforcement of standards or contracted 
rules was by review and comparison with 
the contract statement of work. Deliveries 
could be rejected for even slight deviation 
from the norms. 
‘The remainder of the FAT test was cancelled with the 
understanding that it will need to restart at a later date to be 
determined.’ [Technical Consultant PersonSoft] 
‘If these types of errors are carried through into the formal 
FAT/SAT testing, HRMDEPT would have to indicate that the test 
had failed, as the function/action to be performed strictly 
according to the test script did not exist.’ [Department Manager 
HRMDept] 
 
Forcing obedience by withholding 
consent 
‘(I) remember that very uncomfortable meeting that we had 
with DefOrg where they basically held those errors to ransom 
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Theme (nodes) First order concept clusters Quotations 
Payment to suppliers was staged based on 
delivery of a contracted line item (e.g. 
training, configuration). Buyers forced 
suppliers to complete all sub-deliveries 
within this top level contracted milestone 
by withholding consent and thus 
payment. This included delivery of 
changes outside of the formal contract. 
and if you don’t fix them this was gonna happen we did end up 
actually fixing all of them.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
‘The situation has been going on for weeks now and I remain 
unclear of the answer to the fundamental question, which is: 
‘when will PersonSoft be paid.’ [Account director PersonSoft] 
 ‘Whilst it’s got a wide range of functional capabilities there are 
some real anomalies in there and they were determined on 
bringing those out and fixing them and not signing off on 
acceptance unless we went right back to core product to fix 
some stuff that had been like that forever.’ [Business Analyst 
PersonSoft] 
Enforcing will on design process 
The design process was inappropriate to 
the configuration of COTS. Suppliers were 
forced to produce documentation to 
design standards that were never used 
during the development of the 
application. This included training 
documentation, hundreds of pages long, 
which were never used. 
‘HRMDept are insisting that their UC layer is turned on whilst 
conducting the UAT; the problem here is they have over 350 
UCs and I suspect won't test and review all of these prior to the 
UAT’. [Business Analyst 2 PersonSoft] 
‘I must stress that any discussion or agreement on the possible 
transfer of capabilities or functions from HRMDEPT to NCSA is 
an internal matter for DefOrg. Therefore any comment or text 
included by the contractor on this issue (including any 
recommendation/proposal on who should do what) would be 
unacceptable.’ [Director HRMDept] 
Rejecting by recourse to plans and rules 
Deliveries were rejected for non-
compliance to planned objectives that 
were redundant – and could be changed 
only by an amendment.  
Delaying decisions for more information. 
‘System Integrator (and DefOrg) has taken the plan as stated 
three years ago as the baseline – this plan is not sustainable. It 
is fixed in time, scope and budget and much has moved on in 
the interim.’ [Project Leader PersonSoft] 
‘Both deliverables are rejected, the main reason, among others, 
being the deviation from the SOW in terms of types of users.’ 
[Project Manager Agency] 
Controlling outcomes to align with own 
objectives 
Parties took decisions in line with own 
objectives rather than the superordinate 
goals of the project.  
 ‘I must say it's a real shock, and not an approach that I 
support. We have strived throughout the SRR phase to balance 
our IOC days to enable us to stay within our existing IOC 
budget. To push for additional IOC funding at this point is highly 
undesirable.’ [Services Director PersonSoft] 
‘… with SI were seeing the introduction of a significant 
competitor right in the heart of a DefOrg command situation as 
being in incredibly big threat … so I think whatever he wanted 
to get something in there that was not delivered by a major 
threat to the TestCo world.’ [Sales Director PersonSoft] 
6.7 Evolving power and conflict 
The constructs from the analysis were coded across the project phases in NVivo10 and 
then analysed using a framework matrix to identify any change in emphasis and 
common themes over time, and the outcome of this analysis is shown in Appendix J. 
The use of compliance appeared as two main issues, firstly; as a tool to force a focus 
on contractual demands, mainly arising from a deviation to the contracted time for an 
item, and secondly, to ensure (micro) compliance to prevailing design-rules and 
principles. Furthermore, compliance was used to ensure suppliers yielded to functional 
demands such as the inclusion of extra rules and features outside the specification. 
This was carried out by rejection of the software delivery by stating ‘a deficiency’ if the 
desired function was absent. During early stages of the IOC phase there was an 
emphasis on the application of rules around design, gradually changing over time 
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towards a rejection of deliveries due to test failures. A common thread was the 
enforcement of compliance to standards, design rules or schedules above the 
identification of causal factors of delays or poor quality.  
Poor knowledge sharing between suppliers was endemic throughout the 
project and partner learning was blocked due to a lack of substantial collaboration, and 
consequently the supplier organisation was fragmented and disorganised. At the 
starting point knowledge was required by the partners of PersonSoft to understand 
the basic operating principles of the software, as substantive elements of their work 
depended on a deep working knowledge of the application. Requests for information 
or ‘enabling’ were rebuffed or late, during design by incomplete and delayed Use 
Cases, and by a lack of training, release and install documents during physical install. 
The fragmented nature of collaboration, especially around processes of knowhow 
development, and a passive attention by SI had a material impact on performance.  
A latent conflict was observed arising from a mismatch between project demands for 
COTS and the history of bespoke development at HRMDept that emphasised 
informality. At contract award PersonSoft had assumed continuity in approaches and 
relationships and drew on this when negotiating relief from ‘onerous’ requirements 
such as documentation. During early stages the focus was on containment of contract 
demands whereas later this shifted to influencing HRMDept to enable acceptance. 
Throughout, PersonSoft drew on past relationships to influence project direction and 
to overcome strong project governance. Overall both PersonSoft and HRMDept 
attempted relational influence to direct and control each other’s behaviour, although 
it was observed that the bonds of the earlier relationship weakened as the HRM 
Director withdrew from day-to-day project activities. As a result other actors within 
HRMDept emerged with a weaker attachment to the past and aligned more closely to 
the compliant approach of Agency. This break in continuity emphasised a broader 
change within HRMDept towards a buyer perspective and acted to change the overall 
context to be more conflictual and occasionally hostile. 
6.8 The dynamics of institutional politics 
Shown in Figure 6-6 is how the observed four dimensions of power interacted, with a 
focus on how differences between outcomes and goals, or deviations in deliverables 
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created during episodes of work-practice, triggered action to close gaps and correct 
deficiencies. This framework was derived by mapping the interaction between 
systemic power and actor agency and the corresponding empirical findings using as a 
baseline the framework of institutional politics outlined earlier in section 2.3.4 (see 
also Figure 2-5). Central to this process were the transformative practices that created 
the service outputs and the role actor and institutional agency plays over all phases of 
the project to change, disrupt and transform the institution (Lawrence, 2008, Lawrence 
and Suddaby, 2006). The outputs were matched to goals and conflict arose due to a 
deficit between delivered outcomes and original goals. This showed how power and 
conflict arises from a form of disagreement on the outcomes achieved and will result 
in gap-closing actions (Levina and Orlikowski, 2009). Gaps also appeared within the 
internal dynamics of the group, when for example a deficiency in the process was 
noticed, such as gaps in testing, or a requested action did not occur such as a training 
event. Both of these aspects were observed regularly during the implementation.  
If there is no disagreement, or the situation is accepted, then limited conflict 
was engendered, whereas if there was a disagreement then action was started via the 
triggering of compliance or, if triggered during the work, by bargaining behaviours. The 
role of resistance in this process was to mediate or reduce the effects of episodic 
action or systemic power when this was seen to be detrimental by the parties. The 
nature of the gap, in either outcomes or internally within practices, was framed by 
actors as either acceptable or an unacceptable gap that must be corrected. Dependent 
on what was required an event was triggered as a change via requirements 
modification, governance or management actions. Whether or not a change in work 
actually took place depended on whether the event had salience and there was 
sufficient power applied to overcome inertia and resistance. This feature helps explain 
why episodes of activity in this particular outsourcing context were quasi-stable and 
did not adapt quickly. Although poor performance was becoming evident, mediations 
were dampened by effectively applied resistance. 
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Figure 6-6 - The dynamics of power 
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Source: Author 
 
During the implementation, the outputs of the process were continually being created 
and judged against goals whilst cycles of correction were taking place. This was 
changing the work practices, goals and organisational routines. This process of change 
was observed to be iterative and more characteristic of a negotiated order where the 
eventual outcome emerged over time, driven by a process of compromise between 
what was desired and what could actually be achieved. The final state represented a 
balance between the parties and was an outcome of power and negotiation where 
resistance played an integral part in moderating the process. And this is what can be 
described as the dynamics of institutional politics within this outsourcing change. 
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6.9 Chapter summary: Power and conflict endemic 
The main case findings were: 
 The project context showed underlying conflict and cycles of negotiation driven 
by conflicting objectives for the outcomes, accentuated in this context by an 
over-scoped requirement and resource-poor suppliers. 
 The environment was conflictual as parties furthered their own objectives at 
the expense of partners. Selective exclusion from decision making occurred and 
informal relations were used to shape the agenda to match own needs. 
 There was a use of direct power, mainly by rejection of deliverables, to force 
suppliers to yield to buyers’ needs and objectives. 
 The application of strong control and symbolic threats seems to have had 
limited effect on the actual outcomes and timeline compliance. Discipline, 
force, conflictual meetings and even exchanges of letters were used to attempt 
to discipline and change behaviours but had little impact on the actual work. 
 There appeared to be a ‘decoupling’ from the contractual and control 
imperatives and the actual processes of work. Actors tended to ignore control 
when it suited their own objectives. 
Preview next chapter 
Chapter 7 will consolidate the findings so far and fit a process model of change based 
on a situated change perspective. It will be inferred that change in an outsourcing 
context is constrained and always subject to modification implying that there will 
emerge an inherent gap between goals and outcomes within this arena of sourcing. 
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Chapter 7 – The evolution of change     
7.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 7
The evolution of 
change
Change is delivered by purposive work by actors it 
resembles a superposition of punctuated and practice 
based change
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated 
change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project?
 
This chapter integrates the evolution of practices (Chapter 5) with the influences of 
power (Chapter 6) and analyses six change transformations experienced by the focal 
organisations, HRMDept and PersonSoft, as they designed and implemented HRMSys. 
This chapter covers: 
 A practice based model of six 
transformation tasks derived 
from the literature on situated 
change. 
 The evidence for each of the 
six derived transformation 
tasks that the case 
organisations underwent 
throughout the change 
process. 
 Discusses each derived high 
level transformation task, the 
driving and constraining 
forces, and shows this in a 
simplified model. 
 Summarises the findings on the nature of change and previews the discussion 
and conclusion. 
 This chapter addresses the following research question: 
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change emergent and constrained 
in an outsourcing project? 
 
Abstract and front 
matter
Chapter 1
Outsourcing a 
strategic change
Chapter 2
Literature review
Chapter 3
Research design and 
Context
Chapter 4
The antecedents to 
change
Chapter 5
The practices of 
implementation
Chapter 6
The dynamics of 
institutional politics
Chapter 7
The evolution of 
change
Chapter 8
Discussion complex 
change in outsourcing
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Appendices and 
back matter
Why does outsourcing work in some contexts and yet in 
other seemingly identical situations fail?
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history 
impact and constrain the implementation processes of 
outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance 
impact the development practices and how they evolve 
during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during the 
implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change 
emergent and constrained in an outsourcing project?
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped 
how the new application was to be created and 
interpreted.
Practices are the outcome of a contested field and are 
adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their 
relative salience
The source of power is in the everyday action of actors 
engaged in purposeful work and is an attribute of 
practice based change.
Change is delivered by purposive work by actors it 
resembles a superposition of punctuated and practice 
based change
Theoretical and conceptual aspects linked to RQ’s 
limitations and recommendations
Outsourcing is a complex change, and takes time to 
become a coherent institution and capable of delivering 
the outsourcing goals
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior 
history impact and constrain the implementation 
processes of outsourcing?
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and 
governance impact the development practices 
and how they evolve during implementation?
RQ3: How does power and conflict arise during 
the implementation of an outsourcing?
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated 
change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project?
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7.2 Change transformation at HRMSys 
The implementation of HRMSys IOC phase took place over a period of 2½ years and 
finally closed with preliminary system acceptance (PSA) of the initial operating 
capability (IOC) in July 2013. Prior to the start of the HRMSys project an application 
(MAPS) based on software provided by PersonSoft was developed in a low key 
incremental way over a period of more than ten years and the prior ways of working, 
and the informal culture, formed the starting conditions. Wider scale trends towards 
centralisation of services led to an initiative to, firstly, formally centralise and control 
HRM process, and secondly, to create a system within the DefOrg global infrastructure 
to support the management of Personnel; ‘They were doing basically HR management 
in a distributed way all over DefOrg in different ways, in different places so he saw 
based on conversations I’ve had with him an opportunity to centralise.’ [Former sales 
director PersonSoft] 
The procurement organisation of DefOrg, Agency, ran an open tender process 
for this new system and PersonSoft, encouraged by HRMDept, joined a consortium 
with a major system house to bid for the contract which they subsequently won. 
PersonSoft were now working as sub-contractor delivering software within a 
consortium led by a much larger system integration house (SI). SI was completely 
responsible to Agency for the delivery of the system, testing, and its integration onto 
DefOrg’s infrastructure, whereas Agency was responsible for the provision of the 
service to HRMDept. During the implementation, HRMDept and PersonSoft’s 
relationship changed from an informal dyad creating a small departmental based 
application, to one where they worked under the control of the DefOrg wider 
organisation managing an enterprise system of record.  
7.2.1 Transformation tasks during HRMSys IOC 
During the analysis of the implementation, (see Chapter 5) a process mapping was 
carried out (figures 5.3 to 5.11) to link the steps observed to derive an overall 
trajectory of the project as was shown in Figure 5-12. Included in the figure are the 
critical incidents, verified in the post IOC interviews, which materially impacted the 
progress of the project at that point in time. From this six transformation tasks, 
changes in practices, undergone by Personsoft and HRMDept were derived. These are 
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shown as transformation tasks (I) to (VI) below and in total represent the extent of the 
change undergone by the parties as they transitioned from an adhocracy to operate 
within a formally structured project environment. 
 Transformation I: Formal project governance and planning. Moving away from 
a scheduling and planning approach that was advisory to one strictly controlled 
and contracted. Control based on contracted line items (CLINS) and an agreed 
schedule. 
 Transformation II: Requirements and scope changes specified and contracted. 
Any changes to the project scope, personnel, or objectives were subject to a 
contract amendment. Thereafter the changed scope, for example, was defined 
in a new requirements traceability matrix (RTM) that represented the 
contracted deliverables. 
 Transformation III: Working within a supplier consortium – from direct one-to-
one interaction between the supplier and HRMDept to an extended chain. 
PersonSoft and HRMDept worked within the confines of a project organisation 
led by system integrator (SI) and Agency respectively. 
 Transformation IV: Using design rules for codifying business need – the 
business requirements had to be specified prior to development. The functional 
delivery (system behaviour) and technical specification to deliver the 
requirements were then verified and agreed in milestone processes such as the 
‘Critical Design Review’ (CDR). 
 Transformation V: Controlled configuration and release of software – each 
release of software had to be ‘baselined’ and accompanied with release and 
installation notes then regression tested. Physical implementation, and system 
management, was carried out independently from HRMDept and PersonSoft. 
 Transformation VI: Testing and accepting to defined standards – baselined 
software was semi-automatically tested against test scripts based on the 
expected behaviour of the functions defined within the design use cases. The 
software was further tested for security compliance and finally user acceptance 
tested (UAT) using written down scripts or test steps. 
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For each of the transformations the case data was re-analysed and summarised across 
a framework representing links between control, process and climate dimensions 
within the transformation task (Lawler et al., 1974, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Miles 
et al., 1978). Furthermore, additional quotations were extracted from the case 
material and included within the transformation narrative to provide a connection to 
the earlier practice and power findings in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The sections will 
start by describing the transformation, its principal, proximal and distal effects, and 
will then illustrate this in a process model showing the interactions of the change 
drivers and constraints. 
7.2.2 Process model of change 
This chapter is underpinned by the theoretical concepts of institutionalisation where 
institutionalisation can be regarded as the grammar of change and structuration as the 
process model describing how the change ‘takes place over time’ (Barley Tolbert 
1997:100). The analysis considers two main aspects, firstly, how action and structure 
are recursively related, and secondly, how in periods of constrained work improvising 
and innovation can occur (Orlikowski, 2000). In order to graphically illustrate the 
constraints to change and summarise each transformation task a process model of 
change was derived by the author from the empirical results and is shown as Appendix 
M. This model will be used to summarise the enablers and constraints acting upon 
each transformation task The model is underpinned by the notion that environmental 
and organisational constraints can restrict change and as a consequence the end-
outcome can become emergent in resource constrained context (Bennett, 1998, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Especially during software development, at the heart of 
the HRMSys outsourcing, change can be emergent and embedded in the micro 
dynamics of the practices of creation undertaken by the consultants and developers of 
PersonSoft and TestCo (Allison and Merali, 2007, Orlikowski, 1996, 2000). This notion 
of emergence can run counter to ideas of technological determinism inherent in views 
of development based purely on rational planning (Truex et al., 2000).  From this 
perspective, divergent interests within a development process can be shown to 
engender structural conflict and improvisation. Innovation and problem solving can 
occur driven by the needs of the development process and is an outcome of a complex 
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process of interaction, creation, review and negotiation (Allison and Merali, 2007). And 
demonstrates how implementation is less a technical issue and more a process of 
social interaction (Pishdad and Haider, 2013). By analysing the implementation tasks 
across the dimensions of control structure, process and climate the analytical 
approach aims to summarise the principal constraints and enablers impacting each 
transformation task and illustrate how almost all of the tasks were constrained in the 
HRMSys context (Miles and Huberman (1994)). This adds up to a general conclusion 
that the overall transformation was incomplete and emergent. 
7.3 Transformation (I): Formal project governance and planning 
PersonSoft and HRMDept moved from an earlier era where their interactions were 
mediated by a more informal contractual control to one tightly monitored and 
controlled within a contract focused on process control and prevention (Weber and 
Mayer, 2011). This type of contract frames how the initial relation between suppliers 
and buyers is perceived and orients the parties to take specific postures during the 
implementation, buyers focusing on regulating behaviour, and suppliers responding 
with an instrumental focus on scope, with as outcome, a tendency to not cooperate 
and be flexible (Poppo and Zhou, 2013).  
Figure 7-1 - Transformation I changes in governance 
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The influence of the principle drivers; control, practice and climate change will be 
discussed, drawing out the main features of the barriers and carriers of change and 
also indicating some of the proximal and distal consequences of actions within the 
transformation I dimension, Figure 7-1. Shown as Table 7-1 is the analysis for this 
section that also includes an indication of the emergence of power and conflict 
observed during the project (shown as:  ) and a change process model is also 
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shown later as Figure 7-2. 
7.3.1 Structural and control  
The main structural change was the dissolution of the old ways of managing projects, 
from a dyadic collaborative relationship, to one formally governed and controlled 
within an extended supply chain, and where HRMDept and PersonSoft were now at 
arms-length. The HRMSys contract was a fixed price project predicated on a known 
requirement, a defined set of deliverables, and the mechanisms to create them. The 
project also had to be delivered within a strict contracted timeframe. The contract had 
been accepted by the suppliers who had assumed that during execution it could be 
adapted and made more feasible. However this was not the case, and rather than a 
loosening of the contract, its tightness was further accentuated when additional 
changes were introduced within the fixed price concept.  
‘But it was never going to be done in (the) timescale, it was never, never going to 
be done, and we wouldn’t have won the bid if, if we had gone in with a non-
compliant bid, so it was getting the door (open), establish the relationship we 
have close working relationship with (name) and umm and work it internally, 
engineering more time if that was required or cutting out requirements…in fact 
neither happened.’[Services Director Personsoft] 
A further confounding constraint was the submission of a bid by the suppliers 
emphasising the COTS compliance of MAPS in line with the contract.  
‘(The requirement for HRMSys) … was developed based on an assessment of 
generic capabilities inherent in a variety of COTS HR tools. It is the Purchaser’s 
expectation that these requirements can be met through configuration of existing 
COTS HR capabilities rather than substantial development of custom software.’ 
[DOC-MEM-AG] 
This was broadly untrue as the application was fundamentally a bespoke framework. 
Furthermore, it was assumed work practices would not be substantially changed by 
the project and formality such as the heavy documentation would be in practice 
limited. This later assumption from PersonSoft and HRMDept led to a chronic 
underestimating of the resources needed for the development and validation. 
Although the problems of enhanced formality were understood, at least two years 
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before the start, it was not acted upon to increase resource availability (see Appendix 
H for example). PersonSoft had expected the actual development practices within 
HRMSys to replicate their earlier ways of working. As a result the unexpectedly high 
documentation load and the formalisation of work processes that occurred, especially 
around design, exposed further resource shortfalls. The impact of an over-scoped 
project, in terms of supplier capabilities, and the imposition of strict contractual 
controls engendered continuous conflict and disputes over the contract. Suppliers 
were unable to expand resources due to their own financial constraints and the project 
was chronically understaffed throughout the IOC phase. 
A major strategic error by SI and Agency was made at the start of the project 
and underpinned an ongoing area of dispute. Increasing the scope without allowing a 
plan change, or an increase in resources, within a chronically under resourced project, 
led to repetitive schedule failure, failures of corrective actions and continuous hostile 
exchanges and threats. Resistance is the work that actors in organisations undertake to 
mitigate the effects of institutional power expressed in control and structure and 
appears as questioning legitimacy and challenges to institutional power (Lawrence, 
2008). The updated contract was never accepted by PersonSoft and TestCo and the 
schedule was always seen as not feasible and led to patterns of repeated returning to 
the constraints of the schedule as a primary cause of problems and using this to deflect 
criticisms for failing development and testing processes. Enforcement of structural 
control was by multiple meetings, reviews, letters of complaint, demands for more 
effort, or by the use of threats such as the use of ‘liquidated damages’, a discursive 
practice that became ubiquitous.  
7.3.2 Procedural and practice 
Strong project management formed a major change in organisational routines. Project 
control was in place prior to HRMSys but was more based on a notional time box idea 
where a set of functions had to be delivered, within a set time, for an agreed amount 
of money. If the time or money ran out then the functions delivered to that point were 
agreed as sufficient. This had two side effects; firstly, the delivered scope depended on 
the resources available and was effort based, and secondly, the focus is on functions 
delivered and not on formalities such as project management or testing. In the new 
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project environment, Agency adopted a strong preventative regulatory approach that 
emphasised formality, rules and ‘box ticking’ demonstrating risk aversion - a control 
posture typical for a public sector bureaucratic organisation (Langfield-Smith and 
Smith, 2003). Furthermore, the preventative focus and emphasis on project 
management controls, applied via SI, focused the HRMSys project organisation on 
timeline compliance and not particularly on output achievement (Weber and Mayer, 
2011).  
The focus on the time-line as prime control led to a lack of attention on the 
emerging problems in delivery, and a decision filter was observed biased towards 
focusing on immediate (short-term) issues at the expense of attending to longer term 
systemic problems. As a consequence the actual IOC live implementation of the 
HRMSys was twelve months behind schedule and the final system acceptance delayed 
by two years. The total scheduling failure from the supplier’s perspective was 
therefore 180%. The main implementation deadline was effectively fixed to the 
general movements of personnel around the organisation, a ‘roulement’, which took 
place for military personnel. During this period the system was fully occupied with the 
movements and the personnel within HRMDept would be unavailable for any system 
implementation activities. This fixed window of opportunity restricted the end-dates 
for the IOC phase to specific points in the calendar.  
Agency and SI sought to maintain the contracted schedule. However key 
milestone dates were constantly being delayed, and the end date was being squeezed 
and more tasks towards the end of the project stage were attempted within a 
shrinking time-frame. This is a form of ‘stretch and squeeze’ project tactic (van 
Oorschot et al., 2013). This stretching of earlier project milestones, while minimising 
the extension of the end date, caused two main side effects; firstly, time pressure on 
the development and testing, with increasing demands for fixes caused by errors, and 
secondly, the negotiated removal of functions. In order to meet the end dates 
functional requirements were removed or delayed, especially those consistently failing 
testing. The other aspect of this ‘stretch, squeeze then slim’ strategy was for the 
supplier team to negotiate the move of functions from IOC to a later full operating 
capability FOC phase on a new technology. 
The project was inherently unfeasible and over-scoped before the new 
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requirements were added. Furthermore, inappropriate assumptions led to a chronic 
under-resourcing in the critical supplier PersonSoft. This implied a widening scope was 
confronting restricted resources and this led to cycles of re-planning as new deadlines 
were consistently missed. Conflict arose from threats from Agency to withhold 
payments and between SI, Agency and PersonSoft as timeline pressure emerged from 
systemic problems in delivery and supplier coordination. 
7.3.3 Relationship and climate 
The project was organised as an extended supply chain and was physically distributed 
across Europe. The coordination of the project was by SI in Brussels and this quickly 
exposed problems in partner learning and knowledge transfer that remained in place 
throughout IOC. Although project coordination was broadly effective the actual work 
of creation and testing took place at the locations of PersonSoft and TestCo, who were 
geographically distant, and communicated via email and telephone. PersonSoft and 
TestCo did their work largely independently with no joint activities and limited face to 
face interaction. This lack of interaction has been shown to be a major element in 
blocking partner learning. The arms-length approach stated in the contract, and 
policed by SI, placed PersonSoft as a sub-contractor behind SI and HRMDept behind 
Agency as a user organisation. This broke the former close interaction between these 
two parties and created a problem in that the holders of the basic knowledge of the 
business and supporting application were out of direct communication. This change in 
governance caused a major shift in the relation and climate between PersonSoft and 
HRMDept and as was stated by the HRMDept Director, ‘PersonSoft had to be a lot 
more professional in the way that services and support were delivered in the future.’ 
Furthermore, they now operated at opposite ends of an extended supply chain and the 
contractual ownership was no longer between them, and their roles within the project 
were formalised.  
Resistance to this control was observed by actors circumventing formal 
meetings, counter claims and attributions, absences and exclusions from meetings and 
especially by appeals to former partners to overrule Agency and SI’s. Several unofficial 
meetings were held between PersonSoft and HRMDept where agreements were made 
on project scope and approach and how to force through these changes on Agency 
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and SI. Resistance to control appeared early and was strong during start-up and 
continued for the first three to six months whilst PersonSoft and HRMDept adapted to 
the new regime. The control was partially mitigated, made less strict, when old 
partners took joint action to reduce the power of their respective contractual partners. 
These aspects of resistance and power are shown highlighted in Table 7-1 below. 
Summary: Strong control impeded adaptation 
There were four principal features to change transformation (I), firstly a move to an 
organisation field where a strong preventative control was evident. Secondly, there 
was an erosion of the old collaborative relation and its replacement by a closed project 
structure. Thirdly, there was the adoption of formal control mechanisms mediating 
actions and behaviours, and finally, the delivery of a product had to occur within a 
defined and documented scope. These aspects are illustrated in Figure 7-2. 
A fixed price and defined scope within a formal project process and a 
consortium context acted as the principle drivers transitioning PersonSoft and 
HRMDept away from their earlier informal approach to one structured and formalised 
within a contract. A large change, immediately introduced at the project start, acted to 
make an already doubtful activity non-feasible. Formal project control, and possession 
of a fixed price contract, prevented full adaptation to the new situation. There was 
limited flexibility in responding to this contingency and suppliers and buyers resisted 
any change. The consortium was new, members had not worked together before, and 
effective group processes were slow to develop, and this enabled an ineffective 
supplier response to change.  
The actor’s behaviours were constrained by the strong control posture adopted 
by the buyers and exemplified by strict contract management and a time line focus. 
However, resistance and political action to this control attenuated its influence, 
adapted and constrained it, such that the change transformation was limited and 
partial.  
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Figure 7-2 – Process model Transformation I 
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Table 7-1 - Changes in governance 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and Control 
Move from a dyad to 
controlled project 
environment (PS, HRM).  
Contractual connection 
between PersonSoft and SI 
and existing contract with 
HRMDept. 
Control outside HRMDept 
and PS. 
Conflict over payment delays 
and withholding as well as 
apportionment of liquidated 
damages. 
Accepting a fixed time, scope 
and cost project (PS, HRM).  
Assumption of a COTS project 
not bespoke (SI, Agency). 
Assumption by SI that scope 
could be changed after 
award proved unfounded. 
Embedded uncertainty of 
COTS concept. 
Project IOC phase over 
scoped and plan not feasible. 
Continuous resistance and re-
planning. 
No capacity for change. 
FOC delayed until scope 
agreed by suppliers. 
A defined fixed requirements 
list crystallising known 
business need (PS, SI). 
 
Large requirement change 
had occurred during the two 
year delay in the start.  
Forced extension of 
requirement validation 
phase. Requirements added 
significant delays to design 
completion. 
Configuration started under 
risk three months before 
design complete. 
Substantial formality and 
detailed documentation were 
a large part of the contract 
(PS). 
Almost total lack of up to 
date documents for the 
application at PS. 
Documents had to be created 
in media res and drew down 
capacity.  
Long delays in creation of 
documentation. 
Defined contract line items – 
deliverables organised 
around complete functional 
elements (PS). 
Complete deliverables 
packaged for delivery limited 
flexibility for minor errors. 
Agency used control to 
dominate and force suppliers 
to comply to all 
requirements. 
Small errors resulted in full 
testing and release cycle. 
 
Procedural 
and Practice 
Strong project management 
processes and procedures 
introduced (PS, HRM?). 
Limited experience within PS 
of working within a formal 
partner based control 
system. 
Loose control over work 
practices by deadlines 
decided on contract times 
not real work effort. 
Adoption of controls in 
general at PS took place 
slowly. 
Control exercised by 
reference to timeline 
compliance not on output 
functions (PS). 
Lack of visible and managed 
critical path not effort based 
planning. 
Focus on timeline compliance 
lack of attention on 
continuous delays and 
underlying causes. 
Stretch and squeeze then 
‘slim-down’ project planning 
as delays mount during 
project. 
The primacy of timeline in 
contractual control (PS). 
Deliverables contracted and 
penalty for delay (PS). 
‘Box ticking’ and meeting the 
schedule before close 
monitoring of partners. 
Limited awareness of 
emerging problems in design 
and development. 
Panics and conflict to meet 
deadlines. 
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Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
All deliveries via Prime 
contractor for formal release 
(PS). Payment only after 
completion and acceptance 
of a deliverable (PS). 
Alignment of the partners 
and setting up IT processes to 
manage delivery across 
distance were slow to 
emerge. 
Alignment of all suppliers in a 
project sense emerged but 
practice gaps remained. 
Payment for suppliers held 
up for one year until ceded to 
compliance – payment used 
as a strong disciplinary tool. 
All contacts mediated and 
agreed between SI and 
Agency (PS, HRM) 
Gatekeeping by SI to control 
access between PS and 
HRMDept.  
Long and over attended and 
sometimes conflictual 
meetings. Chaperoning of PS 
by SI and Agency. 
Strong resistance and 
circumventing of this control 
– PS persuade HRMDept to 
countermand this directive. 
All deliverables subject to 
formal quality review and 
then acceptance by Agency 
and HRMDept (PS). 
Review process complex, 
time consuming and 
repetitive due to errors. 
Focus on process not 
content. 
Intense focus on 
documentation of COTS and 
plans.  
Resistance to exposure of 
internal IPR to review. 
Loss of capacity within 
already resource constrained 
project. 
Relationship 
and Climate 
Subordinate to and reporting 
via prime contractor (PS). 
Budget control to Agency and 
SI. 
Some resentment of PS 
subordinate role and loss of 
authority to Agency 
HRMDept. 
Raising utility of governance 
model between HRMDept 
and PD – nostalgia for old 
ways of working. 
Some resistance and friction 
arising due to control of 
prime over day-to-day 
business. 
Arms-length between 
HRMDept and PersonSoft (PS, 
HRM). Direct contact blocked 
at start of project (PS, HRM). 
Unofficial meetings arranged 
between PS and HRMDept at 
user groups. 
Parallel projects within 
DefOrg and incumbent at 
HRMDept breached this 
control. 
Maintenance of prior 
relations inducting new 
personnel into history 
between PS and HRMDept. 
Dispersed team across 
Europe blocked day-to-day 
interaction (PS, TC, SI). 
Remote technologies and 
virtual meetings but time 
difference and coordination 
across countries difficult. 
Partner learning throughout 
the project blocked disputes 
resentment and lack of 
cooperation. 
Tacit knowledge transfer and 
knowhow blocked 
throughout caused friction 
and delays. 
Specific content, application 
and business (buyer) 
knowledge only with 
PersonSoft (SI, TC). 
No oversight or 
understanding of application 
capabilities by TC or SI. 
Resource dependence on PS 
by other consortium 
members.  
Slow and incomplete 
knowledge sharing from PS 
continuous throughout. 
Quality review resented by PS 
developers and consultants 
(PS). 
No experience with working 
with QA processes to this 
depth at PS and HRMDept – 
had to be learnt. 
Minimising exposure and 
questioning utility of process. 
Generally resistive of 
oversight. 
Improved software delivery 
and quality of documents. 
 
7.4 Transformation (II): Requirements and scope changes 
Prior to HRMSys, PersonSoft and HRMDept managed changes in requirement based on 
a review of what had been developed derived from a loose description of what the 
application could achieve. This initial view of the functional requirement was 
iteratively adapted by assessing how well the function performed its objectives by a 
demonstration or walk-through of what had been created. However, managing 
requirements for HRMSys was formal, and based on agreed changes, specifying exactly 
what must be done, and then contracting for the task. The added complexity of the 
HRMSys project was that there was no scope for extending the budget and very little 
change permitted to the contracted delivery timescales.  
The influence of the principle drivers; control, practice and climate change will 
be discussed below, drawing out the main features of the barriers and enablers of 
change and also indicating some of the proximal and distal consequences of actions 
within the transformation dimension II, Figure 7-3. Shown as Table 7-2 is the analysis 
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for this section that also includes an indication of the emergence of power and conflict 
observed during the project (shown as:  ) and also a change process model is 
shown as Figure 7-5. 
Figure 7-3 - Transformation II Requirements and scope changes 
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7.4.1 Structural and control  
Two critical changes occurred right at the start of the project; firstly, a set of new 
requirements covering a new functional area was added, and secondly, the inclusion of 
the current incumbent (MAPS) as a starting baseline with its embedded history of 
functional additions and faults. Furthermore, a large number of requirements within 
the initial bid scope were obsoleted or no longer required by the business due to wider 
scale organisational restructuring within DefOrg. 
These changes acted to introduce uncertainty within a detailed contract 
environment that emphasised clarity in delivery. Furthermore, the resulting conflictual 
approach adopted by Agency/HRMDept set expectations of negative exchange 
relations that proved resilient throughout the project (Weber and Mayer, 2011). This 
supports the contention that it is difficult to contract for flexibility and responsiveness 
unless there is a credible assurance that suppliers will be rewarded for flexibility, 
especially when change occurs (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The inclusion of the changes 
resulted in a negotiation. The initial orientation of the contract owner Agency was an 
attempt to negotiate without disturbing the project’s overall contracted budget as in 
their view, ‘these changes should be cost neutral so no authorization for extra funding 
will be necessary.’ To engineer this, the value embedded in the obsoleted 
requirements was claimed and offset against the new requirements. In addition, the 
incumbent already contained (in some form) many of the requirements listed in the 
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contract statement of work. This embedded value was also claimed as an offset to 
make space for the new business need. Suppliers also showed opportunistic practices 
by expanding the impact of the changes and suggesting that the timescales for 
requirements stated already in the contract were indicative and not representative of 
the effort that the new business need implied.  
The inclusion of new requirements, and the incumbent application as baseline 
with its embedded set of functions, added significantly to the perceived over-scoping 
of the project. This created a problem that was never fully addressed and became the 
source of latent and recurring conflict and resistance throughout the IOC phase. 
7.4.2 Procedural and practice 
Changes to the project occurred through a ‘contract amendment’ that was the 
outcome of a negotiation process that suppliers initiated based on a collation of 
changes in requirement. Changes were codified in an impact statement that set-down 
the impact in time, cost, and functional coverage and represented the current state of 
the understanding between the parties of the new project scope. Cycles of changes to 
this impact statement occurred between suppliers and buyers, as they sought to 
minimise or maximise change based on their own objectives as shown in Figure 7-4. 
Figure 7-4 - Cycles of contract amendment 
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The time reserved for this process was only two weeks, although this was extended to 
six weeks due to repeated amendments. Furthermore, as the main focus turned 
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towards a negotiation of scope the actual objective of this phase of validating the 
requirements received less attention and instead became a debate on interpretation.  
‘For me kinda started at that point you could interpret that requirement in a 
number of ways … So it became interpretive, argument and there is no absolute, 
so you end up in a series of iterative arguments.’ [Services Director] 
As a consequence final requirement scope and scale definition were delayed and due 
to intense time pressure many aspects of the uncertain requirements were left 
unresolved until design when large gaps in understanding emerged. In summary the 
focus of this validation process was not on validation but was confirmatory, restating 
the contract, and became a process of fitting the changes within the contracted time 
and cost budget. 
7.4.3 Relationship and climate 
There was emerging resentment that HRMDept used the validation process to extend 
the scope and in effect to bring into the HRMSys project the old incumbent system 
MAPS. It was also stated by Agency that ‘no regression’ was allowed. What this meant 
was any existing functions within the incumbent were not lost in the new system, and 
it also implied a very large and unknown extension of scope. The weakening of social 
bonds between HRMDept and PersonSoft, and the emergence of new actors with 
limited history with the company, and the stepping back of a key sponsor, also led to a 
shift in relation towards a formal buyer/supplier relation with a consequent shift 
towards instrumentality and contractual focus. Finally, a gradual shift in dependency 
was observed within the supplier group away from SI towards PersonSoft as ‘Both 
partners SI and TestCo had no experience at all with the delivered application.’ SI and 
TestCo had no substantive experience or knowledge in the application or business 
domain and became wholly dependent on PersonSoft for all deliverables. 
‘…I think once we started to take the lead for good or bad it started to work. And 
that’s when the relationship with TestCo started working a lot better. I think it 
was because (name) said this is not working we took the reins and ran with it and 
I think SI were quite happy for us to do that. As a figurehead they were in charge 
but on the ground they were not.’ [Business Consultant PersonSoft] 
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Summary: Lack of stability undermined fixed contract 
A strict regulatory regime assumes a degree of stability and complex contracts can be 
defined covering all contingencies and risk to protect the buyer and control supplier 
opportunism. A fixed price contract shifts most risk towards the supplier and demands 
that the scope is well understood. Furthermore, in principle, change requests within a 
fixed contract environment have many drawbacks and should not be allowed by 
suppliers (van Cauwenberghe Nayima, n.d.). The corollary of these factors however is a 
risk of lack of adaptability or response to significant change. As a consequence the 
application of strict control was constrained in two senses; firstly, the significant delay 
in starting and the large changes in the DefOrg business model had made many 
requirements obsolete, and secondly, completely new business needs had emerged. 
Large changes in the gap between contract offer and the start, and the 
emergence of new requirements, had made the assumptions underpinning the original 
contract unsustainable. And the original plan was now unachievable. Cycles of 
negotiation emerged as suppliers sought to bridge the gap between what had to be 
done and the contractual constraints. The negotiating process shaping and modifying 
the plan and in turn became constrained by it. The paradox in this outsourcing project 
was these large changes did not trigger a fundamental re-assessment, and the project 
started as if very little had happened, when a more appropriate approach would have 
been to begin again. 
The change to formally managing requirements and scope is illustrated in 
Figure 7-5 by the transition from position (A) to (B), where the focal organisations’ 
collaborative development process was eroded and replaced by a controlled 
elaboration of requirements that creates a list of what will be contractually delivered. 
The influence of the constraining elements, for example the need to negotiate the 
change,  is to moderate its effect and this is shown as altering the overall 
transformation pathway, such that the degree of change is emergent and constrained 
and is shown as point (C).  
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Figure 7-5 – Process model Transformation II 
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Table 7-2 - Requirement and scope change 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and Control 
Change controlled by a 
formal impact assessment 
then a contract amendment 
(PS, HRM). 
Negotiated process buyers 
maximising inclusion at 
neutral cost. 
Opportunism emerging 
suppliers/buyers as struggles 
over resources and feasibility 
emerge. 
Focus on suppliers strongly 
on scope control not 
innovation. 
A large change in business 
requirements occurred in the 
two years between contract 
award and start (Suppliers). 
Negotiated process buyers 
maximising inclusion 
minimising implied change. 
(Suppliers exact opposite). 
Opportunism emerging 
suppliers and buyers. 
Focus on suppliers strongly 
on scope control buyers on 
flexibility and inclusion of 
functions. 
Inclusion of the incumbent 
application as a baseline and 
core of the new system (PS). 
Expansion of scope with 
essentially unknown and 
extensive requirements. 
Assumption of stability of 
incumbent application by SI. 
No ‘regression’ loss of 
existing functions as aim of 
buyers. Incumbent functions 
were assumed delivered and 
complete already. 
Implicit assumption that own 
developed software (HRM) 
must be included. Incumbent 
‘full of bugs’ caused major 
problems later. 
Content of delivery and 
technical requirements 
specified in the statement of 
work (PS). 
Suppliers push back as some 
functional and non-functional 
needs impossible in the 
current technology. 
Negotiating the delaying and 
off-putting problem functions 
to later. 
Over scoping FOC. 
Contracted schedule and 
plan (PS). Confirmation of 
contracted requirements 
process. 
Confirmation not validation 
as aim of Agency completed 
within limited time period. 
Validation as constraining 
scale of requirements – time 
pressure truncated actions. 
Meaning of requirements 
only emerged during design 
when users could see 
something. 
Procedural 
and Practice 
Impact statement created - 
listing new and obsolete 
requirements. 
Negotiation and review cycles 
as buyers/suppliers shaped 
outcome to match objectives. 
Maintenance of budget 
realignment of requirement 
serials. 
No future impact statements 
were accepted – no budget 
available. 
Comparing delivered 
incumbent serials with 
specification to gain capacity 
for changes. 
HRMDept listed functions in 
baseline and for which ‘they 
have already paid’. PS states 
still need to configure. 
Resistance to demands to 
cede existing functions in 
incumbent and release 
implied resource usage. 
Not resolved left until design 
– not solved during the 
project. 
New requirement mapping to 
existing within the contract 
and statement of work. 
HRMDept and IV&V claiming 
new functions substantively 
covered by interpreting 
existing requirement list. 
Resistance and negotiation 
on interpretation of ‘vague’ 
requirements to be inclusive. 
Emphasis PS on differences. 
FOC requirements and 
approach subject to much 
more critical review by 
suppliers. 
Scope maintenance by PS 
scope extension by HRM. 
Management of expectations 
to control HRMDept 
perceived opportunism. 
Controlling expectations 
meant negotiating reduction 
to within feasible ability of 
Continuous throughout the 
project – HRM leveraging 
power to gain advantage and 
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Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
project and application. value. 
Schedule maintenance and 
adaptation (Suppliers).  
Continuous adaptation of the 
schedule to meet with actual 
outcomes. 
Timeline as schedule of 
expected deliveries distinct 
from managing project. 
Lack of foresight on emerging 
problems contracted dates 
not delivery schedule. 
Requirements traceability 
matrix (RTM) as prime carrier 
of delivery status between 
suppliers and buyers. 
Prime tool used between 
suppliers as checklist for 
controlling the scope. 
Forced focus on linking 
application specifics and 
support to delivered 
functions. 
Continuous ‘interpretation’ 
of whether delivered or not. 
Relationship 
and Climate 
Distance between HRMDept 
and PersonSoft emerging. 
Distance across supply chain 
broke tacit social control 
process between PS and 
HRMDept. 
Some conflict as HRM sought 
to take advantage of 
contracted situation to push 
extension of scope. 
Passive control over 
HRMDept by key sponsor 
allowed others to come 
forward with no history with 
PS. 
Hierarchical chain 
emphasised that PS and 
TestCo ‘behind’ SI even in 
project meetings. 
PS and TestCo referred to in 
third party by Agency and 
sub-ordinated.  
Emphasis on SI a prime and 
ultimately responsible for 
delivery of contract. 
Lack of any project delivery 
or application knowledge 
shifted control to PS over 
time. 
HRMDept adopting a buyer 
mentality maximising 
contracted opportunity to 
increase gains. 
Recourse to contracted 
demands detailed 
interpretation SOW against 
PS. 
Lack of acceptance previous 
lack of rigour and excuses 
from PS. 
Some reduction in flexibility 
between old partners. 
Hostility between suppliers 
and Agency emerging due to 
inflexibility. 
Strict and formal (over 
detailed) review processes 
create a hostile and strained 
environment. 
Repeated cycles of repair of 
documentation due to strict 
line by line interpretation of 
compliance to contract. 
Hostility towards IVV and 
Agency. 
7.5 Transformation (III): Working within a supplier consortium 
PersonSoft lacked the size and capability to enter a formal bid process at DefOrg for 
the acquisition of the HRMSys application. HRMSys was a centrally managed system of 
record and its implementation involved the embedding of the application within 
DefOrg’s complex infrastructure as well as interfacing the application with other core 
systems. System integrator (SI), seizing an opportunity to deepen their business with 
DefOrg formed a consortium with PersonSoft based on the latter’s track record with 
HRMDept. A three supplier consortium was formed of PersonSoft, SI and TestCo to 
compete for the contract which they subsequently won. There were three principal 
tasks within transformation (III) Figure 7-6; firstly, learning to work together as a 
group, secondly, understanding, creating and sharing knowledge, and finally,  adopting 
the rigorous standards, rules and procedures being demanded to coordinate activities. 
Shown as Table 7-2 is the analysis for this section that also includes an indication of 
the emergence of power and conflict observed (shown as:  ) during the project and 
also a change process model is shown as Figure 7-8. 
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Figure 7-6 - Transformation III working in a consortium 
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7.5.1 Structural and control  
The contract emphasised the primacy of SI in controlling subcontractors and ensuring 
effective delivery and the avoidance of gaps in service provision. The task split 
attempted to emphasise the inherent capabilities the parties brought to the 
consortium, however all delivery functions depended critically on good interaction, 
and handovers of information and expertise, between the parties. The activities of 
testing, training and integration in particular depended critically on acquiring deep 
knowledge of how the application worked and the business context within which it 
was to be implemented.  
‘It was totally unfair (on them) because obviously TestCo had always had people 
on the ground working at DefOrg but none of the guys who were assigned to 
HRMSys had ever worked in that industry before so they didn’t really understand 
how they worked.’ [Project Manager PersonSoft] 
This factor placed extra demands for resources on PersonSoft who were the smallest 
member in the consortium in relative size but who had the largest stake in the project. 
Partners within a consortium need to be able to exhibit their capabilities in a 
clear and unambiguous way, and formation of an alliance from this perspective needs 
to ensure complementary capabilities are available from the start. However, selection 
of the sub-contractor TestCo was primarily on cost. TestCo was a near-shored 
outsourced subsidiary of a major IT system house that was headquartered in Romania. 
SI in selecting this partner did so mainly on the cost of the testers and trainers being 
around one third that of central Europe which would reduce the overall bid price 
substantially. 
To maximise this benefit all peripheral tasks to application development, 
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delivered by PersonSoft, were assigned to TestCo in the bid documents. These tasks 
were: system integration, training development, training management and all aspects 
of testing and release. This overall task assignment represented around 60% of the 
project’s effort. This was a strategic error committed at the bid stage of the project. 
Although TestCo had competent analysts and IT professionals, they had no personnel 
experienced in the product to be delivered, the technology of the product, or the 
business context into which it was to be delivered, and no one from TestCo (or SI) had 
ever worked with PersonSoft before.  
‘(the account director SI) contracted TestCo Romania as being a cheap source of 
capability so his bid was low because he was using mainly our expertise to fulfil 
their part and I think that that backfired significantly.’ [Sales Director] 
TestCo would be entirely dependent on their partners to support them in the project 
and furthermore would need in-place processes such as on-boarding (initial induction 
to the project) to become effective during the start-up of HRMSys. No planning for this 
was done, and as a consequence TestCo were largely ineffective for the first six 
months, placing a burden on the project that was never entirely resolved. 
7.5.2 Procedural and practice 
‘Both partners SI and TestCo had no experience at all with the delivered application,’ or 
any experience working with PersonSoft prior to the HRMSys contract. This meant 
initial trust and a working environment had to be created; ’at the beginning of the 
project we had to learn how to work with the various players particularly our good 
friends TestCo.’ During the early stages TestCo, responsible for testing and physical 
implementation, had to acquire from PersonSoft detailed knowledge on how the 
application worked and delivered its functions: 
‘The other main problem during the early stages of the project was …learning 
how to work together in a much more formal environment… and in terms of 
access between people who knew how the application worked and those who 
used it.’ [Business Analyst SI] 
Formal testing involved the scripting (step by step instructions) of the detailed steps to 
be executed in order to test all the interactions of the application. Without a good 
working knowledge of the application, only available from PersonSoft, this was 
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impossible. In a similar way designing a training programme without complete 
understanding of how HRMSys interacted with users was difficult especially at the 
beginning, when ‘there was a lot of misunderstanding of (the) solution architecture.’ 
High levels of shared knowledge were essential for success and would have allowed 
PersonSoft’s partners, TestCo, to exploit and demonstrate their own competence in 
testing. However, this did not happen and this resulted in large knowledge deficits 
within the team. Overall there was limited explicit knowledge transfer, and how 
content can be interpreted, throughout the early stages of the project, and an absence 
of working application documentation. This meant initial partner learning was slow to 
develop (Blumenberg et al., 2009). This resulted from a long history where PersonSoft 
at HRMDept had not needed to provide any substantive application documentation; 
‘…we didn’t write anything down and I am not going to say it was all on-the-fly but we 
did have fairly slim documentation.’ [Business analyst]  
The early stages of the project involved repeated requests from TestCo for 
‘enabling’ (transfer processes) and knowledge transfer but PersonSoft were unable, 
perhaps due to lack of available resources, to provide this support. In the latter stages 
of the project, where more tacit knowhow that is ‘best articulated face-to-face’ was 
needed, the inability to organise any face to face interaction and the reliance on 
WebEx video conferencing to overcome distance meant essential social interaction 
was absent (Santhanam, Seligman and Kang, 2007) . This observation suggests that 
explicit and tacit knowledge management processes need to be planned and are 
essential for successful outcomes. However, these did not take place and their absence 
may have stunted shared knowledge creation and may partially account for the limited 
outsourcing success observed (Blumenberg et al., 2009).  
‘We could have had a more rigorous and better process if dedicating a fixed time 
period when testers and PersonSoft (could) meet each other and exchange their 
views.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
A cyclic pattern of request and denial emerged and was repeated throughout IOC 
accentuated by the problems of group integration and physical distance (Romania, 
Belgium and UK). This led to dysfunctional group processes appearing and latent 
resentment as requests for help were not appropriately handled. The cyclic nature of 
this practice of request and denial is illustrated in Figure 7-7, and perhaps hints at a 
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negative social exchange context where failure to respond creates latent resentment 
and a lack of propensity to cooperate. 
Figure 7-7 - Cycles of requesting for enabling 
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Source: Author 
 
There were several blocking factors to collaboration but especially the physically 
dispersed nature of the consortium. There was a lack of an integrated working location 
and product consolidation for the organisation's individual elements took place 
independently at the location of the organisations.  
‘Romania is still a concern in terms of what they are doing and the quality. When 
they are here they work well, but then they disappear and there is a disconnect – 
(I have) no faith in whether they can genuinely find problems and add value to 
the testing process.’ [Development Director PersonSoft] 
Remote team working practices in such situations require specific embedded 
processes embedded to ensure coherent handovers and increase social cohesion and 
group identity. Physical remoteness inhibits face-to-face interaction and this prevents 
social control emerging, relationships developing, and made tacit knowledge and trust 
acquisition difficult.  
7.5.3 Relationship and climate 
Lack of overall visibility, problems with testing, poor knowledge and hand-over tended 
to make TestCo remote from the centre of the project. Attributions of blame by 
partners for failings due to 'inability to acquire knowledge', or 'lack of understanding' 
all added to a situation where partners were ineffective and fragmented when a 
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coordinated response to buyer opportunism was required.  
‘Almost every intervention from DefOrg management side reset somehow the so 
fragile connection between TestCo and PersonSoft; I mean everyone tried to 
defend by itself that we forgot to react as a team.’ [Test Director TestCo] 
Collaboration was further complicated due to out-group processes emerging as was 
hinted in this comment by the Services Director PersonSoft:  
‘I think there was a fractious relationship anyway between SI and residual TestCo 
and the people in Romania. It wasn’t at all plain sailing and towards the end … I 
felt that SI was being quite openly critical of TestCo and the quality of people, 
consistency of people, capability of people.’ 
There were key failings in integration of knowledge and the product creation process. 
The team dynamics were poor, no coherent process of knowledge transfer was visible, 
and what transfer there was appeared superficial and not adequate to cover aspects 
required for effective performance. This supports the view of Dyer and Singh (1998), 
that in alliances specific knowledge acquisition and transfer processes have to be in 
place to make the relationship effective and in the case of the HRMSys consortium 
these were absent. The strategic error committed was during alliance formation with 
inappropriate partner selection. If there had been time, and knowledge acquisition and 
sharing processes were in place, it may have worked. However, within a restricted 
time-bound fixed-price project there is no slack available for a slow build-up of 
competence. 
Summary: Team working and knowledge sharing were fragmented 
Working as an integrated supplier team within the HRMSys project was a critical task 
for the suppliers and also a major change for PersonSoft. Appropriate partner selection 
is critical and particularly problematic in short term alliances,  where there is limited 
time for working relations to develop and as a result there is a tendency towards a 
‘calculus based trust’ (Bignoux, 2006). Partner selection for HRMSys was flawed in two 
respects; partners had limited complementarity that increased the burden of 
coordination, and partners, were also physically distant making interaction difficult. 
Underpinning this issue was the high dependency on PersonSoft for specific knowledge 
that could only be acquired by close day to day interaction, accentuated by the fact 
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that even written down knowledge was not available. Repeated requests for support 
went unanswered due to shortage of resources, lack of availability, poor coordination 
and no inclination by PersonSoft to support a potential competitor. Overall good 
working relations were slow to develop and the shortfall in coherent working practices 
led to cycles of conflict occurring throughout the development and testing phase. 
The change to a consortium structure is illustrated in Figure 7-8 by the 
transition from position (A) to (B), where the focal organisation’s bi-lateral mode of 
working is replaced by an extended supply chain. The influence of the constraining 
elements is shown on the overall transformation pathway such that the degree of 
change is emergent and constrained and is shown as position (C). Also shown in Table 
7-3 is the analysis for this section. 
Figure 7-8 - Transformation to consortium of suppliers 
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Table 7-3 - Working in a supplier consortium 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and control 
Supply chain of interactive 
and interdependent suppliers 
and buyers replaced dyad. 
Some partners chosen on 
price not on capabilities lack 
of broad knowledge or 
competence in domain. 
Extra burden of support from 
PS not accounted for in 
resources. 
Gaps emerged in deliverables 
overlaps in responsibilities – 
occasional panics in 
deliveries. 
Joint contractual 
responsibility of deliverables 
created between suppliers. 
Possible inappropriate role 
splits in team – some 
suppliers constrained in their 
tasks. 
Extra burden of support from 
PS – gaps in handovers. 
Recrafting the supplier team 
for FOC without some 
personnel from TestCo. 
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Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Working interactively with 
supplier partners to achieve 
the outputs. 
Resourcing assumptions were 
based on historical delivery 
patterns (PS). 
No allowance in bid for 
partner support during 
implementation. 
Partners left largely 
unprepared for role – learnt 
in media res. 
The need to provide 
structured information 
between the supplier parties. 
The incumbent and software 
within PS was not 
documented to required 
standard. 
Documentation had to be 
created within project 
timeline. 
Some resistance and 
unsuccessful attempts to 
push this task to TestCo.  
Multiple meetings required 
covering all aspects of 
delivery and project control 
imposed by the contract. 
Capacity shortfalls at PS 
restricted availability Physical 
remoteness of TestCo. 
Most technical meetings 
required PS input in some 
way and led to a loss in 
capacity. 
Resistance to the number 
and frequency of meetings 
and the use of resources 
from PS. 
Procedural 
and process 
Arm’s length to the end users 
and subject matter experts. 
Control and calling of 
meetings via formal process – 
gatekeeping. 
More time for problem 
resolution and information 
exchange – long 
communication chain. 
Gaps emerging in 
understanding of the 
business requirements. 
The need to transfer 
knowledge of the technology 
to supplier partners (PS). 
Lack of explicit knowledge 
transfer processes. Limited 
capacity internally at PS. 
Expectation of self-learning 
by TestCo. 
Repeated requests for 
‘enabling’ or knowledge 
sharing sessions avoided.  
Cancellation of meetings 
restriction in time allowed. 
Fragmented knowledge 
transfer. 
Processes to support partner 
product creation.  
Use of remote 
teleconferencing and web 
seminars but restricted in 
internal capability. 
Reliance on implicit 
knowledge of recipient was 
not possible – slow progress. 
Focus on surface level 
behaviour of the application 
not on the deep knowhow 
needed.  
Acceptance of common tools 
across the supplier team to 
coordinate tasks and channel 
deliveries (PS). 
Use of SharePoint, Mantis 
(bug tracking) and Polarian 
(requirement trace) adopted 
by supplier consortium. 
Some promotion of internal 
tools by PS was dropped in 
favour of common tools. 
Resistance to common tools 
that exposed internal 
weaknesses. Common tools 
forced by Agency and SI. 
Mandatory use of common 
development and testing 
practices (PS). 
Development processes 
individual and peer reviewed 
no testing protocols other 
than functional tests at PS. 
Unacceptable quality of 
software delivered to 
supplier partners – low 
capability QA at PS. 
QA manager at PS fired 
restructuring to align QA with 
development. Some adoption 
of processes internally at PS. 
Relationship 
and climate 
Limited understanding or 
knowledge of partners of 
environment or of the 
technology to be delivered. 
Some suspicion and 
reluctance to share (and lack 
of support) restricted trust 
and partner learning. 
Wasted time and effort along 
with ‘false starts’. 
TestCo learnt the application 
enough for testing ‘by doing’. 
Often ‘over testing’ the 
application. 
Partners on delivery teams 
had never worked together 
before and had no prior 
history. 
Lack of experience and 
capacity to support partner 
actions at TestCo and PS. 
Fragmented team for first six 
months limited development 
of trust. 
TestCo left isolated and left 
to ‘fight war alone’. 
Lack of integration of team 
and poor communication.  
Lack of understanding of 
project roles and tasks. 
Poor dialogue and wasted 
capacity. Working in isolation 
no social relation. 
Lack of common and 
integrated team seen as 
major weakness. 
PS technically subordinate to 
TestCo at start based on 
integration task scope. 
TestCo to lead development 
with no understanding of 
application or technology 
context. 
Continuous fielding of 
questions to PS. Fragmented 
communication to buyers/SI. 
TestCo technical lead ‘hung 
out to dry’ until control 
shifted towards PS. 
Partners were physically 
remote from each other 
made face to face interaction 
difficult. 
Limited face to face 
opportunities. 
Limited trust between 
partners. 
Ineffectiveness of WebEx 
remote conferencing to carry 
tacit knowledge exposed. 
7.6 Transformation (IV): Using design rules for codifying business need 
The design rules followed closely the philosophy of DefOrg who as an organisation was 
responsible for the setting of architectural standards. However, most of these 
standards were alien to the supplier consortium at the start of the project, and 
although they were specified within the bid documentation, little notice of this 
constraint was made at the time. It was assumed these were standard boilerplate in 
the contract documentation and a flexible interpretation would occur in the actual 
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implementation. As a result the consortium's response at bid time was to indicate 
acceptance of all these requirements without amendment. This was taken by Agency 
in a formal sense to indicate both understanding of the defined scope and acceptance 
of these specific functional and non-functional requirements as part of HRMSys. Who 
as a result subsequently monitored and assured that the project delivered exactly to 
these standards. There were three principal tasks within transformation (IV) Figure 
7-9; firstly, learning to work together as a group, secondly, understanding, creating and 
sharing knowledge, and finally,  adopting the rigorous standards, rules and procedures 
being demanded to coordinate activities. Shown as Table 7-4 is the analysis for this 
section that also includes an indication of the emergence of power and conflict 
observed during the project (shown as:  ). A process model is also shown as Figure 
7-12. 
Figure 7-9 - Transformation IV using design rules 
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7.6.1 Structural and control  
Most aspects of the design were set down within the contract documentation inter 
alias: the design tooling, methodology and IT standards that should be applied, as well 
as the implementation approach, which was broadly a waterfall strategy. The 
extensive documentation added significant time, capacity, uncertainty and cost to the 
project. Budget was the key constraint as it was so difficult to change within a fixed 
price constraint; ’…design to cost is key, budgeted cost is a key limiter, if it goes to 
committee it could take a very long time to come back.’ [Director HRMDept]. 
A fundamental contradiction was observed within the statement of work defining the 
total scope of the activity. The design rules and method pointed to a new application 
development whereas the contract specified the configuring of ready-made COTS 
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solution. This meant that much of the specified methodology pointed to new 
development whereas the suppliers were claiming a delivery of a COTS package. 
Despite this apparent inconsistency in the contract, Agency adopted an approach to 
apply all the design rules to HRMSys right across the application.  
None of the use case or design documents were used in a substantive way to 
inform the configuration and development of the application, and in effect ended up 
as a documentation of what there was available within the core application. The 
documentation in the end was largely reverse engineered to match the delivered 
configuration, and the ‘effort spent on Use Cases didn't benefit the project in relation 
to the effort expended.’ Overall the design documentation was too late to play a 
substantive part in development and was seen as an exercise in box ticking and 
completion of the contracted deliverables. 
‘I think the whole contracting, procurement, waterfall, define everything upfront 
and define the timescales from them to work within then contract it and then nail 
your suppliers to the wall was not the way we had been working (before).’ 
[Services Director PersonSoft] 
7.6.2 Procedural and practice 
Two main aspects of the design process were observed; firstly, the inability to access 
coherent business understanding, and secondly, capability shortfalls in applying the 
formal standards of DefOrg. In particular, the lack of access to subject matter expertise 
(SME) was accentuated by the new requirements introduced at project start-up. The 
incumbent MAPS encapsulated the current business processes at HRMDept and 
crystallised and incorporated the development processes at PersonSoft. Its operation 
was familiar, well understood and institutionalised. The new functions were for a set of 
functions and processes well outside the then sphere of control of HRMDept.  
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Figure 7-10 - Cycles of design 
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This meant a divide emerged between those requesting and designing the application 
from those subject matter experts owning and eventually using the system. This poor 
access to business knowledge resulted in a design that was fragmented and 
incomplete (and during actual field implementation was rejected).  
‘…And to some extent they (HRMDept) were creating requirements based on ‘a 
finger in the air’ and not in any real sense based on practical understanding of 
how the business process worked.’ [Business Analyst PersonSoft] 
In addition, the imposed design regime caused problems as neither PersonSoft nor 
HRMDept had any experience in its use. These two problems interacted and caused 
two faults to emerge: a gap between the business processes and what was being 
articulated by HRMDept, and basic faults in the technical execution of the standards 
resulting in poor documentation quality.  
Problems with the lateness of the design were well recognised especially the 
impact on configuration and the development proceeding at risk.  
‘…[There is]concern regarding the lateness of the uses case and the risk regarding 
PersonSoft developing without a signed off functional specification etc. more 
evident is the concern that if we are developing and the use cases are not 
delivered there is massive risk as to which stream is driving which, use case to 
development or vice versa?’ [European Services Manager PersonSoft] 
The delays and accumulated errors were reported each week and at each project 
checkpoint meeting. It was known that the project was in trouble and would be 
delayed but the response was to force emphasis on compliance, the threatening of 
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liquidated damages, rather than finding solutions to core issues such as chronic 
resource shortfalls. No resources, with the exception of bug fixing, were available 
consistently throughout the project and only when severe problems occurred towards 
the end was extra capacity made available. The main issue was not the lack of 
recognition of the cause of problems but the lack of an appropriate response.   
Design was developed in parallel with configuration and testing and only 
completed formally just before the UAT. Delays in design, lack of requirement clarity, a 
faulty core system and poor application of basic development approaches led to cycles 
of testing and rework that absorbed the best part of a year to resolve. The impact on 
the timeline is shown as Figure 7-11. 
Figure 7-11 – Project time HRMSys development phase 
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7.6.3 Relationship and climate 
A focus on contractual compliance to unachievable timescales and an apparent 
filtering or ignorance of the signals pointing to emerging problems characterised the 
IOC stage. There was an emergence of actors within HRMDept with no prior history or 
attachment to PersonSoft and the old ways of working. Initial design meetings became 
conflictual and restricted the degrees of freedom to modify design parameters. There 
was an instrumental focus and a promotion of ideas for the design based on the 
incumbent application that represented replication logic of current processes and 
practices. Furthermore, there emerged, for a while, obstruction and hostility between 
PersonSoft and HRMDept as a result of these factors. There was gatekeeping and 
control of the agenda, and this, with a lack of access to subject matter experts to 
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inform the design and the inability to get past this obstruction, caused friction. 
Summary: Poor design processes and limited access to business knowledge 
The design process overall was flawed and ineffective due to a serious lack of real 
business knowledge and capability within HRMDept and an inability to get past this to 
acquire real expertise. As a consequence some design rules and application behaviours 
were poorly grounded and based on suppositions of how the business processes 
worked and not on any substantive experience. Failings in the design process were 
responded to by compliance, threats and discipline and not solution seeking in a 
collaborative manner. All aspects of the implementation and design was characterised 
by these cyclic patterns of negotiation and adaptation as actors struggled to match 
uncertainty to their capabilities within a fixed contracted timescale. 
The change to common methods and visible processes from proprietary 
methods is illustrated in Figure 7-12 by the transition from position (A) to (B), where 
the focal organisation’s bi-lateral proprietary mode of working is replaced by an 
extended supply chain operating within standardised processes. The influence of the 
constraining elements is shown on the overall transformation pathway such that the 
degree of change is emergent and constrained and is shown as position (C). Shown as 
Table 7-4 is the analysis for this section that also includes an indication of the 
emergence of power and conflict observed during the project. 
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Figure 7-12 - Transformation to structured design method 
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Table 7-4 - Applying a formal design approach 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and control 
A contracted design 
methodology expressing in 
detail how design to be 
modelled and represented 
(PS). 
Supplier team had very 
limited experience with the 
use of the design 
methodology mandated 
especially Use Cases. 
PS and HRMDept had to learn 
the required techniques to 
create the design 
specification. Errors and 
capacity lost. 
Adoption of the design 
approach for FOC and 
internally at PS. 
The design philosophy was a 
waterfall and staged 
approach specified for project 
evolution and design (PS). 
Staged approaches suitable 
for fixed original scope but 
agile for the new 
undeveloped business 
requirements.  
New requirements took much 
longer to specify to the 
required standard. 
Agile approach adopted for 
FOC and changed in contract. 
Design globally specified 
configuration of a COTS 
existing package. Assumed a 
fixed need. 
The software produced by PS 
was essentially bespoke 
using a proprietary tool set. 
Mismatch between mandated 
process and actual software 
development at PS.  
Use Cases and most design 
documents were not used 
during IOC. 
Mandated tool sets to create 
the design specified in the 
statement of work (PS, SI). 
No experience with the 
mandated modelling tool set 
within project (buyers and 
suppliers). 
Software tool to create 
systematic design documents 
had to be learnt – errors and 
capacity lost. 
Software tool adopted by PS 
internally for some 
developments. 
Design to be detailed, 
validated and formally signed 
off at a contracted milestone 
(PS, TestCo). 
Different process for PS and 
HRMDept historically design 
prototyping and adaptation. 
Design was emergent over 
time for new requirements 
and too late for the formal 
milestone. 
Letters of delay and threats 
of liquidated damages. 
Design frozen after the 
critical design review (CDR) 
then configuration can start 
(PS). 
Design adaptation continued 
up until UAT as business 
rules that were ‘forgotten’ 
were included in the design 
specification. 
Design process overrun the 
milestone and was actually 
closed two months later – 
was never really frozen. 
Configuration started before 
design complete and gaps 
emerged between design and 
delivered software. 
Procedural 
and process 
Workshops held to define the 
business requirements and 
process steps. 
Remoteness of workshop 
participants to actual 
business limited 
effectiveness of this process. 
Major elements of design 
missed or only became 
clearer later in the process 
close to final acceptance. 
UAT failure users insisting on 
inclusion missed rules – 
withholding of consent. 
Joint technical review 
meetings and design 
walkthroughs planned as 
milestones within each stage. 
Time and number limited 
within each major stage of 
the project planned as a 
milestone not to effort. 
Running to a milestone rather 
than to gaining a good 
understanding. Process cut-
short due to timeline 
pressure. 
Some unfinished business – 
latent dissatisfaction and 
incomplete design. 
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Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Concept demonstrations of 
delivered functionality 
between PS and end 
users/HRMDept. 
When system demonstrated 
exposed the limited contact 
with real functional users. 
Communications initiative 
launched by HRMDept ‘to 
sell’ the approaching system. 
Complete mismatch to in 
theatre operations meant 
some functions were never 
used. 
Formal quality process to 
review, confirm and accept 
design (PS). 
Cycles of correction and 
review of design documents 
continuous changes in 
business specification as 
ideas formed. 
Design matured slowly and 
misinterpretation causing 
multiple review cycles – loss 
of capacity. 
Negotiation to ‘put off’ some 
problematic issues to the 
new version 7 web based 
architecture. 
Software behaviour and 
functional output described 
in a functional specification 
and Use Cases. 
Use cases or formal design 
documentation did not exist 
at PS or HRMDept at start of 
project. 
Capacity loss from repetitive 
repairs as process, technology 
and method had to be learnt. 
Design documents were not 
used in application 
configuration. 
Relationship 
and climate 
Interactive between 
HRMDept and PS for the use 
case design during the 
workshops. 
Very restricted access to end 
functional user’s lack of 
access to subject matter 
experts. 
Mismatch between real world 
processes and those defined 
within project. 
Whole areas of loss with no 
flexibility to correct. 
Conflictual and negotiated at 
times within the joint 
technical reviews. 
Contract imperatives 
impinging on the design 
meetings.  
Agency and HRMDept almost 
trying to ‘design’ the 
application to match contract. 
Limited flexibility allowed – 
upping the ante asking for 
more. 
Conflictual at times between 
PS and HRMDept. 
Occasionally hostile and 
obstructive. 
Passivity of core sponsor at 
HRMDept allowed and 
promoted users with no prior 
history with PS. 
Grandstanding and self-
promotion.  
Some fracture in the prior 
HRMDept and PS relationship 
– carried forward to FOC. 
 
7.7 Transformation V: Controlled configuration and release of software 
Configuration of the software within HRMSys was the transformation task that most 
retained historical practices. Coding and internal testing methods at PersonSoft 
remained largely intact and unchanged. Progress and quality problems were broadly 
invisible to the consortium (or the buyers), as no oversight was allowed, and only 
became visible during final testing. The client server software was based on 
architectural concepts unchanged for around 20 years prior to the start of this project 
and the underlying software was of poor quality. Configuration was based on the 
adaption of this software toolset to particular business contexts. The main impact on 
entering the project was placing this configuration approach within a controlled 
envelope that emphasised managing and controlling the output. Accordingly, emphasis 
was placed on documenting the configured items, tracking changes, proofs of repairs 
and evidence of testing having been applied. Openness and visibility were emphasised 
to risk reduce the development in what was in effect an opaque software and 
development practice. The change to a controlled configuration management 
environment acted to strengthen the software development processes and formalised 
and controlled the release to testing. An extract of Transformation (V) is shown as 
Figure 7-13, and shown as Table 7-4 is the analysis for this section including an 
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indication of the emergence of power and conflict observed (shown as:  ) during 
the project. Also shown is a change process model Figure 7-14. 
Figure 7-13 - Transformation task V controlled configuration 
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7.7.1 Structural and control  
Configuration and development of the application was undertaken within the 
consortium by PersonSoft, and although there were contractual demands for visibility 
in database schemas or software standards, the actual configuration processes lay 
outside the scope of the contract. The software creation process in HRMSys is the 
practice that most resembled PersonSoft’s previous ways of working and was largely 
unaltered within the new project structure, causing problems as a technical consultant 
illustrated: 
‘…a little bit of that we were so used to working on-the-fly working very quickly at 
a very rapid pace but when it came to doing design phases and testing phases 
and FAT, SAT we were like lost. We would renegotiate requirements quite easily 
whereas with this project that was like pulling teeth.’ 
In the UK organisation of PersonSoft there were two main groups: the healthcare 
division, who had developed a packaged solution for nurse rostering, and secondly, 
defence and maritime, who produced and implemented tailor-made software for their 
defence clients’ specific needs. HRMSys was coded and configured within this defence 
division who also produced the incumbent application MAPS and several other 
applications within DefOrg. The software was not really a 'shrink wrapped' packaged 
solution but more a set of capabilities and tools within which to create functional 
solutions. As a corollary of this approach the tool-set had developed incrementally 
over time outside of a formal packaged framework as a developer noted: 
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‘The product is okay, it works but it’s full of bugs, holes and anomalies and things 
that have grown (like) Topsy over time. Whilst it’s got a wide range of functional 
capabilities there are some real anomalies in there… and it’s been like that like 
forever.’ [Developer PersonSoft] 
The agile development process partially practised at PersonSoft supported an 
application that could be radically tailored by their consultants and end users, and was 
predicated on adapting the software, almost real-time, to the needs of their clients 
(Malone et al., 1992). The move to a formalised process, characteristic of packaged 
delivery, removed the tight link between the articulation of the business need and its 
rapid realisation in a software function. Software was now created against a set of 
completed requirements then released, tested and accepted in a water-fall style of 
development (see Laplante and Neill, 2004). This process depended heavily on the 
completeness of the requirement and any lack of certainty could lead to large gaps 
emerging when the software was first seen by the users. Even if development 
processes were well managed, which they were not, the latency between the user 
expressing a need and seeing how this was translated into the application could result 
in dissatisfaction. This problem was especially acute when requirements were 
embryonic, as was the case for the new requirements introduced at the very start of 
the project. 
7.7.2 Procedural and practice 
The overall logic of PersonSoft’s development process was to maintain close contact 
with the client business needs, to develop flexibly, and respond quickly to specific 
demands. Coding and internal testing did not emphasise cross organisational 
standards, or processes, and the software that was used for the core of HRMSys was 
based on architectural concepts unchanged across the PersonSoft defence client base 
for some years. Service management and correction of deficiencies were used as a 
‘cash cow’ and as an engagement manager pointed out ,‘There was no SLA no direct 
follow-up of how long is this issue been out, how long is it going to take to address and 
I think we were vulnerable …service support was kinda not there.’ This concept is 
consistent with an iterative development approach where faults could be identified 
and corrected quickly. 
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The software consisted of three conceptual layers: a core internally managed 
by development, a configuration layer managed by technical consultants on client 
projects, and a user configuration layer (UC), which could be adapted by end-users. 
The behaviour of the application could be modified significantly by any of these 
elements, however no standard software rules or standards were available and in 
effect this was an ‘error creating process.’ [Technical Architect PersonSoft] 
Furthermore, the product was monolithic in terms of the software architecture and 
was created as integrated high level blocks. The breaking down into individual 
components or classes was very limited. In practice this meant that a configuration 
change to one element of the software could impact a function quite distant from 
where the change occurred. Finally, very embryonic configuration management 
practices added to this problem and made it difficult to trace changes or allow specific 
testing on just the component altered. 
Adding to this complication was the internal testing of configured software at 
PersonSoft which mainly consisted of running through typical scenarios of use and 
‘seeing if it worked’ prior to exposing it to the users. Furthermore, internal quality 
assurance testing had limited impact, ‘and PQA didn’t have the best reputation but I 
think we could have asked how did all those bugs get through in the first place?’ There 
was an overall strategy to sacrifice detailed specification and control for flexibility, that 
matched a bespoke ad-hoc development practice, and as a consequence no two 
implementations of the software were exactly the same.  
What this adds up to is a historical process of development that was in part 
improvised responding to contingencies in shifting needs and business context. These 
processes had high resilience. Lack of standardised routines across PersonSoft’s 
developers, over many years and generations of developers, had led to a toolset that 
was inherently faulty, bug-ridden and inconsistent. These embedded long term 
problems were exposed when the output of this software process was subject to 
rigorous testing and review. This caused re-emergence of old-bugs, and forced 
multiple releases, within a business context at DefOrg that was no longer fault 
tolerant. 
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7.7.3 Relationship and climate 
During HRMSys implementation, time pressure within a constrained project caused 
multiple errors and whole new baseline releases. This cascaded into cycles of testing, 
re-emergence of previously solved bugs and warnings of serious quality problems. This 
overall situation created tension and conflict, mainly between PersonSoft and TestCo 
and later with SI, as delays mounted and blame and conflict cycles emerged. 
Summary: Historically weak processes delivered poor software 
The configuration and software release processes at PersonSoft were resilient and 
long-standing and the practices were oriented towards bespoke development. This 
approach could flexibly adapt to the context of their clients’ businesses. Standards, 
documentation, testing and configuration received less emphasis compared to rapid 
response. HRMDept had tolerated this approach as this more accurately reflected their 
improvised use of the software. However, entering the new contractual environment 
eroded the utility of these historical practices, replacing an informal improvisation with 
compliance to contractual norms. The historical practice was thus deprecated and 
replaced by practices and processes in line with professional software house norms. 
However, the historical routines had delivered embedded bugs, inefficiencies and 
shortfalls, which were quickly exposed in testing, and caused conflict right across the 
project. The subsequent rejection of deliveries drove cycles of correction and 
amendment to the software, and as a corollary materially altered the processes at 
PersonSoft and acted to erode old work routines.  
The change from an informally regulated approach to one more structurally managed 
is shown as the transition from (A) to (B), in the Figure 7-14 below. The outcome is 
shown as before by the path of the transformation curve to point (C) that illustrates 
the constrained change as control processes, practice changes and context mediated 
the degree of change. Shown as Table 7.5, is the analysis for this section that also 
includes an indication of the emergence of power and conflict observed. 
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Figure 7-14 - Transformation to controlled configuration and release 
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Table 7-5 - Controlled configuration and release of software 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and control 
Packaging releases into a 
baselined complete solution 
capable of independent 
installation (PS).  
Similar release process did 
exist but not in the detail 
required by the contract. 
Tight, more rigorous and 
robust processes were 
adopted. No ‘hacking’ into 
the system to complete 
install allowed. 
Part of standard procedures 
within this project and FOC. 
System Implementation Plan 
(SIP) and System Design 
Specification (SDS) that 
describes and controls the 
spec of the total application 
including its installation. 
No documentation of this 
type existed at PS or 
HRMDept at start of project. 
Capacity loss as these were 
created within the project – 
were subject to QA review 
process and repetitive 
corrections and re-release 
adding to capacity loss. 
Part of standard procedures 
although major rework 
needed for FOC new 
technology. 
A visible configuration 
management practice 
defined in a plan and 
implemented to control 
deliveries (PS). 
Configuration management 
plans and processes in a 
formal sense absent at PS. 
Application was ‘monolithic’ 
not modular. 
Faults in application difficult 
to isolate – cross 
contamination of application 
to ‘distant’ functions.  
Re-emerging faults during 
regression testing. Root 
cause poor application 
architecture.  
Software must be unit tested 
prior to release to TestCo for 
formal testing accompanied 
with test outcomes (PS). 
Poor QA and unit testing 
approaches within PS. No 
scripted or automated 
process – functional test only. 
Many ‘silly bugs’ getting 
through and being trapped 
by TestCo. 
Very limited role of QA in 
release process – changed 
when QA department 
restructured. 
Procedural 
and process 
Creation of document and 
release sets for each 
baselined release. Defined in 
contract system 
implementation and system 
design plans. 
Experience of creating this 
depth of documentation 
limited – had not been 
requested before by any of PS 
clients. 
Baselining for each release 
including patches including 
documentation Some 
capacity loss as this process 
was learned and executed. 
Some adoption within PS for 
other projects and for FOC. 
Definition and elaboration of 
waived software components 
and incumbent functions 
(PS). 
Claiming a waiver to obviate 
testing depended on proving 
the function had been 
formally tested before. 
Reluctance of Agency 
confirmed as significant 
testing failures emerged – 
‘no longer accepting the 
story’. 
All functions were regression 
tested then fixed following 
UAT failure – waivers did not 
apply. 
Reconfiguring software, 
including embedded 
Quantity of bugs that 
emerged forced PS to add 
Re-emergence of earlier 
‘solved’ bugs – cross 
Multiple over ten releases of 
software to repair bugs and 
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Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
components to repair bugs 
and overcome obstacles (PS). 
resources. contamination. deficiencies. 
A formal release process to 
TestCo and to SI then ‘hands-
off’ in principle for PS. 
Practice had been to ‘support’ 
install to get past problems. 
Manual intervention and 
‘support’ not allowed and 
procedures had to be 
independently run. 
Support dependency on PS 
reduced and moved to 
Agency and TestCo. 
Internal testing processes 
and procedures applied and 
documented. 
Practice had been to 
functionally test by walking 
through scenarios in the 
application. 
Test scripts and outputs 
needed as proof of test 
compliance. 
Some moves to address this 
during QA reconfiguration at 
PS. 
Visibility of daily production 
build made available to the 
buyer. 
Daily production build not 
possible technically or desired 
by PS and TestCo. 
Waived and did not occur 
development did not follow 
this process. 
Resilience of current 
development approaches 
intact. 
Relationship 
and climate 
Deriding and denigrating 
input from TestCo in relation 
to software errors and 
readiness for testing. 
Warnings of serious quality 
problems ‘rubbished’ by PS 
and attributed to testing and 
lack of application 
understanding at TestCo. 
Application entered testing 
routines full of errors that 
were subsequently 
identified. 
Loss of authority on 
application from PS – conflict 
loss of trust in capability of 
PS to deliver. 
Time pressure on 
configuration and releases 
and background threats for 
liquidated damages. 
Releasing new software 
always against time 
constraints and seemingly 
rushed. 
Multiple errors and rework – 
delays and coordination 
difficulties. 
Stronger control and 
dominance exerted over PS 
as problems emerged. 
 
Pressure on resources 
especially at PS due to time 
and workload constraints. 
PS were chronically under 
resourced.  
Delays failures to meet 
agreements some signs of 
stress including absence. 
FOC was resourced correctly 
and team restructured at PS. 
Rejection of training 
documents, training schemes 
and administration docs and 
lack of PS support increased 
internal conflict. 
Expansion of scope to include 
incumbent gaps caused 
conflict within team and 
between suppliers/buyers. 
Some game playing and 
hostility towards TestCo from 
HRMDept.  
Increasing propensity to 
exert control and force own 
will. 
Tense and blame oriented 
with aspects of presentation 
management and attribution 
of blame to others. 
Some aspects of resentment 
of TestCo and SI as assessors 
of PS output quality.  
Flurries of email exchange – 
SI enforced discipline on PS. 
Complaints that TestCo did 
not understand the 
application. 
Tension and blame through 
IOC peaked as problems 
emerge and slowness to 
resolve became clear. 
 
7.8 Transformation VI: Testing and accepting to defined standards 
Extended testing routines carried out independently from PersonSoft and a series of 
defined 'gates' formed the principal transformation in testing and accepting the 
product. In former practice testing was executed, but consisted mainly of a functional 
walk-through and on-site testing, and rarely followed the industry practice of formal 
procedural tests. Furthermore, unit testing, developers confirming their own software 
coding, was not practiced and no documented peer review was observed. An extract of 
transformation (VI) is shown as Figure 7-15 and shown as Table 7-4 is the analysis for 
this section that also including an indication of the emergence of power and conflict 
observed (shown as:  ). A change process model is shown as Figure 7-17. 
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Figure 7-15 - Transformation VI testing and accepting 
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7.8.1 Structural and control  
The main structural influence for Transformation (VI) was the clear functional 
separation of configuration and preparation of the software from its receipt and 
testing. Furthermore, the testing regime relied on a set of predefined rules, derived 
from test plans, which comprehensively confirmed delivered functionalities matched 
the specification. Testing scripts, step-by-step accounts of the test process, were 
derived directly from agreed design specifications. Finally, errors and deficiencies 
discovered during testing, and their resolution, were controlled by a standard 
methodology using an agreed common tool set specified in the contract. All of these 
aspects represented a fundamental departure from previous practice.  
A constraint to this process was the assumption that the testing and design 
rules would be largely complete. This was not the case and the design was still an area 
of dispute and was fluid. As well as the design not being settled the physical install 
processes was not entirely stable. The application was complex and normally took a lot 
of manual intervention to get installed. This tacit know-how, how to get the 
application working, was acquired over many installation instances and could not 
entirely be codified and written down. Therefore it could not be installed completely 
independently of PersonSoft. As a consequence of uncertainty in the design, and gaps 
in testing routines, problems occurred during testing resulting in deficiencies and 
errors that necessitated further rework. In addition, some errors proved intractable, 
no solution could be found, and were negotiated out of scope by agreement. The 
consequence of the poor testing cycle was to add several months to the plan and the 
increasing tension and low-level conflict that resulted were symptomatic of a failing 
process. 
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7.8.2 Procedural and practice 
Characteristic of the physical software delivery were the repeated cycles of rework and 
test. Poor quality software and gaps in design caused rework of the application. During 
configuration where changes to the application take place to the software and 
documentation there were repeated failures: at factory acceptance test (FAT), system 
acceptance test (SAT) and user acceptance test (UAT). PersonSoft had a formal release 
process with its clients but the HRMSys application development followed a much 
more strictly controlled approach that caused issues, as was commented by a technical 
consultant at TestCo,  
‘When it became around to do the install for the factory acceptance test is seen 
to be much more formal and a surprise even to (name). All seemed very formal 
and also very very new (to PersonSoft).’ 
Each failure triggered a cycle of testing and in a new formal baseline. A baseline 
release is a complete software and documentation package delivered to the buyer, 
and caused high demands on resources and time. During testing, until the final version 
was installed on the live system, there were twelve major patches or releases and 
many documentation errors that had to be corrected. This exacting process control of 
the supplier delivery resulted in PersonSoft practicing a ‘fix to the list’ strategy where 
software corrections closely followed the list of deficiencies, and limited regression 
testing was done to check for errors caused by the fix process itself Figure 7-16.  
Figure 7-16 - Cycles of repair and test 
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Source: Author 
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Large gaps between requirement and the delivered components of the service 
emerged due to three main deficits; inadequate testing practices at PersonSoft and 
TestCo, late emergence of the final design, and poor quality basic software. Final 
testing was iterative. Faults or gaps in design resulted in rework or adaptation of the 
design and corrections were focused just on the list of deficiencies and bugs explicitly 
exposed during a test. Retesting just checked the resolution of the explicit problems or 
the design was modified if a technical barrier had been reached. Following the test a 
new deficiency list was generated. This cycle (Figure 7-16) was repeated until the list 
was solved, the criticality of the deficiency reduced, or an agreed compromise 
accepted as a feasible option (a design relaxation). Further improvised practices were 
observed in response to the emerging problems, firstly, directly contacting security 
testers to understand their methodology and adapting practices to meet these aims, 
secondly, influencing HRMDept and Agency to remove entire functional areas, 
applying hot fixes without the extended approval processes, and finally, running 
sequential test routines in parallel. These types of practices enabled shortcuts to be 
taken to reduce the delays experienced and were used extensively during the later 
stages of the IOC phase. 
7.8.3 Relationship and climate 
Throughout the test cycle the overall climate was occasionally conflictual and 
sometimes hostile. Multiple errors, limited time and resources engendered hyper 
vigilant behaviour and firefighting to get through the testing. This culminated in a 
confrontation at the headquarters of the system integrator when HRMDept rejected 
the entire application, and insisted all historical problems as well as those generated in 
the new project needed to be fixed before the system was accepted. This represented 
at the surface level the nature of the fracture in the relationship between PersonSoft 
and HRMDept, as trust was lost during the latter stages of the project. A business 
analyst was questioned in an interview as to the causes of this conflict:  
‘I think it was the broken promises ...when I was over there to do all the testing 
little comments in the background you know ‘PersonSoft’ make all these promises 
and don’t deliver and (name) said this would work and it didn’t work like that, or 
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(name) would say this would work and it didn’t work like that and it was just 
constant all the time.’ 
In summary, the testing and acceptance process was at the end of a series of 
development activities and exposed a lack in internal quality. The formal testing 
approach was a well-documented and well-run process. The problem was it exposed 
the full extent of deep underlying problems in the selected application. These issues 
can be traced back to decisions taken much earlier in the project. Significant rigour was 
not required in an exploratory design process however in an enterprise development 
this was essential. Within the project the legacy of historical practices, incomplete 
design capture, and a change from bespoke to a COTS model, within an over scoped 
resource light project, came together to limit success. A confluence of several mishaps 
occurred during the implementation and to some extent the failures in test at the end 
can be traced back to the selection of inappropriate software at the beginning. 
Figure 7-17 - Transformation to testing to defined standards 
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The change from this situation to a more formal testing regime as specified in the 
contract, where test plans and independent verification is the norm, is illustrated in 
Figure 7-17. The move from an informal, user-centric acceptance testing, to a planned 
activity is shown conceptually as a transition from point (A) to point (B). The transition 
is illustrated by the curved arrow and the influence of the change imperative, as 
constraints act to moderate the outcome and limits the transformation as shown by 
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point (C).  
Table 7-6 - Testing and accepting to defined standards 
Change 
effect 
Primary Change 
Impact 
Output Constraints Proximal Effects Distal Effects 
Structural 
and control 
Testing and acceptance 
controlled and contracted in 
milestone planning with fixed 
dates and gaps for rework. 
Insufficient time allowance 
for contingency or rework – 
only one repair cycle 
foreseen in the plan. 
Test delays and overruns to 
the planning occurred – test 
routines unclear. 
Continuous low-level conflict 
and emerging problems. 
Testing scripts required 
derived from and traceable to 
design use cases and unit 
testing scripts. 
Design was still fluid at test 
start and gaps in test 
routines emerged. 
Test failures due to ‘missing’ 
functions or rules or 
misunderstanding process. 
Continuous low-level tension 
between team around poor 
process and gaps in design 
documents. 
Comprehensive test plan a 
contracted line item and 
down to individual 
requirement (TestCo, PS). 
Test waivers were applied 
claiming no need to test as 
delivered in incumbent 
baseline. 
Waived items were never-
the-less tested and many 
failed. 
Test waiver claims rejected 
and PS forced to repair all 
bugs across the application. 
A traceable bug and 
deficiency resolution process 
within the supply of the 
software and document. 
Fogbugz as tool to trace bugs 
was replaced by Mantis as an 
open visible system exposing 
PS repair process to review. 
Opening and closing of bugs 
as they were ‘solved’ and re-
emerged in testing as 
integrated process was 
developed.  
Categorisation of some 
deficiencies as change 
requests rejected forcing 
repair. 
Multiple testing gateways 
each of which must be passed 
Internal, FAT, SAT, Security, 
UAT. 
Poor preparation by TestCo 
and PS resulted in tests 
aborted and recalled. 
Multiple failures across all 
test categories. 
Cure plans demanded and 
firefighting to get through 
testing. 
Evocation of liquidated 
damages for delays and test 
failures. 
Procedural 
and process 
The tool set Mantis adopted 
as common tool for tracking 
bugs and deficiencies across 
supplier buyer teams (PS, TC, 
and SI). 
Some conflict with FogBugz 
control but this was handled 
internally by PS to channel 
issues to development. 
Mantis became an accepted 
tool and central to config 
process and managing bugs. 
Bug control came under close 
scrutiny.  
Use of criticality standards as 
standards for acceptance 
within the testing process 
(HRM, Agency). 
Objective criteria for passing 
a test in terms of criticality 
(vital, critical, medium and 
low) were applied. 
Gaming of criticality measure 
to force repair/resolution of 
preferred options. 
Agency forced through 
criticality measure changes 
by withholding consent. 
Validating software deliveries 
against the defined design 
specification and UC’s (HRM). 
Gaps between expected 
behaviours and specification. 
Incomplete use cases 
blocked testing. 
Rework and conflict over 
‘inflexible’ interpretation of 
TestCo. 
Upgrading of criticalities in 
security and UAT was used to 
force compliance. 
Validating and observing 
testing outcomes at FAT, SAT 
and UAT (HRM, Agency). 
Multiple test stages each of 
which had to be re-entered if 
failure at any point. 
Emergence of focused bug 
fixing to get past the specific 
failing test. 
Removal by negotiation of 
problematic functions. 
Accepting documents 
including training manuals 
and training courses (HRM).  
Training documentation 
‘agreed’ for functions 
developed in project – 
agreement broken by HRM. 
HRMDept extended 
requirement for training and 
admin docs to cover gaps 
from the incumbent baseline. 
Training documentation 
needed to be recreated in 
new technology at FOC – 
capacity loss. 
Relationship 
and climate 
Conflict, anger and loss of 
trust during repetitive 
software test failures 
(Suppliers, Buyers). 
Failures in install procedures, 
manual interventions and 
tweaks needed to progress 
testing. 
Cure plans demanded and 
strong control enacted as 
weaknesses in PS processes 
were apparent. 
Stronger control and 
dominance exerted over PS 
as problems emerged. 
Tense and blame oriented 
with aspects of presentation 
management and attributing 
blame to others. 
TestCo blamed for lack of 
knowledge and preparation 
to explain problems. 
Firefighting and heroic repairs 
to problems of own making. 
Stronger control and 
dominance exerted over PS 
as problems emerged. 
Hostile and PS in shock as 
HRMDept rejected 
application at UAT (PS). 
HRMDept regression tested 
the incumbent used as 
baseline and exposed all 
historical problems. 
Conflict and feelings of 
‘ambush’ as PS forced to fix 
all historical problems in the 
HRMSys project. 
Upgrading of criticalities in 
security and UAT was used to 
force PS’ compliance. 
Rejection of training 
documents and expansion of 
scope to include incumbent 
in regression caused conflict 
within team and between 
suppliers/buyers. 
Training materials rejected as 
not sufficient – but were 
based on TNA. Unrealistic 
extension of scope of 
required application 
documentation at that time. 
Resistance (and hostility) of 
HRMDept training dept. to 
imposition new routines and 
processes. 
Controlled by appeals to 
HRMDept management by 
informal influence. 
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7.9 Practices were cyclic and negotiated  
The practices of work were characterised as cyclic and negotiated, as suppliers 
responded to the contractual demands within a resource constrained environment by 
seeking to control and minimise the scale of the task. The management of 
‘expectations’ of the buyer implied reducing expectations and between suppliers and 
buyers a meta-narrative was emerging where suppliers focused on scope control 
whereas buyers sought to capture more value. Cooperation emerged between 
suppliers driven by the basic demand to produce a service within a consortium. 
However, collaboration and integrated learning developed slowly and partially, and the 
supplier team was essentially fragmented. Knowledge sharing was blocked by a 
combination of factors; firstly, a basic lack of explicit codified information, secondly, by 
limited resources and physical remoteness of supplier partners, and finally, by a lack of 
willingness of partners to expose their own intellectual capital.  
Progress within the project was slow and delays and emerging problems with 
quality and capability were addressed by letters of complaint or the threat of the 
application of liquidated damages, all of which had very little substantive impact on 
the actual outcome. Strong governance, especially focused on compliance, acted to 
create a hostile and instrumentally focused context, oriented towards just meeting a 
contracted schedule at any cost, and not on problem solving or meeting functional 
demands. This factor alone acted as the principal barrier to progress. The emergence 
of a conflictual environment, driven by the contractual context, poor performance and 
implementation problems, demonstrates the need to consider more closely the nature 
of conflict and politics within a project context, how these arose and how this 
influenced progress within the HRMSys outsourcing.  
This change in governance and structuring of the work represented a significant 
and radical change for both HRMDept and PersonSoft. The change, from the project 
start to completion, represents the total scope impacting the two organisations and is 
shown in Figure 7-18 split over six observed change transformations that occurred 
over the IOC implementation. 
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Figure 7-18 - Practice based model of change 
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The above transformations represented a radical departure from the previous practice, 
where both organisations, PersonSoft and HRMDept, managed the business processes 
and supporting technology independently from DefOrg and possessed a high degree of 
autonomy. 
7.10 Chapter summary: Change is constrained and emergent 
The main case findings were: 
 The change in outsourcing was observed to be constrained by the adaptation 
needed to contingencies and demands placed by real word constraints. 
 Power, resistance and conflict emerged as a result of failing objectives and the 
focus of actors on own objectives at the expense of any overarching goals. 
 A strong contractual context and poor management of scope change blocked 
innovation and change and failed to adapt in time to cope with the emerging 
problems.  
 Project control exhibited a ‘stretch and squeeze’, then ‘slim’ response to 
shifting and failing project parameters. Project control adapted to and reflected 
the actual delivery and was not used as a tool to manage outcomes. 
 Consortium management and effective group working practices, including 
knowledge sharing, were absent. 
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 Cycles of negotiation emerged and adaptation as a new balance in the project 
sought. Opportunism emerged in response to challenges to objectives and the 
use of informal back channels to exploit previous relation was used to influence 
outcomes. 
Preview next chapter 
The Discussion and Conclusion will consolidate all the findings and answer the 
research questions. It will go on to link the findings from this specific case to the wider 
implementation practice of outsourcing. It will demonstrate that outsourcing is a 
constrained change and the final outcome, in terms of delivery, is very dependent on 
the actual work of creating the outsourcing service during the implementation. The 
implementation of outsourcing is highly dependent on supplier and buyer capabilities 
and the nature of the negotiated and conflictual context within which they are 
working. 
 
  
 
Chapter 8–  Discussion complex change in outsourcing  Page| 197 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Chapter 8 – Discussion complex change in outsourcing 
8.1 Chapter overview 
Chapter 8
Discussion complex 
change in outsourcing
Theoretical and conceptual aspects linked to RQ’s 
limitations and recommendations
 
This chapter discusses the findings from the research both in terms of summarising the 
findings to the research questions, and developing the links to the literature discussed 
during Chapter 2.  
This chapter discusses the case study research questions:  
 In what ways do antecedents and a prior history impact and constrain the 
implementation processes of outsourcing? 
 In what ways does strong control and governance impact the development 
practices and how they evolve during the implementation? 
 How do power and conflict arise during the implementation of outsourcing? 
And how do power and conflict impact work practices? 
 In what ways is the nature of situated change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project? 
And will cover the research outcomes: 
 What can the case findings tell us about outsourcing theory? 
 How might these findings be used to improve the practice of outsourcing and 
deliver better outcomes? 
Introduction to broad area of research 
This thesis considers a seemingly straightforward question as to why some outsourcing 
relationships succeed and others, in apparently similar contexts, fail. As it was put by a 
senior product line FMCG director to the author, ’… we have a few successes and lots 
of semi-successes and some outright failures and I don’t know why.’ Outsourcing as an 
interfirm practice has been a subject of intense academic research, and well over thirty 
reference theories from similar disciplines have been co-opted and used to explain 
what is going on, from the decision to outsource to how outcomes are measured  
(Dibbern et al., 2004, Lacity et al., 2010). Despite this intense level of research there 
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have been pleas for a more endogenous approach, especially triggered by emerging 
dissatisfaction with the explanatory power of constructs such as transaction cost 
economics and the RBV, and the over-rationalistic and normative perspective 
dominant in the literature (Lacity et al., 2011b). This research approached the problem 
of a lack of an internal explanation for outsourcing by adopting an institutional and 
practice-based lens focused on the micro practices of everyday work. The research 
examined how internal factors are maintained and change the institution, adopting the 
perspective that micro practices transform organisations (Powell and Colyvas, 2008). 
The research is laid out in five broad sections covering: 
1. The impact of prior history – This section explores how the long-standing 
relationship between the two focal organisations developed and changed as 
wider scale processes forced formalisation and centralisation. The findings 
showed the strong influence and resilience of previous practices and how 
previous history imprinted the ways of working throughout the project. 
2. The impact of control on practice – Six case organisations collaborated 
together to create a software application and support service over a period of 
three years. The findings demonstrate that continuous cycles of negotiation 
were characteristic of the implementation as constraints were explored, 
project contingencies addressed, and actors adapted to changing 
circumstances. It also demonstrated how work practices built over many years 
are strongly resilient and resistant to change.  
3. How power and conflict arises – Collaborative partners, across the buyers and 
vendors, continually sought to shape and control the project trajectory to be in 
line with their own objectives. The findings showed how power and conflict are 
embedded attributes of practice-based change and emerge naturally in the 
course of collaborative project work. 
4. The constrained nature of outsourcing – This section discusses how an 
interfirm relation between the project actors became a process of adaption to 
new norms and practices demanded in the change. The findings extend the 
notion of change to include improvised change as a purposive activity.  
5. Summary and implications – Outsourcing change resembles an improvised 
practice where there is a gradual adaption to new norms and a slow erosion of 
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old practices as the service is created. Change in an outsourcing is constrained 
by real world capability gaps and sufficient time must be allowed for the 
creation and embedding of effective service practices. 
8.2 The impact of prior history 
The period from the building of the original application to the start of the acquisition 
of HRMSys was a time of relatively slow and gradual refinement of the system by 
HRMDept and PersonSoft, characteristic of incremental change. During this long period 
of time mutual adaptation allowed the build-up of practices and norms that became 
firmly established and highly resistant to change (Zucker, 1987). This long-term 
stability was interrupted by three environmental changes; by the wider scale 
restructuring within DefOrg, the decision to centralise many IT services including HRM 
IT, and finally, by the start-up of HRMSys. These three triggers arose within a wider 
institutional context of DefOrg brought about by the ending of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Block. This forced a fundamental reformulation of the DefOrg 
military strategy away from front line and flanks frontal war towards intermediate, out 
of area, and rapid reaction, and this implied a physical re-alignment of assets, business 
processes and support and a major change in institutional practices (Wallander, 2000). 
This wider context impacted HRMDept and became the eventual business driver for 
HRMSys and subsequently the abandonment and the de-institutionalisation of 
previous practices as they were eroded and replaced during the course of the 
implementation (Oliver, 1992). In the following sub-sections a breakdown of the 
antecedent influences as experienced during HRMSys linked to literature is discussed.  
8.2.1 Projecting control into the future 
Institutions at any point in time are an accumulation of past experience and this 
history has a profound influence and ‘shapes the present and constrains the future’ 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967, Kimberly  and Bouchikhi, 1995, Wiebe et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, how an organisation responds to change can be shaped by internal 
capabilities built up over a long period of time that ‘cannot be changed overnight’ 
(Kimberly  and Bouchikhi, 1995: 17). In the early development of the incumbent 
software (MAPS) there was a recursive process of exploration, innovation, and 
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adaptation as actors explored and used the application capabilities (Orlikowski, 1992). 
Within this context there were two integrated processes. Firstly, HRMDept modelled 
their processes and practices within the application. Secondly, PersonSoft adapted the 
application, extending the capabilities of the existing technology to meet new 
functional demands. There was a recursive process of mutual fit, gradual adaptation 
and experiential learning. Both focal organisations created shared ways of working as 
their practices evolved over time and converged (DiMaggio 1983). 
As a result of this, firstly, the existing work processes were encoded in the 
application, and secondly, the way they were functionally represented was defined. 
This implied that the IT system represented the state of practice of the HRM 
department (Lyytinen et al., 2009). This meant, that when centralisation of  the HRM 
processes was mandated, the incumbent application represented and structured the 
rules and resources that underpinned practice at HRMDept (Orlikowski, 2000). 
Furthermore, the requirements specification, within the bid documentation for 
HRMSys, was entirely based on the incumbent system (MAPS). This acted to constrain 
any proposed solutions from other suppliers to fall within the envelope of the existing 
application. This effectively replicated the incumbent into the future, ensured stability 
in work processes and practices for HRMDept, and biased selection in favour of 
PersonSoft. This observation shows that a long term history can facilitate inherent 
organisational inertia and a tendency to shape the present and future in line with the 
past (Kimberly  and Bouchikhi, 1995), and create an inertia that can only be broken by 
‘second-order’ radical organisational change (Bartunek, 1984).  
8.2.2 Maintaining organisational influence 
Funding for the old MAPS product was ad hoc in the sense that development was 
financed by diverting money from existing budgets. Funding was thus limited and led 
to an approach focused on getting as much functionality as possible for the minimum 
cost. PersonSoft responded to this by adopting a complementary approach to delivery 
and became adept at tailoring solutions to emerging, sometimes vague, business 
requirements. A process emerged where outcomes were prioritised and funding 
organised on a time and material basis characteristic of a collaborative environment 
(Poppo et al., 2008a, Weber and Mayer, 2011). This implied that prior to the HRMSys 
 
Chapter 8–  Discussion complex change in outsourcing  Page| 201 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
project governance was collaborative, with low process control, limited 
standardisation and an orientation towards social control mechanisms (Parmigiani and 
Rivera-Santos, 2011). As a corollary the processes and practices for formal project 
management within HRMDept and PersonSoft at the project start were embryonic and 
more lip service than rigorous application. During the IOC phase this was a key 
constraint, as the consortium lead contractor applied formal techniques, and these 
control processes had to be accepted and learned by all suppliers. 
Furthermore, actors within HRMDept had become adept at leveraging the use 
of the technology to other areas, particularly when these extended their overall 
resource base and influence within the organisation. The possession of the incumbent 
application as the only source of coherent HRM data in DefOrg made key actors 
dependent, and gave HRMDept influence and the ability to drive policy, an ability 
which they jealously guarded. A second aspect was a more emergent process where 
development moved beyond the technical and functional constraints of the existing 
configuration to support improvised practices facilitated by the technology itself 
(Orlikowski, 1996). The application was radically adaptable,  end-users as well as 
developers could quickly create exploratory functions, used prototypically, to explore 
new functional areas (Malone et al., 1992). Exploiting these capabilities HRMDept 
were able to develop new approaches and extend influence within the broader 
community even to areas outside of the core remit of HRM processes. The application 
therefore became further co-opted as a tool of political and organisational influence. 
As well as this extension of organisational influence this also enabled the maintenance 
of control over PersonSoft, forcing them to make relational investments (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999), whilst ensuring long-term continuity of authority over HRM and the 
supporting technology processes within DefOrg (Orlikowski, 1992). 
8.2.3 Influencing how business is interpreted 
The approach offered by the consortium as the IT solution was not a packaged COTS 
application as defined in the bid process. PersonSoft, except for minor add-ons 
covering specific browser based technologies, offered the incumbent technical 
solution for the new HRMSys application. This was in effect a tailor-made solution 
masquerading as a packaged solution. The application, with its embedded processes 
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and practices, formed the core of the new development and created a dependency on 
the project in terms of the processes inherited from the previous ways of working. In 
addition, HRMDept mandated that all existing functions in the incumbent (MAPS) 
application, including any in-house developed configuration, were included in the 
HRMSys project.  
The old processes, business rules, application behaviour, processes of business 
definition, administration processes and user embedded software thus became 
included as part of the new system. This confluence of work processes and application 
development techniques and the embedded mental models acted to frame the new 
development as an extension of the old and strongly linked the new development to 
the original practices. 
A further problem during the transition to the formal contracted structure was 
a mismatch between the logic of previous practices that emphasised informality, 
collaboration in development and expertise, compared with that required for formal 
project control more in line with a management control logic (O’Reilly and Reed, 2011, 
Offenbeek et al., 2013). This mismatch was seen throughout the project trajectory in 
terms of an historical lack of documentation, and a bias towards continuous rework 
and ad-hoc firefighting to solve problems, which clashed with the formal routines of 
project control during the implementation of HRMSys. Consequently work practices 
were slow to erode and proved very resilient throughout IOC especially as other 
projects, running at the same time, acted to maintain and continually reinforce the 
status quo between HRMDept and PersonSoft (Oliver, 1992).  
8.2.4 Summary – RQ 1: The impact of prior history 
This research shows the fundamental and long reaching influence of the extended 
history between HRMDept and PersonSoft and how antecedents and initial conditions 
imprinted the trajectory of the HRMSys project (Doz, 1996, Inkpen and Currall, 2004) . 
This history influenced the project in three ways; firstly, defining how the new 
application was to be created and interpreted, secondly, in re-producing existing 
practices and processes, and thirdly, in the maintenance of prior knowledge and 
relationships.  
Furthermore, the reproduction of extant norms and ways of working enforced 
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continuation of existing dependencies and authority over organisational processes and 
procedures. These dependencies constrained activities, blocked alternative 
interpretations, maintained poor practice and redundant processes, and accordingly 
acted to create sub-optimal solutions. Finally, the long-standing embedded practices 
were very slow to erode and dissipate and did not entirely disappear over the three 
years of the IOC phase. The old practices created right at the beginning of the 
relationship between HRMDept and PersonSoft proved to be very resilient, even re-
emerging later for the Full Operating Capability (FOC) phase. This demonstrates the 
long reaching influence of early learning and adaptation processes as highlighted by 
Kimberly  and Bouchikhi (1995).  
8.3 The impact of control on practice 
Once the decision on scope and implementation has been made implementation can 
occur where buyers and suppliers collaborate and ‘co-evolve’ to create the outsourced 
service (Inkpen and Currall, 2004). This consists of collating and organising resources, 
planning and structuring the intervention and the physical creation of the service. 
Strong controls and tight contracts focused on ‘safeguarding’ or ‘prevention’ 
(Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 2011, Poppo and Zhou, 2013) increases the control over 
suppliers but reduce the opportunity for cooperation in outsourcing engagements (Li, 
2011). In this section the evolution of the everyday practices of work will be 
considered from two main aspects; firstly, how purposive actors challenged strong 
controls creating a negotiated order, and secondly, how process and practices are 
adopted, institutionalised, and/or discarded by everyday action. 
8.3.1 Creating a negotiated order 
The service specification in the bid documents was defined based on the existing 
incumbent application created by PersonSoft. It was assumed, by the other members 
of the consortium, that prior capabilities, supplier business competence and working 
application software to support the approach were all available at project start. 
Furthermore, the list of requirements was assumed to be exhaustive and to cover all 
the demands within the fixed price offer. This fixed price and scope assumption was 
invalidated by the inclusion of new and undefined requirements and the formalisation 
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of the incumbent as a baseline, which adversely affected planning and control (Dvir 
and Lechler, 2004).  
The additional new requirements were imprecisely formulated, and to clarify 
them access to business owners was needed to determine the business rationale and 
objectives. However this initiative was inhibited firstly by an absence of authoritative 
owners of business processes who were able to articulate the business need, and 
secondly by the lack of the ability of designers to use the mandated design 
methodology. For the latter point, there were no consultants across the project who 
had any real experience with the contracted design approach. This was a mandated 
practice standard imposed on the project but it proved impossible to deliver the 
required quality. Overall these two factors opened up a major knowledge deficit within 
the project. 
Furthermore, although the existing business processes, as captured in the 
incumbent, were fairly well understood and developed over many years between 
HRMDept and PersonSoft, the new unfamiliar requirements covered an undefined 
area of the business. This meant the consortium instead of a fixed delivery had to 
confront a major change in scope - a known source of project failure (Meredith et al., 
2014, Millhollan, 2008). Fundamental gaps emerged during the initial stages of IOC. 
Firstly, a feasibility gap, with too much to achieve within the timescales; secondly, a 
definitional gap and an inability to understand the overall business objective, and 
finally, a capability gap in creating software using the mandated method. Practices 
emerged that attempted to close these deficits. This was seen in cyclic processes of 
negotiation with proposal and counterproposal as actors bargained, shaped 
boundaries, and exerted influence to support their own position (Ulf and Johansson, 
1997). The main challenge was focused on resources, and specifically how to match 
capabilities to demand, and observations showed how quickly internal conflict can 
arise from disputes over an equitable division of resources within a constrained project 
(Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). 
Two main features were observed in the move from an ad-hoc artisan 
approach creating bespoke software to delivering a COTS standard product: 
 An attempt to reproduce old ways of working, and relationships, that would 
help reduce the impact of the formality and rigour of the contract. The project 
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approach that favoured standardisation and compliance, rather than 
informality, constrained the entire project to the speed of adaptation of 
PersonSoft. 
 Mechanisms such as design rules, audits and acceptance testing, characteristic 
of a formal project management approach, were at variance with historical 
practice, and forced the software supplier to undergo a fundamental re-
evaluation of its processes as it struggled with the demands of the delivery.  
PersonSoft lacked essential skills and capabilities for a formal project and was 
fundamentally under-resourced for this delivery. Furthermore, the assumption that a 
replication of the old ways of working between HRMDept and PersonSoft would be 
established led to an underestimation of the task to be done. Particularly the need to 
support supplier partners and to create supporting documentation that a formal 
system needs became an issue. The research showed the integration of the team was 
blocked due to ineffective knowledge-sharing practices and the exchange of codified 
and tacit knowledge essential for development of effective partner performance 
(Becerra et al., 2008, Blumenberg et al., 2009). In general institutionalised practices of 
knowledge creation and transfer were absent and core members were excluded from 
the learning context (Hong and Fiona, 2009). This also prevented the explicit 
demonstration of complementary partner competences, especially TestCo, and led to 
reduced performance of the consortium (Tiwana and Bush, 2007). It is this mismatch 
between the historical ways of working, the underlying logic and demands of a formal 
system development, and the slow process of adaptation that explain the relative 
failure of software delivery.  
The change demanded could not take place within the contracted timescales 
despite exhortations and threats of liquidated damages. The research also 
demonstrated that an absence of a clearly defined knowledge acquisition process 
within an inter-firm context can open up major deficits in trust between organisations 
and groups (Blumenberg et al., 2009). In this case these gaps were observed between 
developers/users, developers/consultants, buyers/suppliers and across the consortium 
that endured throughout IOC.  
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8.3.2 The erosion of practices 
De-institutionalisation is the process of the erosion of existing institutional practices, 
occurring due to three main forces: political processes, where organisations respond to 
shifting power dynamics, functional pressures, where the salience of current practices 
are questioned in favour of the new, and social pressure, where existing social norms 
and existing practices are questioned (Oliver, 1992). The evolution of purposive work is 
a form of transition and within a changing institutional context is always adaptive, as 
practices are discarded and deinstitutionalised and their relative salience varies. Older, 
less appropriate or redundant practices, or those practices shown to be ineffective, are 
discarded more quickly whilst others that are more resilient or useful are merged 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). From this perspective practices can be a superposition of 
old and new. Practices, the actual activities, exchanges, and processes of work 
undertaken purposefully by actors working towards a common goal are not static, vary 
with resource shifts, and are compromises. To examine the findings in the light of de-
institutionalisation theory, following a brief discussion of de-institutionalisation 
practices shown in Table 8-1,  is a mapping of the empirical observations related to the 
Oliver (1992) conceptual model of de-institutionalisation. 
Political Drivers 
The contract structure, statement of requirements, and the mechanisms to create the 
software artefact were defined. There were pressures to adopt new design procedures 
in line with the contract. Furthermore, stricter formal testing weakened the salience of 
PersonSoft’s own testing that was found in practice to be inadequate. This weakening 
of utility led to restructuring, a loss of personnel, and the abandonment of these ways 
of working and emphasised the movement of control away from PersonSoft to SI and 
TestCo. 
Functional Drivers 
Functional pressures were experienced in the reduction of the informal ad hoc 
processes no longer valued by the other actors. Incompatibility of current practices 
and processes was exposed during the change to a formal system of record within a 
controlled environment. Efficiency, delivery to time, and documentation were all 
representative of a change in technology and economic objectives for the project. 
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Furthermore, the bespoke development process as practiced in previous ways of 
working was unknown to the consortium partners. There was a reduction in salience of 
the ambiguous development process in favour of industry approaches that opened up 
development to review and scrutiny. Unclear processes, and hidden practices, are 
difficult to assess and rely on. Confidence and goodwill can only be gained from 
successful past experience. When this is exposed as unsustainable, especially where 
there is no linkage to past history, distrust arises when failures occur. This reduces the 
confidence in the work and acts to deinstitutionalise the previous practice. 
Social Drivers 
There was turnover of key project personnel and there was an advancement of actors 
on the buyer side that had no stake in the past ways of working. This was observed to 
the extent that there was a hostile questioning of the value of previous ways of 
operating and the production of deliveries. This new cohort of managers ‘unhampered 
by existing debts, loyalties and history’ adopted a more formal orientation to the old 
incumbent supplier (Dawson, 1996: 175). This observation that an inward ‘migration’ 
of new professional managers disrupted the old consensus, acting to de-
institutionalise past practice, extends the notion that new entrants carry their old 
institution with them,  and this can act as a disruptive force (Kraatz and Moore, 2002). 
Although this disruption was partially offset by parallel projects between HRMDept 
and PersonSoft maintaining a link to the past, this phenomenon caused erosion of 
social bonds and the loss of shared meaning between HRMDept and PersonSoft. This 
institutional factor acted to exacerbate an already problematic knowledge-sharing 
approach breaking the link between old partners and preventing the establishment of 
new norms of collaboration.  
Loss of salience old practices  
Deinstitutionalisation of old norms and practices was driven by changes in functional 
necessity by the imposition of new technical norms and standards required and had a 
political and economic impact (Oliver, 1992). The creation of the new application took 
place within a governance structure that emphasised separation and control. This 
factor, exaggerated by the erosion of the old social consensus due to repeated failures 
in delivery, led to a gradual breaking up of old social links and consensus. This latter 
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feature was also emphasised by the phasing out of a political consensus as new actors 
came to the fore, new organisations assumed leadership, and old leadership left the 
organisation and took with them their institutional knowledge (Gilmore and Sillince, 
2014). 
Table 8-1 - Empirical observations of de-institutionalisation 
Drivers Organisational Level of Analysis Contextual/Structural Level of Analysis 
Political 
Shifting power 
distribution 
brought about 
by ending of 
dyad 
Reduced applicability old ways of working 
Poor performance and quality exposed during testing 
Weaknesses in design capabilities 
Exposure of existing weak processes 
Stricter project control replaces ad-hoc governance 
Shifting control towards SI/Agency 
Subordination of PS/HRMDept 
Formality of HRMSys as system of record 
Stricter formal testing and entry requirements 
Strong emphasis cost control DefOrg 
Shifting salience and approach DefOrg in Europe 
Legitimacy and strength  of formal project and client control 
Centralisation of HRM processes 
 
Functional 
Salience of old 
practices 
challenged by 
technical rigour 
Reduced salience ad-hoc reactive support 
Functional testing mismatched to technical need 
Instrumental focus on deliveries lack of ‘flexibility’ 
Maintenance of prior practice in parallel projects 
Reduction in citizenship behaviour shift to instrumentality 
High technical specification HRMSys 
Stricter standards of development  
Focus on defined and precise requirements 
Structurally precise technical architecture and infrastructure 
Move to enterprise scale applications and support 
Social 
Breaking of old 
social bonds 
 
Core sponsor removing from day-to-day control 
Arrival new actors with no prior history 
Arrival new actors with different business models 
Turnover within supplier teams 
Geographical dispersion suppliers 
Loosely connected practices across teams 
Move towards shared delivery and knowledge creation 
Drive towards standardisation different ways of working 
Consortium group based activities 
Expansion of HRMDept in scale and scope 
Formalisation buyer and supplier relations 
Take over SI by larger IT supplier 
 
8.3.3 Summary – RQ2:  The impact of control on practice 
Practices evolve over time as a constrained and negotiated order and are the outcome 
of buyers and suppliers negotiating and compromising before agreeing a direction (see 
Jarzabkowski, 2005). Working methods and approaches seem to be fixed at the 
beginning by prior history (or experience) where this exists, or by dominant actors 
where there is none, and adapted over time to the specific context. In a practical way 
the mechanisms of work are matched to the actual delivery needs and the enacted 
substantive processes may differ from those set down in any formal ostensive 
procedure or contractual imperative. This observation confirms that ‘structural 
elements may only be loosely coupled … to activities (and) rules are often violated, 
decisions often unimplemented’ and the link between the everyday activities of work 
and the controlling structure may be very limited (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 343). 
Practices may not evolve optimally, and may often be sub-optimal, as they are a result 
of a compromise based on the actor’s objectives and will be framed (in some cases) by 
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opportunistic or political considerations and are always interest motivated (Navarro, 
2006). Finally, working practices may not be effectively internalised due to resource or 
capability constraints – actors may not be able to apply them due to skill and capability 
shortfalls.  
This case demonstrated that the evolution of purposive work is a form of 
transition and within a changing institutional context is always adaptive. Practices are 
adopted, discarded and deinstitutionalised as their relative merit varies. Older, less 
appropriate or redundant practices, or those practices shown to be ineffective, are 
discarded more quickly, whilst others that are more resilient or useful are merged 
(Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). From this perspective practices can be a superposition of 
old and new. Practices, the actual activities, exchanges and processes of work, are 
undertaken by purposeful actors working towards a goal, are not static, but vary with 
resource shifts and are compromises. 
8.4 How power and conflict arises 
The interfirm consortium created to deliver the HRMSys application consisted of six 
interacting groups, each with their own internal objective and supporting its own 
organisational and individual group objectives (Morgan, 1997, Whittington, 1993, 
Wilson, 1997). These organisations were operating within the overall framework of an 
overarching goal as laid down in the contract - the delivery of the HRMSys application. 
However they needed at the same time to achieve other objectives; such as cost 
reduction, service delivery and service profit margin. Changes in institutional context, 
relationships and hierarchies, objectives and outcome have been shown to engender 
conflict if the objectives of constituent organisations are compromised or contested 
(Campbell, 2010, Campbell, 2004, Lindegaard, 2013). Furthermore, a project 
environment displays systemic conflict throughout all its stages, a situation known to 
be associated with poor outcomes (Verma, 1998). In this section, drawing on Lawrence 
(2008), the discussion will focus initially on the systemic control and power aspects of 
the institutional field and then on the perspective of actor actions. This shows how the 
transition from an existing stable relationship to the new structure disturbed 
participant objectives, and demonstrates how power and conflict became endemic and 
arose naturally in the course of the practice of purposeful work.  
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8.4.1 The application of systemic power 
Institutional power is the power of the organisational field and is expressed by rules, 
procedures and control mechanisms that control and frame actor actions (Lawrence, 
2008). The IT services technical architecture at DefOrg was complex and all IT projects 
had to comply with defined architectural standards, process directives and governance 
rules. Centralisation of the processes, and the management of the application, implied 
the incorporation of the application into the managed infrastructure. DefOrg (Agency 
IS Services) would be the authority maintaining and delivering the service and the 
HRMSys application had to be consistent with the rules of the complex IT landscape 
they operated. The second aspect of institutional power was control over the 
implementation process itself that transitioned the application onto the IT landscape 
that had to follow defined development and testing routines. DefOrg laid down the 
rules in the form of reference documents that structured a framework within which all 
implementation should take place. These were referenced in the contract as 
mandatory objectives of the project (Scott, 2014). 
This application of control materially impacted the suppliers, and added to 
problems with the sustainability of the project, due to the heavy burden that 
standards and compliance placed on capacity. The rules were enforced by the use of 
threats, rejection of deliveries, and non-acceptance of plans which were all examples 
of supplier discipline (Heiskanen et al., 2008). DefOrg, much like other strong and 
bureaucratic public sector organisations, tended to be risk averse, adopted a strong 
control posture (van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000), that was aimed at 
reducing environmental uncertainty and risk (Kim et al., 2013, Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). Contractual governance, the visible aspect of the organisational field, controlled 
the process of transition and managed the project to deliver effective performance 
(Weill and Ross, 2004). The use of technical standards, rules, procedures and testing 
regimes were crystallised instruments of power and were resources drawn on to 
enforce compliance and discipline (Orlikowski, 2000). Enforcement of contractual 
demands continued even for elements with limited utility and the needs of contractual 
compliance became prioritised above actual functional delivery. Strong use of coercion 
to comply with all contractual elements negatively affected collaboration and even 
generated distrust (Nyaga et al., 2013). Resistance emerged by questioning legitimacy, 
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negotiating exceptions, bargaining for leniency, and by basically ignoring the demand. 
These emerging observations support an idea that resistance can emerge structurally 
as a consequence of disturbing established norms, cultures, and power distributions, 
and not just from processes such as implementation, and accordingly can be difficult to 
overcome even by process measures such as involvement (Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). 
Furthermore, project structuring restated accepted societal norms in terms of 
buyer/supplier, contractor/subcontractor and even military/civilian relations. For 
example, this was seen in the unquestioned legitimacy, privilege and authority given to 
the client.  
8.4.2 Linking resistance and conflict 
The adoption of a preventative, complex contracting approach meant the practices of 
work at HRMSys were strongly regulated and instrumentally framed with an emphasis 
on monitoring and vigilance (Barney and Hansen, 1994, Malhotra and Murnighan, 
2002). This was even observed in how meetings were structured to restate the project 
hierarchies in terms of the norms of behaviour, the planning practices, the allowed 
topics and who was allowed to speak (Fleming and Spicer, 2006). The subordinated 
position of PersonSoft was reified and the flow of delivery and information between 
the parties actively managed. This observation emphasised two concrete aspects of 
how decision making was controlled, firstly, how decisions are taken in situations 
where there are conflicts of interest, and secondly, over the control of legitimate 
dispute, what topics could be discussed or even legitimately raised (Hardy, 1996b, 
Horton, 2003, Lukes, 1974).  
Bargaining behaviours developed in four main areas: managing capability gaps, 
containing scope, circumventing control, and negotiating a modification of the plans 
and standards (Barrett, 2004: 253). Capability gaps had emerged from the differences 
between deliveries in the contract, requirements, and those feasible within the current 
software application. Careful articulation of precise meanings of deliverables, 
persuasion to accept this reduced capability, or the removal of problematic functions 
to later in the activity were examples of negotiated compromises. These activities 
represented the application of influence to change the behaviour of buyers (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993, Pfeffer, 1981). This observation confirmed bargaining power as a 
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forceful factor in framing the choices made during implementation (Heiskanen et al., 
2008). In this case suppliers acted opportunistically to maximise any impact of the 
change, with buyers endeavouring to minimise the effect on time and budget and 
claiming an offset against already delivered functions in the incumbent. These are 
examples of a struggle over resource distribution within a project context (Williamson, 
1985a).  
Resistance was expressed by negotiating relief from demands, appeals to prior 
relations, challenges to authority and relevance, and subverting formal hierarchies. 
Resistance and cycles of negotiation and bargaining became endemic as gaps in 
expectations and deliveries emerged. Furthermore, resistance in this context was seen 
as a response acting to mediate and shape the impact of change or control to 
acceptable levels and as such was an integrated part of the action, evaluation and the 
negotiation process. This supports notions that resistance is not just ‘restrictive’ but 
active and purposive and can operate as a form of ‘negative’ feedback that potentially 
controls and avoids wide variability in project decisions (Perren and Megginson, 1996, 
Piderit, 2000).  
This observed behaviour demonstrates that power and conflict within an inter-
firm relation are dynamic processes contingent on the scale and scope of the gap in 
performance and the relative power between the parties (Cox et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, it demonstrates that in real world implementations changes in scope, 
performance deficits, uncertainty and unplanned contingencies are daily facts of life. 
These continuous changes and problems can swamp planning practices founded on 
the ‘iron three’ of quality, cost and time and can make them ineffective (Cicmil and 
Hodgson, 2006, Pinto, 2010).  
8.4.3 Summary – RQ3: How power and conflict arises 
The analysis demonstrated that institutional and systemic power are realised by 
standards, guides, contracts and rules of engagement and are constraints that control 
how project objectives are interpreted and enacted. Systemic power was materialised 
by compliance, compelling activities to be in line with the rules, by rejection of 
deliveries outside of norms, or enforced by withholding resources. Compliance also 
had negative effects and was used sub-optimally supporting redundant processes that 
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are no longer aligned with overall goals. Power has a dual aspect of control and 
dominance but can also provide the energy to break down stability and institutional 
inertia (Campbell, 2010). In periods of crisis power and dominance can be useful to 
take charge and force change. 
Gaps and deficiencies in output are almost inevitable in a project context 
delivering complex technological artefacts. A significant gap can generate a cascade of 
corrective actions that can trigger cycles of power and conflict. Problems result in 
bursts of activity and conflict that gradually decline as a new stable state is reached. 
Bargaining and trading appears endemic in a contracted service as partners moderate 
project aims to align more closely with their own objectives. Bargaining was also 
observed as a tool of resistance to divert attention from deficits and to control the 
impact of change. There was a latent balance of power observed between the 
organisations shifting during the project as the possession of scarce resources became 
more salient or key delivery dates approached. The role of resistance was shown to be 
legitimate, exposing problems in processes, and used to mitigate the effects of power, 
and acting as a mechanism of organisational feedback and control. From this 
perspective power and resistance observed in this case study acted together to control 
the velocity of change. 
8.5 The constrained nature of outsourcing   
Complex technology impacts all parts of the organisation (Pishdad and Haider, 2013). 
Information Technology Outsourcing (ITO) involves the creation of a service, including 
the supporting processes and technology, within the bounds of another organisation. 
It affects the organisation and the vendor creating the service in a fundamental way. 
Outsourcing within the multiple supplier context created to deliver HRMSys challenged 
the existing cultures and norms and involved a fundamental reconfiguration of 
organisational process, practices and scripts within HRMDept and PersonSoft. 
8.5.1 Practice-based change 
The research identified six implementation transformations undertaken during the 
project as control moved from an informal collaborative context to operate within a 
contracted and project managed delivery. The overall transformation touched on all 
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aspects of the institution, the routines, scripts, processes, and control procedures and 
was to be completed within the contracted timescale of the IOC implementation of 
two years. This forced adoption of practices, rather than selective retention of the 
existing modes of work, led to the emergence of resistance and a questioning of the 
legitimacy and worth of the new system. Furthermore, forced change within a strict 
time frame impeded the development of social control processes, and the 
organisations responded by adopting an instrumental focus on deliverables and scope. 
The research supported Bignoux’s (2006) argument that short-term alliances are prone 
to conflict, focus on specific reciprocity, develop a calculus-based trust and are 
characteristically difficult to manage. In addition, a focus on timelines, and contracted 
deliverables can preclude collaboration and innovation (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos, 
2011, Weber and Mayer, 2011). This was seen in HRMSys through excessive time 
pressure and restricted time for knowledge sharing and a form of selective attention 
on short-term issues at the expense of longer term emerging problems. 
Innovation in practices was observed within the project context not just by the 
emergence of unscripted ideas but also in problem-solving where choices are made 
that can compare alternatives with expected outcomes (March, 1981). When an 
obstacle was encountered, such as the failure of an embedded component, actors co-
opted stakeholders, adapted the application and manipulated rules to improvise their 
way around the blockage. Improvising in this sense does not mean ad-libbed, but 
mobilising available resources, tacit skills, capabilities and meta-routines in the search 
for a solution. This observation extends the notion of improvised practice where new 
processes emerge from a process of  ‘ongoing adaptation and adjustment’ (Weick and 
Quinn, 1999: 362) .  
Successful transition and adoption depended on how the new routines were 
internalised and became part of the permanent practice and routines of the 
organisation (Feldman, 2004). The outcomes of the change transformations were 
constrained by two principal factors; firstly, the time needed for the change, and 
secondly, the degree of acceptance - and therefore whether the change was resisted 
and modified. Change has velocity and momentum (Wiebe et al., 2010). Structure, 
practice and climate are recursively implicated in the evolution of change and each 
transformation can be constrained or its scale limited and reduced. The relationships 
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between goals, as defined in contracts, and actual outcomes may be variable as in 
practice there are always constraints on achievement emerging from the change 
process itself (Feldman, 2004). Change may always be constrained and this may imply 
different outcomes in outsourcing derive from contextual and practice influences.  
Each transformation task, and embedded work routine, was interpreted in 
practical use. Between buyers and suppliers a recursive pattern of exchanges and 
patterns of amendment and review emerged. By this means both parties adapted to 
each other while simultaneously interpreting the overall goal from the standpoint of 
their objectives. The case shows that the transformation was partial; many old 
practices survived intact throughout IOC, which supports the idea that for a radical 
change to be complete it must be completely internalised and the old ways of working 
eroded and deinstitutionalised. Unless this is so, the change may be unstable and may 
subsequently be readily eroded, and perhaps even regress, should the context change 
(Gilmore and Sillince, 2014). 
8.5.2 Improvised practice 
A practice-based model of change focused on the internal dynamics of an organisation 
posits that change emerges from the everyday work of purposive actors working 
towards achieving goals (Berends et al., 2003). This differs from an incremental 
perspective that assumes small innovations occur continuously in organisations and if 
these innovations are selected and embedded as part of current practice a change has 
occurred. In this mode successful new ways of working are selected and unsuccessful 
ones are discarded. Whilst the total change from end to end covering the six 
transformation tasks can be regarded as radical, and in total supports a punctuated 
equilibrium model, the actual transformative activities, the work that achieves the 
change, occurs between actors carrying out every day work. Actors mutually adapted 
to each other’s practices, acquired the required methods, and worked within the 
governance oriented towards project objectives. This means that although the 
transformation practices of work took place under the constraints of context they 
were always directed towards meeting the overarching goals. From this perspective 
the practices observed during HRMSys were an extension of incremental change.  
The observations during the research do not lend support to a wholly 
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technological determinist position as might be implied by the application of strict 
contracting rules and control. Technology, controls, contracts and defined methods of 
working constrain activity, but only in a limited way, as actors interact recursively with 
the technology and processes. Managed change, controlled and directed (solely) by 
management, and underpinned by a normative re-educative approach, also found 
little support within the HRMSys project. Only very late, in the last few months, was 
even any simple communication or training attempted. In general the observations 
revealed a negotiated and disputed context. As a consequence the research supports 
the notion that the change was forced by centralisation, accentuated by a formal 
contracting approach, which was nevertheless challenged and modified in practice by 
the buyers and suppliers. This type of constrained and forced change, with observable 
agency, can be positioned as a superposition of punctuated equilibrium and practice-
based innovation (Weick and Quinn, 1999). The innovation emerged as problems arose 
in the routine practices of work as suppliers and buyers strived to solve problems 
within the constraints of the project. Critical junctures and incidents can disturb the 
status quo and initiate change but change is a consequence of enacted practice, new 
scripts and norms are learned by doing, and accordingly HRMSys can be seen at the 
site of practice innovation. 
Strong governance put in place to constrain and regulate supplier behaviour to 
reduce risk, minimise opportunism and ensure success are founded on a rational 
deterministic perspective. This notion of technological determinism, implicit in current 
outsourcing practice, ignores the effects of actor agency and the resistance actors can 
mobilise to modify an implementation to suit sectional interests. From this perspective 
outsourcing is an enacted process with parties able to escape and resist contractual 
straightjackets. This can lead to patterns of power and conflict during implementation 
that unfolds as the different parties interact and negotiate. From this standpoint, 
outsourcing outcomes are controlled by processes of negotiation, are emergent over 
time, and the eventual achievement is not entirely determined in the contract.  
8.5.3 Summary – RQ4: The constrained nature of outsourcing   
Change processes in outsourcing are constrained fundamentally by the timescale of 
the contract that is typically between two and five years. This means institutional 
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change must occur within a limited and fixed timescale and therefore may be 
incomplete and partial. A restricted timescale, and a strong contractual context, does 
not allow for the development of social control processes or collaboration, and this is 
known to adversely affect change management. Accordingly the focus within an 
outsourcing project tends to be instrumental and on contractual imperatives and as a 
consequence can be blind to emerging social factors (Bignoux, 2006). 
Organisations in an interfirm relationship delivering a common service take 
time to learn the new routines, context, and rules, especially for complex IT services. 
New practices must be enacted and internalised then applied and during this process 
are adapted by actors. The adaptation process is overlapping and recursive and overall 
the change is emergent, but with intent, the actual outcome a compromise between 
the interacting parties. Change as Tolbert and Zucker (1996) argued occurs in the 
practical processes of work and is loosely coupled to structure. Actors innovate, 
change processes, and adapt technology during the course of everyday work to 
achieve ‘various and dynamic ends’ (Orlikowski, 2000: 423). 
Strong contracts aim to frame implementation to reduce risk and are 
underpinned by a technological determinism that holds that agency power and 
resistance are unimportant or at least negligible. The results from the research showed 
a high degree of agency was visible from all actors within the HRMSys project. They 
worked together, negotiated, and recursively shaped the context to align with their 
own sectional needs. An order emerged as multiple actors enacted and interpreted 
goals, shaped practices, and agreed what must be done. The overall outcome of this 
process was a negotiated balance between them. Power and conflict emerged 
naturally from this process of everyday work and was shown to be both generative and 
restrictive. It was generative in the sense of providing energy to overcome inertia and 
surmount obstacles, and restrictive in enforcing compliance to no longer required 
deliverables or redundant processes. 
8.6 Explaining different outsource outcomes 
The research findings are shown in Figure 8-1, mapped to the conceptual framework 
developed earlier in Section 2.4. The consortium created to deliver the software 
consisted of six interacting partners, each with their own internal objectives and 
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supporting its own organisational and individual group needs (Marshall et al., 2015, 
Morgan, 1997).  Although the parties within an outsourcing implementation have the 
common objective of delivering the agreed service within the scheduled timescale they 
have different aims within the commercial contract. Both sides are concerned with 
how value is acquired from the delivery and this creates a latent tension at the heart of 
the project.  
Figure 8-1 - Mapping case findings to conceptual framework 
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Ignoring the capability shortfalls evident from PersonSoft’s performance, the major 
‘fault’ within this implementation was not accounting for the very large change in 
scope that had occurred during a hiatus of almost three years from contract award to 
actual start. This is represented in Figure 8-1 by the inclusion of a construct 
representing the uncertainty in demand that resulted from this major change in scope 
- a known problem and inhibiter of success (Beaumont and Sohal, 2004). This had two 
major effects, firstly, the basis for a fixed price contract in the business case was 
undermined, and secondly, a negotiation process was triggered as buyers sought to 
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rebalanced the contract commercially (Barrett, 1995). Major change especially within a 
rigid contracting regime is very difficult to achieve and engenders conflict as was 
shown in this case study (Campbell, 2010, Lindegaard, 2013). Buyers may be able to 
force compliance by using commercial pressure but this, the research shows, never 
resolves the underlying problem, and drives resistance underground to appear later as 
opportunism when emerging problems require flexibility from suppliers. Preventative 
contractual regimes as shown by the case findings reduce cooperation (Parmigiani and 
Rivera-Santos, 2011, Poppo and Zhou, 2013). Central to the findings is the core role 
played by non-rational actions and power in mediating the progress of the 
implementation (Heiskanen et al., 2008). Strong contractual contexts, common in the 
public sector, constrain inter-dependence and collaboration especially when demand 
is varying (Cox, 2004). Furthermore, poor outcomes and failure in delivery reduces 
trust and can lead to dissatisfaction and conflict (Grönroos, 2011) . This aspect of the 
research findings suggest an emergence of a positive feedback loop caused by sub-
optimal work practices, consequent application of tighter contracts leading to a further 
instrumental focus, and resulting lower collaboration. Such a spiralling downward of 
collaboration and outcomes needs further research but supports findings in an alliance 
learning context (Doz, 1996, Inkpen and Currall, 2004). 
8.6.1 Research propositions 
The notion underpinning this research is that outsourcing is a management innovation 
implementing new processes, practices and routines that impacts all parts of the 
business (Chaudhury and Mukherjee, 2007). This research has explored this issue via 
researching in depth a large scale implementation of an outsourced application 
development using a practice-based lens and has suggested the following research 
propositions: 
Proposition P1: Strong contractual governance places constraints on supplier 
manoeuvrability in responding to business uncertainty. 
Proposition P2: Uncertain and variable demand in an outsourcing requires 
interdependence and collaboration between buyers and suppliers and as a result 
relational contracting. 
Strong contracts are needed during initial stages to control uncertainty. However the 
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research showed that the governance in this project blocked adaptability and focused 
suppliers on instrumentally meeting contracted objectives and controlling losses. The 
contractual approach used was mismatched to the nature of the task, prevented 
collaboration, and adversely effected success (Sanderson, 2009). 
Proposition P3: Power and conflict are systemic when demand is variable and 
emerges as buyers and suppliers conflict over resources and negotiate and claim 
value. 
Proposition P4: Outsourcing and project contexts where power and conflict are 
systemic have poor outcomes. 
Outsourcing is a site of conflict as parties have fundamentally different objectives. 
Power emerges naturally from practices of work as they interact and shape the 
implementation to line up with their own demands. However situations of high power 
have poor outcomes. The research also showed that power has aspects of duality, 
being both constraining and energising, and thus controls the ‘velocity of change’.  
Proposition P5: Large changes in scope or the business requirements leads to poor 
outcomes and negatively impacts success. 
The inconsistencies and contingencies in the real world broke the project assumptions 
but the problem was the actors could not adapt within the project constraints as 
collaboration was inhibited by politics and governance. 
Proposition P6: Prior history and experience biases decision-making and can make 
managers seek future solutions in the past.  
Prior commitments and enforced dependencies on an outsourcing can strongly 
influence success and set in motion a direction that is difficult to change. Legacy 
relationships can lead to poor innovation practices and can lead to buyers and 
suppliers wallowing in their own ignorance (Goerzen, 2007, Poppo et al., 2008a).  
Proposition P7: The degree of change possible, and how close the implementation 
reaches end contracted goals, is heavily dependent on context.  
The actual degree of change in outsourcing is largely constrained by what is possible 
within the available resources and capabilities. The difference between the outcomes 
achieved in this project and the contractual goals may have been a consequence of 
micro factors of implementation, adding up to major gaps and as a result change was 
emergent and not wholly predicable. 
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8.6.2 Practical challenges in implementing outsourcing 
The research threw up several practical challenges in managing outsourcing. The most 
significant of these was in the influence of internal processes and power. There are no 
simple scaling matrices that can be derived to inform implementation planning of 
outsourcing, just basic checkpoints to mediate the archetypical problems that occurred 
within this case. These factors are illustrated in Figure 8-2 and in summary are: 
 Power and conflict emerge from the practical consequences of failing to meet 
objectives and from threats to commercial viability. Differences in objectives 
must be tackled at the source of the uncertainty or actively managed as a 
project risk. 
 Collaboration is not automatic and must be planned for using specific processes 
that must be commercially included within the project plan. Close working 
relations between buyers and suppliers for service creation is needed as an 
outsourcing service is always jointly created. 
 Consortium based alliances must be subject to a thorough due diligence based 
on the partner capabilities for the current contract (not just the past 
performance). It needs to be evaluated whether the management of critical 
sub-suppliers, such as PersonSoft, should be solely controlled by prime-
contractors without proper structured oversight for buyers. 
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Figure 8-2 - The outsourcing lifecycle and practitioner issues 
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8.6.3 Summary 
The fundamental reason why outsourcing change is so difficult is that just as in 
complex IT systems the embedded processes are the ‘ossified institutionalised’ view of 
the practices, relationships and routines that are the substance of the institution 
(Lyytinen et al., 2009) . When outsourcing part of the organisation to a third party it is 
separated then subsumed into the other organisation that then provides the service. 
These two organisations are now collectively responsible for service and must adapt 
internal routines/control to coherently structure and manage delivery. However, 
institutionalised processes have high inertia and are resilient, difficult to break down 
and erode, especially within the time constraints of a contract. From this standpoint, 
outsourcing is a complex change, and the new entity formed only gradually becomes a 
coherent institution capable of delivering the outsourcing goals. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
Chapter 9
Conclusion
Outsourcing is a complex change, and takes time to 
become a coherent institution and capable of delivering 
the outsourcing goals
 
The HRMSys outsourcing delivered only an upgrade of the existing application along 
with a limited set of new requirements. Interfacing, integration within the DefOrg 
architecture, self-service functionality, and most of the workflow requirements were 
obsoleted or put off until the next stage. IOC implementation was scheduled for ten 
months but actually took nineteen months and cost overruns were more than 100% 
for all parties and added up to a million pound loss for PersonSoft. A situation that is 
unfortunately typical for the IT industry (ICPMTF, 2011, Jones, 2006, The Standish 
Group, 1995, Yeo, 2002). The research explored the micro-practices of implementation 
and aimed to explain why, despite the availability of high quality consultants and 
managers, supported by strong technical processes and complex contracts, 
outsourcing outcomes can be so variable. At the level of the ‘iron three’ project 
objectives of cost, quality and time, this outsourcing failed (Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006). 
The research showed that the transition occurring during this outsourcing was 
influenced by three main factors; the imprinting of current practice by prior history, 
the negotiated nature of contractual work and the natural emergence of power and 
conflict from everyday work that controlled momentum (Wiebe et al., 2010). The 
research also demonstrated the relative impotence of formal control and dominance 
in periods of stress and showed how solutions can arise from improvised practice 
outside of technology or formal constraints (Orlikowski, 1996). The research also 
suggested that the deviations between planned and actual outcomes come from 
contingencies, and contextual changes, that could not have been fully anticipated and 
as a consequence the end outcome was emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).  
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9.2 Research questions 
The discussion (Chapter 9) covered the linking of the research questions to the findings 
and literature; to summarise: 
RQ1: In what ways do antecedents and a prior history impact and constrain the 
implementation processes of outsourcing? 
Prior history imprinted the implementation; it shaped how the new application was to 
be created and interpreted, it projected existing practices and processes into the 
future, and maintained and reinforced prior knowledge. 
RQ2: In what ways does strong control and governance impact the development 
practices and how they evolve during the implementation? 
Practices evolved over time as a negotiated order and may have been sub-optimal as 
they were constrained by contractual demands and the conflicting objectives of the 
buyers and suppliers. Practices are the outcome of negotiating within a contested field 
and are adopted, changed, and discarded, based on their relative salience to the task 
at hand. 
RQ3: How do power and conflict arise during the implementation of outsourcing? 
The source of power and conflict is in the everyday action of actors engaged in 
purposeful work and is an embedded attribute of practice based-change. It arises as 
collaborative partners attempt to shape and control the project to deliver their own 
individual and organisational objectives.  
RQ3.1: How do power and conflict impact work practices? 
Power and conflict can impact decision making by constraining and slowing down 
responses to contingencies whilst internal inconsistencies are resolved. It also has a 
dual aspect; enabling in providing energy for change to overcome obstacles, and 
restraining when seen as power enforcing compliance to redundant processes. 
RQ4: In what ways is the nature of situated change emergent and constrained in an 
outsourcing project? 
Change is delivered by purposive work as actors strive to complete project 
deliverables. Actors innovate and improvise to overcome obstacles and change within 
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HRMSys resembled a superposition of punctuated and practice-based change. 
9.3 Academic contributions 
The main academic contributions are: 
Conceptual/Theoretical 
 Adding to the neo-institutional and power/conflict literature by demonstrating 
that conflict and the use of power is endemic in a contracted work situation 
and arises from conflicting goals and objectives made visible in the process of 
work amongst competing coalitions as they perform in real work situations. 
 Showing how strong contractual rules in an outsourcing force an instrumental 
focus on vendors, reduces their flexibility, and supports the notion that 
preventative contracts inhibit innovation and adaption to uncertainty.  
 The research extended and empirically defined the components of institutional 
politics showing how power takes on different aspects as it cascades through 
the implementation processes. 
 Demonstrating how purposive actors interact in a recursive way with 
established technical standards and rules supporting the idea that technology, 
standards and rules are enacted in use. The observations extended this by 
showing enactment was carried by the process of negotiation and compromise. 
 Adding to the literature of change showing the constrained context of 
outsourcing. This is a process of change delimited by a contractual fixed term, 
and positions outsourcing as a forced change within a fixed time scale. This 
observation also supported the alliance literature on short term engagements 
with a fixed goal that showed the development of relational contracting and 
collaboration is severely constrained in the short time of contracts. 
 Showing the impact of the forced nature of change in outsourcing and how 
difficult it is to change well-established practices within organisations. The 
latency and inertia of institutionalised practices can result in re-emergence, or 
regression, if change and ‘sedimentation’ are incomplete.  
 The research extended and empirically defined the antecedent triggers for de-
institutionalisation. Changes in context and contingencies can initiate de-
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institutionalisation of old practices but can constrain the introduction and 
institutionalisation of new routines and processes. 
Methodological 
 Demonstrating the integration of documentary evidence and participant 
interviews along with actual email and forum traffic to construct an entire 
narrative timeline for the IOC phase within which to place respondents’ data. 
The email and documentary traffic was thematically analysed alongside the 
emails to provide a source of rich primary data. 
 In terms of data collected, it was a longitudinal participative process that 
examined the actual processes of work in medias res. There are very few actual 
process longitudinal studies that trace the action as it happened.  
 
The research extended our understanding of institutional processes within the inter-
organisational context. There was weak support for organisational development and 
technological determinist perspectives on change, possibly resulting from the 
conflicted nature of the specific context. The research provided some evidence for 
punctuated equilibrium at a broader scale of analysis and showed how improvised 
change can emerge from the real practices of work. The research also demonstrated 
that outsourcing can be regarded in some aspects as a negotiated order where forceful 
actors within different organisations strive to shape outcomes more in line with their 
own organisational and personal objectives. 
9.4 Implications for practice 
 Contractual approaches with short time periods permit only an instrumental 
focus. Vendors must focus on commercial viability of the contract in such 
circumstances and their flexibility will be very limited. Collaboration and 
flexibility only occur when there is time and when experience in the 
outsourcing has been achieved. 
 Contractual power is actually limited and can be swamped when major changes 
occur in scope or business context. Strong contracts work best for simple or 
well defined outsourcing projects. Contracts should be more contingently 
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constructed to account for known (and fixed) requirements separating out 
those requirements where there is more uncertainty and flexibility is needed. 
 Most practitioner and academic prescriptions are on the decision and scope; 
there needs to be a focus on the client side on the structuring and 
implementation issues of outsourcing – how the outsource service fits within 
the organisational structure of both organisations. 
 Complex outsourcing is a collaborative process and needs careful planning. 
Outsourcers cannot pass over to suppliers the provision of the service in its 
entirety except for very simple straightforward services such as facilities 
management.  
Furthermore, there is a need to understand exactly what is meant by success and 
failure as in many changes, such as outsourcing, the outcome is sometimes partial and 
emergent over time. The outsourcing literature shows that most outsourcing contracts 
will not deliver the assumed benefits in full and this may in part be due to the long 
time it actually takes to fully implement and embed an outsourcing service. 
9.5 Limitations 
This research explored the intergroup dynamics of six case organisations working 
together to deliver a large scale HRM system in the idiosyncratic location of a defence 
organisation in Europe. HRMSys is an extreme case and DefOrg a complex public sector 
organisation subject to turbulence and tight political control and scrutiny. The goal of 
the research was analytic generalisability (Yin, 2003), with the assumption that DefOrg 
showed similar institutional dynamics to other major public sector organisations, such 
as the NHS in the UK, undergoing large-scale implementations of IT (see Currie, 2012). 
The particular transformations and transitions identified were grounded in the 
specifics of the context and cannot be generalised outside the specific context of 
HRMSys. However, the longitudinal change processes, and aspects of situated practice 
and power dynamics, are in principle transferable to other contexts (Eisenhardt, 
1989b, Orlikowski, 1996). 
Although some short interviews and group data were collected during the 
implementation, all interviews and documentation data record events from an 
historical retrospective perspective, and will be subject to presentation and recall bias 
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(Barley, 1986). To overcome this, access to a shared repository of project 
emails/documents was granted, and all email data for the implementation was 
downloaded, cleaned and coded across time, respondents, and organisations. From 
this data the entire event narrative of the HRMSys project IOC phase was 
reconstructed, from contract signing, to acceptance of the final deliverable. This 
materially added to the data gathered in situ, including participant observations, and 
enabled respondent recall to be directly compared and contrasted to the real-time 
narrative. Furthermore, the main analytical steps, using a grounded theory approach, 
were executed following system acceptance and project closure to remove bias and 
‘the threats to action research’ (Kock, 2004). Realising the researchers’ own recall and 
interpretation could be influenced by the researcher’s theoretical interpretation and 
biases an additional round of semi-structured interviews were conducted during 2015, 
with key project participants, to discuss and validate the main themes and critical 
points the analysis uncovered (Kock, 2004). 
9.6 Future research 
To confirm the observed elements of practice-based change, an extension of the 
research into similar implementation contexts where groups of actors are purposively 
working together to reach a set goal is proposed. In particular, in project management 
contexts, there are high degrees of failure and ‘chaos’ still reported despite an ever-
burgeoning use of more extensive and complex planning techniques (Jones, 2006, Yeo, 
2002). This has even led some researchers to criticise this practice for using 
inappropriate and poorly grounded techniques that have limited scientific justification 
(Dietz, 2011). The notion emerging from this research is that a limiting factor in 
achieving outsourcing success, and by extension project management, is to be found in 
the implementation practices, and not in the rigour of the technical processes. Poor 
techniques can contribute to failures but issues in inter-organisational work are likely 
to be more contingent, socially or practice bound, and amenable to process-based 
research (Boudreau and Robey, 2005, Jasperson et al., 2002). 
A constraint in this research was the theoretical lens chosen, institutional 
theory, structuration and power, and the application of these within the short 
timescale of the initial operating capability phase at HRMSys. Because this was a 
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participant practice-based observation the much longer term institutionalisation 
factors, such as embedding, were not observed or recorded. Returning to the research 
subject for the FOC stage, and extending the observations, to assess particularly the 
degree of sedimentation of new structures and processes, would lend more weight to 
observations on the impact of history and the nature of change. Punctuated 
equilibrium in institutional theory is predicated on the notion of change impacting all 
aspects of the organisational routines and becoming normalised practice (Greenwood 
and Hinings, 1996, Wiebe et al., 2010). If this is not the case, sedimentation may be 
incomplete, and erosion and regression to the former institutional practices may be 
observed, and this would yield a better understanding of the actual change process 
itself. 
9.7 Conclusion 
The value of an institutional power and a situated practice perspective is that it moves 
the research agenda away from an overly rationalist and determinist view of how 
outsourcing actually works. Change operates at several levels but within a constrained 
outsourcing context operates as a process of incremental change with occasional 
radical action when severe problems occur. Within this context purposeful actors 
‘intelligently attentive to their environments’ meet problems and contingencies and a 
lack of knowledge as best they can (March, 1981: 564). Within a multi-supplier and 
client context, with many competing interests, the outcome of outsourcing is often 
decided by negotiation and bargaining and is as a result a negotiated order.  
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Appendix A  – Example NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA)  
PARTIES: 
Researcher: Royston Edward Morgan (‘Researcher’)  
Address:  
Company: (‘Company’)  
Address:  
DATE: (‘Effective Date’)  
In consideration of the mutual covenants set out in this Agreement and for other good 
and valuable consideration (the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby 
acknowledged by each of the Parties), the Parties agree as follows:  
DEFINITION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 
Confidential Information means any information disclosed by one party (the 
‘Discloser’) to the other (the ‘Recipient’) relating directly or indirectly to Outsourcing 
Practice at Company which is identified by the Discloser, either orally or in writing, as 
confidential, either at the time of disclosure or, if disclosed orally, confirmed in writing 
within thirty (30) days following the original disclosure.  
EXCEPTIONS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
This Agreement does not apply to information that:  
i. was available to the public at the time of disclosure, or subsequently became 
available to the public without fault of Recipient; 
ii. was known to Recipient at the time of disclosure or was independently 
developed by Recipient, provided there is adequate documentation to 
confirm such prior knowledge or independent development; 
iii. was received by Recipient from a third party and Recipient was not aware 
that the third party had a duty of confidentiality to Discloser in respect of the 
information; 
iv. is used or disclosed by Recipient with Discloser’s prior written approval; or  
v. is required to be disclosed by law, provided that Recipient gives Discloser 
sufficient prior written notice of any such disclosure to allow Discloser to 
contest the disclosure. Any action taken by Discloser to contest the 
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disclosure must not compromise the obligations of Recipient under the order 
to disclose or cause Recipient to be subject to any fine, penalty or 
prosecution.  
USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
Recipient may only use the Confidential Information for the purposes of; advice to 
Company on outsource best practice, for Academic Research into Outsourcing, and the 
publication of such research into peer reviewed academic journals (any publication 
must be suitably anonymised and under no circumstances can Company’s name be 
used without clearance). Recipient must not use the Confidential Information for any 
other purpose without the prior written approval of Discloser.  
NON-DISCLOSURE  
Recipient must keep the Confidential Information in confidence. Recipient may only 
disclose the Confidential Information to other academics or research supervisors who 
have a need-to-know the Confidential Information for the Permitted Purpose, provided 
that they are advised of the confidential nature of the Confidential Information and are 
under an obligation to maintain its confidentiality. Recipient must not otherwise 
disclose Confidential Information to any person or third party without the prior written 
approval of Discloser, except when such disclosure is compelled pursuant to legal, 
judicial, or administrative proceeding, or otherwise required by law.  
STANDARD OF CARE  
Recipient must use at least the same standard of care in protecting the confidentiality 
of the Confidential Information as it uses in protecting its own information of a similar 
nature and, in any event, no less than a reasonable standard of care. Recipient must 
notify Discloser promptly upon discovery that any Confidential Information has been 
accessed or otherwise acquired by or disclosed to an unauthorized person.  
RETURN OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION  
If requested in writing by Discloser, Recipient must return to Discloser and/or destroy 
all Confidential Information and any copies of Confidential Information in its 
possession or control. Recipient may retain one archival copy of such Confidential 
Information for the sole purpose of establishing the extent of the disclosure of such 
Confidential Information, provided that such information is not used by Recipient for 
any other purpose and is subject to the confidentiality requirements set out in this 
Appendix A–  Example NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA)  Page | 262 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Agreement.  
NO LICENCE OR OTHER RIGHTS  
All Confidential Information remains the property of Discloser and no licence or any 
other rights to the Confidential Information is granted to Recipient under this 
Agreement. This Agreement does not obligate the Discloser to make any disclosure of 
Confidential Information to the Recipient or require the parties to enter into any 
business relationship or further agreement.  
LIMITED WARRANTY & LIABILITY  
Discloser warrants that it has the right to disclose the Confidential Information to 
Recipient. Discloser makes no other warranties in respect of the Confidential 
Information and provides all information ‘AS IS’ without any express or implied 
warranty of any kind, including any warranty as to merchantability, fitness for a 
particular purpose, accuracy, completeness or violation of third party intellectual 
property rights. Neither party will be liable for any special, incidental nor 
consequential damages of any kind whatsoever resulting from the disclosure, use or 
receipt of the Confidential Information.  
TERM  
This Agreement and Recipient’s obligation to keep Confidential Information 
confidential expires five (5) years from the date that the confidential information is 
received unless otherwise extended by mutual agreement.  
GENERAL PROVISIONS  
i. Remedies - Recipient agrees that damages may not be an adequate remedy 
for any breach or threatened breach of the Recipient’s obligations under this 
Agreement. Accordingly, in addition to any and all other available remedies, 
Discloser will be entitled to seek a temporary or permanent injunction or any 
other form of equitable relief to enforce the obligations contained in this 
Agreement. 
ii. ‘No waiver’ – Failure of a party to enforce its rights on one occasion will not 
result in a waiver of those rights on any other occasion.  
iii. Assignment - Neither party may assign any of its rights or obligations under 
this Agreement without the prior written consent of the other party.  
Appendix A–  Example NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (NDA)  Page | 263 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
iv. Regulatory compliance – Each party must comply with all applicable laws, 
regulations and rules in its jurisdiction, including but not limited to those 
relating to the export of information and data.  
v. Entire Agreement – This Agreement represents the entire agreement 
between the parties with regard to the Confidential Information and 
supersedes any previous understandings, commitments or agreements, 
whether written or oral. No amendment or modification of this Agreement 
will be effective unless made in writing and signed by authorized 
representatives of both parties. 
vi. Severability – If any provision of this Agreement is wholly or partially 
unenforceable for any reason, all other provisions will continue in full force 
and effect. 
vii. Binding Effect - This Agreement is binding upon and will ensure to the 
benefits of the parties and their respective successors and permitted assigns. 
viii. Governing Law - This Agreement will be governed and construed in 
accordance with the laws of England and Wales. 
The parties have duly executed this agreement by their duly authorized 
representatives as of the Effective Date. 
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Appendix B - Full Research Consent Form 12 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project. The purpose of the 
interview is to explore client supplier relations and to gain an understanding of your 
view, there are no correct answers and your own experience is being sought. Please 
feel free to say if you do not know the answer to certain questions, particularly in 
factual areas often the details are unknown or forgotten. Telephone interviews are 
likely to take around an hour, face to face often approximately one to two hours. 
Project Context 
The research focuses on how clients and suppliers engage together to deliver a 
successful outsource. The attention is on the actual work processes and practices of 
outsourcing, aims to identify best and problematic practice, and from this derive 
practical guidelines for clients and vendors. Academically the research addresses 
power and conflict in inter-organisational relations. 
Please note the following conditions: 
 All information from this study will be treated as strictly confidential, and will 
be anonymous. All records will be marked with numbers rather than names 
and any recorded dialogue will be deleted after transcription. 
 All information concerning interviews will be kept in a safe place, with access 
limited to the researcher and used solely for the purposes defined by the 
project. 
 Any reports for your organisation (or any research funder) will offer 
recommendations but will not disclose names, individual details or comments 
that could lead to the identification of respondents. 
 Any academic or practitioner publications arising from this study will use a 
pseudonym for your company and for participants. All wording will be carefully 
checked to ensure that none of the parties can be recognised directly or 
indirectly.  
 Because it is difficult to keep up with note taking of free-flowing speech the 
interview will be recorded. If you do not wish to be recorded please say so. 
                                                     
12
 Usually sent out prior to interview or group discussion and read out at start of the discussion. 
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 If you agree to be recorded if you wish to speak ‘off the record’ at any time I 
will stop the recording. For telephone interviews just say ‘this is off the record’ 
or something clearly expressing your desire to stop recording and I will switch 
off the recorder. 
 You have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time or refuse to 
answer any question without prejudice to yourself. 
 If any aspect of the research or the questioning is unclear, or if you require any 
further information, please ask. Should you change your mind about 
participating in the research, you can contact the researcher at any stage, and 
your data will be removed from the project and all files deleted and destroyed. 
 
I have read and understood the ethical considerations outlined above. 
 
Signed……………………………………………….. Dated…………………………………. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation.  
If you have any questions related to the project please contact: 
Royston E. Morgan 
Dragons Farm, 
Herons lea, 
New Domewood, 
Copthorne, 
West Sussex 
RH10 3HE 
Mob: +44(0) 7764154340 
Email: r.e.c.morgan@sussex.ac.uk 
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Appendix C - Ethical Review: Certificate of Approval 
 
Figure C-1 Ethical Review approval certificate 
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Appendix D - Full interview protocol 
Interview protocol – Complex change in outsourcing 
Note: This script was only needed at the very beginning of the project when the 
researcher was gaining initial orientation to the activity. 
Scripting the Interview 
Approach is to gain a rich description of the formal and informal processes that 
occurred during the outsourcing start-up and implementation. Respondents will be 
asked mainly to describe their experience of the contractual, negotiation, start-up and 
transition into the service. Questions probe what occurred and in what way the parties 
responded to that part of the process (their style of negotiation for example). The aim 
is to define both the importance of the outcome (the contract created say) as well as 
how the relationship of exchanges framed the outcome. 
The vendor selection for this contract 
 Can you describe how the outsource vendor was selected? 
 What were the important things you considered when selecting a vendor? 
 Can you outline how business choices like outsourcing are made in your 
organisation? 
 Did you create a formal business case for example? 
 Did you carry out a due diligence formally? 
How are contracts managed in your organisation? 
 Is there a formal process? 
 Who is involved in that process? 
 Are you a formal organisation and rely on processes and procedure? 
The initial conditions and the relationship at the beginning of the project 
Can you describe the negotiation and contracting process? 
 How formal or informal were the discussions? 
 The contract and agreement is it too tight or too lax? 
 Is a service level agreement in place? 
 How would you say the relationship developed between the parties during the 
contracting phase? 
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 How were communications between the organisations at that time? 
 Did you get all you asked for or needed during the contracting? 
 Looking back do you think you missed anything during the negotiations? 
Development of the working processes 
Thinking back to the start-up can you describe the start-up and implementation? 
 How was the change management addressed? 
 Were they any issues with resistance seen? 
 How were problems and issues in the service managed? 
 What went well during the start-up? 
 How were communications managed during the change over? 
 Did your supplier need or ask for your help? 
 How would you describe the working relationship? 
 Were there any times where this could have been improved? 
Flexibility and change 
 How was the service level managed during the delivery? 
 How were the service levels perceived during the delivery? 
- Did you have to discuss any shortfalls? 
 Were problems and issues addressed promptly? 
 Were there any issues that were not addressed promptly? 
 Did you need changes to the service during operation? 
 Was the supplier willing to accommodate changes to the service? 
 How flexible was your supplier in accommodating changes to the 
service? 
 Can you describe the process of changing service elements? 
 Thinking about the service delivery were your expectations met? 
 How do/did you evaluate the performance of the service? 
 How do/did you evaluate the communications and relationship? 
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Appendix E – Post IOC HRMSys interview plan 
Introduction and purpose 
For all of the interviews conducted (inclusive email or by phone) the project will be 
repositioned and the purpose of the interview, and how it fits with previous interviews 
and meetings, will be outlined. All of the respondents for this part of the research are 
known or had previously been involved in the project – no introductions or 
introductory questions around role etc. will be necessary. The interview guide below 
was used to frame the discussion but was not used openly. The researcher 
remembered the order of the research questions and used probes as the need arose. 
 
Hygiene and Ethics 
Notwithstanding earlier consent the ethical rules were briefly repeated especially 
around right to withdraw or stop the interview. For all post-IOC interviews permission 
was given to record the discussion. The recorder to be used was placed in front of the 
respondents (including group interviews) and the mechanism to pause the recorder 
was demonstrated. For Skype meetings, the respondent had to request a pause which 
the researcher applied. 
 
Question Protocol – approximate order (RQ’s 2,3,4) 
The focus is on events behaviours, what occurred and actions therefore avoid 
evaluation of blame placing. 
 Thinking back on the implementation of HRMSys from your perspective: 
 What do you consider the positive or beneficial outcomes/events that occurred 
as a result of the implementation? 
 What do you consider the negative events that possibly led to a poor outcome 
during the implementation of HRMSys? 
 What led to or caused this outcome (for each event)? 
 When did, this event occur? 
 Can you describe what happened and how this impacted your perspective on 
the project? 
 What could have been done to avoid/promote this type of behaviour in the 
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future? 
Relations between the individuals/groups 
 What actions or behaviours in your view helped progress (or caused the 
event)? 
 What actions or behaviours in your view hindered progress (or caused the 
event)? 
 What aspects of working together were effective in delivering outcomes? 
 What aspects of working together were blocking progress? 
 How effective were your partners in delivering the outcomes? 
 
Supplement for the Group interviews (RQ’s 1):  
For the three group interviews held with senior staff from HRMDept and PersonSoft 
the general questions were prefaced by a focused discussion on the antecedents of the 
HRMSys project especially the prior history between the organisations and the 
selection process for the outsourced activity. 
 
For two email interviews, a shorter protocol was used 
 How from your perspective did the working relationship develop with the other 
members of the project especially PersonSoft? 
 Were there any particular problems or difficulties you encountered in 
performing your task? 
 Were there any critical points where things went well or went badly? 
 
Closure – broadly covering the following points 
Thank you for your input. I will over the next week transcribe the interview and then 
load this into the analysis tool I am using for the project. Loaded transcripts will be 
coded and anonymised. When this process is complete the original recordings are then 
deleted. If possible will you be able to check my understanding of any points or clarify 
issues if I email the summary of the transcript? 
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Appendix F  – Concept framework analysis 
 
Appendix G- Extract from Cluster Analys is  Page | 272 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Appendix G - Extract from Cluster Analysis 
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Appendix H – Workshop Output PersonSoft 
This extracted cluster picture was developed in a workshop on the start-up of the 
HRMSys project two years prior to the actual start in February 2011. 
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Appendix I – Practice evolution over time 
 Adapting 
plans and 
goals 
Controlling a 
change in 
requirement 
Reconnaissance 
and making 
sense of the task 
Aligning  
processes 
and practices 
Building 
working 
knowledge 
Capturing the 
business 
need 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 t
h
e
m
e
s
 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
s
ta
b
ili
ty
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
. 
P
la
n
s
 w
e
re
 
e
x
te
n
d
e
d
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
in
g
 
u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 c
a
u
s
e
s
 o
f 
d
e
la
y
s
. 
F
ix
e
d
 p
ri
c
e
 a
n
d
 s
c
o
p
e
 
p
ro
je
c
t 
w
it
h
 l
im
it
e
d
 t
im
e
 f
o
r 
c
la
ri
fi
c
a
ti
o
n
 e
s
p
e
c
ia
lly
 f
o
r 
n
e
w
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 n
e
e
d
. 
P
o
o
r 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 d
e
fi
n
it
io
n
 
fu
e
lle
d
 d
is
p
u
te
 o
v
e
r 
s
c
o
p
e
. 
L
im
it
e
d
 a
c
c
e
s
s
 a
n
d
 
a
v
a
ila
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
ro
u
ti
n
e
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 p
la
c
e
d
 e
x
tr
a
 
b
u
rd
e
n
 o
n
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 t
o
 
p
ro
v
id
e
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 t
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 n
o
t 
g
iv
e
n
 d
u
e
 t
o
 t
im
e
 a
n
d
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 c
o
n
s
tr
a
in
ts
. 
A
lig
n
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 T
e
s
tC
o
 a
n
d
 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 –
 
d
if
fi
c
u
lt
ie
s
 i
n
 a
b
a
n
d
o
n
in
g
 
o
w
n
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
n
d
 
a
c
c
e
p
ti
n
g
 p
ro
je
c
t 
le
v
e
l 
d
e
m
a
n
d
s
. 
L
im
it
e
d
 a
llo
w
a
n
c
e
 f
o
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
le
a
rn
in
g
 b
u
t 
le
a
rn
t 
b
y
 d
o
in
g
 
to
 g
a
in
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 –
 
e
ff
e
c
ti
v
e
 l
e
a
rn
in
g
 o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 o
f 
fo
rm
a
l 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
. 
D
e
s
ig
n
 w
a
s
 u
n
s
ta
b
le
 u
n
ti
l 
q
u
it
e
 l
a
te
 i
n
 t
h
e
 p
ro
je
c
t.
 
L
e
v
e
l 
o
f 
d
e
ta
ile
d
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 w
a
s
 l
o
w
 w
it
h
in
 
u
s
e
r 
p
ro
je
c
t 
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
ts
. 
P
o
s
t 
IO
C
 a
n
d
 e
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 
S
u
s
ta
in
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
th
e
 w
a
te
rf
a
ll 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
e
d
 –
 a
g
ile
 
fo
r 
F
O
C
 p
o
s
it
io
n
e
d
. 
In
a
b
ili
ty
 
o
f 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
to
 m
a
in
ta
in
 
s
c
h
e
d
u
le
 c
o
n
s
is
te
n
c
y
 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
e
d
. 
C
lo
s
u
re
 o
f 
IO
C
 a
llo
w
e
d
 o
n
ly
 
w
h
e
n
 a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
c
lu
d
e
d
 a
t 
n
o
 
c
o
s
t.
 R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 f
o
r 
F
O
C
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
 f
o
r 
lo
n
g
e
r 
v
a
lid
a
te
d
 
s
ta
te
d
. 
B
u
rd
e
n
 f
o
r 
la
c
k
 
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 p
la
c
e
d
 o
n
 
T
e
s
tC
o
 f
o
r 
in
a
b
ili
ty
 t
o
 a
c
q
u
ir
e
 
th
e
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 e
x
p
e
rt
is
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
ti
m
e
 a
v
a
ila
b
le
. 
A
 f
ra
c
ti
o
u
s
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 
e
m
e
rg
e
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 T
e
s
tC
o
, 
S
I 
a
n
d
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
. 
C
o
m
p
la
in
ts
 
th
a
t 
‘t
h
e
y
 s
e
e
m
 t
o
 b
e
 
re
w
a
rd
e
d
’ 
fo
r 
th
e
 n
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
u
g
s
 f
o
u
n
d
. 
In
te
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
le
a
rn
in
g
 
re
c
o
g
n
is
e
d
 a
s
 k
e
y
 –
 r
e
v
ie
w
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
n
d
 f
o
rm
a
l 
s
ig
n
-
o
ff
 p
ro
p
o
s
e
d
 a
s
 s
e
p
a
ra
te
 
e
v
e
n
ts
. 
B
ro
a
d
e
r 
u
s
e
r 
c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 a
g
re
e
d
 f
o
r 
F
O
C
 a
n
d
 
n
e
e
d
 t
o
 e
n
g
a
g
e
 e
a
rl
y
 w
it
h
 
u
s
e
rs
 o
n
 a
n
a
ly
s
is
. 
M
o
v
e
 t
o
 
C
O
T
S
 a
n
d
 a
w
a
y
 f
ro
m
 
b
e
s
p
o
k
e
 r
e
c
o
g
n
is
e
d
. 
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 a
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
p
la
n
s
 a
s
 r
e
p
e
a
te
d
 d
e
la
y
s
 
o
c
c
u
rr
e
d
 d
u
e
 t
o
 t
e
s
t 
fa
ilu
re
 a
t 
F
A
T
, 
S
A
T
 a
n
d
 U
A
T
 c
a
u
s
in
g
 
re
w
o
rk
. 
B
u
y
e
r 
in
s
is
ti
n
g
 o
n
 n
e
w
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 s
u
d
d
e
n
ly
 v
it
a
l 
a
n
d
 s
ti
ll 
in
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t.
 
B
u
y
e
rs
 s
tr
e
tc
h
in
g
 s
c
o
p
e
 t
o
 
in
c
lu
d
e
 i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 
–
 s
u
p
p
lie
rs
 r
e
s
is
ti
n
g
 b
y
 
c
a
lli
n
g
 f
o
r 
a
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 n
o
te
. 
G
a
p
s
 i
n
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 o
f 
in
s
ta
ll 
o
u
ts
id
e
 
o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
. 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
in
g
 
p
o
o
r 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 t
ra
n
s
fe
r 
–
 
in
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
T
e
s
tC
o
 t
o
 p
ro
v
id
e
 
s
u
p
p
o
rt
 s
u
p
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
 
d
ir
e
c
tl
y
 b
y
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
. 
D
e
m
a
n
d
s
 f
o
r 
e
x
c
e
s
s
iv
e
 
tr
a
in
in
g
 d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
u
n
re
a
lis
ti
c
 –
 p
la
c
e
d
 a
t 
e
n
d
 o
f 
IO
C
 p
h
a
s
e
. 
C
O
T
S
 w
a
iv
e
rs
 
d
is
p
u
te
d
 a
n
d
 r
e
-a
lig
n
e
d
. 
U
s
e
 
o
f 
b
u
g
 t
ra
c
k
in
g
 i
n
 M
a
n
ti
s
 
s
tr
e
n
g
th
e
n
e
d
. 
D
e
ta
ile
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 o
n
 
s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
t 
a
n
 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 l
e
v
e
l 
b
u
ilt
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
. 
A
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 
o
f 
p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
 n
e
e
d
e
d
 
fo
r 
u
s
e
r 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
 f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
a
re
a
s
. 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
in
g
 a
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
d
e
s
ig
n
 U
s
e
 C
a
s
e
s
. 
In
c
lu
s
io
n
 
o
f 
s
u
p
p
o
rt
 c
a
lls
 f
ro
m
 
in
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 r
e
g
re
s
s
io
n
 
te
s
ti
n
g
 b
y
 u
s
e
rs
 a
d
d
e
d
 t
o
 
a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 p
ro
b
le
m
s
. 
D
e
s
ig
n
in
g
 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 a
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
 t
o
 t
h
e
 
p
la
n
 a
n
d
 s
c
h
e
d
u
le
 a
s
 
re
p
e
a
te
d
 d
e
la
y
s
 o
c
c
u
rr
e
d
 t
o
 
v
a
lid
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 d
e
s
ig
n
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
. 
E
m
e
rg
in
g
 c
o
m
p
le
x
it
y
 o
f 
d
e
s
ig
n
 r
u
le
s
 a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
n
e
e
d
 e
m
e
rg
e
d
 s
lo
w
ly
. 
E
ff
o
rt
s
 
m
a
d
e
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
h
o
w
 d
e
e
p
 
in
to
 d
e
ta
il 
w
a
s
 n
e
e
d
e
d
. 
G
a
p
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
 a
n
d
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
. 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 o
f 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 
d
ri
v
e
n
 b
y
 l
im
it
e
d
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
tr
a
n
s
fe
r.
 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
 g
a
p
s
 e
m
e
rg
in
g
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 
te
s
ti
n
g
 ‘
m
a
n
y
 u
n
a
n
s
w
e
re
d
 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
s
.’
 P
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 s
e
t 
d
o
w
n
 f
o
r 
m
a
n
a
g
in
g
 U
C
 
in
c
lu
s
io
n
 w
it
h
in
 p
ro
je
c
t.
 I
s
s
u
e
 
c
lo
s
u
re
 i
n
 m
a
n
ti
s
 r
e
a
lig
n
e
d
. 
M
o
v
in
g
 a
w
a
y
 f
ro
m
 e
x
p
lic
it
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 t
o
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
 
h
o
w
 t
h
e
 a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 
p
e
rf
o
rm
s
. 
T
e
s
tC
o
 m
o
v
e
s
 
s
lo
w
ly
 t
o
w
a
rd
s
 d
e
e
p
 
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 s
y
s
te
m
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 r
e
fi
n
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 
d
e
s
ig
n
 d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ts
 d
ri
v
e
n
 b
y
 
m
e
th
o
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
ti
n
u
in
g
 e
v
o
lv
in
g
 o
f 
th
e
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 i
d
e
a
s
. 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
v
a
li
d
a
ti
o
n
 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 v
a
lid
a
ti
o
n
 
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 c
o
re
 C
O
T
S
 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 w
e
re
 a
lr
e
a
d
y
 
a
v
a
ila
b
le
. 
B
u
y
e
r 
a
s
k
e
d
 f
o
r 
e
x
is
ti
n
g
 f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 c
o
s
ti
n
g
 t
o
 
b
e
 f
re
e
d
 u
p
 f
o
r 
n
e
w
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
. 
L
im
it
e
d
 t
im
e
 a
llo
w
e
d
 f
o
r 
v
a
lid
a
ti
o
n
 –
 e
m
p
h
a
s
is
 o
n
 
‘c
o
n
fi
rm
a
ti
o
n
’ 
o
f 
b
id
. 
N
e
w
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 i
n
tr
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
fo
c
u
s
 o
n
 m
a
in
ta
in
in
g
 t
im
e
lin
e
 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 n
o
t 
h
o
w
 t
o
 
a
c
h
ie
v
e
. 
R
e
q
u
e
s
ts
 f
o
r 
d
e
ta
il 
o
n
 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 b
e
h
a
v
io
u
rs
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ts
. 
L
im
it
e
d
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 e
m
e
rg
e
s
 a
s
 a
 
p
ro
b
le
m
 f
o
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
r 
le
a
rn
in
g
. 
A
lig
n
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
q
u
a
lit
y
 
a
s
s
u
ra
n
c
e
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 a
n
d
 
T
e
s
tC
o
. 
A
rr
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
ts
 f
o
r 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 h
a
n
d
o
v
e
r 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
f 
re
le
a
s
e
 o
f 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ts
 v
ia
 
d
e
fi
n
e
d
 c
h
a
n
n
e
ls
. 
G
a
in
in
g
 u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
 o
f 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
 a
s
p
e
c
ts
 o
f 
n
e
w
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 –
 a
tt
e
n
ti
o
n
 
s
ta
rt
s
 o
n
 a
d
d
re
s
s
in
g
 n
o
n
-
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
e
le
m
e
n
ts
. 
F
o
llo
w
in
g
 a
n
 u
n
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
fu
l 
fo
rm
a
l 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 t
o
 d
e
fi
n
in
g
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 n
e
e
d
 a
n
d
 w
ri
ti
n
g
 
u
s
e
 c
a
s
e
s
 a
 w
o
rk
s
h
o
p
 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 w
a
s
 a
g
re
e
d
. 
A
n
te
c
e
d
e
n
ts
 A
R
M
S
 
(f
ro
m
 b
id
 t
o
 s
ta
rt
) 
W
it
h
in
 t
h
e
 b
id
 t
h
e
 
a
s
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
 w
a
s
 f
o
r 
a
 C
O
T
S
 
p
a
c
k
a
g
e
 w
h
e
re
a
s
 t
h
e
 h
is
to
ry
 
h
a
d
 b
e
e
n
 b
e
s
p
o
k
e
 –
 b
id
 
re
s
p
o
n
s
e
 w
a
s
 c
o
m
p
lia
n
t 
to
 a
 
C
O
T
S
 a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
. 
S
u
s
ta
in
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
th
e
 p
la
n
 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
e
d
 a
t 
p
ro
je
c
t 
s
ta
rt
. 
A
s
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
s
 t
h
a
t 
s
u
b
m
it
ti
n
g
 
a
 c
o
m
p
lia
n
t 
b
id
 w
o
u
ld
 ‘
g
e
t 
th
e
 d
o
o
r 
o
p
e
n
’ 
th
e
n
 s
u
p
p
lie
rs
 
w
o
rk
 i
n
te
rn
a
lly
 t
o
 e
n
g
in
e
e
r 
m
o
re
 t
im
e
 a
n
d
 m
o
n
e
y
. 
N
o
 a
llo
w
a
n
c
e
 w
a
s
 m
a
d
e
 f
o
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
m
o
d
e
s
 o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
 
in
c
lu
d
in
g
 p
a
rt
n
e
r 
m
o
d
e
ls
. 
E
s
ti
m
a
te
s
 w
e
re
 b
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 
h
is
to
ri
c
a
l 
p
a
tt
e
rn
s
 o
f 
w
o
rk
. 
T
e
s
tC
o
 c
h
o
s
e
n
 o
n
 c
o
s
t 
n
o
t 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
. 
N
e
e
d
 t
o
 c
lo
s
e
 g
a
p
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
 u
n
d
e
rs
to
o
d
 a
s
 r
is
k
. 
H
e
a
v
y
 d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 l
o
a
d
 
fl
a
g
g
e
d
 a
s
 a
 p
ro
b
le
m
 a
s
 w
a
s
 
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 -
 
n
e
e
d
e
d
 c
a
re
fu
l 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t.
 I
O
C
 p
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 
a
s
 ‘
to
o
 h
e
a
v
y
’.
 
N
o
 a
llo
w
a
n
c
e
 m
a
d
e
 f
o
r 
a
n
 
e
x
te
n
d
e
d
 s
u
p
p
ly
 c
h
a
in
 a
n
d
 
th
e
 r
o
le
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 h
a
d
 i
n
 
s
u
p
p
o
rt
in
g
 p
a
rt
n
e
rs
. 
E
v
e
ry
 
p
o
in
t 
in
 t
h
a
t 
c
h
a
in
 c
a
m
e
 b
a
c
k
 
to
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 a
s
 s
u
b
je
c
t 
m
a
tt
e
r 
e
x
p
e
rt
s
. 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 w
e
re
 ‘
v
e
ry
 
w
o
o
lly
’ 
a
n
d
 a
 m
ix
tu
re
 o
f 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 b
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 -
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
a
n
y
 i
d
e
a
 o
f 
th
e
 
u
n
d
e
rl
y
in
g
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 
 
Adapting plans 
and goals 
Controlling a 
change in 
requirement 
Reconnaissance 
and making sense 
of the task 
Aligning  
processes and 
practices 
Building 
working 
knowledge 
Capturing the 
business need 
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Continued… 
 Codifying and 
writing down 
business need 
Configuration 
and creation of 
software 
Testing and 
accepting 
Controlling the 
engagement 
Planning and 
coordinating 
delivery 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 t
h
e
m
e
s
 
N
o
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
fo
rm
a
l 
m
e
th
o
d
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
d
 o
n
 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
a
n
d
 b
u
y
e
r 
s
id
e
 –
 
p
re
v
io
u
s
 d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
in
s
u
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
s
is
te
d
 
o
ft
e
n
 o
f 
s
c
re
e
n
 s
h
o
ts
. 
S
o
m
e
 b
lin
d
n
e
s
s
 t
o
 e
m
e
rg
in
g
 
s
o
ft
w
a
re
 q
u
a
lit
y
 i
s
s
u
e
s
. 
S
o
m
e
 e
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
 t
h
a
t 
re
p
a
ir
s
 c
o
u
ld
 b
e
 d
o
n
e
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
a
 g
o
-l
iv
e
 ‘
o
n
 t
h
e
 f
ly
’.
 
P
o
o
r 
a
n
d
 i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 
a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 f
o
r 
y
e
a
rs
 
c
la
s
h
e
d
 w
it
h
 n
e
w
 c
o
n
te
x
t.
 
R
e
a
lig
n
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
Q
A
 a
t 
P
S
 
fo
rc
e
d
 b
y
 f
a
ilu
re
s
. 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 c
y
c
le
s
 o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
/r
e
p
a
ir
in
g
. 
A
t 
s
ta
rt
 s
tr
ic
t 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 t
o
 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
 s
c
h
e
d
u
le
 a
n
d
 
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 r
e
la
x
e
d
 f
o
r 
d
e
s
ig
n
 a
n
d
 r
e
ti
g
h
te
n
e
d
 a
s
 
p
ro
b
le
m
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
te
s
ti
n
g
. 
C
o
o
rd
in
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
f 
d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 d
e
le
g
a
te
d
 b
a
c
k
 t
o
 
s
u
b
c
o
n
tr
a
c
to
rs
 –
 i
n
d
ir
e
c
t 
c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 O
u
tp
u
t 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
n
 
ti
m
e
lin
e
 –
 l
im
it
e
d
 p
ro
b
in
g
 o
n
 
p
ro
b
le
m
s
. 
P
o
s
t 
IO
C
 a
n
d
 e
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 
N
a
tu
re
 o
f 
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
 g
a
p
 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 a
n
d
 
d
e
s
ig
n
 a
n
d
 w
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 
a
c
tu
a
lly
 d
e
liv
e
re
d
 e
x
p
o
s
e
d
. 
C
o
re
 M
A
P
S
 s
e
e
n
 a
s
 p
o
o
r 
q
u
a
lit
y
 a
n
d
 r
o
o
t 
o
f 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 
is
s
u
e
s
. 
R
e
p
e
a
te
d
 d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 
a
n
d
 r
e
p
a
ir
s
 f
o
rc
e
d
 a
ft
e
r 
s
u
p
p
o
s
e
d
 g
o
-l
iv
e
 o
f 
IO
C
. 
T
e
s
ti
n
g
 a
s
 p
ro
b
le
m
 –
 d
o
u
b
ts
 
o
v
e
r 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 o
r 
T
e
s
tC
o
. 
A
tt
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
b
la
m
e
. 
P
e
rc
e
iv
e
d
 w
e
a
k
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
f 
p
ro
je
c
t 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
n
d
 o
f 
d
e
liv
e
ry
. 
C
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
n
o
t 
p
ro
je
c
t 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t.
 C
o
n
tr
a
c
to
rs
 
le
ft
 t
o
 f
ig
h
t 
it
 o
u
t.
 
F
lo
w
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 v
ia
 l
o
n
g
 c
h
a
in
 
s
e
e
n
 a
s
 c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 
p
ro
b
le
m
. 
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 
L
im
it
e
d
 t
im
e
 i
n
 f
o
rm
a
l 
p
la
n
 
fo
r 
re
w
o
rk
 –
 g
a
p
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
fi
n
a
lis
e
d
 d
e
s
ig
n
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 c
o
u
ld
 n
o
t 
b
e
 
c
lo
s
e
d
. 
D
e
s
ig
n
 w
a
s
 b
e
in
g
 
fi
n
a
lis
e
d
 b
y
 n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
. 
S
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
b
u
g
s
 a
n
d
 
d
e
fi
c
ie
n
c
ie
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
d
 w
it
h
in
 
c
o
re
 C
O
T
S
 s
o
ft
w
a
re
 
p
re
v
io
u
s
ly
 i
m
p
le
m
e
n
te
d
 i
n
 
in
c
u
m
b
e
n
t.
 L
o
s
s
 o
f 
c
o
n
fi
d
e
n
c
e
 a
t 
H
R
M
D
e
p
t.
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 e
rr
o
rs
 f
o
rc
e
d
 r
e
- 
te
s
ti
n
g
 &
 i
d
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
 m
a
n
y
 
e
rr
o
rs
. 
R
e
p
a
ir
in
g
 j
u
s
t 
to
 
p
ro
b
le
m
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
s
 a
s
 
p
ra
c
ti
c
e
 a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
. 
U
C
 
e
m
e
rg
e
s
 a
s
 t
e
s
t 
b
lo
c
k
in
g
. 
E
m
p
h
a
s
is
 o
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
f 
e
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
. 
S
tr
ic
te
r 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
a
n
d
 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 
a
s
 p
ro
b
le
m
s
 e
m
e
rg
e
. 
C
u
re
 
p
la
n
s
 e
n
te
r 
v
o
c
a
b
u
la
ry
. 
U
s
e
 o
f 
re
p
o
rt
s
 b
y
 S
I 
to
 
m
o
n
it
o
r 
p
ro
g
re
s
s
 a
n
d
 r
e
p
o
rt
 
b
a
c
k
 b
u
t 
w
it
h
o
u
t 
in
v
o
lv
e
m
e
n
t 
in
 i
s
s
u
e
s
. 
A
lig
n
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
 t
o
 a
llo
w
 m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 b
y
 
s
u
p
p
lie
r.
 
D
e
s
ig
n
in
g
 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 e
rr
o
rs
 i
n
 u
s
e
 
c
a
s
e
 m
e
th
o
d
 a
n
d
 a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
. 
Q
u
a
lit
y
 o
f 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 
lo
w
 a
n
d
 i
n
 e
rr
o
r 
–
 r
e
w
o
rk
 
n
e
e
d
e
d
. 
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
 f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
 f
ro
m
 
u
s
e
rs
 o
n
 t
e
s
ti
n
g
 p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 
a
n
d
 e
rr
o
rs
. 
F
a
ilu
re
s
 o
f 
in
s
ta
ll 
s
c
ri
p
ts
 a
n
d
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
. 
R
e
c
o
v
e
ry
 p
la
n
s
 d
e
m
a
n
d
e
d
 
b
y
 S
I.
 
A
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
o
n
 a
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 
to
o
l 
fo
r 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
tr
a
c
k
in
g
 
a
n
d
 b
u
g
 r
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 a
n
d
 
re
s
o
lu
ti
o
n
. 
F
ir
s
t 
in
tr
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
w
a
iv
e
rs
 t
o
 r
e
d
u
c
e
 s
c
o
p
e
 
o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
. 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 t
ra
c
e
a
b
ili
ty
 
m
a
tr
ix
 a
s
 c
o
re
 i
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g
 
d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t.
 
D
e
v
e
lo
p
e
r 
te
s
te
r 
ro
le
 a
n
d
 
in
te
ra
c
ti
o
n
 c
la
ri
fi
e
d
. 
E
m
p
h
a
s
is
 o
n
 r
e
p
o
rt
in
g
 b
a
c
k
 
a
c
c
u
ra
te
ly
 a
n
d
 v
ia
 c
o
rr
e
c
t 
c
h
a
n
n
e
ls
. 
F
o
rm
a
l 
p
ro
je
c
t 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
u
s
in
g
 m
in
u
te
’s
 
re
p
o
rt
s
 a
n
d
 s
c
h
e
d
u
le
. 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
v
a
li
d
a
ti
o
n
 
N
o
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 i
n
 d
e
s
ig
n
 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 d
e
m
a
n
d
e
d
 b
y
 t
h
e
 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
t.
 N
o
 e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
 w
it
h
 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
 o
n
 u
s
e
r/
 s
u
p
p
lie
r 
s
id
e
. 
H
u
n
d
re
d
s
 o
f 
d
e
fi
c
ie
n
c
ie
s
 i
d
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
 i
n
 
re
v
ie
w
. 
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 i
te
m
s
 f
o
r 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l/
 n
o
n
-f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 w
e
re
 l
is
te
d
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
te
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 S
O
W
 
a
tt
a
c
h
e
d
 t
o
 t
h
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
–
 
a
n
d
 w
a
s
 a
 c
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
re
fe
re
n
c
e
. 
C
re
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
 p
la
n
s
 a
n
d
 
tr
a
n
s
p
a
re
n
t 
p
ro
c
e
d
u
re
s
 f
o
r 
b
a
s
e
d
 o
n
 d
e
s
ig
n
 u
s
e
 c
a
s
e
s
 
w
e
re
 s
p
e
c
if
ie
d
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
t.
 D
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
 o
n
 
w
h
e
th
e
r 
C
O
T
S
 f
u
n
c
ti
o
n
s
 
s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 t
e
s
te
d
. 
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
p
ro
je
c
t 
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 –
 r
e
le
a
s
e
s
 v
ia
 
S
I.
 C
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g
 m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
 a
n
d
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 –
 f
a
c
e
 t
o
 f
a
c
e
 
a
llo
w
e
d
 b
u
t 
w
it
h
 c
a
v
e
a
ts
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 
F
o
c
u
s
 o
n
 t
e
a
m
 a
lig
n
m
e
n
t 
fo
r 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
 a
n
d
 r
e
g
u
la
r 
m
ile
s
to
n
e
 d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
. 
S
c
h
e
d
u
le
 o
f 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
 a
n
d
 
a
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 e
n
fo
rc
e
d
 a
s
 
m
a
n
d
a
to
ry
. 
A
n
te
c
e
d
e
n
ts
 A
R
M
S
 
(f
ro
m
 b
id
 t
o
 s
ta
rt
) 
D
e
s
ig
n
 m
e
th
o
d
 a
n
d
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e
 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 w
a
s
 s
p
e
c
if
ie
d
 i
n
 
th
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
a
n
d
 w
a
s
 a
t 
v
a
ri
a
n
c
e
 w
it
h
 a
ll 
e
a
rl
ie
r 
e
x
p
e
ri
e
n
c
e
. 
C
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
s
o
ft
w
a
re
 
h
is
to
ri
c
a
lly
 h
a
d
 b
e
e
n
 b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 l
im
it
e
d
 b
ro
a
d
 i
d
e
a
s
 
in
te
rp
re
te
d
 b
y
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 
th
e
n
 r
e
fi
n
e
d
 j
o
in
tl
y
. 
T
e
s
ti
n
g
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 h
a
d
 b
e
e
n
 
e
m
b
ry
o
n
ic
 a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
s
is
te
d
 o
f 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
te
s
ti
n
g
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
fo
rm
a
l 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
n
d
 w
a
s
 
in
a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 f
o
r 
H
R
M
S
y
s
. 
H
is
to
ri
c
a
l 
d
y
a
d
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 a
n
d
 H
R
M
D
e
p
t 
re
p
la
c
e
d
 b
y
 a
 c
o
n
s
o
rt
iu
m
 
a
n
d
 e
x
te
n
d
e
d
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
ti
o
n
 c
h
a
in
. 
R
o
le
 o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 w
it
h
in
 
g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 a
s
 s
u
b
-
c
o
n
tr
a
c
to
r 
in
v
is
ib
le
 a
n
d
 
re
m
o
te
 f
ro
m
 b
u
y
e
r.
 
D
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 v
ia
 S
I 
a
ft
e
r 
te
s
t 
b
y
 
T
e
s
tC
o
. 
 
Codifying and 
writing down 
business need 
Configuration 
and creation of 
software 
Testing and 
accepting 
Controlling the 
engagement 
Planning and 
coordinating 
delivery 
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 Enforcing and 
policing rules 
Controlling 
decisions 
Controlling 
resources 
Conflict and 
blame 
Negotiating 
C
o
m
m
o
n
 T
h
e
m
e
s
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
re
d
u
n
d
a
n
t 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
, 
in
a
b
ili
ty
 t
o
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 d
ir
e
c
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 f
o
c
u
s
 
o
n
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
tu
a
l 
a
n
d
 t
im
e
lin
e
 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 n
o
t 
o
n
 
c
a
u
s
a
l 
fa
c
to
rs
 o
f 
d
e
la
y
 a
n
d
 
p
ro
b
le
m
s
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
a
llo
w
e
d
 t
o
p
ic
s
, 
e
x
c
lu
s
io
n
 a
n
d
 
p
o
o
r 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 s
h
a
ri
n
g
, 
a
n
d
 u
s
in
g
 i
n
fo
rm
a
l 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 t
o
 
e
n
a
b
le
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
c
e
. 
D
is
c
o
n
n
e
c
te
d
, 
u
n
d
e
r 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
d
 s
tr
u
c
tu
re
 t
h
a
t 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t 
re
a
d
y
 f
o
r 
th
e
 t
a
s
k
. 
F
a
ilu
re
 i
n
 c
o
o
rd
in
a
ti
o
n
, 
w
it
h
h
o
ld
in
g
 i
n
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
p
a
s
s
iv
e
 a
tt
e
n
ti
o
n
 t
o
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
 
p
la
n
n
in
g
. 
L
a
te
n
t 
c
o
n
fl
ic
t 
a
t 
th
e
 h
e
a
rt
 o
f 
th
e
 p
ro
je
c
t.
 R
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
re
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 a
n
d
 s
h
o
rt
 o
f 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
. 
M
is
m
a
tc
h
 n
ic
h
e
 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
o
f 
b
e
s
p
o
k
e
 s
o
ft
w
a
re
 
a
n
d
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
fo
r 
a
 f
o
rm
a
l 
C
O
T
S
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
. 
C
o
n
ta
in
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
d
e
m
a
n
d
s
, 
c
lo
s
in
g
 g
a
p
s
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
d
e
liv
e
ri
e
s
 a
n
d
 w
h
a
t 
is
 
a
c
c
e
p
ta
b
le
 t
o
 t
h
e
 b
u
y
e
rs
. 
In
d
u
c
e
m
e
n
ts
, 
p
ro
m
is
e
s
 a
n
d
 
a
p
p
e
a
ls
 t
o
 t
h
e
 p
a
s
t 
to
 e
n
a
b
le
 
a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
. 
P
o
s
t 
IO
C
 a
n
d
 e
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 
C
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 r
e
w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 
te
s
ti
n
g
 t
o
 c
u
re
 a
ll 
b
u
g
s
. 
R
e
je
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 r
e
w
o
rk
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
V
a
lu
e
 a
n
d
 w
o
rt
h
 o
f 
p
a
rt
ie
s
 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
e
d
 t
o
 e
lim
in
a
te
 o
r 
re
a
s
s
ig
n
 f
ro
m
 n
e
x
t 
s
ta
g
e
s
. 
G
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 m
o
d
e
s
 o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
 r
e
b
a
la
n
c
e
d
 i
n
 f
a
v
o
u
r 
o
f 
in
c
u
m
b
e
n
ts
. 
P
o
o
r 
o
r 
n
o
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
tr
a
n
s
fe
r 
w
it
h
 f
ra
g
m
e
n
te
d
 
te
a
m
 s
tr
u
c
tu
re
. 
Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
in
g
 
o
f 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 c
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
e
 
o
f 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
. 
G
a
n
g
in
g
 u
p
 a
n
d
 b
la
m
in
g
 d
u
e
 
to
 l
a
c
k
 o
f 
e
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 
fa
ilu
re
 t
o
 a
c
q
u
ir
e
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 
- 
s
te
p
p
in
g
 b
a
c
k
 a
n
d
 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
. 
A
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
liq
u
id
a
te
d
 d
a
m
a
g
e
s
. 
N
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 i
n
c
lu
s
io
n
 o
f 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 a
t 
n
o
 c
o
s
t 
b
y
 
w
it
h
h
o
ld
in
g
 c
o
n
s
e
n
t.
 U
s
in
g
 
a
b
ili
ty
 t
o
 b
lo
c
k
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 t
o
 
e
x
tr
a
c
t 
c
o
n
c
e
s
s
io
n
s
 f
ro
m
 
s
u
p
p
lie
rs
. 
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 
R
e
je
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 
re
w
o
rk
 w
it
h
 t
h
re
a
ts
 o
f 
d
is
c
ip
lin
e
 f
o
r 
d
e
la
y
s
. 
G
o
o
d
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
p
o
o
r 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
. 
In
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 b
y
 d
ir
e
c
t 
c
o
n
ta
c
t 
to
 
a
c
h
ie
v
e
 l
e
n
ie
n
c
y
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 
O
ff
e
ri
n
g
 'f
a
v
o
u
rs
' 
a
n
d
 
c
u
rr
e
n
c
ie
s
 t
o
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
d
e
c
is
io
n
-m
a
k
in
g
. 
F
o
rc
in
g
 
d
e
c
is
io
n
 b
y
 g
iv
in
g
 a
n
d
 
w
it
h
h
o
ld
in
g
 c
o
n
s
e
n
t.
 
In
a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
, 
g
a
p
s
 
in
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
 a
n
d
 a
tt
e
m
p
ts
 t
o
 
re
s
tr
ic
t 
te
c
h
n
ic
a
l 
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
 b
y
 
re
c
o
u
rs
e
 t
o
 b
la
m
e
. 
D
e
la
y
s
 i
n
 
s
h
a
ri
n
g
 k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
. 
S
e
tt
lin
g
 o
f 
o
ld
 s
c
o
re
s
 a
n
d
 
re
v
e
n
g
e
 f
o
r 
fa
ile
d
 p
a
s
t 
p
ro
m
is
e
s
. 
A
m
b
u
s
h
e
s
 
fr
a
c
tu
ri
n
g
 p
a
s
t 
h
is
to
ry
. 
A
tt
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
b
la
m
e
 t
o
 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
 f
o
r 
te
s
t 
fa
ili
n
g
s
. 
N
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 w
a
iv
e
rs
 a
n
d
 t
h
e
 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g
 d
e
m
a
n
d
s
, 
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
s
 w
it
h
 a
tt
e
m
p
ts
 t
o
 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
s
c
o
p
e
 a
n
d
 r
ig
o
u
r 
o
f 
te
s
ti
n
g
. 
D
e
s
ig
n
in
g
 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
d
e
s
ig
n
 r
u
le
s
 
a
n
d
 d
e
liv
e
ry
 o
f 
d
e
s
ig
n
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
. 
R
e
je
c
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
o
u
s
 r
e
w
o
rk
 -
m
ic
ro
 f
o
c
u
s
 o
n
 c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g
 d
e
c
is
io
n
s
 a
n
d
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 c
o
n
g
ru
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 
o
w
n
 o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
 a
n
d
 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
. 
C
h
a
lle
n
g
in
g
 
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 w
o
rt
h
 o
f 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
p
a
rt
n
e
rs
 w
h
e
n
 
a
d
v
e
rs
e
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
s
. 
P
o
o
r 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 s
h
a
ri
n
g
 i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 
c
a
p
a
c
it
y
, 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
 
e
m
e
rg
in
g
. 
O
p
e
n
 c
o
n
fl
ic
t 
o
v
e
r 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 
a
n
d
 d
e
la
y
s
 w
it
h
 t
h
re
a
ts
 o
f 
liq
u
id
a
te
d
 d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 i
n
 
b
a
c
k
g
ro
u
n
d
. 
A
tt
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
 o
f 
b
la
m
e
 t
o
 p
a
rt
n
e
rs
. 
A
g
re
e
in
g
 c
o
m
m
o
n
 t
o
o
ls
 a
n
d
 
a
p
p
ro
a
c
h
e
s
. 
G
e
tt
in
g
 c
lo
s
e
 t
o
 
b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 t
o
 s
h
a
p
e
 t
h
e
 
d
ir
e
c
ti
o
n
. 
N
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 r
u
le
s
, 
lim
it
s
 a
n
d
 e
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 t
ra
n
s
fe
r.
 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
v
a
li
d
a
ti
o
n
 
E
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
te
d
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
s
e
ri
a
ls
, 
d
o
c
s
 
a
n
d
 p
la
n
s
. 
R
ig
id
it
y
 o
n
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 w
it
h
 m
ic
ro
 f
o
c
u
s
 o
n
 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
. 
E
x
c
lu
d
in
g
 p
a
rt
ie
s
 f
ro
m
 
d
e
c
is
io
n
-m
a
k
in
g
, 
re
s
tr
ic
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 b
y
 f
o
rm
a
l 
p
ro
je
c
t 
h
ie
ra
rc
h
y
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
lli
n
g
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 a
llo
w
e
d
 
d
is
c
u
s
s
io
n
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 p
a
rt
ie
s
. 
P
o
o
r 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 a
n
d
 
re
s
o
u
rc
e
 s
h
a
ri
n
g
 d
e
n
y
in
g
 
h
e
lp
 a
n
d
 f
a
ilu
re
 t
o
 e
n
a
b
le
 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
 t
ra
n
s
fe
r.
 L
im
it
e
d
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 a
llo
w
e
d
 t
o
 s
u
b
je
c
t 
m
a
tt
e
r 
e
x
p
e
rt
s
. 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
b
e
tw
e
e
n
 a
d
 h
o
c
 
v
e
rs
u
s
 f
o
rm
a
l 
c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 f
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
s
c
o
p
e
 
a
n
d
 p
la
n
n
in
g
 d
u
e
 t
o
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 
in
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
re
s
is
te
d
. 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
o
v
e
r 
b
u
d
g
e
ts
 a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
. 
N
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 s
c
a
le
 o
f 
th
e
 t
a
s
k
 
a
tt
e
m
p
ti
n
g
 t
o
 m
a
tc
h
 t
o
 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
. 
N
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
n
g
 
a
w
a
y
 o
r 
d
e
la
y
in
g
 p
ro
b
le
m
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
. 
M
in
im
is
in
g
 
IO
C
 t
o
 m
a
tc
h
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ty
. 
A
n
te
c
e
d
e
n
ts
 A
R
M
S
 
(f
ro
m
 b
id
 t
o
 s
ta
rt
) 
C
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 t
o
 g
o
v
e
rn
a
n
c
e
 
ru
le
s
, 
ti
m
e
lin
e
s
 a
n
d
 
fu
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
n
e
e
d
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
d
 a
s
 
p
re
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 o
f 
e
n
tr
y
. 
F
a
v
o
u
ri
n
g
 i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
b
y
 w
it
h
h
o
ld
in
g
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 f
a
c
ili
ta
ti
n
g
 
re
q
u
ir
e
d
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
. 
S
u
p
p
lie
rs
 
d
is
g
u
is
in
g
 l
a
c
k
 o
f 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 
fi
e
ld
in
g
 n
o
n
-c
o
m
p
lia
n
c
e
 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
. 
A
s
s
u
m
in
g
 c
o
n
ti
n
u
it
y
 o
f 
c
u
rr
e
n
t 
w
a
y
s
 o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
, 
u
n
d
e
re
s
ti
m
a
ti
n
g
 s
c
a
le
 o
f 
n
e
w
 
ta
s
k
 a
n
d
 a
s
s
ig
n
in
g
 
in
a
d
e
q
u
a
te
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
s
 a
n
d
 
c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
. 
A
s
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
O
T
S
 a
t 
b
id
 
v
e
rs
u
s
 h
is
to
ry
 o
f 
b
e
s
p
o
k
e
 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t.
 P
o
o
r 
s
o
ft
w
a
re
 
a
n
d
 s
e
rv
ic
e
 h
is
to
ry
 w
it
h
 
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
 p
ro
b
le
m
s
. 
L
a
te
n
t 
c
o
n
fl
ic
t 
a
ri
s
in
g
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 
g
o
a
ls
 a
n
d
 c
a
p
a
b
ili
ti
e
s
. 
H
is
to
ry
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
l 
n
e
g
o
ti
a
ti
o
n
 w
it
h
 n
o
 f
o
rm
a
l 
s
e
rv
ic
e
 l
e
v
e
l 
a
g
re
e
m
e
n
t 
o
r 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
ti
n
g
. 
S
y
s
te
m
 
in
te
g
ra
to
r 
s
u
b
m
it
s
 l
o
w
 
c
o
m
p
lia
n
t 
b
id
 t
o
 f
u
rt
h
e
r 
o
w
n
 
o
b
je
c
ti
v
e
s
. 
 
Enforcing and 
policing rules 
Controlling 
decisions 
Controlling 
resources 
Conflict and 
blame 
Negotiating 
Appendix J–  Power evolution over t ime  Page | 277 
C o n f i d e n t i a l  
Continued… 
 
 
 Relational 
influence 
Symbolic 
Power 
Structural 
Power 
  
C
o
m
m
o
n
 T
h
e
m
e
s
 
T
h
e
 o
ld
 i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
p
la
y
e
rs
 
u
s
e
 s
o
c
ia
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
s
 a
n
d
 
re
la
ti
o
n
a
l 
in
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 t
o
 d
ir
e
c
t 
a
n
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
e
a
c
h
 o
th
e
r'
s
' 
b
e
h
a
v
io
u
r.
 P
a
s
s
iv
e
 r
o
le
 o
f 
s
p
o
n
s
o
r 
b
ro
k
e
 l
in
k
 w
it
h
 
p
a
s
t.
 
O
n
e
 w
a
y
 s
a
n
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
d
is
c
ip
lin
e
 f
ro
m
 c
lie
n
t 
to
 
s
u
p
p
lie
r 
- 
le
g
it
im
a
c
y
 o
f 
s
a
n
c
ti
o
n
. 
S
e
lf
-d
is
c
ip
lin
e
 o
f 
liq
u
id
a
te
d
 d
a
m
a
g
e
s
. 
M
o
v
e
 o
f 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 
in
fo
rm
a
l 
d
e
p
a
rt
m
e
n
ta
l 
to
 
fo
rm
a
l 
s
y
s
te
m
 c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
. 
In
c
o
n
s
is
te
n
t 
w
it
h
 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
’s
 o
ri
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
a
n
d
 e
n
g
e
n
d
e
rs
 r
e
s
is
ta
n
c
e
. 
  
P
o
s
t 
IO
C
 a
n
d
 e
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 
P
ri
o
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 s
e
e
n
 a
s
 
d
o
u
b
le
-e
d
g
e
d
 s
w
o
rd
. 
S
te
p
p
in
g
 b
a
c
k
 o
f 
s
p
o
n
s
o
r 
a
n
d
 p
a
s
s
iv
e
 e
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
e
n
a
b
le
d
 h
o
s
ti
le
 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t.
 
D
im
in
is
h
in
g
 i
m
p
o
rt
a
n
c
e
 o
f 
p
ri
o
r 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 w
it
h
o
u
t 
s
p
o
n
s
o
r 
re
s
ta
ti
n
g
 t
h
e
 l
in
k
 t
o
 
th
e
 p
a
s
t.
 
S
o
m
e
 r
e
s
is
ta
n
c
e
 b
u
t 
a
d
o
p
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 e
n
tr
e
n
c
h
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
n
e
w
 i
n
s
ti
tu
ti
o
n
a
l 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
e
s
 a
t 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
. 
E
s
p
e
c
ia
lly
 a
ro
u
n
d
 f
o
rm
a
lit
y
 
o
f 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t.
 
  
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 
D
ir
e
c
t 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
 t
o
 i
n
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 
a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 o
v
e
rc
o
m
e
 
o
b
s
ta
c
le
s
. 
P
a
s
s
iv
e
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
s
p
o
n
s
o
r 
m
a
in
ta
in
s
 c
o
n
fl
ic
tu
a
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
 d
u
ri
n
g
 a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
. 
N
o
s
ta
lg
ia
, 
h
u
rt
 a
n
d
 d
a
m
a
g
e
 
a
s
 H
R
M
D
e
p
t 
m
o
v
e
 o
u
ts
id
e
 
p
re
v
io
u
s
 w
a
y
s
 o
f 
w
o
rk
in
g
. 
L
e
g
it
im
a
c
y
 o
f 
ri
g
h
t 
o
f 
a
c
c
e
p
ta
n
c
e
 u
n
q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
e
d
 -
 
u
s
e
 o
f 
'v
it
a
l' 
a
s
 s
y
m
b
o
l 
o
f 
re
je
c
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 
S
tr
ic
t 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
ru
le
s
 
a
n
d
 r
e
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
 f
o
r 
te
s
ti
n
g
 
a
n
d
 d
o
c
u
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 o
f 
a
rt
e
fa
c
ts
. 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 a
n
d
 
lim
it
s
 s
u
p
p
lie
r’
s
 d
e
g
re
e
 o
f 
fr
e
e
d
o
m
. 
  
D
e
s
ig
n
in
g
 
c
o
n
fi
g
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
D
ir
e
c
t 
w
o
rk
in
g
 g
ro
u
p
 t
o
 
e
x
p
lo
it
 r
e
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 a
n
d
 
s
h
a
p
e
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
d
e
s
ig
n
 
c
o
n
g
ru
e
n
t 
w
it
h
 t
h
e
 
in
c
u
m
b
e
n
t.
 
R
o
le
 o
f 
ti
m
e
 a
n
d
 f
o
rm
a
l 
p
ro
je
c
t 
p
la
n
n
in
g
 o
v
e
rr
id
in
g
 
th
a
t 
o
f 
g
o
a
ls
 -
liq
u
id
a
te
d
 
d
a
m
a
g
e
s
 a
s
 t
o
o
l 
o
f 
d
is
c
ip
lin
e
. 
S
y
m
b
o
lic
 s
ta
tu
s
 
a
n
d
 l
e
g
it
im
a
c
y
 o
f 
th
e
 
c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
a
n
d
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
w
o
rk
. 
M
a
n
d
a
te
d
 d
e
s
ig
n
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 
ru
le
s
 o
p
e
n
 u
p
 d
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t 
to
 s
c
ru
ti
n
y
 a
n
d
 r
e
v
ie
w
. 
In
c
re
a
s
e
d
 s
u
rv
e
ill
a
n
c
e
 a
n
d
 
c
o
n
tr
o
l.
 
  
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
v
a
li
d
a
ti
o
n
 
S
o
c
ia
lis
a
ti
o
n
 t
o
 i
m
p
ro
v
e
 
ti
g
h
te
r 
lin
k
a
g
e
 a
n
d
 e
x
p
lo
it
 
p
a
s
t 
re
la
ti
o
n
. 
P
a
ra
lle
l 
p
ro
je
c
ts
 m
a
in
ta
in
 t
a
c
it
 l
in
k
s
 
a
n
d
 e
n
a
b
le
d
 b
a
c
k
d
o
o
r 
in
fl
u
e
n
c
e
. 
D
ir
e
c
t 
m
e
e
ti
n
g
s
. 
C
o
n
tr
a
c
to
r 
a
s
 s
e
rv
a
n
t 
a
n
d
 
b
u
y
e
r 
a
s
 m
a
s
te
r.
 S
tr
o
n
g
 
in
fl
u
e
n
c
e
 o
f 
fo
rm
a
l 
p
ro
je
c
t 
h
ie
ra
rc
h
y
 -
 s
u
b
o
rd
in
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 'b
e
h
in
d
' 
5
1
. 
S
y
m
b
o
lic
 s
ta
tu
s
 a
n
d
 
le
g
it
im
a
c
y
 o
f 
th
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
a
n
d
 s
ta
te
m
e
n
t 
o
f 
w
o
rk
. 
E
n
a
c
tm
e
n
t 
o
f 
s
ta
n
d
a
rd
 
u
n
c
h
a
lle
n
g
e
a
b
le
 r
u
le
s
 a
n
d
 
re
g
u
la
ti
o
n
s
 f
o
r 
th
e
 c
re
a
ti
o
n
 
o
f 
a
rt
e
fa
c
ts
 s
h
if
ts
 b
a
la
n
c
e
 
fr
o
m
 P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
 t
o
 o
th
e
rs
 
b
y
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
 o
f 
c
o
d
if
ic
a
ti
o
n
 o
f 
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
. 
  
A
n
te
c
e
d
e
n
ts
 A
R
M
S
 
(f
ro
m
 b
id
 t
o
 s
ta
rt
) 
In
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
h
is
to
ri
c
a
l 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
 
fa
v
o
u
re
d
. 
R
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 
u
s
e
d
 w
it
h
 i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
a
p
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
 a
s
 r
e
fe
re
n
c
e
 
s
h
a
p
in
g
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
p
ro
je
c
t.
 
M
y
th
s
 o
f 
p
a
s
t 
a
b
o
u
t 
th
e
 
s
o
u
rc
e
 o
f 
th
e
 i
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t 
a
n
d
 t
h
e
 o
ri
g
in
 o
f 
th
e
 
re
la
ti
o
n
s
h
ip
s
. 
C
h
a
n
g
in
g
 
ro
le
s
 i
n
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t,
 t
h
e
 
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 o
f 
th
e
 c
lie
n
t,
 t
h
e
 
o
w
n
e
rs
h
ip
 o
f 
th
e
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t.
 
L
a
c
k
 o
f 
s
p
e
c
if
ic
 s
tr
u
c
tu
ra
l 
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
s
ti
c
 o
f 
c
o
lla
b
o
ra
ti
v
e
 a
d
 h
o
c
 
p
ro
c
e
s
s
. 
  
 
Relational 
influence 
Symbolic 
power 
Structural 
power 
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A
P
M
S
 A
c
to
rs
In
it
ia
ls
 
R
e
sp
o
n
d
e
n
t
A
g
e
 R
a
n
g
e
B
e
h
a
v
io
u
r 
a
n
d
 
A
tt
it
u
d
e
G
e
n
d
e
r
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
P
o
w
e
r-
In
fl
u
e
n
c
e
P
ri
m
a
ry
 O
b
je
c
ti
v
e
 f
o
r 
P
ro
je
c
t
P
ro
je
c
t 
R
o
le
R
o
le
 o
f 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
 
P
ro
je
c
t
A
a
m
e
r 
M
o
g
h
a
l
A
M
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
U
n
c
le
a
r
T
e
c
h
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
d
ri
a
n
 C
o
le
A
C
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
U
n
c
le
a
r
T
e
c
h
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
d
ri
a
n
 P
lu
m
p
to
n
A
P
2
1
 -
 3
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
Ju
s
t 
a
 J
o
b
C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
m
e
d
ic
k
, 
F
ra
n
k
F
A
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
A
m
b
iv
a
le
n
t
M
a
le
S
y
s
te
m
 I
n
te
g
ra
to
rH
ig
h
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
o
b
je
c
ti
ve
s
S
a
le
s
S
y
s
te
m
 I
n
te
g
ra
to
r
A
m
m
a
s
s
a
ri
 S
a
n
d
ro
A
S
A
N
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
C
o
lla
b
o
ra
ti
ve
M
a
le
A
g
e
n
c
y
M
e
d
iu
m
T
im
e
lin
e
 m
e
t
P
ro
je
c
t 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
 C
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
n
d
re
w
 S
c
o
tt
A
S
2
1
 -
 3
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
n
d
re
w
 T
a
y
lo
r
A
T
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
H
R
M
D
e
p
t
M
e
d
iu
m
F
u
n
c
ti
o
n
a
l 
e
x
p
e
c
ta
ti
o
n
s
S
M
E
U
s
e
r 
O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
A
n
d
y
 E
c
c
le
s
A
E
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
Ju
s
t 
a
 J
o
b
C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
n
g
e
lla
 R
o
s
e
A
R
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
F
e
m
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
H
ig
h
C
lie
n
t 
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
ti
o
n
B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
A
n
ja
 d
e
 B
o
o
m
A
D
B
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
F
e
m
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
C
lie
n
t 
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
ti
o
n
T
e
c
h
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
B
o
rm
a
n
d
 F
lo
ri
e
n
B
F
L
O
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
S
o
m
e
ti
m
e
s
 c
o
n
fli
c
tu
a
l
M
a
le
A
g
e
n
c
y
H
ig
h
S
a
ti
s
fie
s
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t
P
ro
je
c
t 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
e
n
c
y
 C
o
n
tr
a
c
t 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
C
h
a
rl
ie
 M
u
n
ro
C
M
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
D
is
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 o
r 
p
a
s
s
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
l
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
C
h
ri
s
 F
a
rn
a
th
C
F
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
D
is
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 o
r 
p
a
s
s
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
l
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
C
io
b
a
n
u
, 
C
ip
ri
a
n
C
C
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
M
e
d
iu
m
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
C
liv
e
 J
e
c
k
s
C
J
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
D
is
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 o
r 
p
a
s
s
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
M
e
d
iu
m
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
o
b
je
c
ti
ve
s
S
a
le
s
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
C
o
d
a
rc
e
a
 C
ri
s
ti
a
n
-M
ir
c
e
a
C
C
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
U
n
c
le
a
r
T
e
c
h
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
C
o
m
a
n
, 
C
a
lin
C
A
L
IN
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
H
ig
h
Q
u
a
lit
y
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
D
a
n
ie
l 
M
a
rc
k
D
M
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
D
a
rr
e
n
 W
e
s
t
D
W
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
A
m
b
iv
a
le
n
t
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
M
e
d
iu
m
D
e
liv
e
ry
 s
o
ft
w
a
re
T
e
c
h
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
D
a
vi
d
 M
o
lle
r
D
M
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
A
m
b
iv
a
le
n
t
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
M
e
d
iu
m
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
D
e
ve
lo
p
m
e
n
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
E
m
m
a
 W
ill
ia
m
s
o
n
E
W
2
1
 -
 3
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
F
e
m
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
O
ffi
c
e
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
F
a
b
ri
z
io
 P
O
D
R
E
C
C
A
F
P
O
D
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
H
o
s
ti
le
M
a
le
A
g
e
n
c
y
H
ig
h
C
o
n
tr
o
l
T
e
c
h
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
A
g
e
n
c
y
 I
S
F
a
tt
a
h
 N
u
ri
F
N
U
n
k
n
o
w
n
U
n
c
le
a
r
F
e
m
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
o
b
je
c
ti
ve
s
O
ffi
c
e
 S
u
p
p
o
rt
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
G
ra
h
a
m
e
 R
o
y
le
G
R
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
H
ig
h
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
o
b
je
c
ti
ve
s
S
e
n
io
r 
M
a
n
a
g
e
r 
D
ir
e
c
to
r
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
G
ri
g
o
ru
t,
 C
la
u
d
iu
-P
a
u
l
C
G
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
U
n
c
le
a
r
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
H
e
n
ry
 H
o
u
le
H
H
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
S
e
rv
ic
e
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
H
u
g
h
 T
o
le
r
H
T
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
S
a
le
s
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
Ia
in
 B
is
h
o
p
IB
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
A
m
b
iv
a
le
n
t
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
S
a
ti
s
fie
s
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t
S
e
n
io
r 
M
a
n
a
g
e
r 
D
ir
e
c
to
r
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
Ia
n
 B
o
w
le
s
IB
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
D
is
e
n
g
a
g
e
d
 o
r 
p
a
s
s
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
o
b
je
c
ti
ve
s
S
e
n
io
r 
M
a
n
a
g
e
r 
D
ir
e
c
to
r
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
Ju
lia
n
 G
o
o
d
ri
d
g
e
JG
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
Ju
lia
n
 M
a
rt
in
e
z
JM
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t 
A
n
a
ly
s
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
L
e
e
 C
la
rk
e
L
C
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
T
e
c
h
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
L
ic
a
, 
Io
n
u
t 
D
a
n
ie
l
D
L
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
L
lo
y
d
 B
a
rn
e
s
L
B
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
P
e
rs
o
n
S
o
ft
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
T
e
c
h
 C
o
n
s
u
lt
a
n
t
S
o
ft
w
a
re
 D
e
ve
lo
p
e
r
L
u
c
a
s
, 
P
a
tr
ic
k
P
L
5
1
 -
 6
0
 Y
e
a
rs
P
o
s
it
iv
e
M
a
le
S
y
s
te
m
 I
n
te
g
ra
to
rH
ig
h
S
a
ti
s
fie
s
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
t
P
ro
je
c
t 
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
S
y
s
te
m
 I
n
te
g
ra
to
r
M
a
rc
k
, 
D
a
n
ie
l
D
M
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
a
rs
U
n
c
le
a
r
M
a
le
T
e
s
tC
o
L
o
w
N
o
t 
A
p
p
lic
a
b
le
Q
A
 T
e
s
t
T
e
s
t 
a
n
d
 T
ra
in
in
g
 O
rg
a
n
is
a
ti
o
n
M
a
ri
n
a
 R
o
b
e
rt
s
o
n
M
R
3
1
 -
 4
0
 Y
e
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Appendix M – Process model of change 
The process model of change is based on combining two early research approaches 
linking the influence of strategy on control and processes (Miles et al., 1978) and the 
influence of processes on climate (Lawler et al., 1974). This creates a chain of causality 
between the three dimensions and forms the basis of an argument that the three 
factors interact to constrain the change processes. It was in this way that it was used in 
the seminal work carried out in schools by (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  The change to 
a goal state control from an initial position is illustrated in Figure M-1 by the transition 
from position (A) to (B), where the focal organisation’s original way of working is 
eroded and replaced by a new one, for example, by a stricter contracted regime. The 
transition from (A) to (B) is shown by the curved arrow moving via control, practice 
and climate change, and the path locus is shown as an outcome between drivers and 
constraints. The impact of a change driver, such as control, is constrained and 
mediated by factors such as resistance to the change, or by rational constraints, such 
as shortfalls in capacity. The influence of the constraining elements is to moderate the 
driver and in the concept model below this is shown as altering the overall 
transformation such that the degree of change is emergent and constrained and is 
shown as position (C) in the figure. 
Figure M-1 - Model of change transformation 
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